



Cetshwayo ka Mpande.



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“Cetshwayo desired us to urge upon the Governor of Natal to interfere to save the destruction of perhaps both countries, Zululand and the Transvaal. He requests us to state that he cannot and will not submit to be turned out of his own homes. It may be that he will be vanquished; *but as he is not the aggressor death will not be so hard to meet.*”—Official Zulu message in 1875, the 13th since 1861, about the Disputed Territory and Boer aggressions (*Parl. Papers*, C. 1748, p. 14).

“No! we do not understand it. For there has never been known one like him among us Zulus before, so good, so kind, so merciful. He never killed except for grave offences; the whole country swarms with people who owe their lives to him, and who fled to him as the merciful Prince who did not kill.”—Statement of Zulu Chiefs at Bishopstowe, May 1880.



THE
RUIN OF ZULULAND:

AN ACCOUNT OF
BRITISH DOINGS IN ZULULAND SINCE
THE INVASION OF 1879.

BY
FRANCES ELLEN COLENZO.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

BEING A SEQUEL TO
THE HISTORY OF THE ZULU WAR,
BY
FRANCES ELLEN COLENZO
AND
LIEUT.-COLONEL EDWARD DURNFORD.

VOLUME II.

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PREFACE.

THE *Saturday Review* for August 9th, 1884, criticising the first volume of my work, remarks, "Miss Colenso complains that Zibebu was assisted by white adventurers, but she cordially approves of the alliance between the King's party and the Boers;" while the *St. James' Gazette* accuses me of "Anglophobism."

I have no wish to disregard the unwritten law by which authors, as a rule, accept without reply, the criticisms of the reviewers, profiting by just and discerning rebuke, and careless of that which is manifestly mere abuse, written "to order." But when two of the leading journals of the day so entirely misinterpret the whole purpose and meaning of one's work, one may be permitted to protest.

The first volume of this book contains very little mention of the Boers at all, for the simple reason that it deals with a period during which they had nothing to do with Zululand, beyond that insidious creeping in from the north, of individual borderers on pretence of grazing and squatting, which has preceded the late—as well as all previous—Boer encroachments on native lands. But in an appendix

(written and added by a brother, who has also revised the whole work and seen it through the press) occurs a mention of "the service which a small party of Boers has rendered the cause of peace in Zululand," and upon this single phrase the *Saturday Review* rests its assertion that the writer "cordially approves of the alliance between the King's party and the Boers"!

It is true that, for the moment, the Boers did render such service to the Zulus as that mentioned by my brother, in giving the national party "the moral support which they so much needed," and in assisting them "to get rid of the firebrand which has desolated central Zululand—the European-led force . . . which has operated with Zibebu's territory as a base." But I myself should have avoided any expression which might be taken to imply even toleration of the unhappy alliance in question. I have never for a moment believed that any good could result from it; from the first I have regarded the irruption of the Boers into Zululand as the greatest of all the misfortunes which have befallen that unhappy country, and should rejoice to hear that England would insist upon their withdrawal, she giving up at the same time that share of the unlawful spoil which her representatives have forced into her unwilling hands under the title of "Reserve." The recognition by England of Dinuzulu as his father's properly appointed successor, and King over the whole of Zululand, would combine the disintegrated portions of the Zulu nation, while there can be little

doubt that the party which has admitted the Boers would not only willingly submit to their expulsion on such conditions, but would be very thankful to be relieved of the monster of their own production which has grown so much beyond their control. Even were England obliged to use force to induce the Boers to retire, she would have the satisfaction of knowing that for once in South Africa she had used it on the right side, and her soldiers would have the encouragement of feeling that, at last, they were required to fight in a good cause.

The Boer adventurers* can in justice demand payment for their services (which also, in strict justice, should be recompensed by us, and not by the unhappy Zulus), but the payment should be in cattle or money, not in land, and most certainly not in the shape of that territory of which the Transvaal has so long endeavoured to rob the Zulus—the remaining portion of that awarded to the latter by the British Commissioners in 1878, but the greater part of which Sir Garnet Wolseley arbitrarily made over to the Transvaal in 1879.

In refutation of the accusation of “Anglophobism,” I need only appeal to my preface to the first volume of this work, and to the general spirit of all that I have written.

If patriotism is to love and honour one’s own nation and fatherland above all others, to rejoice in

* The Transvaal Government has so entirely repudiated the actions of the Boers in Zululand that it could give no excuse whatever for objecting to their expulsion.

her virtues and blush for her misdeeds, and to be willing to work and suffer for her sake, then I claim to deserve the name of Englishwoman. But if it means the determination to maintain, regardless of the truth, that all she does is right, to hide and deny her faults, instead of helping to cleanse her from them, and to glory in her success when she is in the wrong, then, indeed, I am no patriot at all.

FRANCES ELLEN COLENZO.

PALMHURST, DURBAN, NATAL,
Nov. 4th, 1884.

INTRODUCTION.

UPON the 3rd of September, 1884, an event took place which obliges me to ask my readers' pardon for the form in which this work is brought to a close. Its concluding pages give little beyond a bare summary of the events which followed the installation proceedings of January 1883, and led up to Cetshwayo's death on the 8th of February, 1884. My subject, indeed, could not have been forced into two volumes with any advantage to itself, but I had been seriously warned of the difficulty of obtaining public attention for three volumes of this description, and had, therefore, meant to confine myself to two. On the day previous to the date first mentioned above, I posted to England a roll of manuscript which completed about two-thirds of the intended volume, and I then had all my materials collected and partly arranged for the remaining chapters.

The 3rd of September broke upon Bishopstowe, our home for many years, a heavy sultry day, with an intensely hot wind blowing from the north-west, so violently that none who could avoid doing so attempted to leave the house. Bishopstowe stood

upon a long sweep of hill, surrounded by other lower rises on three sides, but overtopped to the north at right angles by a higher range into which one end of its own ascends. Upwards to the north, downwards to the east and west, swept wide plantations of trees, grown by ourselves, those to the west bounded by a sluggish stream, white with lilies every autumn, across which a long low bridge with heavy weeping willows led to the steep and winding drive, bordered on either side by choice and foreign shrubs, which brought the traveller at length to my father's ever open doors. Year after year the one real danger of a country life in this our colony of Natal, the late winter grass-fires, had passed us by, warded off by the care bestowed upon the "burning-round" which is the common practice of the country, and in this winter of 1884, especial pains had been taken in this respect. The place was safe, indeed, from any ordinary chances of burning grass, but the fire that destroyed it was something remarkable in the experience of Natal. At about 3 P.M. on the day in question, September 3rd, a little herd-boy came breathless to Miss Colenso * in the house to report a great fire about a mile and a half to the north-west, leaping over the shoulder of the range of hills already described as above that on which Bishopstowe stood. In ten minutes' time, the flames, carried before the violent gale, flew down the long slope, leaping across the wide burnt belt which surrounded us on every side, tearing through the undergrowth of the long

* The writer's sister.

plantations, and throwing themselves with fury upon the house. "A regiment of soldiers could have done nothing!" said afterwards an intelligent English farmer present at the scene. The buildings, composed to a great extent of wood and thatch, were tossed up in flame like a child's cardboard house thrown upon a glowing fire, and the dense driving masses of smoke prevented any chance of saving ought from destruction except the lives of the inmates and a few cherished articles snatched from the study: our lives were spared, but little else. Less than one hour sufficed for all, and, when that had passed, the gale of wind, which had been the cause of the mischief, dropped suddenly, and a calm and lovely evening fell upon the blasted scene.

The materials for the latter portion of a detailed history of the Ruin of Zululand having been destroyed on this occasion, it is necessary to collect them again, and as this will be a labour of time, I venture to lay the finished portion of the work before the public in the shape of this volume, trusting that what must now form a supplement may gain rather than lose by the misfortune to ourselves, since time and space will thus be granted to me for the elucidation of the matter. My third volume, then, if I can accomplish one, will treat at length of the points mentioned in the concluding pages of this up to Cetshwayo's death; of the further ill-treatment of the Zulu national party by the Natal Government officials after that event, which treatment finally drove them to despair; of their desperate acceptance of help from

the Boers—the people of whose interference their late king had always entertained a wise distrust; of the advance of the Boer borderers on pretence of assisting the unhappy Zulus; of their practical seizure of the whole of the country, and of the apparently approaching realisation of the suggestion daringly made in Natal six years ago, “Why should not we and the Transvaal Boers take Zululand, and divide it between ourselves?”

CONTENTS.



CHAPTER I.

Grounds of Colonial ill-feeling against Cetshwayo, 2-7—Chief Dunn's protest endorsed by Sir Garnet Wolseley, 8-9—The General's guarantee to the Chiefs and England's to the Zulu nation, 10—The Boundary Award: a retrospect, 12-15—The Transvaal Government solicits Cetshwayo's release, 16—A noisy faction at Durban petitions against it, 18—Its meeting at Durban and disloyal language, 20—A further memorial against Cetshwayo's restoration, 22—J. Dunn threatens active resistance, 24—Further protests, 25—J. Dunn's third appeal, 27—His finances, 28—Analysis of the Natal petitions, 30—Sources of agitation against the restoration, 34—Coarse tone of Natal papers; just language of English press, 36-7.

CHAPTER II.

Cetshwayo starts for England, 38—His departure from Capetown, 39—The disgraceful condition of his Capetown prison, 40—European tastes and Zulu comforts, 42-3—The King's prison open to his foes but closed against his friends, 45—Sir Bartle Frere's excuses, 46—The Bishop's prayer for the Zulus, 47—His offer to bury the dead on field of Isandhlwana, 48-9—The Diplomatic Agency, 50—Dr. R. J. Colenso refused access to Cetshwayo, 52—Cetshwayo's surroundings and character from Colonial point of view, 55—His attitude towards the press, 56—Voyage to England, 57—Petty spite of Colonial papers, 58—Disgraceful sentiments, 59—The *World* and Cetshwayo, 60—The arrival in England, 62—Anxieties of Cetshwayo's mission, 65—Visit to Marlborough House, 66—Visit to the Queen, 67—Chagrin of Natal editors, 68—The temperance deputation, 69—The portrait for the Queen, 70—Woolwich Arsenal, 71—At the Colonial Office, 72—The conditions, 76—The King pleads for his people, 80—Cetshwayo's sense of his innocence, 81—His anxiety for his people's good, 82—Final interview at Downing Street, 83—The mutilation of Zululand, 84—Chief Dunn, 85—His antecedents and treachery to Zululand, 86—Further delays must be borne, 88—The King's promise, 89—Just intention of Home

Government, 90—Mr. W. Whiteley and the Zulu King, 91—Royal presents, 93—The King's cattle, 94—British debts, 95—England's agents in Natal, 96.

CHAPTER III.

The Great Deputation, 97—Telegrams in *Daily News* and in *Times*, 98—9—One of Mr. J. Robinson's telegrams, 100—Further telegrams in *Daily News*, 101—Persevering loyalty of Zulus, 102—Dunn's attitude reported, 103—Return of deputation and consequent proceedings, 105—Effort made by Dunn to repress Zulu loyalty, 106—His chiefs appeal to Government; their application for passes, 109—The Native Affairs Office, 110—Passes not obtainable, 111—Favour shown to Dunn, 112—The Native Affairs Office again, 113—Interference of press, 114—Right disposition of *Natal Witness*, 115—Important facts established, 116—Audience obtained at last, 117—Substance of Zulu complaints, 118—Raids of Zibebu and Hamu, 119—Resident's remarks thereon, 120—Mnyamana, the ex-Prime Minister, replies to Government message, 121—His defensive attitude, 123—Defeat of Hamu, 124—Mr. Osborn and the Great Deputation, 125—Official mis-report, 126—The Governor's ears, 129—Authorised channels of communication fail the Zulus, 133—Objects of Home Government ignored, 134—Cetshwayo's brothers misrepresented, 135—Restraint upon Zibebu, 136—Meeting of loyal Zulus and Resident, 137—Defensive attitude of national party, 138—Impis dispersed on both sides, 139—Umnyamana's representations to the Resident, 140—Cause of the country's troubles, 142—Undabuko's representations, 143—Zibebu persecutes his subjects, 144—Ndabuko slandered, 149—Forbearance of loyal Zulus, 150—Zibebu the protégé of Natal officials, 151—Threats by Zibebu, Hamu, and Dunn against petitioners for the King, 154—Zibebu's own version of his oppressive proceedings, 156—These are contradicted by palpable facts, 158—Reprisals on part of Aba Qulusi, 159—Massacre of Aba Qulusi, 160—Animus of Resident against the Princes, 162—Sir H. Bulwer and the Bishop, 163—Langalibalele, 168—The Matshana inquiry, 169—Attitude of discredited officials countenanced by Sir Garnet Wolseley, 171—Official animosity and Zulu affection, 172—Report by Mr. J. Shepstone, 174—Further accusations against the Bishop, 176—Message from Cetshwayo to his people, 178—Further insinuations of interference, 184—Self-sacrifice of Zulus its own credential, 186—Supposed emissary of the Bishop caught "red-handed," 188.

CHAPTER IV.

Report on condition of Zululand, 192—The Governor visits the border, 196—Temptation held out to the Princes, 197—Their loyalty proved, 198—A London telegram read to them, 199—Zulu accounts of inter-

view between Mnyamana and the Governor, 200—Unreasonable project for location of Princes, 202—The staunch old Prime Minister grossly libelled, 204—Undabuko's character and purposes, 206—Means of self-protection denied to Zulus, 208.

CHAPTER V.

The partition of Zululand, 209—Sir T. Shepstone's plan for location of Natal natives in Zululand, 210—Evidence of emigration from Natal into Zululand, 212—Apprenticing of Zulu emigrants in Colony, 214—Sir H. Bulwer advises partition, 215—Just basis therefor adopted by Home Government, 216—Delimitation of reserved territory not warranted by facts, 218—Position of the thirteen kinglets, 220—Disposition of people at large, 225—Territory arbitrarily severed, 226—First suggested partition; diagram of same, 227—Mr. Osborn's fatal plan, 228—Zibebu, Sir H. Bulwer's protégé, 229—An extensive reserve contrived by Natal officers, 230—Sir H. Bulwer's actual proposal for division of Zululand; diagram illustrating same, 232—Right intentions of Home Government defeated by contrivances of its local agents, 234—Boundaries finally fixed; diagram showing same, 238—Severance of Tonga tribe, 239—Dilatory proceedings of Governor, 240—Supplementary conditions, 241—A combination of enemies; a fatal appointment, 242—Plans of Home Government at mercy of hostile agents, 244—Expenses of Resident, 246—Zulu people kept in ignorance, 247—Official report as to views of principal chiefs, 248—Appointments of Sir T. Shepstone and Mr. J. Shepstone, 252—Zibebu's boundaries, 254—Alteration of King's boundary to suit Zibebu, 258.

CHAPTER VI.

Cetshwayo and the small-pox, 259—The king recklessly exposed to grave risk of infection, 260—His anxious waiting; unwarrantable delays, 262—The King's acquiescence in plans as explained in Downing Street, 264—He is dismayed at discovery of arbitrary partition of Zululand, 266—Binds himself, but cannot bind the nation, 268—Misappropriation of royal cattle, 270—The King forced to borrow 50*l.*, 273—He feels his poverty, 274—The *Cape Times* on the Conditions, 275—The King's misgivings at Capetown, 276—His letter of thanks to the Queen, 277—Complexion put by Colonial officials upon reservation of territory, 278—Inhabitants of Reserve not amenable to projects of Natal Government, 280—The chiefs of the district and their dispositions, 282—Declarations of Home Government brought to knowledge of Zulus, 284—Attempts to act on these resented by Natal officials, 286—

Cetshwayo's language misinterpreted, 288—The landing and subsequent events, 289—Newspaper correspondents, 290—Bias of officials notorious, 292—Ignorance and fears of Zulus, 293—Their anxiety to show their loyalty, 294—Their distrust of official statement, 295—Zulu account of events preceding landing of King, 296—Zulus threatened with bullets, 300—False telegrams to England, 302—Attitude of Zulus misrepresented, 303—Zulu narrative continued, 304—Identity of returned exile doubted, 305—The landing, 306—Suppression by officials of enthusiastic greetings, 312—Cetshwayo's admirable self-command, 314—His messages to his people, 315—He is treated as a prisoner despite instructions of Minister, 320—The journey through Zululand, 322—Arming of Zulus, 326—Zibebu's attitude, 327—Shepstone's reports, 329—Movements of loyal Zulus, 330—Groundless rumours utilised, 334—The waiting at Emtonjaneni, 337—The Royal women, 339—A misleading report, 342—Religious ceremony forbidden, 344—Arms prohibited, 345—Zibebu's visit, 347—Official support accorded to Cetshwayo's opponents, 350—Desecration of Mpande's grave, 355—Mfanawendhlela, 357—Magnanimity of Cetshwayo, 358.

CHAPTER VII.

Arrival of loyal chiefs, 359—Arrangements for ceremony, 362—Situation from Zulu point of view, 363—Returns to allegiance despite influence of official frowns, 366—Methods of Natal officials designed to lessen King's influence, 368—Cetshwayo deprived by second Condition of power of exacting civil service, 370—The people build his kraal only by special leave of Sir T. Shepstone, 373—Self-sacrificing adhesion of people to King, 374—Sir T. Shepstone's opening speech, 376—Fatal blunder concerning Zibebu's threefold boundary, 379—Mr. Osborn omits to explain alteration to Zulus, 383—The term *Usutu*, 385—The installation, 386—Protests of the chiefs, 387—Sir T. Shepstone boldly denounced, 395—Dabulamanzi's speech, 401—British bounty to King, 402—Sir T. Shepstone's views, 403—Anxieties and misgivings of Zulus, 410—Policy of Natal officials, 411—The conditions, 412.

CHAPTER VIII.

Natal journalists, 416—Mr. F. R. Statham, 419—His Zululand correspondent, 422—Alleged censorship of telegrams, 423—Zulus threatened with bullets, 424—Appeal to Lord Derby, 425—Sir H. Bulwer's attitude, 427—*Daily News* telegrams discredited, 429—Mr. Statham's defence, 431—Formal protest of Zulu chiefs against reservation of territory, 434—Vices of settlement patent, 435—Zibebu's threefold frontier, 436—Mischievous pens at work, 437—General loyalty to King, 439—Chiefs of Reserve under official persuasion: use of his influence denied,

to Cetshwayo, 440—Views of Home Government, 444—Deputation from Reserve, 445—Allegations of ill-treatment of Zulus in Reserve, 448—Comments in *Natal Witness*, 452—Official telegrams, 453—Coercion of Zulus in Reserve not intended by Home Government, 455—No breathing space allowed them, 456—Cetshwayo forwards formal report of alleged violence to Zulus in Reserve, 459—Written appeal by Cetshwayo, 460—Official translation, 461—The Governor avoids an investigation, 462—Chiefs at Government House, 463—Coercion in Reserve, 465—Zulus without a spokesman, 469—The inhabitants of Reserve prove their loyalty, 471—Mr. W. Y. Campbell investigates public feeling in Reserve, 472—The action for libel against the *Natal Witness*, 474.

CONCLUSION.

Zibebu's aggression, 493—Defeat of loyal Zulus acting without organisation, 494—Zibebu's well-trained forces, 496—Schemes against Cetshwayo, 497—Zulu protests, 498—Massacre of Ulundi, 499—The Inkandhla, 500—The last dregs, 501—Friendless, 502—At rest, 503.

APPENDIX	505
INDEX	507

THE RUIN OF ZULULAND.

CHAPTER I.

CETSHWAYO was to visit England. That, at last, at the end of June 1882, was settled beyond dispute. But the conclusion was not arrived at without the most strenuous opposition from all those who, apparently from the sheer perversity of human nature, chose to look upon the Zulu King as their deadliest foe.

1. What, we ask, had he ever done to earn Sir Henry Bulwer's hatred? 2. How had he personally offended Sir Theophilus Shepstone and his faction? 3. What injury had the colonists of Natal to lay to his charge?

The following incidents may be pointed to as supplying answers to two of these questions:—

1. The so-called "formidable message" of November 1876.*

But not only had that been condoned by many friendly messages between Cetshwayo and the Natal Government, from then till the end of 1878, but Sir H. Bulwer must have had strong evidence brought

* See vol. i. p. 32.

to his notice, again and again, that *Cetshwayo had never sent that message.*

2. The failure of the Blood River Meeting, and the refusal of the Zulus, and of Cetshwayo on their behalf, to give up to the Boers that "disputed territory," of which the latter had tried to rob the Zulus.

But at the Blood River Meeting Sir T. Shepstone had hoped to persuade the Zulus to give up rights which they had defended with his countenance for seventeen years, and his expectations rested mainly on his knowledge of their faith in him—a faith which he had earned to a great extent by supporting those very rights, while the decision in favour of the Zulus on this boundary question, given by the British Border Commission of 1878, entirely justified Cetshwayo in his refusal to give up his people's rights.

3. How, finally, had he offended the colonists of Natal?

It might indeed be supposed, that after the ill-treatment he had received, the public conscience would cause him to appear in an alarming light. But until the British invasion of Zululand in 1879, not one of the Natalians had even the pretence of a complaint against him, except that, although a black man, he was a king, powerful, happy, beloved and obeyed by his people, *and subject to no direct European rule.*

And, even after the Zulu war of 1879, what was there to say against Cetshwayo that any generous-minded adversary would have cared to advance? Of unreasoning spite, indeed, there was enough. The

Natal Advertiser [? *Mercury*], of June 11th, 1883, publishes a letter containing the following sentences:—
 “ . . . soon after the Zulu war Mr. Grant* received the arch-scoundrel Dabulamanzi, and treated him not only with hospitality, but open friendship; this gentleman, too, so far forgot himself as to attempt to introduce Dabulamanzi to Mr. W. Shepstone in the street, when Mr. Shepstone turned his back on them both. It must be remembered that Mr. George Shepstone had fallen at Isandhlwana,† and that

* Mr. Grant is best known as the white interpreter and secretary recommended to Cetshwayo in 1883 by the Bishop of Natal, and therefore accepted gladly by the King and Zulu people in that capacity. He was afterwards refused permission by the Natal Government to remain with Cetshwayo, after the latter took refuge from Zibebu at Etshowe, although the Zulu King earnestly entreated to be allowed to keep Mr. Grant with him.

† It must also be remembered that Mr. Grant himself had likewise lost a brother at Isandhlwana. Whether on the above-mentioned occasion he or Mr. W. Shepstone showed himself the better Christian, the reader may decide.

It may not be amiss to mention here an instance of the feeling—precisely contrary to the Colonial sentiment as illustrated in this story of one of the Mr. Shepstons—shown on a previous occasion by the noblest British soldier who fell on that fatal day at Isandhlwana. In a memoir of the late Colonel A. W. Durnford, R.E. (*‘A Soldier’s Life and Work in South Africa,’* by Lieut.-Colonel E. Durnford; Sampson Low & Co. publishers) we find at p. 101 the following sentences, taken from a letter from Colonel Durnford to his parents in England:—“The tribe of Langalibalele has been pardoned, and the Bishop of Natal has a scheme of buying land for them in a dozen different places (as they must not live together *as a tribe*), they working out the purchase money. They say they will *all come to me* [Colonel Durnford was acting as Colonial Engineer in Natal at this time, and could employ them on the public works]; and they are right too. They stood to their chief like men, and deserved every credit for it. Have we not exchanged ‘love-tokens?’ Are not *their* dead on the field where

Dabulamanzi was the leader of the host there who massacred two thousand gallant Englishmen, refusing quarter to any."

This last allegation is a mistake, though not an unnatural one, since none but fugitives escaped that day of the British force. As a matter of fact quarter was repeatedly offered towards the end to the gallant remaining few who held the famous "neck" to the death. But our soldiers did not understand the Zulu language, or knew too little of the customs of the savage race with which they were contending to believe in the offer. The case of Grandier,* the white prisoner taken at Kambula, kindly treated, and released by Cetshwayo, afterwards proved that it might have been accepted, but no one could know it then.

It is, however, difficult to understand how we can condemn the Zulus for giving no quarter, since in our turn, we gave them none. Notably at the battles of Ulundi and Kambula.†

But such unworthy sentiments as these expressed by the Durban paper would be instantly condemned by all right-minded persons. The attack upon the camp at Isandhlwana was made without Cetshwayo's orders or even knowledge, so that, personally, he was

they fell, and am not I half a cripple yet?" And again at p. 104 he writes:—"They come to *me* for protection, which I give to all who ask. You see these Zulus, like Afghans, consider that wounds given and received are love-tokens between brave men, and that they give a claim to help if required—a true soldier's creed it is too."

* See vol. i. pp. 63-4.

† See vol. i. p. 153 *in notis*.

not responsible for it at all. Nor can any generous person blame those on the Zulu side who *were* responsible, however sadly they may lament the unhappy issue. Our British force was, alas! an army of invasion; the Zulu generals did but their duty to their King and country; and well would it have been for England had her general done the same.*

* Lord Chelmsford. This general planted his unintrenched camp (Isandhlwana) in an indefensible position, neglected to reconnoitre the surrounding country, and marched away from it with half his force on the morning of January 22nd, 1879, to look for the Zulus, unaware that he left behind him, in close proximity to the camp, an army of 20,000 of them. He afterwards laid the blame of the consequent surprise and destruction of the camp upon Colonel Durnford, R.E., who had fallen in its defence. Lord Chelmsford did this on the ground that the "orders" sent to Colonel Durnford early the same day were to come up and "take command" of the camp, and that, therefore, the directions which he (the General) imagined he had left at the camp, for concentration and defence in case of attack, devolved upon, and had been disobeyed by Colonel Durnford. From positive evidence it appears that no such orders were given by the General or left at the camp at all, and it is more than doubtful whether, under the circumstances, there was any possibility of carrying such orders out, had they been given. The General, apparently, left the camp (without intrenchments or other defences) without the slightest suspicion of a possible attack; indeed he asked, when miles away from the camp, what orders had been left for Colonel Pulleine, the officer in command.

But, however this may be, it is now known that Colonel Durnford could not have been to blame in any sense, rather that he did his duty nobly to the death, and deserved all the honour his country could have shed upon his grave—honour which has been withheld from him to screen his General. Lord Chelmsford's military secretary, Colonel Crealock, has since acknowledged that *no order to take command of the camp was ever sent to Colonel Durnford*, and it would seem that the latter was sent for to *join the General with his (native) cavalry* (in accordance with previous instructions, 2252, p. 63) for the battle expected beyond Isandhlwana, and that he was merely passing through the camp there on his

Yet, although a certain number of people in Natal were worked up to take the erroneous and ignoble view of the case put forward by the writer to the

way, when the fatal Zulu assault began. The actual orders sent to Colonel Durnford were lost with him; and the one put forward by Lord Chelmsford at the time is now disproved by the very man who wrote it. When the battle-field was searched in May 1879, Colonel Durnford's remains were found undisturbed. The coat he had worn upon the day of his death was still upon him, and the Zulus had taken nothing from the pockets, as was plain from the fact that a pocket-knife (a treasure to any Zulu) was found upon him as well as other trifles. It is therefore certain that his papers—the order received that morning, after he mounted his horse, and probably that of the previous day—were still upon him on May 21st, when his body was at last discovered by members of the reconnoitring force under General Marshall. But these papers mysteriously vanished upon that day, after being seen by at least one person present, and it remains to be proved who took possession of them, and by whose orders the sacrilegious deed was committed.

At the time they were stolen it had not been confessed that the "order," recorded as the one sent to Colonel Durnford, and on the strength of which his conduct had been officially condemned, was a fabrication, written after the event, to suit the "theory of blame" which had been invented to save the reputation of the faulty living at the expense of the blameless and silent dead.

This is a matter which, although not immediately pertinent to our main inquiry as to the rights of the Zulu question, throws much light upon the ideas of honour held by some of the principal actors in it. Colonel Durnford lies in a grave honoured, indeed, by all private friends, and by all others who realise and deplore the deep injustice that has been done him, but neglected and unhonoured by the nation at large.

And why is this? Because it suited his General's convenience to throw the blame of his own errors upon his dead subordinate, who could not speak for himself, and who, being a Royal Engineer, was almost solitary in the land. Therefore Lord Chelmsford had a clear field. His military secretary writes an "order" after the event, which order is constructed to suit the case as he desired to make it

Advertiser,* it cannot have been the original cause of the popular hatred of Cetshwayo, for that feeling was as much in vogue towards the end of 1878 as it ever has been since.

Probably not one in twenty Natalians could give a distinct statement of the grounds of their objection to the Zulu King, and, of those who could, the majority would make it plain that their ideas upon the subject had been gathered from the statements of the late Sir Bartle Frere, or of some other contributor to Blue Books. Briefly the said objection has been an imaginary one, and most of those who have held it have simply followed, like sheep through a gap, in the wake of a few noisy and interested leaders, and without the remotest notion of their own of Cetshwayo's merits or demerits, or of how the case has stood for and against him from the first. A striking proof of this assertion may be gathered from a perusal of the protests sent in from different parts of Natal, in 1882, against the Zulu King's re-

appear; the battle-field is left untouched, even jealously guarded from examination, so that the actual order sent was not discovered inconveniently; one confidential officer appears to have searched for it, and another to have found and secreted it. And, to crown all, the authorities have refused to investigate the case.

So Lord Chelmsford remains, pitied and even honoured, the supposed victim of unhappy circumstances and a disobedient subordinate, while that falsely accused officer has died the death which he would have met twenty times over rather than commit the fault falsely imputed to him, and so incur the blame which England, in whose service he lived and died, still allows to rest upon his name.

* Or *Mercury*.

turn. The first of such protests came, naturally, from John Dunn, who could not expect that even Cetshwayo's magnanimity would overlook the treacherous and ungrateful part which he, Dunn, had played during the Zulu war. In this, as we are aware, Dunn was mistaken. Cetshwayo was quite capable of showing indulgence towards faults committed in a time of general excitement, and, possibly, partly under the influence of fear.* Dunn had deserted him in his hour of need, and had even assisted his enemies to capture him, but the King was just enough to remember that the man was of the same race with the invaders of the land, and kind-hearted enough to suppose that he had acted under compulsion. If Dunn had, *after the war was over*, kept in mind the interests of one who had been his benefactor for many years, and had tried then to do him a good turn, Cetshwayo would readily have forgiven him, and, as it was, he preserved a kindly recollection of him until it became evident that the man for whom he had done so much, had, purely for the sake of his own selfish interest, become a most determined and unscrupulous foe. Dunn's protest [3466, p. 1] written to Sir Garnet Wolseley in February 1882, did not receive much attention: those who make use of and reward traitors seldom having much opinion of their tools afterwards. Sir

* Dunn says himself, "It was only by hard persuasion, and not being allowed to remain neutral . . . and at Lord Chelmsford's earnest entreaty, that I consented to join him."—*Natal Mercury*, March 3rd, 1882.

Garnet Wolseley, indeed, forwarded it to the Colonial Office [*ibid.*], inclosed in a similar protest from himself, but that was to be expected, since the threatened Zulu settlement was his own latest handiwork. He writes as follows:—"I wish to place on record my strong conviction that the return of Cetshwayo to Zululand would be fraught with considerable danger to Natal, and would give rise to serious trouble and bloodshed in Zululand itself." Events have not justified his opinion, and his own "settlement" having brought about more bloodshed in four years than all that took place during the whole of Cetshwayo's reign, the perpetuation of that bloodshed has followed distinctly and undeniably—not from the restoration of the Zulu King, but from the intervention of European marauders and the foolish and inhuman manner in which his hands were tied, and his power and influence neutralised, by Sir H. Bulwer and the Natal Government. In fact it may truly be said that *Cetshwayo never was restored*, as the ensuing pages of this volume will make plain, and that to that fact is due all the disorder which has taken place since he was brought back to Zululand, but not restored to his kingship, in 1883.

As to the "considerable danger to Natal," which Sir Garnet Wolseley and others predicted, not even the most timorous alarmists in the colony suggested the necessity of making the smallest movement in the direction of defensive precautions when Cetshwayo's return was announced as about to take place [*ibid.*].

The concluding objection made by Sir Garnet

Wolseley to the Zulu King's restoration was that it would be in direct contravention of the guarantee given by himself that "under no circumstances should Cetshwayo be ever allowed to settle again in that country"; and he asserts that, without such guarantee, none of the thirteen kinglets would have accepted the position of chief. As eight out of the eleven Zulus amongst the thirteen kinglets joined in the petitions for Cetshwayo's restoration,* Sir Garnet Wolseley made a mistake in this latter assertion. It is to be hoped that by this time he and other important personages have also learnt that England will not be committed to a series of unjust actions by a few rash unauthorised words spoken by one of her servants, and that it is a mistake to suppose that she can any longer be forced into courses of which she disapproves for the sake of keeping promises made in her name *without her permission*. That Sir Garnet Wolseley *had said* that Cetshwayo should never return was actually quoted in Natal as a sufficient reason for refusing justice to the latter, whatever the circumstances of the case.

As an instance of the different light in which Sir Garnet Wolseley regards the respect to be paid to his own word and that due to the promises of other officers of Her Majesty's Government and army, it may be interesting to observe the arbitrary and inconsiderate fashion in which he set aside the decision of Colonel Durnford and his colleagues in the Zulu Boundary question, and drew a line of his own

* See vol. i. for proofs of this statement.

choosing (on the map, apparently, for he knew very little of the country), and quite independently of the rights of the case, or of anything except what he thought "a long way a better frontier" [2482, p. 258]. The decision which he thus arbitrarily set aside had been made by officers appointed for the purpose, and after thorough sifting of the evidence in the matter, and the "award" had been fully considered, and formally delivered to the Zulus, in England's name, and with her sanction. Yet the very man who thought so lightly of his country's honour, and of the "guarantee" given with her permission by *other* officers, that, on his own and sole authority he swept the whole aside, and gave the land awarded to the Zulus back to the encroaching Boers, considered it an injury to himself that when he had far overstepped the bounds of his power by asserting that England would *never do so and so*, she found herself obliged to disregard his unauthorised statement, and to remind him by act, if not by word, that Sir Garnet Wolseley is not, after all, the despotic ruler of Great Britain.

A curious proof of the hasty carelessness with which Sir Garnet Wolseley cast aside the conscientious and able work of the Zulu Border Commissioners of 1878 is to be found in the despatch which has just been quoted [No. 87, 2482].

It will be remembered by readers who have studied the subject of the Zulu War, that when the decision of the Border Commissioners was given in favour of the Zulus, Sir Bartle Frere—who had previously

entirely approved of the said commission, palpably under the impression that it would, as a matter of course, be made to turn against the Zulus, and so help to bring about the war which it was his policy to declare—was grievously disappointed, and did his utmost to reverse the decision, but failed to do so, chiefly through the determination of Colonel Durnford, R.E., that justice should be done.* Sir Theophilus Shepstone—who had anticipated the probable results of an impartial investigation of the Border question too clearly to desire, on behalf of his then protégés the Boers, that it should take place—objected to the proposed arbitration throughout, and, in the end, consented to it most reluctantly. In one of his despatches, while the subject was pending, he writes as follows, February 5th, 1878 [2079, p. 137]:—

“At present the belt of country [which Sir H. Bulwer proposed should be treated as neutral during the inquiry] is occupied solely by Zulus; the whole of it has been apportioned in farms to Transvaal subjects, *but has not been occupied by them* [author’s italics]; and it comprises, in fact, the whole of the land that has hitherto been looked upon as disputed territory.”

Yet, three days later, February 8th [*ibid.*, pp. 138, 139], he writes of “the existence of a deep feeling of distrust” on the part of the Boers, in regard to the course which this Government has . . . consented to adopt [i. e. arbitration], and continues thus:—

“This is scarcely to be wondered at when it is remembered that these men are compelled to occupy with their families fortified camps [N.B.—They did so by Sir T. Shepstone’s directions, in anticipation of a British invasion of Zululand—2100, p. 66], while their farms in the neighbourhood are being occupied by

* ‘A Soldier’s Life and Work in South Africa,’ p. 194.

Zulus, while their crops are being reaped and their cultivated lands are being tilled by Zulus, and while the timber of their houses is being used as Zulu firewood."

Had this actually been the case, it would only have been the natural result of the "farms" having been occupied, the crops sown, the fields cultivated, the houses built by the Boers on land which belonged, not to them, but to the Zulus, but the discrepancy between Sir T. Shepstone's statements on the 5th and 8th of February, 1878, were too glaring to escape detection.

At this time, 1878, Sir H. Bulwer, then Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, was doing his best to prevent the necessity of war, and his despatches, in reply to or in comment upon those of Sir B. Frere and Sir T. Shepstone, display considerable acuteness, and expose the intrigues by which the war was brought about as firmly and thoroughly as could be desired. On the point above mentioned he silences Sir T. Shepstone out of his own mouth, writing thus [2144, p. 191]:—

"I do not quite understand what farms and cultivated lands are referred to; because in a previous despatch—No. 7 of February 5th—your Excellency, in referring to the disputed territory, states, as I understand, that it '*is at present occupied solely by the Zulus,*' and that, 'although the whole of it has been apportioned in farms to Transvaal subjects, *it has not been occupied by them.*'"

This would seem conclusive enough, yet eighteen months later, Sir Garnet Wolseley, laying down the law on the subject of which he knew so little, writes:—"I have also to remark that many farms which had been for more than ten years actually occupied by Dutch families were made over to the Zulu King as part of his dominions" [2482, p. 258].

It would appear from the above that Sir Garnet Wolseley had merely cast his eye over a few of the papers in which Sir T. Shepstone and others stated the *Boer* claims, and had studied the subject so little, that he was quite unaware that the ground (essentially worthless in point of principle as it was in any case) on which he elected to take his stand, had long since been cut from beneath his feet. However, the pretence of it which remained seemed to answer his purposes as well as more substantial facts would have done, for, on September 3rd, 1879, he wrote the statement given above, and acted upon it, reversing the award of the Border Commissioners.

It is not, perhaps, strictly correct to speak of the boundary line which Sir Garnet Wolseley fixed as *one of his own choosing*. He knew too little of the country and of the facts of the dispute to choose a line himself. Rather, it may easily be gathered, that the line he fixed was that long since chosen and desired by the knot of politicians who brought about the Zulu War, who looked to what they deemed *expediency* rather than to strict justice, and whose whole calculations had been upset by the decision of the Commission in favour of the Zulus.

Colonel Durnford (and his colleagues who have lost their claim to credit for the action which neither of them has lifted a voice in public to defend since the death of the one amongst them who would have protested to the utmost against such injustice), having carefully sifted all producible evidence, decided in favour of the Zulus, giving them as a boundary "*the*

line offered by Cetshwayo” [2222, p. 84], and commending the “self-restraint and moderation of the Zulus in reference to the much vexed boundary question” [2220, p. 38]. But Sir Garnet Wolseley substituted the *precise reverse* of this decision, namely, the line required by Sir T. Shepstone, &c., and says that it “will not, of course, satisfy all claims of the Transvaal Boers to land [probably not, since those claims are of perennial growth], some of which possibly rest on good grounds [the Border Commission had decided that they rested on no grounds whatever: the proofs they give [2220 and 2222] are simple and conclusive, and Sir Garnet Wolseley could have no *secret* evidence to the contrary], but it will include in the Transvaal territory most of the farms that had been longest in occupation by the Dutch farmers on the long-disputed frontier.” That is to say, the land which had been “apportioned in farms to Transvaal subjects [by the Transvaal Government, in a country which did not belong to them], but has not been occupied by them.”

It is very much to be doubted if Sir Garnet Wolseley’s decision would not have been considerably altered could he have taken a peep into the future, and have discerned that in two years’ time the Transvaal would have passed from British hands, and with it the piece of Zululand with which he had presented it while it was under England’s rule. But at the time he fixed his line, the main object of British politicians in South Africa was to pacify the Boers, and probably it was thought that if anything could

have reconciled them to the loss of their somewhat misused independence, it would be the cession of the territory of which they had been trying to take possession for so many years.

But what is to be said of Sir Henry Bulwer's supineness on this occasion? He had thoroughly supported the Commissioners in their report, had boldly withstood both Sir B. Frere and Sir T. Shepstone in their attacks upon it, yet on the first sound of the general's trumpet he lays down his arms, ceases to have an opinion of his own, and meekly holds his peace when Sir Garnet Wolseley—immediately after the statement above quoted, which Sir H. Bulwer had himself thoroughly disproved on a previous occasion—writes, "Sir Henry Bulwer agrees with me, &c." [2482, p. 258].

We must now return to the subject of the protests and petitions concerning Cetshwayo. As early as October 1881, the Boer Government of the Transvaal requested Sir Hercules Robinson [3247, p. 7] to send a telegram to the Earl of Kimberley on their behalf, "soliciting Cetshwayo's release and restoration, as an act of justice, and to prevent bloodshed."

It is not necessary for our present purpose to investigate the disputed question of what feelings or motives may have induced the Transvaal Government to make this appeal. The only point which (in the present work) it concerns us to notice is that, had there been a grain of truth in the oft asserted "dangerous" disposition of Cetshwayo towards the European colonies of South Africa, his ancient

enemies the Boers would have been the very last to desire his restoration to power. They were the only European race which had had any quarrel with the Zulus before the British invasion of Zululand in 1879, and had certainly earned the ill-will and suspicion of the Zulu King and people by a long series of unscrupulous encroachments and frequent outrages.

Cetshwayo himself never concealed his dislike for the Boers,* although he never would have begun hostilities against them, as he never did through fifteen years of aggression and misconduct on their part.

Again, on August 8th, 1882, Sir Hercules Robinson transmits another request from the Transvaal Government to the same effect, urging the restoration of Cetshwayo for the sake of peace and quiet on their own eastern border, and in the interests of humanity "as speedily as possible" [3466, p. 78].*

* [1961], [1748], [2000], and other Blue Books.

† Since the policy of the Transvaal Government, in encouraging Boer aggressions (still continued in 1884) upon Zululand, and the misconduct of the frontier Boers, was undoubtedly the *first cause* of our invasion and destruction of Zululand, it is difficult to credit the good feeling now expressed for the first time towards Cetshwayo by that country and people, and it is not surprising that many should look upon this sudden change of front as rather intended to annoy England than to benefit the Zulus. But there is no reason to doubt that Dr. Jorrisen and a few others were sincere in their intentions, and whether the Boer Government and people generally were honest in their expressions of kindness towards Cetshwayo or not signifies nothing to the point under consideration. Had the Transvaal had any real grounds for the evil words spoken again and again in her name against the Zulu King, she never would have petitioned for his return, even to exasperate England, and the mere fact of her having done so sweeps away at a blow all the plausible pretexts put forward by her subjects, and on her behalf, in favour of the Zulu war.

On the same day Sir H. Bulwer sends the following telegram to the Earl of Kimberley [3466, p. 77]:—

“8th. Mayor of Durban requests that the following resolution passed at public meeting on 5th be transmitted to your Lordship:—

“That this meeting hereby records its solemn protest against the restoration of Cetshwayo to Zululand, feeling assured that such a step would be fraught with imminent peril and disastrous consequences to this Colony, and would weaken the authority of Her Majesty’s Government amongst the native tribes of South Africa, and it (i. e. the meeting) pledges continued resistance to the return of the ex-king.”

Durban had, from the first, been the stronghold of opposition to the Zulu King, and Zulu freedom, partly because it is furthest and safest from injury *in case* of a Zulu attack, partly because it had long been to a great extent, represented by a newspaper, whose editor—whether through constitutional timidity, or negrophobia, or a keen eye to his own interests as a leader of the worst, and therefore most violent feelings of a half-educated public—has always stood out prominently in favour of every turn of policy which promised to do the most towards reducing the aboriginal inhabitants of South Africa to the condition, practically, of slaves.

Sir Henry Bulwer forwarded the Durban protest of August 5th, and sent with it extracts from the two Durban newspapers about the meeting at which it had been made.

One, from the *Natal Mercury*, Cetshwayo’s constant and bitter opponent, is simply an expression of opinions from its own point of view [3466, p. 130]:—

“The open-air meeting on Saturday,” says the *Mercury*, “was an unqualified demonstration of public opinion adverse to Cetshwayo’s restoration, and yet not quite unqualified, for there was just sufficient opposition to emphasise the force and fulness of the prevailing sentiment.” And again, “So far as the meeting is concerned, therefore, the result is this: That a formally convened assemblage of several hundred townspeople decided not only to protest against Cetshwayo’s restoration, but pledged themselves to offer continued resistance to his return. . . . The ‘premier constituency’ of this Colony was asked to declare itself upon this question, and the response has been one which no home ministry can lightly disregard or override. Durban at any rate does not want to see Cetshwayo restored, and will do its best to prevent his getting back to Zululand.”

This is decided language, but, perhaps, it rather loses its force on comparing the *Mercury’s* “several hundred townspeople,” with an item from the census for 1882, from which we learn that, in that year, the white population of the Borough of Durban numbered 7774 [*ibid.*, p. 131].

The second extract given in the Blue Book is taken from the *Mercantile Advertiser*, and is a more careful report of what occurred at the meeting. It runs as follows [3466, p. 131]:—

Natal Mercantile Advertiser, August 8th, 1882:—“The open-air meeting held last Saturday afternoon for the purpose of protesting against the return of Cetshwayo to Zululand at one time appeared likely to become a complete failure. At the beginning of the meeting, and when Mr. Robinson rose to propose the protest, there could not have been more than between 150 and 200 people present. There was no sign whatever of enthusiasm, the meeting opening very flat indeed. Even Mr. Robinson failed to raise a cheer in the earlier part of his speech, though the great bulk of those present were undoubtedly his personal supporters. It seemed to be taken for granted that the protest he had to propose would be passed without opposition, and as a matter of course. But presently it

got whispered about that an amendment was to be proposed, and this whisper awakened an interest that had previously been lacking. When Mr. Escombe made his appearance, and it became known that he was to move the amendment this interest increased, and as the ordinary Saturday sales concluded, the people left them and came over to the meeting. Thus the numbers of those present were, towards the end, considerably increased, though still there was a conspicuous absence of very many of our leading townsmen. Comparatively few of these were, in fact, present, even some of those who had signed the requisition to the Mayor asking him to call the meeting, not putting in an appearance. The platform was occupied only by the two Members for the Borough, the Messieurs Escombe and Hartley, Mr. Robinson, the Mayor, and ex-Mayor, and the Town Clerk. The resolution moved by Mr. Robinson and the amendment proposed by Mr. Escombe, together with Mr. Pinson's revolutionary motion, appeared in the report of the meeting published yesterday, so that our readers have already been able to form their own opinion upon them. Mr. Robinson did not support his resolution by any arguments. In fact he stated at the opening of his address that the meeting was not a meeting for argument. It was called simply in order to make a protest, and Mr. Escombe was perfectly right when he pointed out that the bulk of those present had come there for that set purpose, that is to make a protest. Mr. Escombe evidently did not expect to get any support for his amendment. When he rose to speak, the tactics adopted by Mr. Robinson's supporters at the late election were repeated. Mr. Escombe was interrupted at every sentence; a few of Mr. Robinson's friends making themselves conspicuous by the open manner in which they kept up the interruption. They did not gain much by this line of conduct at the late election, and they gained nothing more by it on Saturday than to disgust those who had gone to the meeting prepared to listen quietly to what had to be said on the one side or the other. Of course they carried their protest, and it was quite right that they should do so. They were there for the purpose, and they had a perfect right to protest. But Mr. Escombe also gained his point, which was to show that there is a difference of opinion in the Borough on the subject in relation to which the meeting was called, and to prevent, as far as he could, misleading telegrams in reference to the meeting being sent to England. Our own opinion of the meeting is that it will not have much effect one way or the other on the question at issue. It was not a meeting of a kind calculated to create an

effect. It was too noisy, and the spirit of intolerance of opposition was too much manifested by those who went there to support the protest. The references made to England, both in some of the speeches made and in the interruptions of the hearers, were such as loyal Englishmen should never have uttered. They were not only disloyal and discreditable to Englishmen, but were lowering to the character and prestige of the people of that nation. Had they come from the mouths of avowed Fenians they could not have been more anti-English or seditious. 'What is England's guarantee worth?' 'How can we trust England?' were the common exclamations made by the crowd. Derisive laughter greeted every reference to the honour or the good faith of England, and if there were any foreigners present they must have been profoundly impressed with the strange exhibition of disrespect for their own nation and Government made by the British colonists assembled. Could a faithful report of the meeting reach England it would destroy any little effect the passing of the protest might otherwise have, because no one could attach any importance to a gathering where so partisan and one-sided a feeling was exhibited. It is to be regretted that the meeting was of that kind. It is to be regretted that a fairer hearing was not given to the speakers who were opposed to the protest. They had a right to such a hearing, and nothing was to be gained by attempting to hoot them down, or by interrupting them because what they said was not palatable to the majority of those present. The object of the meeting, however, was so far gained that the protesting resolution was passed, and it remains now to be seen what will follow. A poll of the borough was demanded by the mover of the amendment; but the Mayor, instead of at once granting it, said he would take time to consider.* We do not suppose it will matter much whether the poll takes place or not, but we repeat that it would have greatly added to the effect of the meeting, and more favourably impressed those who went there as spectators, had a more tolerant disposition been manifested by the supporters of the mover of the protesting resolution. Nothing, in the end, is ever gained by intolerance."

From this account it would seem that the *Mercury* assumes more in its last sentence, "Durban at any rate does not want to see Cetshwayo back, &c.," than

* The Mayor was, perhaps, wise from his point of view.

it had grounds for, and that even Durban public opinion was by no means unanimous.*

Again, on August 16th [*ibid.*, p. 133], Sir Henry Bulwer forwarded a memorial from the people of

* The editor of the *Natal Mercury* has always arrogated to himself the right of representing the general opinion of the Natal colonists, yet he lost his seat in the Legislative Council in 1882, when this question of Cetshwayo's return had been made, as it were, the watchword of his party. His right to figure as the representative of colonial feeling had previously been disputed on more than one occasion. A letter from the present writer, which appeared in the *Times* of September 6th, 1881, contains the following paragraph:—

“Mr. Robinson strikes the favourite key-note of that portion of the colonists whom he represents when he recommends that a hut-tax should be imposed on the Zulu people to satisfy their ‘eager craving . . . to pay tribute,’ of which unnatural appetite no one, I think, ever heard before, unless it is a new version of their earnest entreaty to be allowed to ransom their King. A certain part of the colonial community cannot endure the notion of a black man who is not obliged to pay hut-tax to the whites, and before the Zulu war the imposition of such a tax upon the free Zulu people was one of the special advantages counted upon by colonial ‘Jingoes.’ But if Mr. Robinson really believes that he represents colonial feeling and opinion on the subject of the Zulu King and the future settlement of Zululand, he will find, on his return to Natal, that he has slipped behind his age. When one of the most influential colonial journals can express itself as strongly on behalf of Cetshwayo as did the *Natal Witness* of the 23rd of July—speaking of such restoration as the victory [to be] of ‘truth and right’—it is time for the editor of the *Natal Mercury* to leave off informing the British public that he represents colonial feeling.”

Without supposing that Mr. Robinson's éléctional defeat a year later was *caused* by his Zulu policy, or proved any particular desire on the part of the electors to support the Zulu King's cause, it cannot be doubted that, if their feeling on this point had been as strong and unanimous as he makes out, they would not have rejected as a legislator the man who had been, throughout, Cetshwayo's most persistent opponent.

Newcastle to the effect that, in their opinion, "the past history of Cetshwayo affords no guarantee of future peaceable government by him, that any pledges given by him in this respect cannot be relied upon, and that his return to Zululand will be detrimental to the peace of this colony, and the adjoining states. We feel assured," they continue, "that such return must lead to the organisation of a Zulu army which would, as before, be a standing menace to this colony, the population of which is wholly inadequate to cope with such a force." In conclusion they "therefore respectfully beg that Y. E. will be pleased to convey" these their views to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State to the Colonies, &c."

This protest, coming from people so much nearer to possible danger from the Zulus, is proportionately more temperate in its form, and although distinctly expressing the opinions of those who sign it, it bases its objections to the Zulu King upon his "*past history*." This circumstance, and the prophecy that Cetshwayo's return would lead to the organisation of a Zulu army which would be a "standing menace" to the colony *as before*, at least leaves others to judge of the said "past history" for themselves, and to form their own conclusions as to the reality of the supposed "standing menace" to Natal.

Meanwhile, it is a curious fact that from Greytown, the place, perhaps, more than any other in Natal which would be exposed to danger in the event of a Zulu attack upon Natal, no protest against Cetsh-

wayo could be obtained at all, and a correspondent, writing from Natal [*Daily News*, September 3rd, 1882], says, "You will see that the public meetings against Cetshwayo's return cannot be considered successful, and that people really seem to be making up their minds to it. Of course, the Jingoës have met together at different places, and resolved and protested, but at Greytown they stopped their own meeting lest it should bless Cetshwayo altogether;" and the editor adds, "It appears that the projected meeting was not held at Greytown because the groups of Dutch farmers and others who had assembled outside the hall gave emphatic expression to their opinion that it was desirable to restore the ex-king."

On August 26th, 1882, Dunn sent another protest to Lord Kimberley on the same subject, in which he kindly offers to instruct the Home Government on the subject of *British prestige* in South Africa [3466, p. 154], and predicts that bloodshed will follow Cetshwayo's return, enforcing his meaning by the remark that "*your Lordship can hardly expect us to relinquish our claims.*"

The *Natal Mercury* of December 20th, 1881, says, "He (Dunn) affirmed emphatically that, so far as he and his people were concerned, Cetshwayo should not come into Zululand across the Tugela, and that, having possession of the country, he meant to stick to it," and the editor of that paper said at the Durban meeting before mentioned, that Dunn would "resist the landing of Cetshwayo"; but all this was idle boasting, since the people under Dunn would

welcome, and not "resist" Cetshwayo's return, while of Dunn's personal adherents, renegade or refugee Zulus, aliens and whites, he could not have raised a band worth mentioning, unless assisted by the Natal Government, i. e. (to the minds of the Zulus) British influence.* Dunn said openly to a gentleman in Durban, "as soon as I get sight of Cetshwayo, I'll shoot him."

A protest from the "Lower Tugela Division, Planters' Association" [*ibid.*, p. 165], forwarded by Sir Henry Bulwer on September 2nd, is to the effect that "This Association feels certain that the break up of the Zulu power and removal of Cetshwayo was in all respects necessary, and consequently the return of Cetshwayo is unrighteous and dangerous," which opinion, as it had long been generally decided in England that the said "break up" and "removal"

* For evidence of the King's opponents in Zululand being in the minority before British influence was thrown into the scale against him by Sir Henry Bulwer, take the following sentence from a letter to the *Mercury* of January 16th, 1882, written by one whom that inveterate opponent of Cetshwayo calls a "well-informed correspondent":—"What was the use of appointing chiefs over subjects who were sure to set their authority at defiance? Ntshingwayo could not raise more than 50 followers, Mgojana 100, and Mfanawendhlela about 100. They have each thousands in their districts, consisting of Mnyamana's, Ndabuko's, Ziwedus, Masipula's (&c., &c.) people," i. e. all people who desired Cetshwayo's return. And a trader in Zululand writes to the *Mercury* (same date): "I have in Dunnsland inquired privately from the people whether they would be pleased to receive their King back again, and they one and all, without exception, say 'Yes.' Ask them 'Why?' and the general answer is simply because he is their hereditary King, and their hearts are with him wherever he may be, and they would like him to be again at the head of the country."

had been quite unnecessary and most unjust, was not likely to produce much effect. The petitioners in this case requested Sir H. Bulwer “to refuse permission for Cetshwayo to land in Natal,” thereby showing a singular ignorance of the limited extent of the Governor’s (direct) powers * in supposing that he could openly refuse to permit anything that England might order.

Next in order followed a protest from “the undersigned inhabitants of the city of Pietermaritzburg, and its vicinity” [3466, p. 170], signed by 425 people, and forwarded by Sir Henry Bulwer on September 5th. This, again, dwells upon the “ideas of military aggression and conquest which for years” had, they said, made the Zulus under Cetshwayo “a source of disquietude and dread to the neighbouring territories,” of all which there is no trace until 1878, and then only in Sir Bartle Frere’s despatches.†

* Unhappily the Governor’s *indirect* powers have been made only too manifest by the manner in which he has thwarted England’s good intentions, and practically prevented Cetshwayo’s restoration, even after it had been ordered by the Home Government.

† Sir T. Shepstone wrote in 1874 [1137, p. 6], that since the nomination of Cetshwayo as his father’s successor the benefits of “quiet to the Zulu country, and relief to this colony from the continual apprehension of fresh disturbances,” had, “with the exception of a serious alarm, which turned out to have no real foundation, continued to this day,” the Natal Government having been able “to arrange amicably every difficulty, and to maintain peaceful and even cordial relations during twenty-seven years’ close contact with the Zulus” [*ibid.*, p. 18]. While Sir Bartle Frere, writing of the state of things on the Natal border in 1878, says, “Few things struck me more than the evident haste and temporary character of the defensive measures undertaken by the English

Again, on October 23rd, the Governor forwards the same memorial, signed this time by "a number (396) of the inhabitants of the colony of Natal" [*ibid.*, p. 215].

On November 4th Sir Henry Bulwer sends another from "the inhabitants of Alexandra and Alfred Counties"* [*ibid.*, p. 222], who, being a long way from the border, and well out of the way of the supposed danger, write of course "in great consternation," 101 persons being found to express themselves thus forcibly out of a white population of 1166.

On December 28th Dunn writes another appeal, which is only worth mentioning on account of two singular and untruthful statements which it contains. The first is that "a few months since a few of the people residing in my territory *were persuaded by emissaries of Bishop Colenso* to go to Natal and agitate for Cetshwayo's return," and the second runs thus: "For myself I may say that in good faith of my position I have been too liberal, and saved nothing." The first assertion is in allusion to the great deputation [see vol. i. chap. vii.], and, in

part of the population" [2318, p. 32], the fact being that for many years past the border farmers had been so undisturbed that they never thought "defensive measures" necessary until it was put into their heads by Sir Bartle Frere.

* Sir H. Bulwer's covering despatch mentions Alexandra County only, but the petition itself is from "the undersigned inhabitants of the counties of Alexandra and Alfred." These two counties are the furthest removed from Zululand, "Alfred" especially being a corner which runs down into (free) Kaffraria, to the south of Natal.

reply to it, it is only necessary to remind the reader that the Bishop never sent any emissaries to Zululand for that or any other purpose, and to refer to his own answer to that accusation [Appendix C. to vol. i.].

As to the second statement—Mr. Osborn, the British Resident in Zululand, writes to Sir Henry Bulwer on August 2nd, 1882 [3466, p. 165], that Chief Dunn had reported to him that “the total amount of hut-tax received by him from the people in his territory,” was, for the year 1880, at 5s. a hut, 2468*l.*; for 1881, at 10s. per hut (which was to be the permanent rate), 5101*l.* Supposing, therefore, that he received the same in 1882 as in 1881 (after which latter date his chieftainship came to an end), he had obtained from the Zulus the sum of 12,670*l.* Added to this large amount—in itself a fortune to a man in Dunn’s class of life—would be the cattle which he frequently levied by fines, and the full value of the large herd of magnificent animals, “royal cattle,” which he was allowed to purchase from Government at a very low rate* after the Zulu war [*ibid.*, p. 233].

As to the “building, tree-planting, and other improvements” on which he declares that he had “expended large sums of money” [*ibid.*, p. 270], they do not appear ever to have been visible to the naked eye, and in reply to the Resident’s question on the subject, Dunn says, “Particulars as to the purpose to which the revenue so obtained is applied

* It is said of his own fixing.

over the total annual expenditure under each head of appropriation I am unable to give,* as I have used the same as a general fund for salaries, general expenses, and for road-making;” while his warm supporter the *Natal Mercury* is only able to harp feebly on the said “roads.” The “salaries” of his few white underlings and personal followers, and such rough dwelling-places for them as the habits and resources of the country would admit of, or render necessary, can have made but a small hole in over 5000*l.* a year, while the term “general expenses” has a vague

* The wording of this sentence, except the last five words, would appear to have been taken from the Resident’s own question.

The *Natal Witness*, June 27th, commenting on this reply, remarks:—

“A delightful account, reminding one very much of the statement made by Sir Epicure Mammon in the ‘Alchemist,’ after he was asked how he intended to apply the money he obtained, after all his pots and pans had been turned into gold; he should spend it, he said, ‘in marrying poor virgins, building almshouses, and now and then a church.’”

“And now and then a road,” says John Dunn.

“But” continues the *Witness*, “what more concerns us is Sir H. Bulwer’s comment on John Dunn’s statement. . . .

“‘With reference to this tax, your Lordship will have learned from my General Report on the Zulu question that it is not one which, in my opinion, the chief John Dunn had any power to levy under the terms subject to which he received his chieftainship.’ This was Sir H. Bulwer’s deliberately stated opinion. The question will be asked—Did the Colonial Office venture in any way to censure John Dunn for thus acting? The reply must be—No! not so much as by a word.”

N.B.—But John Dunn by his massacre of Sitimela’s people, Hamu by that of the Aba Qulusi, and Zibebu by that of the Usutus, forfeited their chieftainships far more flagrantly than by any taxes, yet Zibebu was left in possession when Cetshwayo was—*not* restored.

sound of importance, for which, however, there is nothing to show. Possibly the introduction of the word "household" would make it more comprehensible, Dunn's households being numerous and large, though their members can hardly have been accustomed even to such luxury as is obtainable in Natal. A really detailed and accurate account of what Dunn has done with the 12,670*l.* to which he acknowledges would be interesting, and, probably, instructive.*

The number of the Durban petitioners is not given in the Blue Book, their "resolution" being passed at a public meeting, and, therefore, signed only by the chairman, but the *Mercury*, which was sure not to understate it, speaks of "several hundred" townspeople as agreeing to it, and the *Advertiser* says that, during the earlier part of the meeting, "there could not have been more than between 150 and 200 people present," but that when it "got whispered about that an amendment was to be proposed" a fresh interest was awakened, and that "as the ordinary Saturday sales concluded the people left them and came over to the meeting." This does

* The *Natal Mercury* of December 20th, 1881, says, "Quite a little commotion was caused outside the Standard Bank in Durban yesterday morning by the arrival of a consignment of cash from Chief John Dunn's territory. The money was contained in a large iron safe, which lay on the top of a bullock waggon, and was carefully wrapped round with canvas and blankets. It had been well guarded all the way *through the colony* [author's italics] by Zulus armed with assegais. . . . The safe contained between 5000*l.* and 10,000*l.*, and this was tax money."

not look like a very eager interest on the part of the townspeople, and probably the "300," roughly guessed as the number actually present, will cover the whole.

The Newcastle petition appears also signed by the chairman of the meeting only, and the address of the Planters' Association the same, and the proportions in these two latter cases of petitioners and inhabitants can only be inferred from that in all other cases. The following table of comparisons will give a clear result, the "populations" being taken from the *Natal Almanac* for 1884, which gives the results of the census for 1882, the year in question, and the total population of the Colony being returned as 30,296.

<i>White Population 1882.</i>		<i>Petitioners against Cetshwayo.</i>	
Durban (borough of)	7,774	Durban, "several hundred,"	300
Maritzburg (borough of))	9,278	Maritzburg, and its vicinity	425
Maritzburg (vicinity of))			
6,085 3,193			
Alexandra and Alfred	1,166	Alexandra and Alfred ..	101
	<hr/> 18,218		<hr/> 826

Taking, therefore, the sum of petitioners given, against that of the corresponding "populations," and leaving out on both sides the separate counties whose petitioners are not numbered, we find that not 4.54 per cent. of the colonists feared Cetshwayo enough to try and prevent his return.* And it is not to be supposed that the 396 *inhabitants*

* These calculations are entered into because so much capital has been made, throughout the Zulu difficulty, by politicians adverse to Cetshwayo, of the supposed *universal fears* of the colonists, an argument, of all others, the most likely to influence

of Natal (mentioned on p. 27 *supra*) are over and above the 300 Durban and 425 Maritzburg people, for this is plainly not the case. The signers of this third indeed can hardly be reckoned separately, since most, if not all of them, must either have signed the Maritzburg petition, or have been amongst those who attended the Durban meeting. The seven names given in the Blue Book as attached to the memorial of the "Inhabitants of Natal" [3466, p. 214], are those of Durban men, well known as Cetshwayo's opponents, the first mentioned being that of the editor of the *Mercury*, who was the prime mover in the matter of the Durban meeting, and another is the Mayor of Durban, mentioned in the extract from the *Advertiser*. The fresh style and title of "inhabitants of the Colony" gives the impression of a fresh petition from a new set of people, but plainly the impression is erroneous.

But the above calculation gives, after all, a very unfair advantage to the petitioners, since it includes just those towns where their proportions were largest.

Victoria county has a white population of 2024, and, although the members of the "Planters' Associa-

the kindly British breast. But the argument is a fictitious one. The majority of the Colonists had no genuine fears at all (except just *during* the war, which was a matter of course, and hardly the fault of the *Zulus*), and of those who really were afraid the greater part were so because they had been told that there was cause for fear, and without one grain of reason, proof, or justification.

tion" who protest from thence are not given, they cannot be very many. Umvoti county numbers 1600 Europeans, and, although the part of Natal most exposed in case of a Zulu invasion, it was silent altogether, its capital, Greytown, declining to protest. Klip River county, again, of which Newcastle is the capital, has 2908 white inhabitants, and, although we are not given the number of Newcastle petitioners, we may readily suppose it to have been much in the same proportion as in the other districts of Natal. There remain, unrepresented, two counties, Weenen, containing 1510 European souls, and the Umsinga division, which only numbers 524 whites.

But in spite of the necessary incompleteness of these calculations (since the author has no means of learning the number of names signed to some of these petitions), the main point appears to be amply proved, namely, that only a most insignificant minority of Natal colonists had sufficient genuine fear, or hatred* of the Zulu King to cause them to exert themselves in the smallest degree to prevent his restoration to the position which he had held before the Zulu war.

It will be seen then at a glance how small a proportion of the colonists after all had any active feeling against Cetshwayo, although every possible recruit to the number of his opponents was beaten up by those who headed the movement. On the other hand, it is probable that had petitions in his favour been prepared, and ably worked, quite as

* In this case frequently an entirely different thing from fear.

many Natalians would have signed them, while there cannot be the shadow of a doubt that if all those who knew, or cared, too little about the subject to have any opinion of their own upon it had been counted, they would have proved to be a very large majority, which could not possibly have been the case had there been any real grounds for public dread of Cetshwayo's return.

But the King's friends trusted to the sense of justice of the Home Government, and made no attempt to produce any popular demonstration on his behalf; those who agitated against Cetshwayo were the comparatively few who are rightly termed the "noisy party," and who apparently express public feeling because, as a matter of fact, the majority are too busy, too ignorant, or too indifferent to contradict them.

Even amongst those who signed these protests against the King's restoration it may be safely asserted that a considerable number could give no clear account of the reasons for their objections, while it is equally probable that most of those who could do so, if pressed to substantiate their accusations, would have to fall back upon Sir Bartle Frere's long-exploded indictment, or else upon stories gathered from traders in Zululand, and either dating back to the time before Cetshwayo's reign, or, if referred to a later date, travellers' tales unsifted and unproved, perhaps pure inventions, or, more often, monstrous distortions and exaggerations of actual facts.

A few extracts from the local papers at the time will show the feeling which the editors endeavoured to keep up amongst the colonists, of whom those who had the sense to think for themselves were too indifferent or too timid to express themselves in public.

The *Natal Mercury*, always foremost in mischief, contained the following on May 20th, 1882:—

“The mind of Parliament had doubtless been disturbed by the news of the Zulu invasion,* which was so promptly repelled by his Excellency the Governor, and a question was asked . . . in the House of Commons on the subject of the proposed visit of Cetshwayo to England. . . . The Hon. Evelyn Ashley answered the question, and said that the visit would be postponed, as its projection had led to intrigues in Zululand.† . . . The Colony is probably indebted to Sir Henry Bulwer’s representations for this change of front. . . . If this surmise be correct His Excellency will have earned the most sincere gratitude of all classes of the people.”

Again, the *Natal Witness* of June 20th says that—

“It is satisfactory to learn that Sir Henry Bulwer’s action has been successful (in putting off the King’s visit to England), and, if report be true, Sir Henry is now convinced that it would be most undesirable to restore the ex-King to power. We hope, for the sake of the Natal colonists, as well as for the future of the Zulu country, that this is the case.”

Again, the *Times of Natal* (the Government organ and “brother” to the *Mercury*) says, on May 22nd:—

“We believe that we are indebted to the foresight of His Excellency Sir Henry Bulwer for the cheering news received

* This absurd expression alludes to the quiet and unarmed Great Deputation (see vol. i. p. 187).

† This statement has been contradicted, and, it is thought, confuted, in vol. i.

yesterday respecting the postponement of Cetshwayo's visit to England. . . . The visit of Cetshwayo to England will undoubtedly prove the spoiling of an already spoilt man.* Cetshwayo will come back from England—if he ever goes there—more impressed with the supreme importance of Cetshwayo than the importance of the English nation.† Any delay, therefore, is an admirable arrangement, profitable alike to Cetshwayo and to the Colony of Natal, to the Transvaal, and to Zululand. Sir Henry Bulwer in representing this matter in its true light to the Home authorities has earned the gratitude of three communities,‡ and distinctly deserves their thanks. Could His Excellency persuade the Imperial Government that the best and safest, and, in fact, only reasonable course to pursue towards Cetshwayo is to keep him at the Oude Molen [his Capetown prison] for life, and permit those who admire the bloodthirsty old reprobate to visit and bow the knee to, and pay their homage to his ex-majesty, Sir Henry Bulwer would gain the unbounded gratitude of the Zulus, Boers, and Natalians.”

It is needless to repeat, what must be well known to every reader, that the coarse abuse of the *Times of Natal* quoted above was utterly undeserved by the unhappy but noble-minded Zulu King. Upon that subject England has been thoroughly undeceived, and no longer needs to be told that Cetshwayo was *not* a “bloodthirsty old reprobate.”

Some of the English papers at the same time displayed a very different spirit, and one of them,

* The history of the Zulu war and of Cetshwayo's captivity furnishes a strange picture of “spoiling,” truly!

† There is not the faintest ground for this sneer beyond the popular resentment that a “black man,” of whatever rank and worth, should ever be treated as anything but a “nigger.”

‡ This is a rash statement since Zululand persistently cried for the King's return, and the Transvaal Government had asked for it “as an act of justice and to prevent bloodshed,” urging that for the sake of peace and quiet on their own eastern border it should be brought about as speedily as possible.

after quoting a dozen touching passages from his letters, concludes—

“But we have quoted enough to show what manner of man Cetshwayo is. Comment is needless. The disgraceful intrigues which led to the Zulu war are known to all. No member of the present Government, at all events, will deny that the ex-King was treated shamefully at our hands. And no one who reads the correspondence now published can deny that that shameful treatment did not end with his hunt and capture after Ulundi.”*

* No! indeed, for it ended only with his life.

CHAPTER II.

ON the 12th of July, 1883, Cetshwayo was allowed to leave Capetown on his visit to England. He was accompanied by three chiefs, Umkosana, Ungobazana, and Ngcongwana,* and two attendants, his new interpreter, Mr. R. Dunn,† and Mr. H. Shepstone as custodian during his journey and stay in England. The Union Company steamer *Arab* conveyed the King and his party from Capetown, and considerable public interest was shown in the ship and her important passenger. His departure was witnessed by a large number of persons, most of whom had assembled on the wharf at an earlier hour. The crowd, which was every moment increasing, waited patiently for about an hour and a half, and as the time for the steamer's departure approached, it was feared that there might, after all, be some truth in a rumour that Cetshwayo would not embark at the docks, but be taken quietly round to the steamer by boat, after she had got outside the Bay. The arrival of the

* In vol. i. will be found an account of these chiefs, *vide* index to that vol.

† Mr. R. Dunn is no relation to Chief John Dunn, but was a stranger to the King, who would much have preferred his old friend, Mr. Samuelson.

King's luggage excited fresh interest, and at four o'clock the carriages containing the party appeared, escorted by a guard of honour furnished by the Cavalry Volunteers. One is glad to learn from the local papers at the time that there was good feeling enough in this Capetown crowd to elicit a cheer as the Zulu King passed through it. The newspapers, unwilling, as usual, to accord anything more than half sarcastic respect to a *coloured* man of any rank, used the expression, a "most *good-natured* cheer," but one may believe that there were men present who were really capable of appreciating the true nobility and undeserved yet bravely borne suffering of the Zulu King, and cheered him with honest enthusiasm, and not merely with "good-natured" indulgence to the feelings of a savage, or "half savage, half child," as Cetshwayo has been called by some ill-informed persons.

The Capetown press, indeed, was terribly afraid of committing itself to anything beyond half-contemptuous tolerance, such as a man might render not only to the child or savage, but even to the intelligent brute; but there was little or no active enmity to Cetshwayo at the Cape. The majority were indifferent to his fate; others, while secretly acknowledging his claim to both pity and respect, had not courage to espouse an unpopular cause (i. e. that of the black man), and thereby to lay themselves open to the contemptuous charge of negrophilism. A carefully aimed sneer has extinguished many a good but weak sentiment of humanity in foolish shame.

and no doubt there were such influences at work in Capetown against the Zulu king at this and other times, or surely he would not have spent three long years in miserable and neglected captivity, close to a populous and wealthy town. The newspaper accounts of the care taken on board the *Arab* to render Cetshwayo's voyage as comfortable and pleasant as might be, contrast singularly with the absence of all ordinary consideration for him during his long captivity. Lady Florence Dixie writes of the latter as follows : *—

“Surely it is something more than negligence that this unfortunate man should be denied common necessaries of comfort. I was informed by one high in official quarters not long since that 1200*l.* a year was expended on the maintenance of Cetshwayo. If this is the case the King surely receives no benefit from it; a due inquiry should be made as to the manner in which his wants are supplied. It is not the first time that I have called attention to the disgraceful neglect of this unfortunate man, whose location would hardly be fit for the meanest pauper—dismal, dark, and bare rooms, without any ornaments of any kind. The room allotted to the women is a disgrace, and this I can affirm, having seen it with my own eyes. That the King has no friends in the Office for Native Affairs is well known, his requests are shamefully neglected, and if he asks for anything, weeks, and even months, elapse before he can obtain it. The women are kept in a kind of imprisonment; permission has been refused them to visit Capetown, although they offered to pay their own expenses out of their earnings; and when some pitying friend wished to enliven the dreary solitude of Oude-Molen by a display of fireworks—a pleasure to which the King, his women, and Langalibalele looked forward with expectation and eagerness—permission was refused by the Under-Secretary. The objections given were that they did not want recreation, and they had freedom enough. Cetshwayo's daily life at Oude-Molen is full of annoyance, his requests are unheeded, and his wants unattended to.”

* *Vanity Fair*, reprinted *Times of Natal*, March 29th.

There have been many contradictory reports published about the treatment of Cetshwayo during his captivity, some asserting, as above, that he was neglected and ill-used, others declaring that he was better off than he had ever been in his life before, and that his prison-house was in every respect luxurious in comparison with his habitations in Zululand. The present writer visited him at the end of 1882, and confirms in every respect Lady Florence Dixie's account of the wretched accommodation afforded him. The house at Oude-Molen was a rough farm building, of the sort put up by early settlers in a new country, and very different from the comfortable Anglicised dwellings of well-to-do people in Capetown. Yet, such as it was, some expense in furnishing, &c., would have rendered it habitable enough, but nothing of the kind had been attempted so late as November 1882. Four bare walls,* a bare floor, and bare window, a rude table and one or two hard chairs, was all the furniture possessed by the king's reception room, while the women's apartment boasted even less. Not the faintest attempt had been made at comfort, decoration, or anything but the barest shelter, and nothing could well be more forlorn than the appearance of the whole place within and without, if the *distant view*, of which so much is said by some reporters, be left out.

The stories making out that the king was well off, in all respects compatible with his exile from Zulu-

* Bare except for the Queen's portrait, so frequently mentioned by visitors to Oude-Molen.

land, have been somewhat deceptive to the English reader on the following account. Those who have given them have chosen to regard a Zulu—any Zulu, even the King—as essentially inferior in every respect to the lowest white man, and have therefore declared that what would be sufficient for the wants of the latter must of necessity mean luxury to the former, and they have supported their theory by reference to the habits of even the greatest Zulus in their own country. The man who has been used to creep into his hut on all-fours, and to sit in an atmosphere dim with smoke for want of a chimney, who never handled a fork in his life, and knows no more of the use of the ordinary necessaries of civilised existence than do the Transvaal Boers,* must, it is argued, fancy himself in Paradise on being transferred to the humblest European dwelling. But this is a mistake, and one showing great ignorance of the immense variety in ideas of comfort which exists even amongst the civilised inhabitants of the globe. The Scotchman is starved at an English breakfast, the Englishman for lack of one in France or Italy; the Frenchman or Italian thinks tea and coffee, port and sherry a poor substitute for the copious draughts of thin light wine which form the beverage of his first meal in his own country. How much more, then, must such differences exist between English

* Who are reported, by some of those present, to have been greatly puzzled at the first British Government House dinner-party in Pretoria, as to the proper use of their table-napkins, and finally, with one accord, to have used them in lieu of pocket-handkerchiefs.

and Zulu notions? Yet it is not, therefore, to be supposed that the height of Zulu comfort must necessarily be inferior to the poorest European style.

The door of the royal hut may be low, but the abode within is roomy and scrupulously clean.* The floor is smooth and polished; on every side are spread fine white mats, and thick, soft blankets lie at hand ready for use, something after the fashion of a Turkish divan. Again, the diet of a Zulu chief might seem plain and monotonous to the European palate, but it is, at all events, the best of its kind. Cetshwayo's wants might be few and simple in his native land, but at least they were instantly supplied. The bare rooms and little wooden chair at Oude-Molen were a poor exchange for the simple comfort and entire ease of Ulundi; and since it was not possible to reproduce the latter at the Cape, those who held the King captive should surely have endeavoured to replace them by something of the luxury of civilisation enjoyed by the superior portion of the European inhabitants of Capetown, such as curtains, carpets, lounges and easy chairs, bright pictures, and the like.

That Cetshwayo's wishes were little considered may readily be gathered from official behaviour on the subject of his visitors. A great show was made, indeed, of consulting his feelings by careful exclu-

* It is said that, during a visit from Sir B. Frere to his victim, Cetshwayo, being repeatedly pressed by his visitor to say if he wished for anything, at last remarked, looking round upon the bare boarded floor, that he would like it to be made *a little cleaner*.

sion of all mere sightseers, and this was right, of course, the King having the greatest aversion to being made the object of idle curiosity. But the rule, enforced with so much parade on this account, was allowed to cut both ways, which would not have been the case had the motive been really consideration for Cetshwayo's feelings. The very friends who, it was well known, would have been his most welcome visitors, were excluded from his presence on the pretence of strict adherence to the rule laid down, while some of his bitterest foes—for instance, the editor of the *Natal Mercury*, who had not the smallest claim to an exception in his favour—were admitted.

On the 25th of September, 1879, Sir Bartle Frere personally refused Mr. F. E. Colenso and his sister, the present writer, permission to visit Cetshwayo, although the High Commissioner knew what a pleasure such a visit would have been to the prisoner in his great misery, nor, indeed, was the King even told that they had asked leave to see him, but was left to suppose himself neglected. "I heard of your passing through Capetown," he said on a later occasion, "and as you did not come to see me, I thought that even the children of *Sobantu** had forgotten me."

The following is the "minute" sent by Sir Bartle Frere, in reply to Mr. Colenso's request:—

"*Minute.*

Government House, Sept. 25th, 1879.

I regret I cannot at present give any one permission to visit Cetshwayo. He is, as Mr. Colenso is aware, a prisoner of war, and,

* *Sobantu*, "the Father of the people," i. e. the Bishop of Natal.

until proclamation of peace,* or her Majesty's pleasure regarding Cetshwayo be otherwise known, all intercourse with him must be regulated by the orders of the General Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in the Field, to whom all application to communicate with the prisoner should be referred.

(Signed) H. B. E. FRERE,
Governor."

Since, by the "General Commanding Her Majesty's forces in the field" Sir Bartle Frere meant Sir Garnet Wolseley, then in Zululand or Natal, and since Sir Bartle was perfectly well aware that Mr. and Miss Colenso were on their way to England, merely remaining at Capetown for the few days' delay necessitated by the arrangements of the mail steamers, the above suggestion was a mere farce, and the "minute" meant nothing less than a flat refusal to the individual applicants. But were this fact not sufficiently palpable, it is distinctly stated in a despatch which Sir Bartle Frere had occasion to write at a later date (May 1880), giving some explanations on the subject of visitors who had "been refused admission to see Cetshwayo." On the 18th of May, 1880, he writes to Lord Kimberley as follows [2695, p. 50]:—

"Occasionally admittance is claimed by persons professing to be friends, or well-wishers of Cetshwayo. When the reason assigned is other than sympathetic curiosity, the authorities in charge are necessarily guided by the spirit of their instructions regarding Cetshwayo's safe custody.

"It would obviously be inconsistent with their duty at present

* Sir Garnet Wolseley's interview with the thirteen chiefs whom he had chosen as kinglets took place on September 1st, 1879, when the chiefs in question signed the conditions he offered them.

to give facilities for intercourse with those whose purpose is to embarrass the Government by obstructing his further detention.

“I know, however, of few such instances of refusal. One was that of Mr. Mullins,* a notorious gun-runner, who had been convicted in Natal, and suffered a term of imprisonment with hard labour, for smuggling guns and selling them to Cetshwayo. On being refused permission to see him he attempted to elude the sentry, and to communicate with Cetshwayo on the ramparts of the castle ditch.

“The other case related to members of Dr. Colenso’s family.† One of them applied to see Cetshwayo just after his arrival, and was referred, like all other applicants, to the military authorities. I am not aware whether any further application was made, in consequence, to the General or any of his officers; ‡ but on a subsequent occasion, I am told another of Dr. Colenso’s family applied to see Cetshwayo without obtaining permission, and the result was, I think, inevitable. It will be in the recollection of Her Majesty’s Government that some time before the Zulu War Sir Henry Bulwer declined to permit Mr. Colenso, [an English barrister and] an advocate at the Natal bar, to interfere in his communications with Cetshwayo, and his refusal was, I believe, entirely approved by Her Majesty’s Government. Whether what has since been done by Dr. Colenso and members of his family in matters relating to Cetshwayo is or is not of a nature to induce any reasonable person to suppose that their interference in any question affecting Cetshwayo would conduce to his happiness, or to harmonious relations between him and the Government, I must leave to Her Majesty’s Government to decide.” §

* An account of the real facts of this case from the pen of Mr. Mullins’ counsel will be found in the Appendix to this volume.

† Sir Bartle Frere here alludes to the Bishop of Natal, not to his son, Dr. R. J. Colenso, M.B., who, on his way from England to Natal, tried in vain to see the King on the second occasion mentioned.

‡ Sir Bartle Frere could hardly have been unaware that application to the General was impossible under the circumstances, and if the words “any of his officers” meant to imply that application might have been made to officers on the spot, at Capetown, it will be observed that there is no hint of the sort in the “memo.” sent to Mr. Colenso.

§ Her Majesty’s Government did decide it, though not as Sir

Upon this remarkable document several comments will occur to every reader. In the first place it is freely acknowledged that, in the case of the Colensos, referring them "like all other applicants" to the military authorities was a mere pretence, and that it was "inevitable," i. e. especially intended, that they should be excluded. Secondly, it may be observed that Sir Bartle Frere openly classes a man of whom he speaks as a "notorious gun-runner," smuggler, and convict with the Bishop of Natal and his family as being alike dangerous and untrustworthy characters. What had "since been done by Dr. Colenso and members of his family" does not appear, but the expression can only apply at that time (May 18th, 1880) to the following facts. The Bishop had caused a prayer to be read in his churches during the war, which asked for God's mercy for the Zulus as well as for ourselves,* and which possibly was an

Bartle Frere desired. The facts concerning the above refusals were laid before Lord Kimberley, in consequence of which he sent out directions which effectually removed all official opposition to visits from the Bishop of Natal, or members of his family, to the captive King.

* Prayer written by the Bishop of Natal to be used during the continuance of the Zulu war:—

"O Eternal Lord God, through whose inscrutable Providence it has come to pass that the terrible scourge of war is laid by our hands upon a neighbouring people, we humbly commend to Thy mercy all those whose office it is to rule at this time, and all who shall be called to take part in the conflict. Thou knowest, Heavenly Father, what lessons we Christians need to be taught, though it be by suffering even unto death, as well as the ignorant heathen with whom we fight. We pray that in our different stations we may lay to heart Thy Divine teaching, and do our duty

unpatriotic petition in the eyes of some. Again, he had asked permission, in April 1879, to go up to Isandhlwana and bury the dead left upon the battle-field since January 22nd, and had offered to go without armed force, and under a safe-conduct which he would himself obtain from Cetshwayo.* And, finally,

in all things as in Thy sight. O Thou, Who alone art just and right, a God of truth, and without iniquity, watch over, we beseech Thee, all near and dear to us, and all our fellow-men, whether white or black, engaged in this deadly struggle. In Thy wisdom, we pray Thee, Merciful Father, overrule Thou all events for good, and in Thine own time restore to us, and to those whose land we have invaded, the blessings of peace, for Thy Name's sake declared to us in Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen."

* Lord Chelmsford writes to the Bishop from Utrecht on May 12th, as follows:—

"My Lord,—With reference to our conversation held at Government House, Pietermaritzburg, on the 20th April last, regarding your Lordship's proposal to ask permission of Cetshwayo to be allowed to bury the bodies, or rather bones, of those who fell at Isandhlwana, I have the honour to inform you that I referred the question, according to our agreement, to H.E. the High Commissioner. Owing to both H.E. and myself being on the move, the reply, dated May 1st, only reached me a few days ago.

"Sir Bartle Frere considers that a request such as your Lordship proposed would not be advisable at the present moment, and I cannot help expressing my entire concurrence in that view.

"I need hardly assure your Lordship that the question of burying those who fell so nobly has been continually in my thoughts, and that I am most anxious to have it done as speedily as possible. From reports that I have received I do not believe the work could have been done without risking the health of those employed in the task, until quite lately [N.B. It could have been done safely, in every sense, immediately after the battle]. And now I feel that I could not detach the requisite number of troops without seriously interfering with the operations now going on. I should feel much obliged if your Lordship would explain to any whom you may meet who are interested in the application which your Lordship

he and his had published various statements of facts tending to show that the invasion of Zululand had been unjust and unnecessary. The first great Zulu

made to me, how much I regret that political and military considerations prevent its being complied with.

I remain, my Lord, very faithfully yours,

(Signed) CHELMSFORD, L.G."

It is hardly necessary to point out that the above is a string of weak and worthless excuses. It is a matter of history now that nothing but the utter panic which seized upon the leaders of the remaining British army, upon discovering the destruction of the camp and troops at Isandhlwana, prevented their finding out that the superstitious and national customs of the Zulus rendered that dreadful battle-field safe from them for many days after the battle. Lord Chelmsford might have formed an intrenched camp hard by, and buried his dead at once in perfect safety from attack. It may also be remarked in passing that there was no "requisite number of troops," as the Bishop had offered to go with a native working party only. But the refusal is not surprising. Sir B. Frere would naturally resist any attempt to *treat with Cetshwayo* according to the honourable customs of more chivalrous warfare, or to consider him in any light but that of a wild beast to be hunted down. The decision of the High Commissioner and the General is deeply deplored by many on a special ground; for the discovery of Colonel Durnford's papers (still upon him at that time) by the Bishop of Natal, would have revealed the fact of the false-witness borne against the Colonel, and would have proved that no order to "take command" was ever sent to him, and that the one put forward by Colonel Crealock, and upon the strength of which Lord Chelmsford laid his accusation, and obtained Colonel Durnford's condemnation, was a fabrication after the event. Lord Chelmsford's friends maintain that he himself was unaware of these facts, that he believed he had sent the order to "take command," and acted in good faith in asserting it in the House of Lords. So be it. His Lordship is said to have had a severe fall from his horse, upon his head, a day or two before the disaster, and it may be that some consequent confusion of his faculties had more to do with the fatal mistakes of that unhappy day than has ever

deputation did not arrive at Maritzburg until May 24-5, 1880, a week after Sir Bartle Frere wrote, so that there had, as yet, been no opportunity for the invention of the absurd, malicious, and groundless stories which were afterwards spread abroad against the Bishop of "intriguing" in Zululand, fomenting discontent and sending emissaries to "agitate" the Zulus in favour of Cetshwayo's return.

Again, it is indeed amazing to find a man in Sir Bartle Frere's position so ignorant of the facts of what had taken place almost under his very eyes as to assert that Sir Henry Bulwer's refusal to allow Mr. Colenso (and another lawyer) to act as Cetshwayo's agents in Natal was "entirely approved by Her Majesty's Government!" This was so far from being the case that Lord Carnarvon *recognised* their original appointment, writing to Sir Henry Bulwer, "I request that you will inform Mr. [Dr.] Smith and Mr. Colenso that the desire of Her Majesty's Govern-

been made plain. Perhaps, therefore, he did *not* know at the time what orders he had given, or had intended to give. Let it be allowed also, that when he made his speeches in the House of Lords nineteen months later, he was still under this misapprehension (although there are circumstances which make this more difficult to believe than the former supposition). Granting all this, there remains the fact that Colonel Crealock's confession concerning the "order" was made on May 18th, 1882, and published about three months later, and that, *still* Lord Chelmsford is silent, though, however much misled he may have been, he has now known for two years that he has publicly laid unjust blame and dishonour upon a dead officer, whose name, owing to falsehood, has never yet received the official recognition and national honour which it so well deserves.

ment in this matter is that the boundary question shall be fully and fairly discussed, and a just arrangement arrived at, and that you will refer them to Sir Theophilus Shepstone, to whom has been committed the duty of negotiating on the subject."

The above was written, of course, in ignorance of Sir Henry Bulwer's strenuous objection to an appointment which he looked upon as an "interference" with his own dignity and prerogatives. The Zulu indunas who had made the appointment in the King's name* were frightened into backing out of the matter, and Cetshwayo, his chief object being to do what was right in the eyes of the British Government, dropped the idea at once on learning how displeasing it was to the Governor of Natal. †

* A request was sent through these indunas by Cetshwayo to the Bishop of Natal that the latter would put the Zulu claim (to the disputed territory: afterwards pronounced by the British Commissioners to be a just one) into writing, to be sent to Sir H. Bulwer and the Queen. But the Bishop had nothing whatever to do with the appointment of the diplomatic agents.

† During a personal interview with Cetshwayo in January 1878, Mr. F. E. Colenso, whilst promising to perform all services within his power as a man of law for the King, impressed upon him the wisdom of his trusting implicitly in the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, and taking no step which might possibly interfere with his Excellency's plans for the settlement of the Transvaal Border dispute. Mr. Colenso further, in accordance with what he knew to be the desire of his father, informed the King that the acceptance of the Diplomatic Agency had taken place without the knowledge of the Bishop; that it had occurred in the course of his, Mr. Colenso's, professional practice, with which his father had had nothing to do. The demeanour and disposition of the Zulu King appeared to Mr. Colenso to be deserving of the greatest sympathy and respect.

Nevertheless there can be little doubt that had the appointment been accepted by Sir Henry Bulwer, and carried into effect, the Zulu war would never have taken place, for all that was needed to prevent it was that the Zulu King should have been allowed the right to employ some educated and friendly Englishman, possessed of a competent knowledge of the Zulu tongue, to make his wishes, feelings, and intentions known to the British Government and public.

Finally, for Sir Bartle Frere to talk of what would or would not conduce to "harmonious relations" between the Government and their helpless captive reads very like a combination of bad joke and heartless mockery.

A few months after Mr. and Miss F. E. Colenso's vain effort to visit Cetshwayo on their way to England, Dr. and Mrs. R. J. Colenso made a like attempt on their way out to Natal, with the like "inevitable" result, but on this occasion, the King having passed from Imperial into Colonial custody, Mr. Sprigg, Colonial Secretary, gave the refusal [2695, pp. 52, 53]. He was challenged on the point by Mr. S. Solomon (M.L.A., Capetown) on May 13th, 1880, and Mr. Sprigg's reply amounted, in effect, to the statement that he had given "impartial refusals" to everybody.* He had a good deal to say on the subject, although the one sentence of fifteen words quoted from would have amply ex-

* Which, surely, could not have been done out of *kindness* to Cetshwayo!

pressed such meaning as he had. The point (if so it can be called) of the rest appears to be an argument about the phrase used that "Dr. Colenso got a point-blank refusal from the Colonial Secretary." Now Mr. Sprigg said that the application had been made for Dr. Colenso by a friend, and had been replied to in the negative by his—the Colonial Secretary's—Secretary; therefore, as there was no direct communication between Dr. Colenso and Mr. Sprigg, the latter argued that the former had not received a point-blank refusal. Such quibbling would be beneath notice were it not as well to point out to what manner of men so much authority was entrusted.*

A curious instance of the unwillingness to be frankly favourable to Cetshwayo is given in the *Cape Times* for July 11th, 1882. The writer begins by declaring that "It had been well if those who talked of the hardship of Cetshwayo's captivity could have

* The tone of what passed in the House of Assembly, especially the remarks of the *officials* on this occasion, is instructive. Mr. Solomon had said [2695, p. 53], "He thought if any one had a right to see this chief (Cetshwayo) it was Dr. Colenso, and he repeated that the chief, in respect of the late war, had committed no offence against God or man, and he did not see why he should be kept in this wretched captivity." (The Attorney-General, "Oh!") "The Attorney-General said 'Oh!' That remark from him was not surprising, seeing that he looked upon the captive as one of our 'natural enemies.'" (Hear, hear.)

And again, on Mr. Sauer saying he believed that there were people at large who were much more deserving of punishment than Cetshwayo, the Attorney-General cried "Oh!", and "Hear, hear" again followed the remark that he would not agree with the sentiment.

seen the spot in which he has been located for the last three years as seen yesterday" Then follows a description of the *surrounding and distant scenery* visible from Oude-Molen, which might, no doubt, have been some consolation to a landscape-painter during a temporary imprisonment, but could certainly have had no soothing effect on the miseries of the captive Zulu King,* who would have preferred the bleakest corner of his own country in freedom, and amongst his devoted subjects, to captivity with the loveliest view on earth to be seen from his prison-house. The writer says nothing of the King's actual dwelling-place, of which another eye-witness had written, "There possibly may be rooms more cramped, more desolate, and more bare than that in which Cetshwayo lives, but I hardly think it possible;" nor does he speak of the land given with the poor cottage upon it for the Zulu King's use, wretchedly barren, poor, and, in winter, bleak—as worthless a piece of ground as could have been selected anywhere within reach of Capetown.

The writer in the *Cape Times* proceeds to describe the King's appearance, saying that he was thinner than of yore, but that "captivity has not saddened Cetshwayo's face, nor dulled his intellect, nor shaken off the edge of that marvellous diplomatic cunning which is peculiar to the native chieftains of South Africa."

* The artistic feeling of the Zulus has certainly yet to be developed, but that it is dormant and not absent may be gathered from the readiness with which they learn to use their eyes when any trouble is taken to teach them.

Here we have again the stereotyped accusation of "cunning" thrown in Cetshwayo's face, and this time plainly by one who had personal opportunity of observing his bright frank bearing and open countenance. The conversation which ensued is described, showing that the King had perfect faith in the justice of his cause, and *therefore* in his restoration to his kingdom, as soon as he should have had this longed-for opportunity of explaining matters to "the Queen." Also that he was sure of his people's glad reception of him when he should return, and of their quiescence meanwhile, when they should learn that he had really been allowed to go to England to plead his and their cause. The bare report of Cetshwayo's words is simple and touching enough, and nothing but the most determinedly perverse and unfriendly spirit could have dictated the comment of the *Cape Times* which follows:—"It may be noted as significant that the King conceives that his visit to England will restore rest for a period in Zululand, a period between his departure from the Cape and his return to his native country. Why rest? If rest comes immediately Cetshwayo leaves these shores, then the intrigue must be perfect."

According to the writer's own account, Cetshwayo had said, "Yes, people would sit still when they heard that their King had gone to England," and said nothing about "for a period." His simple and evident meaning was that he had heard of the anarchy caused in Zululand by his absence, and of the desire of his people for his return, and he natu-

rally believed that they would be still as soon as they knew that so great a step had been taken towards the fulfilment of their hopes, especially as he had written to the heads of the nation on the 17th of May bidding them be quiet [3247, p. 88]. The result justified his expectations. The sudden lull in Zulu disorder which ensued was, of course, ascribed to various other causes, but this was the true one, and it was due to no "intrigues," as so wildly imagined, but to the simple love and loyalty of the Zulu people for their King, for whose sake they bore tyranny, insult, and loss through all the years of his absence, in hopes of his return.

"We said that Cetshwayo was a diplomatist," continues this writer. "In proof of this, he yesterday said that he should be glad to see, when he returned to Zululand, many white people coming to see him, and, imitating writing, he said especially newspaper men. This was conveyed to us in the most becoming way, and, if there were any satire in it, the King had his enjoyment, and we were not hurt. Let us hope that all Cetshwayo's enjoyments in the future will be as harmless."*

The above is plainly intended to contain some satire, but the writer might have spared himself the trouble of labouring over it had he remembered how often the Zulu King had lamented the want of clerical knowledge amongst his people, saying truly that, if there had been any one with him in 1878 to write the truth for him, and to explain matters between him and the English, there would have been

* This phrase insinuates that his amusements in the past had been far from harmless, but this is mere "formula" without any discoverable foundation in fact.

no war. All that Cetshwayo wanted was light, and that the truth should be published concerning his words and deeds, and, taking for granted, as he innocently did, that every English newspaper correspondent would write the truth as far as he knew it, he naturally wished to have one at his side when he should return to power.

Various anecdotes were naturally related and published concerning Cetshwayo's behaviour on the voyage to England, and as unfortunately is habitual with our modern press, every detail, however trivial, of his dress and habits, every petty personal peculiarity, was described for the public benefit, down to the amount of food he required, the size of his boots,* his predilection for personal cleanliness, and his opinion of the British bull-dog. One of the most frequently repeated stories about him is that of his indignation against a brutal (white) fellow-passenger, who tossed a live cat overboard in his presence. The King, it is said, protested against the act as one of wanton cruelty, and never ceased to show his dislike for the person who had committed it as long as they remained on board together.

It is curious and painful to observe the petty jealousy shown throughout by nearly all the Colonial papers (even a few English ones) of every kindness and evidence of respect and good-feeling shown

* The Zulu King's hands and feet were by no means large for a man of his height. The size of his boots of course tells nothing, as they would necessarily be very much too large (to fashionable apprehension) in order to be comfortably worn by feet which had never known such confinement before.

towards the Zulu King. Nor was this grudging and spiteful spirit wholly to be accounted for by his having been, however involuntarily, in the position of an enemy. It arose chiefly from the colour of his skin, which to a certain portion of the South African colonists is intolerable, except in an inferior, and to such people the inability of the majority of the British public to understand or enter into their foolish and unchristian feelings is a most grievous offence.*

* In all such passages the writer wishes it to be understood that allusion is made to a *portion* only, although a large portion, of the Natal colonists. But unhappily that portion is not only large, but "noisy," and the minority is small who really recognise the coloured man as a fellow-creature; these latter, while knowing that the greater part of an untaught race must, of necessity, be inferior to the educated portion of a civilised nation, yet realise that such a state of things may prove to be a temporary one, that already there are striking exceptions, and that many a coloured man, even without the advantages of civilisation, is a nobler man and, in his life, a better Christian, ay! even although he has never heard the name of Christ as yet, than those amongst the "superior" race who would grudge him any position but that of slave. That the slave-holding instinct of a considerable portion of the South African colonists is not exaggerated, may be gathered from what has lately taken place in Natal with regard to the *master and servant's ordinance* (i. e. *white* master and *black* servant). By the old law of the Colony, in force up to 1876, the magistrates had the power of inflicting the lash upon native servants for trivial offences, neglect of duty, absence without leave, and other matters which were purely civil offences, coming under the head of breach of contract. The majority of the magistrates being entirely in sympathy with the master class, to which they belonged (being therefore themselves liable to all the unavoidable inconveniences of untrained and ignorant native service), made common cause with the complainants in such cases, until, in fact, there was little difference between the effect of the law in Natal and that in the Transvaal, where a master, whether justly displeased or merely

Instances of this temper may be found in the Colonial papers at the time, one of which, at the end of a column of selected paragraphs from English papers upon Cetshwayo's arrival in England, heads the last (from the *World*) with "sensible," thereby showing its sympathy with a sentiment that it was truly a disgrace to the British press to have uttered, and which was expressed as follows:—

"Says the *World*, 'The manner in which Cetshwayo has been received by the British public would be amusing if it were not disgusting. This gormandising black savage, who cost us many of the flower of our youth, thousands of lives, and millions of money, has scarcely landed, before a young lady presents him with a valuable locket, and all Southampton is waiting to clasp his enormous paws. The airs the fellow gives himself are tremendous. He would not receive the Governor of Madeira, but sent word that "the King sleeps," and, on awaking the first morning at Melbury Road, he *expressed a wish that the people should be thanked for the way in which they had cheered him.*" This really only wants the insertion of "was graciously pleased to express" to read like a bit of our own Court Circular.'"

out of temper, could simply send a native servant to receive so many lashes, without giving any reason why. The main difference, indeed, may be said to lie in the fact that in Natal, the *women* servants could not, by law, be flogged. But without that additional atrocity, the system was bad enough to be a crying disgrace to a colony under British rule. In 1876 a regulation was introduced by which no sentence of flogging could be carried out without application made to, and permission received from, the Governor, and this rule for a time considerably lessened such punishments for lighter offences. But the regulation has been, and still is, a most unpopular one with the masters, and many attempts have been made by members of the Legislative Council to reintroduce the lash at will. Responsible government, it can hardly be doubted, would produce that effect at once, and is earnestly opposed on such grounds as these by those who have the interests of the natives at heart.

The young lady's present may not, perhaps, have been a judicious one—of that the recipient's gratification or indifference would be the only measure—but it was a kindly meant and an innocent act on her part to give it; and the *World* appears to have equally objected to the ordinary English courtesy of hand-shaking (although that in itself did away with any resemblance to British Court etiquette).* The "enormous paws" may be well allowed to pass, but is pure fiction, as Cetshwayo's hands were noticeably small and well-shaped, and the writer must indeed have been hard up for some fault to find when he uttered his sneer at the poor King's grateful wish to show that he felt the kindness of his reception in England, after all the tribulations and humiliations through which he had passed since Sir Garnet Wolseley's first discourtesy to his captive at Ulundi.†

* Cetshwayo must have learnt it from his captors, as it is not a Zulu custom.

† The first, but not the last, though the former act showed more want of manners on Sir Garnet Wolseley's part, and the latter more lack of heart. The second instance is mentioned by Sir B. Frere in the despatch already quoted [2695, p. 50], where he says: "I know of but one instance in which he (Cetshwayo) has asked to see any one, and his wishes have not been complied with; and that was in the case of a military officer of very high rank and official position, passing through Capetown; who did not see any reason for complying with Cetshwayo's wish to see him." When Sir Garnet Wolseley passed through Capetown in 1880, and refused, as above-mentioned, to comply with Cetshwayo's request, the latter sent him the following letter [2695, p. 31]:—

"The Castle, Capetown, May 3, 1880.

"Cetshwayo sends his greetings to Sir Garnet Wolseley; he is much disappointed at finding Sir Garnet Wolseley is so much engaged during his short stay in Capetown that he cannot give him an

This extract from the *World* continues in the original:—

“The fact that this delightful creature is accompanied by two of the leaders of his forces at Isandhlwana and Rorke’s Drift will

interview, and is much distressed at hearing he is leaving the country. He wishes to tell him that, during his stay in the castle here, he has been living in the hopes of being pardoned. He trusts His Excellency will speak in his favour to Her Majesty the Queen, whose pleasure he is waiting, and whose will he will submit to. Cetshwayo still lives in the hopes that he may some day be allowed to return to his native country, and join his wives and children. Since he has been living in the castle he has received little or no news of his family in Zululand, and is ignorant of what Sir Garnet Wolseley has decided on with regard to them, and is anxious to hear how his wives have been disposed of, and what will be their future. He wishes to say that, although Sir Garnet Wolseley is a great man, yet he has the heart and feelings of other men, and therefore can appreciate Cetshwayo’s desire to return to his native country. Cetshwayo has always heard that England is not only a great country, but also a merciful one. Cetshwayo wishes His Excellency a pleasant and safe voyage.

“The foregoing was dictated to me, through Mr. Longcast, the interpreter, by Cetshwayo, this 3rd day of May, 1880.

(Signed) W. RUSCOMBE POOLE, Capt.,
Staff-Officer in charge of
CETSHWAYO.”

By way of showing the King how thoroughly he had misjudged his composition, Sir Garnet Wolseley would not see him, and himself remarks [*ibid.*], “To Cetshwayo’s prayer for pardon I returned no answer.” He did, however, send “instructions to the British Resident to make inquiries regarding Cetshwayo’s family,” about which, after “settling” Zululand, the General does not himself appear to have known anything at all, and so deeply did he feel the captive’s appeal to his “heart and feelings,” and such energetic steps did he take to have the King’s mind set at rest, that it only needed from then, May 3rd, 1880, to April 25th, 1882—two years all but a month—to obtain the official information for which Cetshwayo had begged. This, as the

increase the admiration with which the visit is regarded by those who lost relatives in the Zulu war. We forget too quickly. Let us read again the records of that sad time before we give ourselves up to welcoming the cause of it."

This paragraph is stated to be from the pen of Mr. Edmund Yates, and one cannot but regret that so well-known an author, whose many and popular works have given him some influence over the public mind, should have thus descended to the level of the most ignorant colonial jingo, and should have tried to stir up the bitter feeling, natural, although unreasonable, which is sure to exist after deadly warfare between any two nations, but which it should be the part of Christian and educated men to calm.

It will be enough for our purpose to select a few passages out of the many newspaper accounts of Cetshwayo's arrival in England published at the time, those chosen giving what the present writer, with her special opportunities of knowledge, and after personal acquaintance with the Zulu King, believes to be a fair description and probable in all respects, palpable blunders being corrected.

Before leaving Madeira, it was said, letters were written by the King to each of his wives, and sent ashore to be posted. If this was so (which seems likely, judging from Cetshwayo's habitual care for his family), either his custodian, Mr. Shepstone, or

General had come straight from Zululand, he ought himself to have been able to supply at once, or at all events, the information should have been obtained from the British Resident in Zululand within the month.

else the authorities in Natal, must certainly have neglected their duty, for no news at all was received by the King's wives, although, perhaps, the women attendants left at Oude Molen—and for whose comfort during his absence he had especially begged that an interpreter might be provided—may have had news of his safe arrival so far.

The story told of his refusing to see the Governor of Madeira, because his Excellency had not "first sent a state messenger to see if the King of the Zulus" would receive him, is simply nonsense. Either the native attendants may have said, as a simple truth, that the King was asleep, or else he was not informed by the custodian or interpreter of the rank of his visitor. Whatever may be the actual explanation of the tale, there cannot be the smallest doubt that Cetshwayo would have readily received any one whom Mr. Shepstone advised him to see. He was far too anxious for the success of his enterprise to risk it by any such "airs" as Mr. Yates has it.

"The *Arab*—says the *Standard*—with the Zulu King Cetshwayo and his suite, arrived in Plymouth Sound this morning (August 3rd) at five o'clock, after a much longer voyage from Madeira than had been anticipated . . . and the *Thames*, tender, speedily made her way . . . to the vessel. . . . On nearing the *Arab* the head of the Zulu King was seen above the bulwarks, but before the tender came alongside it had disappeared, as Cetshwayo objected to be stared at, and had retired to his cabin. He was, however, persuaded to receive the 'newspaper men,' who had come on board for the express purpose of 'interviewing' him, and who gave the public the benefit of their first impressions, which appear to have been far from unpleasant.

"Cetshwayo was dressed in a thick pilot-cloth coat, and wore a

cap, under which was a circlet indicating his royal faction.* He seemed in the best of health and spirits. He has a jet-black face † and hair with just a tinge of grey. The King's good temper seemed unbounded. He shook hands heartily with all who bade him welcome to England, laughed and joked with Mr. Shepstone, Mr. Dunn, and his chiefs almost incessantly, and the opinion passed upon him in homely phrase by one of the sailors of the tender was that which, after all best seemed to suit him, 'a down-right jolly old chap.'

"In reply to your correspondent, who welcomed him to Plymouth, he said he was delighted to be in England, he had long wished to pay England a visit, and he had been eagerly looking out to see what sort of a country it was.

"The morning was one of the loveliest of the year. The water looked its bluest, and the wooded slopes of Mount Edgumbe never appeared more pleasant. Cetshwayo was delighted with the harbour, and the deep green of the land, and the great buildings which he saw, the lighthouses, the breakwater, and forts. But he wanted to know was not Plymouth a small place. . . . He said he had enjoyed the voyage, after the start, very much, and that the weather had been very agreeable until within the last two or three days, when the climate had been rather colder than he liked. However, it was all right again now. He declared in the most emphatic way that there never ought to have been any war between him and England; and ascribed the fact that there was one, to the little grey-headed man (meaning Sir Bartle Frere) and some of the Colonial newspapers, against whom he is deeply prejudiced. He believes that when he gets ashore he will obtain the consent of the Government to his return. His people, he says, want him, and he thinks John Dunn is the only stumbling-block in the way of his restoration. Unless he is restored, he holds that there will be war; but he is confident that the English people will not disappoint him, because he believes that when he is able to see the Government for himself, and state his own case, he will be able to show that justice was on his side."

The correspondents of other papers give substantially the same account, the *Echo* stating that "the

* This is a mistake; the head-ring is worn by all Zulus who are married men.

† Dark brown, by no means "jet black." This is the mistake of an unaccustomed eye.

ex-King had even gained on board the *Arab* the appellation of the 'first gentleman in South Africa.'"

Cetshwayo was taken at once to London, a house in Melbury Road, Kensington, having been prepared for his reception, and due pains were evidently taken to provide for his comfort and amusement. The latter, however, he could not fully appreciate, his whole mind and heart being occupied with concern for his people's troubles, anxiety for their welfare, and hopes of his return to them. His visit to England was not, he felt, for pleasure, but strictly and seriously for business of a character overwhelmingly important to him and his. The *Daily News* remarks :—

"Our agitated life is nothing to Cetshwayo, our smoky air is not for his breathing, our art (such as it is)* to him is meaningless. He knows very well what he likes: he likes free air, absolute dominion [?], and an affectionate harem, not too many clothes, and as much exercise as he can take. He has a home-sickness for the old happy time when all these were his own, and unless we restore him as King of Zululand, we can do little for him that he is likely to enjoy. This, according to many men of sound judgment, well acquainted with the politics of South Africa, is a step that our own interests as well as a sense of justice dictate. A peaceful and united Zululand is more likely to be promoted by his restoration, according to these authorities, than by any other course that can be taken. In the meantime he is our guest, and it is the duty of hospitality to make his sojourn with us as pleasant for him as possible. A horse-race, or a good day on the moors, he might appreciate; but, unless we misread his character, evening parties will not minister to his entertainment."

"Cetshwayo does not regard his visit to England as a pleasure excursion," says another journal, "and it is doubtful

* The parenthesis is the *Daily News's* own, which the author declines to seem to adopt.

whether he will appear much in public. He is filled with a serious purpose, and is overwhelmed with the importance of his mission. He says openly that he has come to plead with the Queen and the Home Government for his restoration to the Zulu Kingdom. It is touching to read of his eagerness during the voyage to reach his destination, and there is something truly pathetic in the spectacle of a dethroned monarch making a pilgrimage to the land of his conquerors. Whatever may be the object of the Government in bringing him over, it is in the light of a pious pilgrimage that Cetshwayo regards his visit. He is hopeful of the result, and looks forward to his interview with 'the great Queen' as the realisation of his ardent longings. Apart from legal technicalities, or rather in spite of them, he is still a captive among a strange people, and his natural intelligence and sensitiveness cause him to feel his humiliating position with painful acuteness."

These suppositions proved correct, nevertheless Cetshwayo was too intelligent a man not to take an interest in much that was shown him during his stay, especially in such machinery and mechanical inventions as were explained to him from time to time, and he was of too buoyant and hopeful a disposition not to extract some pleasure by the way. He paid a visit to the Prince and Princess of Wales at Marlborough House, where he was very kindly received :—

"On being introduced," says the reporter, "the Prince shook Cetshwayo's hand warmly, and through the medium of the interpreter introduced him to the Princess of Wales. In the course of conversation the Prince inquired if Cetshwayo had recovered from his illness, and expressed great interest in the King's enjoyment of his visit to this country. . . . Previous to departing (from Marlborough House) Cetshwayo presented the Princes Albert Victor and George with two sticks made of wood brought from Zululand."

But the visit of which he thought the most was, of course, to Osborne, to see that Sovereign Lady towards whom, through all his miseries, he preserved

a deep and simple loyalty which never wavered. The visit was described as follows :—

“The special train, with Lord Kimberley, Cetshwayo, Mr. Shepstone and the three Zulu Chiefs, arrived in Portsmouth Dockyard at 11.15. A large crowd assembled on the jetty, curious to see Cetshwayo, who was received by Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar and Admiral Ryder. The *Fire Queen*, the Commander-in-Chief's yacht, was in waiting to convey the ex-King to Osborne, for the purpose of having an interview with Her Majesty.

“Cetshwayo was attired in a dark suit, with a tall hat which shone resplendent in the bright sunshine, no less than did the dark and shining features of the ex-King, who by his pleasant smile, and dignified deportment, created quite a favourable impression. . . .

“When Cetshwayo and his party were ready, they proceeded on board the *Fire Queen*, the crimson-covered gangways used on the occasion of Royal visits being brought into requisition. The crew doffed hats as Cetshwayo reached the deck, and from the *Tyne* troopship lying astern of the *Fire Queen*, as well as from the flagship and other vessels in the harbour, the greatest interest was exhibited in the Royal party.

“The *Fire Queen* arrived at a quarter past twelve, and the party drove to Osborne, and were conveyed in the Queen's private open carriages with postilions. The Queen received the ex-King in her private reception-room. . . . Her Majesty gave Cetshwayo and his suite a very cordial reception, and during the quarter of an hour or thereabouts that the interview lasted, conversed freely with the ex-King through the medium of the interpreter.

“Cetshwayo subsequently expressed himself as highly gratified with his visit to the Queen, whose dignified and yet gracious and affable bearing evidently impressed him, and during the return journey he was in the best of spirits. When the interview was ended, Cetshwayo was shown over the house and through the gardens. At half-past one luncheon was served to the visitors, who were joined by the Earl of Kimberley, Sir H. Ponsonby, and the Ladies-in-Waiting.”

On his return journey to Melbury Road, after his visit to the Queen, Cetshwayo was heartily cheered by large crowds, both at Portsmouth and Victoria

Station, and thus ended a day which the Zulu King certainly regarded as one of the proudest and most hopeful of his life.

The adverse colonial papers, of course, kept up a running commentary of sneers at every instance of kindness or courtesy shown to the Zulu King, but in the midst of their disgust, which culminated with the reception of Cetshwayo at Osborne, they comforted themselves with one reflection, viz. that he had been made to lunch there *with the upper servants!* This, it seems, was the idea conveyed to the colonial mind by the words "Master of the Household" and "Ladies-in-Waiting"!

Her Majesty, indeed, like all others who came into personal contact with the Zulu King, seems to have been favourably impressed with him. It was a sign of royal good-feeling that she desired his portrait to be painted for her, and that he fully appreciated the honour done to him in this respect is plain from the following story which was given in all the newspapers at the time, and which seems to be a well-attested tale:—While he was sitting for his likeness, a deputation from the National Temperance League called upon him in Melbury Road, for the purpose of impressing upon him the great evils inflicted upon native races by the use of alcoholic liquors, and to ask him to discourage, as far as possible, the importation, manufacture, and use of such drinks in his own country. After waiting half-an-hour the deputation were informed by Mr. Fynney that Cetshwayo was sitting for a portrait, by order

of Her Majesty, who had specially sent an artist that morning. It was, therefore, with great regret that the King found it impossible to receive them.

The following conversation ensued between Mr. Fynney and Mr. Rae, a member of the League:—

Mr. Rae.—Do you not think he could spare ten minutes from the sitting to-day?

Mr. Fynney.—The gentlemen who accompany the artist are very desirous the portrait should be finished as soon as possible.

Mr. Rae.—I do not think we need delay the process, if you could try to arrange the meeting.

Mr. Fynney.—I have been trying, and have asked the King to give you a short time, but he positively says, No. He is sitting for the portrait, and I cannot see that he can leave it. There is one thing I should like to say, namely, that the Zulu nation are not drinkers of spirits—that is, the Zulus themselves—and, with the exception of their own beer, and that is harmless, are a most abstemious people. I will ask again if he will see you, as you desire it.

The deputation then waited for another quarter of an hour, when Mr. Fynney returned, and said he greatly regretted that he could not possibly prevail upon the King to see the deputation. The King had said, “No; this is a request from her Majesty, and as it is the wish of my Mother, the Queen, I cannot disregard it, much as I wish to see these gentlemen.” Mr. Fynney added that Cetshwayo would be happy on any other day, when he was at liberty, to have an interview with the members of the League, and

to receive their statement. "It is," the King had said (alluding to the Queen's command), "as urgent as a matter of life and death, and I cannot neglect the wishes of the Queen."*

"On being asked to express an opinion upon our Queen, he said," writes the London correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, "She is born to rule men, she is like me. We are both rulers. She was very kind to me, and I shall always think of her.' We spoke of Bishop Colenso," continues the same writer, "and the name roused him to instant vigour. He rolled on his seat, and showed his very gums in his eager talk, while his hands waved in the air, and he took snuff violently. 'The Bishop,' he said, 'loves all Zulus.† His heart is as big as all London for my nation. I love him, and he has done everything for me.'"

This writer speaks of an "ominous expression" passing over the King's features at mention of John Dunn, and foretells evil to the latter should he ever be a captive under the "dusky gaze" of that "ruthless face," which expressions are about as inapplicable as that about the "enormous paws." The "London correspondent" plainly writes on a preconceived

* It will be observed that it was purely Cetshwayo's feeling of duty in obeying the Queen's wish which actuated him, and no disregard for the motives and opinions of the Temperance deputation. The Zulu King was never addicted to strong drink himself, and even those amongst his enemies who tried to bring the charge against him at the beginning of his captivity were compelled to withdraw it, or rather, to put forward the statement, "he has quite overcome the predilection for 'square face' which marked the earlier days of his captivity," which would hardly have been the case had he ever shown any such "predilection" at all. Had he ever been allowed to reign again, it would have been well worth while to put him on his guard, for his people's sake, against that terrible foe to nations still in their childhood, and of the evils of which he had really hardly had the opportunity of judging.

† He might have said with equal truth "all his fellow-men."

idea, and another writer about the same time (and not a very partial one either) more truly says, "His temper is amiable, and his disposition generous. He does not appear vindictive, and refers to John Dunn's alleged ingratitude with indignation, but without bitterness."

A visit to the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich appears to have interested him greatly, and to have brought out especially his keen intellect and quick comprehension of the various mechanical principles explained to him. On leaving, he addressed General Gage (commanding Woolwich Garrison), through the interpreter, saying that he could not express the pleasure which this visit to the "great workshop" of the Queen, his Mother,* had given him. He had now seen the wonders of the English nation, and had witnessed where England gets her power from. "You are indeed a wonderful people, and what I have seen has filled me with astonishment," he said, concluding by expressing warm thanks to General Gage for so kindly showing him everything. To this General Gage replied, "I can only assure the King how pleased we have been to have had the honour of showing him the sights of Woolwich Arsenal. I hope that in the future we shall always be the firmest of allies with him, and he with us." On the General's reply being interpreted to Cetshwayo, the King's face beamed with animation and pleasure, and he spoke again at some little length

* It must be borne in mind that, from a Zulu, the title of parent is the highest and most respectful that can be given.

He said, "I may say that I have almost ceased to be astonished. I feel that I have grown up, so to speak, in a day; that from a childhood of the understanding I have suddenly sprung to manhood. I have a great deal to report to my nation when I return, for which I shall hardly be able to find words, but I have seen the might of England, and the goodness and kindness of the English nation."

But most important of all to the future of Zululand were Cetshwayo's interviews with Lord Kimberley at the Colonial Office, on the 7th, 15th, and 17th of August [3466, p. 105]. This was what he had come for, to plead his cause before the Queen through her representative, to explain or deny the accusations brought against him, and to obtain his own release by showing that he had never deserved his capture and imprisonment. It may readily be imagined that a different tone on his part would have proved more comfortable and convenient from the official point of view. If he would but have allowed the plea of "guilty" to be made for him, expressing contrition and promising amendment for the future, it would at least have been gratifying to the feelings of those who had wrought his downfall, and whose strongest objection to his restoration lay in the fact that for England to grant it as a point, not of mercy, but of *justice* and expediency, virtually signed the condemnation of a whole string of notable names. But Cetshwayo never learnt the lesson of diplomacy which his European neighbours and conquerors had striven so long and hard to teach him. He remained

simple, honourable, and truthful to the last—a man of his word to the bitter end—even when his adherence to it, and the knowledge that he would adhere to it on the part of his less scrupulous adversaries, white and black, were costing him his kingdom, his liberty, and at last, unhappily, his life.

The Zulu king's own words on behalf of himself and his people are more forcible and convincing than anything which can be said for him by others, and it is in unwilling acknowledgment of this fact that his (white) enemies are so fond of talking of his "cunning," his "craft," and "wiliess." But, in point of fact, no such terms are applicable to any portion of Cetshwayo's dealings with either friend or foe. His chief strength throughout lay in the fact that having nothing to hide, he was absolutely frank, truthful, and straightforward. He had never been either the secret treacherous foe to England, nor the cruel tyrant to his people that his opponents tried to make him out, and when his own simple, manly words made the fact apparent, those opponents could only endeavour to throw discredit upon them by the parrot-cry of "Oh, the wily old savage!"

The first interview at the Colonial Office, on August 7th, may be given as it stands in the Blue Book, being short, and very much to the point [3466, p. 105].

"Cetshwayo was accompanied by three chiefs and a native interpreter" [besides Mr. Shepstone and Mr. Dunn, who acted as interpreter. Mr. Ashley, M.P., and Mr. Bramston were also present at the interview]. "Lord Kimberley inquired of Cetshwayo whether he was satisfied with his treatment here (in England),

and Cetshwayo replied that he was. Lord Kimberley then invited him to make any statement as to his case that he desired. Cetshwayo replied that he wished to know what he had done wrong; why he had been punished. He said that he threw himself, as it were, at the feet of Her Majesty's Government. Lord Kimberley said it was of no use now to go into the past; but that Cetshwayo must know that his army was regarded as threatening the peace and safety of the Queen's dominions.

"Cetshwayo said that he never had any intention of attacking the Queen's dominions, that he had never sent his armies across the border during the war, and that he had been defeated and captured while in his own country.

"Lord Kimberley observed that, whatever the future arrangements in Zululand might be, one thing was certain. The Queen could not allow a Zulu armed force to exist, as formerly, under his reign; Cetshwayo had seen that our power was too strong for him, and that would always be the case; but we could not allow our peaceful colonists to be alarmed and their security threatened.*

"Cetshwayo said that his father Panda, and Dingaan before him, had made large armies, but that he himself had not created a single new regiment; that his predecessors had, nevertheless, always been friendly to the English, and that he had never had any intention of being otherwise; that Sir Theophilus Shepstone was taken away and new men came, and there was no friend to advise him; and that as regards his keeping an armed force, he was quite willing to obey the orders of the Government, but that regiments were wanted to attend on the King, to build kraals, and to do other work which he ordered.

"Lord Kimberley said there would be no obstacle to peaceful works, but that regiments for war, such as existed formerly, could never be allowed.

"Cetshwayo said that he quite understood that.

* *Vide* the language of the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal (vol. i. p. 371, *ad fin.*):—"The view of his Excellency the Lieutenant-General, and also of his Excellency the High Commissioner, were both based on the assumption of an invasion of Natal by the Zulus—a contingency which, though it was of course a *possibility*, as it had been a possibility for the last thirty years, was, in the opinion of the Government, in the highest degree improbable, unless, indeed, it should be brought about by compromising action on our part."

“ Lord Kimberley then asked if he had anything to say as to the present condition of Zululand.

“ On this point Cetshwayo referred to the three chiefs who had recently come from the country. The sum of what the chiefs said was that only four of the appointed chiefs were unfavourable to Cetshwayo's return, namely, John Dunn, Umfanawendhlela, Uhamu, and Usibebu. They complained especially of oppressive proceedings on the part of Dunn, Usibebu, and Uhamu. They mentioned specially Somkeli and Umlandela as favourable to Cetshwayo's return, and said that Chingwayo had also expressed himself favourably, but did not dare to say so now.

“ Finally, Lord Kimberley referred to the reports which had reached this country of his cruelties.

“ Cetshwayo said: How could he reply to mere general accusations? Let a particular case be stated, and he would explain and defend his conduct. He entirely denied any indiscriminate killing such as he had been accused of. In conclusion, Cetshwayo said: Let the Queen not take him merely by the hand. If you take a man merely by the hand, he may slip from you. Let Lord Kimberley rather grasp him by the arm, and let the Queen take him by the waist, for then will ‘they hold him fast.’

“ Lord Kimberley then said that the interview would terminate for that day. The matter was too important to be disposed of at once; he would only now inform Cetshwayo that his statements would be considered.”

The second interview took place on August 15th, and the following is the official report of what passed [*ibid.* p. 106]:—

“ *The Earl of Kimberley* (addressing Mr. Dunn).—Will you tell the King first, that the other day, as our conversation was of a general character, I did not think it necessary to have a full record kept of what was said then, but as this conversation will be upon matters of importance, I have given instructions to have what is said duly written down. (*Mr. Dunn interpreted this to the King.*)”

Many readers will regret that no “ full record ” of the first interview was kept, since even from the short account given above, it was plainly of the utmost importance for the decision of the rights of Cetshwayo's

case, his innocence or guilt, and, in fact, of all upon which the amount of power and independence to be rightly restored to Cetshwayo must depend. It is difficult, therefore, to comprehend how Lord Kimberly could think "it was of no use now to go into the past," since upon that the future so much depended, and it is impossible not to ask whether, if that past, and the King's own statements upon it, had been carefully considered, Her Majesty's Government might not have been convinced that the wisest and safest as well as most just course would be to restore him to his position of King over Zululand, instead of reducing him to the nominal chieftainship of a portion of his previous dominions—nominal even there, since the promises exacted from him left him bound hand and foot, at the mercy of all who chose, or could be induced to oppose him.

After these preliminaries,

"*The E. of K.* continued—Tell him that Her Majesty's Government have very carefully deliberated upon the whole question of Zulu affairs, and I am able to-day to inform him generally what they have resolved upon. (*Mr. Dunn interpreted.*)

The E. of K.—He will be good enough to listen very carefully to what will be now said, and it will be afterwards explained to him again, and as often as he pleases after our interview, in order that he may completely understand what is put before him. (*Interpreted.*)

The E. of K.—Her Majesty's Government have determined to consider the possibility of making arrangements for his return to Zululand. (*Interpreted.*)

The E. of K.—The following are the main conditions on which Sir Henry Bulwer, the Governor of Zululand, has been authorised to proceed. (*Interpreted.*)

The E. of K.—First, a portion of the country, to be hereafter defined by Her Majesty's Government, will not be placed under his rule, but will be reserved for other purposes. (*Interpreted.*)

The E. of K.—Secondly, a Resident will be appointed by the Queen to advise him and report to Her Majesty. (*Interpreted.*)

The E. of K.—Thirdly, he will be required to enter into engagements with Her Majesty for the just and peaceful government of his people, similar to those by which the thirteen Chiefs are now bound. (*Interpreted.*)

The E. of K.—Say that I am not aware whether he is well acquainted with those conditions, but that I will read to him shortly the heads of the conditions, and afterwards, as they are long, they shall be fully explained to him by Mr. Shepstone. (*Interpreted.*)

The E. of K.—I will now read the heads of the conditions. The first is that he shall observe the boundaries assigned to his territory by the Queen.

The E. of K.—Secondly, that he will allow all men to marry whom they choose, according to the usage and customs of the people before the establishment by Chaka of the military system.*

The E. of K.—Thirdly, that he will allow all persons living in his territory to pass freely where they please, to work in Natal or elsewhere.

The E. of K.—Fourthly, that he will not allow to be imported into his territory by the sea coast any arms, or ammunition, or goods, or merchandise without the permission of the Resident.†

The E. of K.—Fifthly, that he will not allow the life of any of his people to be taken without an impartial trial, and after sentence passed by a council of his chief men.‡

The E. of K.—Sixthly, that he will not allow the practice of ‘smelling out’ for witchcraft. ‡

* For this condition Cetshwayo would be prepared, as it was part of Sir Bartle Frere’s *Ultimatum* in 1878. It must also be remembered that the said “military system,” as carried out under Cetshwayo’s rule, has been greatly exaggerated by his (white) opponents. In point of fact, only Zulus who entered the army were forbidden (like British soldiers) to marry without leave, and they enrolled themselves voluntarily; there was no obligation, except that of custom, or “fashion,” although it was, no doubt, a very general one.

† The portion of this condition with regard to merchandise seems somewhat petty and *mercantile* for a great nation to require.

‡ These two conditions only require what Cetshwayo had himself, of his own accord, tried throughout his reign, and (with regard to the sixth condition, before it) to carry out. It is a matter of undisputed history that he disbelieved many of the

The E. of K.—Seventhly, that he will surrender all persons to justice who are fugitives in Zululand from the Queen's territory, and deliver them up to the Queen's officers—I mean, of course, when they have committed a crime against our law—in order that they may be punished by the Queen's authorities.*

The E. of K.—Eighthly, that he will not make any treaty with any chiefs, people, or government outside the territory assigned to him without the sanction and approval of the British Government. (*Interpreted.*)

The E. of K.—Ninthly, that he will not make war upon any chief or chiefs, or his or their people, without the sanction of the British Government. (*Interpreted.*)

The E. of K.—Tenthly, if he has any dispute with any chief, people, or government, that he will appeal to the arbitration of the

witchcraft superstitions of his people, and tried to combat them. His kraal *Ekubazeni*, which contained, in 1879, "four circles of huts" (i. e. between 3000 and 4000 persons), is a sufficient proof of this, for every man in them was an accused *umtagati* (wizard), whose life Cetshwayo had saved during his father's reign, when the "council of his chief men" would have put them to death. It was a mistake into which the Home Government was led by the determined hostility of the Natal Government officials and Sir Bartle Frere to Cetshwayo of supposing that the King required restraining by "his chief men," the great Zulu Council, &c., in his taste for blood. In point of fact, he was far more mercifully disposed than they; in this, as in other things, much beyond his age amongst his own people. As his brothers said of him in 1880, "there has never been known one like him amongst us Zulus before, so good, so kind, so merciful . . . he shrank from shedding blood. . . . He never killed, except for grave offences; the whole country swarms with people who owe their lives to him, and who fled to him, as the merciful prince who did not kill." And whenever during his reign any Zulu law of special severity was carried out, it was in reluctant acquiescence on the King's part to the councils of these "chief men" whom he was now ordered almost to obey.

* An extradition condition would readily be accepted by Cetshwayo, who had always acted up to the principle scrupulously. See latest case, that of one *Jolwana*, accused of the murder of a European in Zululand, captured and delivered up by Cetshwayo to the Natal authorities, but returned by them as beyond their jurisdiction.

British Government to assist him. Of course that means chiefs outside his territory. (*Interpreted.*)*

The E. of K.—Eleventh, that the succession to him shall be according to the ancient laws and customs of his people, and the nomination of each successor in turn shall be subject to the approval of the Queen. (*Interpreted.*)

The E. of K.—Twelfth, that he will not sell or alienate any part of his land or territory. (*Interpreted.*)†

The E. of K.—Thirteenth, that he will permit all people now residing in the territory which is to be assigned to him to remain there, provided they recognise his authority, and that any person who does not wish to recognise his authority may be permitted to go elsewhere unmolested. (*Interpreted.*)

The E. of K.—Fourteenth, that in all cases of dispute where British subjects are concerned he will abide by the decision of the British Resident; and in all cases where crimes are committed by British subjects, or by his people against British subjects, he will pass no sentence except with the approval of the British Resident. (*Interpreted.*)

The E. of K.—Lastly, in all matters whatsoever not included in these conditions, that he will govern, order, and decide according to the ancient laws and usages of his people, and that he will engage and solemnly pledge his faith to abide by and respect the letter and spirit of these conditions without equivocations or reserves. (*Interpreted.*)”

Since any innovations made by Cetshwayo on the “ancient laws and usages of his people” were distinctly in the direction of humanity, this last was indeed a blind condition. It pledged the king *not* to use his own superior judgment and gentler heart for the improvement and civilisation of his people, but to give way to their more barbarous impulses whenever the “ancient laws and usages” of the

* This he had persistently tried to do, during many years, in the case of the Zulu-Transvaal boundary.

† His determination to act as is here required of him had long been the chief obstacle in the way of Boer appropriation of Zulu territory.

people required. How, even in civilised England, would such an enactment operate? Let us go back but a hundred years and consider the result. Only a blind confidence in the statements of the few Europeans who had ruled in South Africa, and brought about all the misery of the last ten years there, can account for the drawing up of this last condition. Sir Bartle Frere had declared Cetshwayo to be a blood-thirsty and cruel tyrant, Sir Theophilus Shepstone (knowing little) and Sir Henry Bulwer (knowing nothing of him) had endorsed the accusation, and the result was that conditions were imposed upon the Zulu King which, had they been necessary would have been absolutely useless, and which, as the ones in question were needless, simply acted as a clog upon Cetshwayo's power of restoring peace and order to his distracted kingdom, when at last he reached it.

The conversation which ensued after the rehearsal of the conditions made it plain enough that the cutting off of land, as mentioned in the first condition, was the main point to be considered in Cetshwayo's eyes. He did not speak, indeed, until required to do so, and then only in the most quiet and courteous manner, but that condition evidently lay heavy on his heart. Throughout his troubles, *his people and his people's good* seem rather to have concerned him than his own, and this proposition to either take from them a portion of their own country, or to oblige them to become subjects of another power, "pressed hard" upon him, as he said. In commenting on this point, he told the Earl of Kimberley that "a very large portion of his country has been

already cut off [alluding to the disputed territory, decided by the British Commissioners of 1878 to be rightfully part of Zululand, but handed back by Sir Garnet Wolseley as a sop to the Boers, at the end of the Zulu War,*] and that for some time he has had very little country left to him, and he says his people are all crowded together, and that he is like one living on the top of a rock."

The Earl of Kimberley advised him to "wait to see how much country will be reserved" before taking so unfavourable a view of his position, and after a few more remarks on either side, and thanks expressed by Cetshwayo, "for the courtesy and kindness" with which he had been received, this interview came to an end, to be resumed when the King should have had time to think over what he had heard.

It would seem that much had been expected from Cetshwayo's joy at his own promised release, and that his silence and apparent depression at the close of the recapitulation of the conditions was rather a disappointment, and Lord Kimberley urged upon him more than once that this was the first time any such hopes had been held out to him at all. But to understand the feelings with which the Zulu King heard the conditions of his restoration, it must be remembered that he knew himself to be absolutely guiltless of those evil intentions towards Natal, &c., which had been the supposed ground of the invasion of his country, and his own capture, and that he had preserved a most complete and touching faith in England, and

* See vol. i.

England's Queen, and in justice being done by her as soon as the truth was made plain. To his simple ideas of justice it was self-evident that when it was discovered that he had been punished for faults which he had never committed, the punishment would be remitted, not in part, but altogether. But he had not been allowed fully to state his case, and the sentence was one of pardon, not of exoneration. Nor can his disappointment at the proposed further reduction of his territory be fully understood without a fuller knowledge of the border question, the history of the disputed territory, and the gradually contracting Zulu dominion, than is possessed by most English readers, as well as a greater insight into the relations between the Zulu King and people. It must not be overlooked that Cetshwayo was essentially the King at heart. He was not a mere despot, ruling for his own benefit, and caring only for his own satisfaction, but the father of his people, anxious for their happiness, and aiming at their good according to his lights. It was for their sake rather than for his own that he pleaded for the undivided restoration of Zululand, knowing well as he did what a source of evil to them, and of endless confusion, would prove an attempt at reservation of a portion of the country under other control than his. It has often been argued by those who opposed his restoration, that even granting the injustice of our invasion of Zululand and capture of Cetshwayo, and supposing that, were it to do over again it would be left undone, yet that it was impossible now to do

justice to him without sacrificing the interests of his people, and much scorn has been showered upon the supposed sentimentalists who, in pity for the miseries of one captive, forgot—it was said—those of a whole nation. But the argument, however forcible in itself, rested on fallacious grounds, namely the long-exploded notion that Cetshwayo was a cruel tyrant, under whose bloody yoke his people groaned, and that, therefore, although his capture was undertaken and achieved on false or mistaken grounds, the error should, for the sake of his people, be left unrectified. In point of fact, the interests and happiness of King and people were bound up with each other, and it was the knowledge of the unhappy condition of Zululand which had made Cetshwayo's captivity so intolerable to him. Again, he had always fully recognised the great truth that he held his land not as his own, but in trust for the Zulu people, and it was their rights rather than his own which he strove to uphold in pleading against the proposed reservation of a portion of the country.

The third and final interview took place on August 17th, when, in addition to those already mentioned, Mr. Fynney, who had not accompanied Cetshwayo from the Cape, but had crossed by another steamer, to act as additional interpreter, was present.

After one or two preliminaries—

“*Mr. Fynney.*—He says, my Lord, that the conditions which were given to him the other day are more than satisfactory : that there is no condition in which he has anything to complain about. He

says: 'This I may explain is made outside any remark that I may wish to make about the piece of land referred to by your Lordship the other day. The other conditions explained to me are more than satisfactory.'

The E. of K.—If he wishes to speak as to the land tell him to speak freely.

Mr. F.—He says that after the kind way in which he has been met and the conditions being so satisfactory, he feels as if he had been raised up from the dead—raised out of his grave, so to speak, and felt that he was to be seated again. But the land which belonged to his father is now very small, and the country is not as big as it was; it is a small country, comparatively speaking, and the idea of another piece of land being taken from that little country has buried him up to his knees again. In coming to England he felt that on hearing that he was to be raised up, that he was raised from the dead, so to speak, by the gracious action of this nation; that it had encouraged him to ask for more graciousness with reference to this slip of land. He had been encouraged to speak to the English nation the feelings of his heart, and he asks that his feeling with reference to his piece of land, that his representations and feelings here may be made known to the Government, and also to Her Majesty the Queen, with respect to this piece of land; and in that matter he throws himself on Her Majesty's mercy, and also hopes for the favourable consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

The E. of K.—Has he anything more to say on this point?

Mr. F.—He says he has finished on that point, but there is one subject which he wishes to mention, that is this: that he has heard no word yet with reference to John Dunn.

The E. of K.—First, as to the strip of territory, he should understand that the reservation of a part of the territory will not be as a punishment to the Zulu people or himself, or for the purpose of injuring him or the Zulu people; that no more will be reserved than is, in the opinion of the Government, absolutely necessary, and that he must remember that the past cannot be simply undone without regard to good faith which we have pledged to others. Secondly, with regard to John Dunn, my observation applies to him as well as to others. John Dunn must be treated fairly and justly, like others.* If the British Government and the Queen treat John Dunn as a friend, we shall expect Cetshwayo to do so

* "Cetshwayo shook his head here," says the Blue-Book report.

too, notwithstanding what may have happened. He will remember that a war has been fought with us, and that he killed many of our people, and that as we are friends now with him he must behave in the same way to John Dunn, though he may have grounds of complaint against him.* Then tell him that I know he has grievances about his family, who, he thinks, have not been well treated; but that all that will be put straight when he goes back; and that if he is a friend to us we shall be careful that no one, neither John Dunn nor any one else, shall do him injury.† Then, lastly, say to him about this piece of land, that I have only told him very generally about this matter, because definite arrangements could not be made until the great question of his return was decided, and that he must wait until he hears precisely what will be done. That Sir Henry Bulwer must see the Chiefs and people after it is known that Cetshwayo is to go back, which he has not yet been able to do,‡ and that he may be quite sure that we mean to treat him in a kind and friendly manner in every way as far as the necessity of the case will permit, and that all that he has said upon this point will be told to the Queen and my colleagues, but that he must quite understand that this does not imply that a change will be made upon the point, that he must not expect that I can give him any hope of a change. Ask him whether he has any other particular point that he wishes to ask me about. I will not go through all the conditions again unless he wishes it.

Mr. F.—He says that with reference to the other conditions he had heard them gratefully, and cheerfully accepted them; and that he is led to speak about this piece of land because the Government here is unaware, being in England, of all the local circumstances. The Government is unaware of how he has been treated by John Dunn, how John Dunn has treated him; and further, as a Prince, he says that that part of Zululand which is now occupied by John Dunn is a piece of land which was the Prince's portion, and where his cattle were sent to. He says the Government do not know how John Dunn has treated him, and how things are going on there; and he has now thrown in his words, relying upon the kindness of the Government.

* The absurdity of any comparison between Cetshwayo's position towards England and Dunn's towards him is self-evident.

† A little later we shall see, alas! how this promise was kept by those commissioned to "restore" Cetshwayo.

‡ He never attempted anything of the sort.

The E. of K.—Ask him to say what he particularly refers to about John Dunn's treatment of him. I wish to hear it.

Mr. F.—'I picked John Dunn up walking with empty hands. He was not a man that was sent to me by the Government, he was not a man holding or coming to me with any position whatsoever, but came to me empty-handed, and I picked him up. I picked him up, and when I did pick him up, I took care of him, and he grew great under my fostering care, and I permitted him to live there as my subject close to my own big kraals, near my military kraal at Ginginhlovu. I allowed him to remain on that piece of land as my subject whom I picked up.'

The E. of K.—What did John Dunn do of which he now complains?

Mr. F.—'John Dunn persistently misrepresented me. On the one side, he misrepresented the British Government and the English people to me. On the other side, he took my words, he came to me, and, as I thought, as my friend, took my words, got at the feeling of my heart, and turned my words on their back. The words also of the Government of the British nation he turned on their back to me. John Dunn told me a year beforehand that the war was to be fought against me; and why? Because he knew thoroughly the action he had taken, and how I had been misrepresented by him. John Dunn, when his plans were effected by the war, has taken what belonged to me—my property, and when my people have expressed the wish for my return, or ask for my return, he has seized and eaten up their cattle, and has constantly represented to the Government that it is not the wish of the people that I should return; and any person who has wished for my return has been punished or ill-treated by John Dunn. Whilst I was a fugitive, going from place to place, I caught some of John Dunn's messengers with messages which he had sent to Usibebu, in which he said, "Help me to turn out the King and the Royal Family, and I will be instrumental in getting you placed as one of the chiefs over the country." John Dunn has been the cause of all; John Dunn, through his action, was the cause of the war.* Through John Dunn's action, I consider, the land was destroyed; it was he who sent the words round and misrepresented things. When I was seized, John Dunn took my property; he

* All these speeches of the King's might be much better translated, but even in this bald form they are forcible and impressive.

took all that he could possess himself of, and he is now building and creating his harems through and by my property—the very property that he has been using for that purpose. And now, when I am liberated, and when I feel that I have been so treated and injured, I feel as if there is an assegai placed by my side. Who was John Dunn? Who is John Dunn? What was John Dunn? and who would he have been if I had not raised him up? The English would never have heard of him; and I feel that it is placing an assegai by my side to let John Dunn be near me. He took my property and my cattle away from my children, and caused my people and my children to suffer hunger.’

The E. of K.—Say these are the results of the war.

Mr. F.—He says, my Lord, that there is a difference in Dunn’s case. Dunn was not in the war; he was only my subject.

The E. of K.—But he joined us in the war.

Mr. F.—‘Who would stay with a rat in his hut that ate his food? I must again express my grateful thanks for what has been said and what has been done. I feel that, although of a different nationality, I am now born an Englishman. I am encouraged also to speak. I ask in my turn that you will bear with me in saying what I do, and understand that I speak it in gratitude; but that I do not see how it would be possible ever to live with John Dunn in Panda’s, my father’s, territory, the land which belonged to him. I cannot see how we can live in the same country or near each other. I cannot do it—it cannot be done. I am more than grateful to the English people, and they will now have had a chance of seeing me, and the nation has heard what I have had to say about my government and so on, and the English nation will now have a chance of seeing really what I am, and what my government will be. I am encouraged to speak, and I must again say that it is utterly impossible for John Dunn and myself to live in the same territory, or near each other. Who am I to cry to? Who am I to go to, to tell my feelings and my sorrows to, if not to the ones from whom I was born? The English nation, so to speak, stands in the light of a father to me, and I must speak the feelings of my heart, and I cannot live with John Dunn. In the house where a man is born he speaks decidedly, and speaks earnestly. I cannot therefore—I dare not—reserve my feelings. I have to speak out my sentiments and the feelings of my heart, and I say that it is utterly impossible for John Dunn to live near me; if he does, then that simply means further trouble.’”

In reply to these representations, Lord Kimberley told the King that all he asked of him, and what the Government required of him, if he returned, was "to keep within his own borders, and to keep the peace;" and, after some repetitions on either side, his Lordship continued:—

"Now I wish to go to another matter. It is well that he should know that of course it will take some time to make all these arrangements, and communications must be made with people in Zululand, and much will have to be done before he can go back; and although the Government are anxious that everything should be done as quickly as possible, still there must be time, and he will know that himself. And he should also know that some arrangements will have to be made for him to pass the interval, and that he must be ready to consent to such arrangement as we shall make, and that they will be directed to his personal comfort and convenience.

Mr. F.—And Cetshwayo wishes also to say: 'Of course, whilst I am perfectly patient, awaiting the action of the Government, I do ask that when things are settled I may be enabled to return as soon as possible, for I am afraid of the sea; as the year goes on, the sea gets so very cross.'

The E. of K.—Say, certainly. I will arrange for him to leave this country as soon as I can, but he will have to wait on the other side of the water. We will take care of him, and send him back during fine weather. Tell him, if he acts well, he may always consider me his friend.

Mr. F. (for the King).—'I cannot take your hand alone; I take your arm, and I ask your Lordship to lie on one side, and then on the other.'* (Cetshwayo here took his Lordship's hand and right arm to indicate his pledge of friendship.)

The E. of K.—Say that, whether I am in office or not, I will always listen to his words if he acts well.

* This is in allusion to a previous remark of the King's while still pleading against Dunn's being forced upon him. "There may be a talk over-night, and a man lie on one side, and lie on the other, and by the next morning he may see that another course might be taken, or an improvement made. That is all I ask."

Mr. F.—"I have gratefully accepted all that has been given me, and now I say, My Lord, watch me."

To the day of his death Cetshwayo was entirely loyal and faithful to his word given thus to Lord Kimberley. It has yet to be shown by what means his actions were subsequently misrepresented.*

There is no reason to doubt the intended good

* Towards the end of this interview, the chief Umkosana, anxious lest his King's earnest appeal against Dunn should give offence, asked leave to say that "the child (i. e. Cetshwayo) in speaking out as it has done, has simply spoken to its father, simply spoken through having been encouraged to do so by the grace received. There is no self-will in the child in any way, but it simply wishes to represent its feelings to its father."

The figurative form of this speech is worth noting, as it corroborates the Bishop of Natal's rendering of the too often repeated phrases of the Zulu deputations, i. e. "We are sent by the Zulu chiefs to return thanks for Mkosana, who was the skin in which the child (Cetshwayo) was wrapped, meaning that having got back the skin, they hoped to get back the child also." And, again, that they had come "to ask for the bones of Cetshwayo, 'their bone,' [what was left of him in power as well as person] according to native custom—in other words, to ask for his restoration to Zululand under any conditions which the British Government might think fit to impose."

The Bishop's interpretation of these phrases was vehemently denied by those officials interested in making out that the Zulus did not desire their King's return; but a single illustration of the manner in which they were questioned, with the supposed view of eliciting their actual meaning, is enough to show how worthless were such denials. During an interview between Sir Evelyn Wood and the three chiefs who, while forming part of the fourth deputation [see vol. i. chap. i.], had also their own especial request to make that they might join the King in his captivity, the following words were spoken, according to the Blue Book [3182, p. 174]:—

"*Sir E. Wood*, speaking.—*Q.* Your request is to go to Cape-town, and you have no message about skins, &c. ? (!)

The Chiefs.—*R.* Yes; we have no message about skins."

faith and kindness of Her Majesty's Home Government towards Cetshwayo and his people at this time. That a piece of territory should be reserved *sufficient for the support of any Zulus who, at the actual period of the King's restoration,** desired to quit his country, and to come under British rule, no one would dispute, nor would such an arrangement have given just cause of discontent to any one concerned. Cetshwayo left England satisfied that this was what was intended, and although there is no mention made of the concession in the official reports of the interviews with the Zulu King, it is plain that the intention to force Dunn upon him was seen to be a mistake, for nothing more was heard of it. Cetshwayo certainly did not give way on that point, but the more general agreement to "respect the border limits which we may draw, and keep the peace," are substituted for Lord Kimberley's express stipulation, "If the British Government and the Queen treat John Dunn as a friend, we shall expect Cetshwayo to do so too." After the King's forcible representation of the wrongs which he had sustained from John Dunn, it would indeed have been monstrous to

* Had this proposition been *honestly* carried out, it is doubtful whether it would have been necessary to reserve *any land at all*. Zibebu, Dunn, and Hamu had all three forfeited British promises by breaking the conditions on which they were made, i. e. by the slaughter of many defenceless persons, while although the Basuto Hlubi had undoubtedly a claim on *us*, we had no right to satisfy it at the expense of the Zulus. Amongst the common people, criminals only would have fled to the reserve had no unfair means been used against Cetshwayo by his white enemies. The grounds for this assertion will be given in their proper place.

insist upon such a condition, and the merest common-sense must have made it plain that to do so would be a proof—not of firmness, and a determined course of action, but of sheer unreasoning obstinacy, ever allied to the greatest weakness. The border limits were necessarily left to Her Majesty's future decision, but Cetshwayo trusted in its fairness, and was, perhaps, not yet fully aware of how far Sir Garnet Wolseley had tossed the Transvaal border decision of 1878 into the bottomless abyss of Boer pacification, at the expense of England's word to the natives. It was therefore with high hopes and a lightened heart that Cetshwayo took leave of his new English friends, and turned his face to cross the ocean once more towards his home.

One of his last visits before departing was to Mr. Whiteley's famous establishment in Bayswater, with which he seems to have been extremely pleased.

"It has been Mr. Whiteley's fortune," says a London paper, "to be brought into more frequent and friendly contact with Cetshwayo since his arrival in this country than any other Englishman. He has therefore had most excellent opportunities of becoming acquainted with the King's characteristics and with his views relating to England. . . . Mr. Whiteley informs us that in his communication with Cetshwayo he has found him to be exactly the opposite of what, according to popular notions, might be anticipated. 'I went over to see him a day or two after he came,' relates Mr. Whiteley. 'He was very pleased indeed to see me, and he entered into a most intelligent conversation. He asked me a number of very shrewd questions about my business. For instance, How long had I been in business? How many people did I employ when I started? How many had I now? What number had I engaged in making articles to be sold? What number had I at work as salespeople? What were the proportions

of men and women? Numbers of questions such as that, which showed a very clear apprehension of what commerce and business meant. Altogether I found him an exceedingly nice fellow. Some people seem to have the impression that he has a rough manner, that he is a sort of savage, a half cannibal, a barbarous, cruel, unsympathetic man. I assure you he is nothing of the sort. He is peculiarly good-natured, and wonderfully pleasant company. If he meets anybody that will jest and joke with him, there is nothing he likes better. He is fond of chaffing those with whom he is familiar, and he can stand chaff just as well as he can give it. He is very fond of paying a compliment, more especially where a lady is concerned. He is a big, burly man, about forty-six years of age, standing over six feet high, and he weighs over twenty stone. But for a black man he is very good-looking, and were it not for the thickness of his lips, he would be handsome. In conversing he expresses very pleasing, and sometimes refined sentiments. I brought my two little children over to see him one afternoon, and he chatted with them for over half an hour. He said afterwards that he had met nobody since coming to England who had pleased him so much as these children. The little girls were also delighted with him, and would have liked to stay longer.' Mr. Whiteley on one occasion told him that he thought the Government had made a mistake in declaring war against Zululand and in making him captive, and added that he believed in saying so he represented the feelings of the great mass of the English people, who were really most amicably disposed towards him. Cetshwayo said he was delighted to hear that, and he quite believed it was true. From what he had seen of the English people, he could not believe that they would inflict such injustice upon him. If they had been the cause of his misfortunes, he forgave them, but he could not bring himself to think that they had. It seemed to him as if some fiend had been at work against him. He said that when the English soldiers attacked him in Zululand, nothing could have been more unexpected on his part. He was not at all prepared for war, but, under the circumstances, he had just to do the best he could to protect his people and his country."

Before departing, Cetshwayo called upon Lady Holland, at Holland House, to thank her for having placed Holland Park at his disposal during his stay, although he had not been able to make that use of

the permission which he might have done but for the crowds of people who watched his every movement whenever he went abroad.

“He took back from England,” says one report, “many handsome and costly souvenirs of his visit, including a stick with silver head and silver ferule, given to him by the Prince of Wales, beautiful Cashmere shawls from the great ladies for his wives and female suite, superb railway rugs and piles of prints and other dress stuffs for the use of persons who prefer the garb of *Norah Creina*. But of all his mementoes, that which he values most is a great silver goblet presented to him by the Queen, and bearing the inscription:—‘Presented to H.M. King Cetywayo by H.M. Queen Victoria, August 14, 1882.’ In addition to this goblet, the Queen gave him with her own hands a photograph of herself, rather larger than cabinet size, charming him the while with the gracious words, ‘I respect you as a brave enemy, who will I trust become a firm future friend.’”

Arrangements had been made with the Cape Government that Cetshwayo should land at Cape-town, and reside again at the farm *Oude Molen*, pending the arrangements for his return to Zululand, and Lord Kimberley wrote thus to Sir Hercules Robinson on August 29th [3466, p. 115]:—

“Cetshwayo should, of course, be treated with every consideration, and allowed free intercourse with all such persons as he may wish to see; but at the same time careful attention should be paid to his proceedings, in order that Sir Henry Bulwer may be made acquainted with any matters which may affect Zulu affairs.

“You will, I am sure, bear in mind that all communications with Cetshwayo connected with his restoration should be carried on in such a manner as to encourage him as much as possible to look upon the British Government permanently as his friend, and to allay any impatience which he may feel at the unavoidable delay in his return to his own country.”*

* How this friendliness of the British Government was evinced by the Natal Government will be seen hereafter.

Lord Kimberley also wrote, directing Sir Henry Bulwer to take whatever steps were possible towards collecting such cattle of the King's as were then in the hands of the chiefs (Hamu, Zibebu, and Dunn in particular) who had taken possession of them illegally after the war, and he writes as follows:—

“The want of cattle is evidently a point on which Cetshwayo feels the greatest anxiety. He frequently alludes to his poverty, saying that if he returns with empty hands he will only be going back to fresh troubles. If it should be found to be impracticable to collect the cattle which formerly belonged to him, the natural alternative would seem to be that the chiefs and people who are willing to receive him back as their ruler, should make a contribution from their own herds for his support.*

“Either, however, by the collection of his cattle, or by some other arrangement, it will obviously be necessary that proper provision should be made for his maintenance and support on his arrival in his own country; otherwise, in the absence of any means for his support in a manner suited to his station, he would find himself compelled to resort to arbitrary measures to supply his wants, a contingency which it is most important to guard against at the outset of his new rule.†

* This has a plausible sound, but it must be remembered that it was precisely those “chiefs and people” who had been plundered and impoverished on account of their loyalty to Cetshwayo by Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu, and even (under pressure) by some of the kinglets favourable to the King's return. If any King's cattle remained amongst the loyal chiefs they were very few compared to those confiscated by the British, or taken by the three disloyal chiefs named above. In fact such an arrangement was practically a heavy tax on Zulu loyalty, which must have been deep-rooted indeed to withstand all the efforts made to destroy it.

† The result of this admonition was the magnificent gift in the Queen's name of 360 head of cattle (according to native accounts 345)! Of these, 243 were a mixed herd, many of them old oxen and cows, which had been picked out by Zibebu and Hamu as the most worthless of the King's cattle which they had seized, and therefore most proper to be handed over to the Resident, and the

“The chief Unconwana also complained that his cattle had been seized by Uhamu, because he has supported Cetshwayo, and you should consider whether any intervention is possible on his behalf.”

However kindly these directions may have been meant towards the King, it is plain that again, as so often before, our British policy was that of *making other people pay our debts* when the necessity of their being paid at all was made apparent. *We* had done all the mischief in Zululand, *we* had stripped the King of all his possessions, and the whole country of a large portion of its wealth, by confiscating cattle, burning kraals, and destroying crops, but it did not seem to occur to our rulers that *we*, therefore, should bear the cost of restitution when it became plain that justice demanded it. To tax the people we had injured

remaining 100 were young cattle, the produce of the former while in Mr. Osborn's hands. It is notorious that the great bulk of the King's cattle fell into the hands of Dunn and Zibebu—e. g. the great herd of the “*Inyoni kaipumuli*,” white cattle flecked with black—which they, by some means or other, kept for themselves, while the King's brothers, and even his aged grandmother, had been stripped of their own cattle, on the pretence that they belonged to the King, and must be handed over to the Resident, as ordered after the war.

The loyal Zulus, i. e. all except these few chiefs, did indeed joyfully bring offerings of their cattle to the King as soon as they knew he had actually been returned to them, and, so to speak, empty-handed. But this was quite reversing the proper Zulu order of things, namely that the King should bestow upon his people, not they upon him, and placed Cetshwayo in a false position from the first. Nor did even the cattle thus received really add to his wealth, since he gave them back, as it were, at once, to feed the crowds who flocked round him, first to greet, and then to protect him—of all which a full account will appear in its proper place.

much, on behalf of the King we had injured most, was the only means thought possible of getting out of the difficulty, and probably the proposal to solve it by levying a tax on some one object of unnecessary British luxury would have struck all except some half-dozen so-called "enthusiasts," as a preposterous idea.

Nevertheless, the real loyalty of the Zulu people was so great that, but for one fatal mistake, the plans of the Home Government to restore peace to unhappy Zululand might have been crowned with success in the restoration of Cetshwayo and the subsidence of all party strife under his rule. That mistake lay in the fact that the whole matter was left to be carried out by the knot of Natal officials, who had for long been openly antagonistic to Cetshwayo, working under one with almost boundless power to make or mar, who had evinced throughout a persistent personal dislike for the King, who never spoke a good word for him since the war, and who had done all in his power to prevent his release. Failing in that, Sir Henry Bulwer gave his whole mind to preventing the King's restoration, in which effort he was greatly assisted by the officials above-mentioned, and succeeded in it to an extent quite unimagined at present by the British public. The story of the Natal officials' success has yet to be unfolded.

CHAPTER III.

WE must now return to the Great Deputation from Zululand, which we left* retracing their steps to their own country, after vainly endeavouring to obtain a hearing from the Governor, in order to pray for the return of Cetshwayo, and to represent the injuries under which they suffered in consequence of his absence. Deeply disappointed as they must have been, they submitted quietly and respectfully to Sir Henry Bulwer's orders, and left the colony as peaceably and inoffensively as they had entered it. Their last request, that the chiefs of the party might be allowed to come into Maritzburg, and take leave of the authorities, having been, like all previous ones, refused, they started, as ordered, on Monday, May 8th, 1882, intending to go straight to the Residency at the Inhlazatshe, and there repeat their prayer for Cetshwayo, so soon as the Resident should arrive, according to the Governor's instructions. They feared, however, that they might meet with opposition from Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu, and might, perhaps, be obliged to defend themselves, and get rid of these three disloyal chiefs, although

* See vol. i., chap. vii.

they had no wish or intention to fight, if they could avoid doing so.*

The first telegram which reached England on this subject, appeared in the *Daily News* of April 28th, 1882, from its Maritzburg correspondent, the editor of the *Natal Witness*, and was regarded as semi-official at that time.

It ran as follows:—

“ PIETERMARITZBURG, *April 25th.*

“ A serious crisis exists in Zulu affairs. A Zulu deputation, numbering nearly 2000 persons, chiefs and followers, is now waiting a few miles from here for an audience with the Governor. The deputation essentially represents the ex-King's party ; † three of Cetshwayo's brothers are present in person ; it also includes several chiefs living under John Dunn, who come to protest against his authority.

“ The deputation comes without a pass from the Resident, which makes matters more critical.‡

“ Great care is necessary to prevent civil war, and terrible bloodshed in Zululand.”

“ Thursday, [April 27th].

“ Sir H. Bulwer has declined to see the Zulu deputation, and directed the members of it to return home. Great fears are felt for their safety on reaching Zululand.§ The deputation, which is

* The Prince Maduna (Ndabuko)'s endeavour throughout was to obtain justice and his brother's release by quiet and peaceable means, which fact makes it all the more cruel that for party-purposes he has been so persistently and falsely branded as “ turbulent,” &c., &c.

† The writer is silent as to the fact that the representatives of the three appointed chiefs headed the deputation, though they were included in a long list of the principal men composing it, which had appeared in the *Natal Witness* of April 17th.

‡ For an account of their vain efforts to obtain such a pass, see vol. i.

§ They thought it possible that they might be attacked on their return by Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu ; and, while they had no fear

upwards of 2000 strong, has been fed, while in Natal, mainly by the liberality of the colonists.* Serious troubles are anticipated, especially in John Dunn's district, which adjoins Natal."

The *Times* of May 2nd published a telegram from its Durban correspondent, editor of the *Natal Mercury* :—

"The Zulu deputation, numbering fully 1000 [! 2,000] persons, has returned to Zululand after eight † days' sojourn near Maritzburg. It appears that they had followed the Resident into the colony without waiting for the decision which he was to obtain from the Governor regarding their reception.‡

"Their action being unauthorised and defiant,§ and calculated to bring the authority of the Government into contempt, Governor Bulwer very properly declined to receive them. Bishop Colenso repudiates any sort of connection with the movement,|| the origin

as to the ultimate result of a struggle, they wished to avoid the necessity of civil war, as Cetshwayo had warned them to do. Any anxiety they might feel was due to the fact that, although they had left a strong party of adherents in Zululand, these were not mobilised, and attacks might be made by their enemies on kraals whose principal male defenders were away.

* The 2000 Zulus received from colonists during sixteen days' sojourn three sheep, with a little meal, sugar and coffee. From Natal natives two head of cattle and two sheep. But they brought down thirteen head of cattle of their own, and received another from the Bishop of Natal. They said, however, that all the natives at the kraals where they stayed were very hospitable.

† The deputation arrived near Maritzburg on April 20th, and set out on their return on May 7th, so that they left after sixteen, not eight "days' sojourn near Maritzburg."

‡ A full explanation of this circumstance is given in vol. i.

§ Their action was *not* defiant, as they left all their weapons behind them in Zululand, and behaved throughout their stay in Natal with the utmost propriety and respect to the authorities.

|| Bishop Colenso had done nothing of the sort. He had stated in the *Natal Mercury* that the two deputations which came to Maritzburg in May 1880, and July–August 1881, were "as wholly unexpected by himself as they were by the Government." He has

of which is attributed to sinister intrigues * of serious significance.

“Mr. Gladstone’s remarks in Parliament concerning the possibility of Cetshwayo’s restoration have caused much apprehen-

himself explained how far he had anything to do with the last great one, i. e. having told Zulus who asked him for advice that “it was no use for the ex-King’s brothers, and his personal friends only, to make application on his behalf; but, if it was really true, as they asserted, that ‘all Zululand’ wished for his restoration, they should go to the Resident and ask for leave to come down to Maritzburg, and make their wishes known in a proper manner to the Government.”

* These “sinister intrigues” were merely the very natural efforts of Mnyamana and the Princes to bring to the ears of the Governor, and through him to the English Government, the general desire of the Zulu nation for the restoration of the King. But Sir H. Bulwer had set his face against that restoration, and therefore he, and those who supported his policy, never failed to stigmatise every action of the Zulus *which might tend to a disposition on the part of the Home Government to restore the King*, as “defiant,” “turbulent,” “rebellious,” or whatever terms might best suit their purpose. The Zulus could not ask for their King in “a proper manner,” because Sir H. Bulwer did not choose that they should ask for him at all, and thus he speaks of this orderly and respectful attempt to make the feelings of the people known to him in the following terms:—

“Unfortunately, the ill-timed agitation that has of late been set up by the leaders of a party in that country [Zululand], not only tends to increase the difficulties, and to embarrass the due consideration of the question, but threatens, unless more moderate counsels prevail, to disturb the public peace in some parts of the country.” (Sir H. Bulwer’s speech at the opening of the Legislative Council of Natal, June 8th, 1882.)

True—so decided a proof of loyalty to Cetshwayo *did* “tend to increase the difficulties,” of hiding from the British Government and public the fact that Zululand, as a whole, prayed for Cetshwayo’s return, and there is no doubt about it that nothing could so decidedly “threaten . . . the public peace” in Zululand, as Sir H. Bulwer’s action in refusing to receive the deputation, and sending it back, therefore, branded with British disapproval of its errand, a proceeding highly calculated to embolden the three disloyal

sion here, where such a policy would provoke vigorous resistance."*

Meanwhile the despatches received in Downing Street from Sir H. Bulwer, made light of the whole matter, for, to quote Mr. Courtney's reply to Mr. R. N. Fowler, in the House of Commons, his telegram "merely refers incidentally to a demonstration at Natal by the ex-King's brother."† (*Daily News*, April 28th, 1882).

On May 8th, the *Daily News* publishes another telegram from its Maritzburg correspondent:—

"Native reports from Zululand state that the present agitation there is largely owing to a message purporting to come from Cetshwayo, stating that he would return soon, and that the chiefs must prepare to meet him at Maritzburg. The message is explicitly stated to have come from Bishop Colenso. John Dunn has returned to Zululand. There is evidence that he has threatened vengeance against the chiefs who complained of him."

The writer cannot possibly have been ignorant of the absurdity of the statement concerning the Bishop

chiefs, Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu, in their tyrannical and aggressive course, and to crush the spirit of such Zulus as, inwardly attached to the King's cause, lacked courage to assert their opinions, and meet the threatening consequences.

* This is simply a specimen of the editor of the *Mercury's* favourite assumption of representing "colonial" feeling. As a matter of fact, although, at the Natal elections for the Legislative Council of 1882, he raised the *anti-Cetshwayo* cry to obtain his own re-election, he was yet rejected by the constituency of Durban, which had supported him on previous occasions.

† Mr. Osborn (the Resident for Zululand) went out twice to converse with the heads of the deputation, on the 21st and 24th of April, and took down the names of the principal men. Sir H. Bulwer must, therefore, have known when he sent the above telegram that three appointed chiefs were represented amongst them.

of Natal. He was perfectly well aware that the Bishop, at this time and for some weeks previously, had expected daily that the order would arrive for Cetshwayo to be taken to England, and *could* not, therefore, have sent a message to the chiefs months beforehand, "to prepare to meet him in Maritzburg." This consideration of mere common sense might have been thought sufficient to prevent his publishing so ridiculous a report (without one word of dissent), even had he not been aware, as he was, that the Bishop had already publicly denied the like accusations.

Surely nothing but a heroic spirit of determined loyalty to their King would have moved the Zulus to make any further demonstration in his favour at once! The cold reception they had met with might have been expected to damp their ardour for a while, and was, no doubt, intended to have that effect. Yet it failed. On May 30th, two messengers reached Maritzburg, sent by Dabulamanzi to make a report to the Government of the state of things in Zululand upon the return of the Great Deputation. They made five several attempts on five following days to obtain an interview with the Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr. J. Shepstone, but were put off with excuses each day, having, however, three unofficial interviews, one with Sir T. Shepstone, who received them with apparent kindness, but said that, being out of office, he could do nothing for them, and two with his son, Mr. Theo. Shepstone, who, each time, told them to "come again to-morrow." On the

fifth day, June 3rd, they received at last their answer, through the *Induna* of the S.N.A. (who did not see them himself at all). It was, as usual, a refusal to receive them, and the order—repeated and obeyed in vain so often before!—that the Prince (Dabulamanzi) should go to the Resident, Mr. Osborn, “or his representative, if he is not there himself” [query, clerk? The one perhaps who insulted the Royal women; see p. 103, vol. i.], and get him to write down his words for him, and give him leave to come to the Government in Maritzburg. And, they were told, even if Mr. Osborn refused to do so, Dabulamanzi might *go on asking for a pass till he got it*, but was not to come without.

So they started for Zululand again next day, having been kept waiting a week only to be told at the end of it to go and make their report to Mr. Osborn [or the winds!].

They had been sent, as they said to their friends, to inform the authorities that Dunn was threatening to “eat up” all the people in his district who had joined the deputation. Dabulamanzi wished the Governor to know this, so that he might understand, if disturbances took place, that it was no fault of theirs, as they should only fight in self-defence when attacked by Dunn, as, indeed, they had told Dunn that they would do, in presence of the Governor.* They said that when Dunn hurried home (as he did after the interview with Dabulamanzi and others before the Governor), he gave out that he had left

* See p. 208, vol. i.

the Princes in bonds (*botshiwe*) at Maritzburg, whereas he himself had been dismissed with honour, "Mr. Jan"* having escorted him out of town upon his way. And he forthwith summoned all the chiefs and headmen of his own district to come to him, and some of the neighbouring appointed chiefs as well. One of these obeyed the call, and so did some other men of rank, about ten or twelve in all. But the appointed chief Siwunguza, when setting out to go to him, met the deputation returning, with the Princes amongst them, and found that they had not been in bonds at all, but were going, by order of the Governor, to make their prayer for Cetshwayo through Mr. Osborn, at Inhlazatshe. Upon this, Siwunguza joyfully turned and joined them, as did some others, even of the few who had been prepared to submit to Dunn, armed, as they had thought him, with fresh powers from the Government at Maritzburg. The bulk of the chiefs and headmen, however, had refused to listen to Chief Dunn, who had set them all against him by his assertion that they were opposed to the King's return, and that the taxes paid to him by them were a proof of their content at the King's absence. Mavumengwana, the head of one of the powerful tribes in Dunn's district, entertained the Princes Maduna and Dabulamanzi, with the bulk of the deputation, for three days, killing a beast as a sacrifice to the *amadhlozi* (ancestral spirits) for them, and presenting his followers to Maduna, saying, "They are your

* Mr. Jan = Mr. J. Shepstone, Secretary for Native Affairs.

tribe, not mine, O sons of Mpande! We are all with you, and will go with you to Mr. Osborn to pray for Cetshwayo." And all the people of Southern Zululand began to collect for the same purpose. But Maduna sent to turn these back, bidding Dabulamanzi and all the Southern Zulus remain (as Dunn was threatening them), to protect their homes, until the arrival of Mr. Osborn, who had not yet come from Maritzburg, when he, the Prince, would let them know, that they might all move up together to Inhlazatshe. "We heard," said the messengers, "that Dunn sent a vehicle to fetch Nongena,* being determined that he should attend his meeting. But he refused, saying, 'I have done with John Dunn for ever!' And, truly, the hearts of all Zululand are now turned towards Inhlazatshe, praying for Cetshwayo."

A little later, July 1st, a fuller account of these proceedings was brought by three Zulus of position, sent by nine important chiefs living in Dunn's district, and most of whom had considerable tribes attached to them. Their message was to the Governor, but as they had brought no "pass" from the Resident, they never had an opportunity of delivering it. "Part of our message," said they, "is to explain that we all, who live in Dunn's district, have been absolutely forbidden by two Indunas of the Resident, who came accompanied by two of Dunn's, to go to the Resident to pray for Cetshwayo." And this although they had been told by

* Nongena, a very old chief, too feeble to come on foot.

the authorities in Maritzburg, when they came as part of the recent deputation, that they were to go back and make their prayers and complaints at the Inhlazatshe to the Resident, and ask him to write them down, and to give them a pass to go to Maritzburg. Their story showed how, after the events described by the former messengers, Dunn had, by repeated messages and threats, borne down the somewhat feeble spirit of Mavumengwana, who finally went to him, as required, and, being thoroughly badgered and brow-beaten, admitted one point, at least, which Dunn was desirous of asserting, namely, that he had heard that the Zulus were said to have paid taxes in order to keep Cetshwayo away "from the two young men, who had been to see after Posile at Bishopstowe."* But on Mavumengwana's return to his companion chiefs the latter blamed him severely for having said this, since, in point of fact, both they and he had first heard the matter from two of Dunn's own men.

With Mavumengwana returned a couple of Dunn's policemen, and one of his white men, with the important addition of two of the Resident's police, who, whether authorised to do so or not, invariably assumed a tone of command amongst the Zulus, and as invariably threw in their influence, that is to say the influence of their master, on the side of tyranny, and oppression of the loyal Zulus. For a few

* Nothing, indeed, was known at Bishopstowe of the matter until it was published, on Dunn's own authority, in the *Natal Mercury*, by Dunn's friend, the editor of that paper.

months such conduct might have been carried on without the Resident's knowledge, but when it is found to have lasted throughout the three years of Cetshwayo's absence, it is difficult not to suppose that it was regarded with indifference, if not approval. These men proceeded to call a meeting of all the Zulus in Dunn's district then at Mavumengwana's kraal, as they had refused to go to Dunn's kraal, and he was determined they should hear what he had to say. The violent and insolent language used by him is not worth recording now, but it included utter contempt towards the Governor and other authorities at Maritzburg as well as towards Cetshwayo and the loyal Zulus, and many vaunts as to what he and *his friends in Durban* could, and would do, to vindicate their power. Dunn's messengers were supported in all they said by the Resident's Induna, who also forbade the Zulus of Dunn's district to go to the Inhlazatshe at all. "The words of the authorities are these only which I have spoken,* there is nothing further for you to hear from Malimati (the Resident)."

Meanwhile messengers came to Dabulamanzi and the other chiefs, from Maduna and Mnyamana, to say that "Malimati (the Resident) tells us that he hears from Dunn, that the people of his district do not

* That "at Maritzburg, it was said (i. e. ordered) that all people on this side of the Umhlatuze should pay taxes to Dunn, and that he had power to 'eat up' cattle, and turn people out of his district." He also informed them that they would never see Cetshwayo again, as he had been "broiled down for fat, with which to anoint magically the English soldiers"!

want Cetshwayo at all—they were only beguiled by Cetshwayo's brothers." *

So all the chiefs and headmen whom Dunn had threatened gathered together at the Inkandhla † to take counsel, and fresh members of the party were still arriving when these three men were sent down in haste to tell the Governor again, "We do pray for Cetshwayo, all of us," and that "John Dunn is now threatening us with an *impi* from Durban," ‡ and that the Resident's own policemen "forbid us to take our prayers and complaints to him at Inhla-zatshe, as the Governor had told us to do."

The messengers attended at the office of the Secretary for Native Affairs daily for a week (from Monday, July 3rd), receiving a daily "shin-bone" of beef. On the fifth day, July 7th, they spoke with the S.N.A. (Mr. John Shepstone), who said that "he had no word for them, but the chiefs who had sent them should come down in person" (Dabulamanzi, the principal one amongst them, having only just gone

* This was the pretence constantly put forward by the Natal officials to discredit the movement in Zululand in favour of Cetshwayo's return, but not a shred of evidence has been produced that any single Zulu ever even professed to have been thus beguiled.

† The *Inkandhla*, afterwards Cetshwayo's place of refuge.

‡ A writer in the *Natal Witness* of August 11th, 1882, dating from the Lower Tugela a week before, says, "It is being freely said that Dunn has sent emissaries to Durban in quest of [white] recruits. Ten shillings per diem and rations is his bribe, but very few, I fancy, will come forward at that price. A meeting of his people was called the other day, ostensibly to talk over the advisability of sending an *impi* to prevent the encroachments of the Boers . . . I learn . . . that the real object of the meeting was to plan a march on Ndaduko (Maduna)."

up). They replied that they would send one of their party to call the chiefs, and would await their arrival, to which the S.N.A. agreed. Their messenger started on July 9th, and on Sunday night, the 23rd, the return envoy reached Bishopstowe. Next day he went in to the S.N.A. Office to report that "Dabulamanzi had sent him to the Resident to ask for a pass, according to the Governor's word," but Mr. Osborn had refused it—also that "the Prince and Zeyise* had now gone in person to ask for a pass for the whole party, and had sent him on beforehand to announce to the authorities at Maritzburg that they were coming." † The Indunas at the S.N.A. Office told him "Since they are coming themselves, there is no 'word' for you." The subsequent treatment of the chiefs thus sent for, when they came, is so characteristic of the way in which the Office for Native Affairs in Natal habitually trifles with the feelings and convenience of these people—shifting its ground as often as suits it, without the smallest regard for justice, truth, or humanity, deceiving, temporizing, and insulting by turns—that the account will be best given in the words of the Zulus themselves.

On Saturday, August 12th, eight of the nine chiefs

* Zeyise, one of the nine chiefs in Dunn's district. See p. 105.

† It will be remembered that their not having thus sent beforehand, or, rather, *long enough beforehand*, was made one of the pretences for blaming the Great Deputation. It was always noticeable with what care the Zulus avoided anything that had once been made by the Government a ground of offence.

who had been summoned by direction of Mr. J. Shepstone, several of them aged men, with representatives of the ninth and others, arrived at the Umgeni (about 12 miles from Maritzburg). Sunday and Monday were the black and white days of the New Moon, and the Zulus therefore remained where they were. Next day they moved on to about five miles from Maritzburg, and sent in Mbewana (the man who had been sent up to call them), and two others, to report their arrival to the S.N.A. They saw Luzindela, the Induna, and announced the Prince and the chiefs. He asked "Had they a pass from Malimati?" They replied that "The Prince himself would answer about that." Then he asked, "Where had they been all this time (since they were sent for)?" Said they, "We have been delayed by the difficulty of travelling with such aged men. We pray the authorities to appoint us a place to sleep at." Said Luzindela, "Do you not know, then, the kraals where you stayed before?"—[i. e. when the Great Deputation was left to lie out upon the hills, or in any kraals in which they could find shelter]—"Go and sleep there, and come again to-morrow." *

Next day (August 16th) they went in again. Said Luzindela, "Speak, then!" Said they, "What should we say, since we spoke yesterday?" Said he, "Speak! and let me hear by whom this Prince and these chiefs have been called." Said they,

* Here we have the common spectacle of the little authority imitating the official arrogance of the bigger one.

“Were you not present when they were called?”* Said he, “It was never said, ‘Go and call them.’ Did you not say, ‘We left them coming?’” Said Mbewana, “Well, I do not understand you; for you were in the room when Mgamule told Mr. Jan (Shepstone) that his knees [i. e. their weakness] prevented his journeying so much, for which reason he would send me.” Said Luzindela, “You misunderstood! It was because you told us that they were already on the road that it was said, ‘Let them be quick, then!’” [So easily do masters find followers to “swear to what they say”!]

On Thursday the same men were sent in again. And this time another *Induna*, “Tom,” was with Luzindela, who asked them the same question, “Who had called them?” Said they, “We have nothing further to say on that point; but that you should now announce us to the *Inkos*’ (Mr. Jan). But Dabulamanzi told us to say that he himself and Zeyise went to Malimati, and spent a whole day praying for the pass. Malimati was writing a paper while he spoke, apparently taking down their words; but in the end he refused them the pass. And so Dabulamanzi has come down without it.” While speaking with the messengers, Luzindela was called into the Office. Coming back presently, he said, “The *Inkos*’ says you will hear from him (when you are to come in to him).”

Meanwhile, a policeman had gone out to the

* In Zulu this interrogative form of answer implies assertion, as “Were you not present?” = “You *were* present.”

Prince to inquire for the pass from Malimati. But Dabulamanzi replied that "he could not report all that matter by messenger; he begged leave to bring in his words himself."

Men from Dunn had arrived in Maritzburg a day or two before Dabulamanzi and party, and were met by his messengers at the S.N.A. Office, where they saw Dunn's men called in to have audience with Mr. Jan, while they were left waiting day after day outside. On Thursday they found that Dunn's party was increased by some men from Mavumengwana and three other chiefs, who had arrived in charge of Dunn's policeman, Mkatini. And on the same day messengers from home reached Dabulamanzi, to warn him that Dunn had told Mavumengwana to go down and make as if he had joined the Prince's party, and act as a spy for Dunn. Mavumengwana had refused to do this, but had sent men to be his ears, and so had the three other chiefs. On Saturday (August 19th) after waiting for a summons to no purpose through Friday, the Prince and party sent in messengers to ask for food, as they had received none all these days, and were very hungry. Luzindela, whom they found in company with Dunn's men at the S.N.A. Office, just drove them away, saying, "What! are you coming here with your tricks from Zululand? Be off! Nobody sent for you!" But Dunn's men were seen going through the town carrying beef.

Two days later* a messenger from the S.N.A.

* During this time they were so much pinched by hunger, owing to the neglect of the Government officials, that they went

Office came to them, to say—"What! are the Princes and the chiefs here all this time? Why do they not come in to Mr. Jan?*" Do they not know that he is the Governor's representative? How can he feed them if they do not come to him? Do they get anything to eat out there?"

It was too late to go in that day, but they went the next morning, the whole party. The *indunas* of the S.N.A. asked, "What has all this crowd come for?" They replied, "Here are the nine chiefs who

to the Bishop of Natal and represented their case to him, receiving food from him at once. But they must have been hard pressed before doing this, since Ndabuko, with a delicacy and genuine gratitude not often equalled even amongst civilised people, had strongly impressed upon all the members of the Great Deputation that, knowing the Bishop's readiness to give to all who required, and how much he had already done for them in many ways, they must not, on any account, ask for presents at Bishopstowe, and must be careful not to impose on the kindness of their best friend.

* They *had* been in to "Mr. Jan" four days out of the five. If it is argued that the native *indunas* alone were responsible for the neglect and insult under which they had suffered, and that the Secretary for Native Affairs (Mr. J. Shepstone) was ignorant of their arrival, it must be answered that it is notorious that official subordinates, such as these *indunas*, behave as they know their masters wish them to do, and that, especially in so old established an office as the one in question, the *indunas* would not *dare* to act thus, unless encouraged, or at least permitted by the authorities. These men (the *indunas*) except as reflecting the sentiments of their masters, could have no possible interest in the Zulu question, unless, indeed, those masters had promised them lands and spoil in Zululand when the country, or a portion of it, should finally be annexed. The above account of the treatment of these Zulu messengers is given in their own unsophisticated language, as taken down from their mouths by competent persons from day to day, and translated as literally as possible, because their own simple story will carry conviction with it, as perhaps the same *facts* more elaborately related might fail to do.

were called; of the rest, some have come of their own accord, because they too wish to pray for Cetshwayo's return, and others have come in attendance upon the chiefs their fathers." They did not see Mr. Jan that day, and were told to "come again to-morrow." They received some meat, but very little; it could not possibly have been meant for one meal for the nine chiefs alone. As a matter of fact, only three of them got any of it.

The next day (Thursday) they went in again early, and waited all day outside the office of the S.N.A., but were told in the end, "You have come too late, come again to-morrow." They again received a little meat—four small pieces.

At this stage *the Press* interfered—for once (in Natal) on the right side. With one signal exception,* for many years the Natal press had universally

* That of the *Natal Colonist*, whose editor, Mr. John Sanderson, made a gallant stand against public opinion, and in the cause of justice to the natives, thereby sacrificing his own interests completely, and losing popularity, personal friends, livelihood, and, finally, it may almost be said life itself. He defended Colonel Durnford from the unjust charges brought against him by the colonists in connection with the Bushman's River Pass affair in 1873; he made a determined protest against the injustice done to the tribes of Langalibalele and Putini in the same year; and his voice was one of the few raised against the prosecution of the Zulu war. In consequence of these repeated and fearless struggles with *popular evil*, and his determined opposition to the dishonest machinations of what has since fitly been named the "official clique" of Natal, the support to his journal declined, it became impossible longer to maintain it, and the sad effects of disappointment in right endeavour, and the apparent failure of every effort made to stem the tide of oppression and deceit, helped to shorten another good man's life.

supported the *stronger side*, i. e. every measure tending to the oppression of the aborigines, and their reduction to the convenient condition of mere servitors of their white fellow-creatures. But about this time the *Natal Witness*, under the control of its present editor, Mr. F. R. Statham, began to emancipate itself, slowly at first, but later on, by a gallant stroke (which has yet to receive its meed of approbation from the thinking public)* from the bonds of officialism and (so-called) "colonial interest," which still hold its brother journals. Even before the date given, the *Witness* (under the same editor) had shown signs, from time to time, of having the courage of its own opinions in face of the multitude, and upon unpopular subjects. It was an article from Mr. Statham's pen which, after the battlefield of Isandhlwana was openly examined for the first time, on May 21st, 1879, gave to the Natal world the true meaning of the discoveries made there, and pointed out, in thrilling language, the deep injustice which, until then, had been done to the true hero of that melancholy day, Colonel Durnford, R.E.

On the present occasion a reporter for the *Witness* came up and questioned Dabulamanzi, while waiting outside the S.N.A. Office on the Thursday, as described above, and this proved the last day of their weary detention. The conversation as published in the *Witness* is too long for reproduction here, but

* See account of action for libel brought by Mr. J. Shepstone against the *Natal Witness* in 1883, *infra*.

several most important facts were elicited by it. Their "direct mission in coming to Natal" was "to ask for the immediate return of Cetshwayo." They had not known before they left Zululand that the Government had decided to restore him,* and they were both greatly rejoiced to hear it, and sure that "all Zululand would rejoice as well. We are all happy, and the whole country will be happy. We will not have a good night's sleep until we have seen him. We will all go singing the whole way back to our kraals, because of his restoration. Even the old women who cannot walk will get up and walk [with joy] when they hear he is coming again."

Further, they said that even the appointed chiefs would welcome the King gladly, with the exception of Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu, by whom they declared that all the disturbances in Zululand had been caused. Dunn, they said, was universally hated, he had followers only because Cetshwayo was away; on his return, Dunn's men would all fall away from him. The Zulu nation had not the slightest hatred to the British Government, and would rejoice to receive Cetshwayo back at their hands, and with their goodwill. The questions and answers concluded,

* One of Sir Henry Bulwer's most persistent assertions about the Great Deputation is that many of those who composed it were induced to join it by assurances from the Princes that Cetshwayo was about to be restored, and that therefore their appearance was owing to fear of incurring the King's displeasure rather than to any desire for his return. As a fact, the Princes themselves knew nothing of the good news until the Deputation reached Natal.

Dabulamanzi, after a short pause, made the following voluntary statement :—

“ We are all glad to hear that Cetshwayo has gone to England, for he has gone as if to see his father, Mpande, to get instructions, and to pay his compliments to the Queen. He has been sent to England to see what the strength of the British nation is. Since we have heard to-day of the return of Cetshwayo, we shall all die happy. There will be no more fighting in the land again as long as we live. We will all die with grey hairs. We will all get fat now. We don't want those three chiefs. All the rest of the chiefs, and the people, hate them. We hate them, and rank them as offal. Now I am satisfied that I have had my say.”

It was a curious coincidence, if nothing more, that the very day after Dabulamanzi thus had his “ say,” in the hearing, of course, of some of the Government *indunas*, Mr. J. Shepstone did, at last, after putting them off from day to day so long, find it possible to give them an audience. They were confronted by several of Dunn's followers,* who accused them of laying complaints against Dunn, “ just because they hate him,” and without real grounds of ill-treatment by him. This charge the Zulus never denied, so far as that their own personal grievances (i. e. Dunn's oppressive rule, the seizure of their cattle, &c.) were matters of small importance in their eyes compared with their great desire for Cetshwayo's return. What they desired was, not that Dunn should be obliged by

* The *Times of Natal* (Government organ) tries to make out that these men were not sent by Dunn, but came down of their own accord, to defend him from the charges brought against him by Dabulamanzi and party. This palpably improbable statement is sufficiently confuted by the fact that some of the men who formed Dunn's party arrived *in charge of one of Dunn's own policemen*.

the British Government to restore cattle, or do other small acts of justice, but that he should be removed altogether, and their own King restored to them. Dunn, who had betrayed both King and country, and who, after years of kindness from Cetshwayo, had never ceased, since the latter's downfall, to bear false witness against him, and to oppose every chance of his release, was simply odious in the eyes of the Zulu nation, and his supporters on this occasion only assisted Dabulamanzi's case by pointing out the fact. The latter, however, and the chief men with him, declined to discuss these minor questions of Dunn's misrule upon this occasion. The news of Cetshwayo's probable return put aside all their own personal troubles. "We have come to cry and plead to the Government for the return of Cetshwayo, and not to complain of anything we have against John Dunn."

Dabulamanzi touched also on various important points: on the indignation of the people at finding that the taxes paid to Dunn were represented by him as paid to prevent Cetshwayo's return; on Dunn's threats against those of the people in his district who had "prayed for" the King; and on the fact that they were left without any resource but a direct appeal to the Natal Government, since Dunn's threats were enforced by "three policemen from the Resident, *to whom we should have made our complaint,*" and since the Resident refused to give them the passes for which the Natal Government had told them to ask, in terms which they under-

stood to imply that he would be directed to grant them. Finally, it was confidently asserted by some of those present at this interview, that even Dunn's own men remarked, on hearing of the King's probable release, "Immediately Cetshwayo returns, we will leave Dunn and join our King;" and that one of them * had said before the S.N.A., "Why did not Dabulamanzi tell us that he was coming down to ask for Cetshwayo's return? We would all like to see him back."

The main body of the returned deputation, including the representatives of the appointed chiefs and Maduna, had gone on to the Inhlazatshe, after waiting the three days at Mavumengwana's, that they might not reach the Residency before Mr. Osborn.

On the way they learned that Zibebu and Hamu had already taken a step towards fulfilling their threat to the Deputation: "If you are rejected, and come back without what you are asking for (i. e. unprotected by British favour from our vengeance for your attempt to bring back Cetshwayo), we shall wipe you out." Two separate attacks were made, one by an *impi* from each chief, taking possession of many kraals, appropriating or destroying the stores of grain, but taking no lives, the people having fled with their cattle at the approach of the attacking force. At one kraal, however, the master, Ndabezimbi, whose two brothers were away on the Deputation, having

* The first mentioned of these men would seem to have been some of those who had come reluctantly, under compulsion from Dunn, to take his part before the Government, but the latter was his own messenger and representative.

with him about one *ivio* (company) of his men, resisted the attack successfully, and drove off the *impi* (Zibebu's), being wounded himself in the encounter. His success did not last long, however, for the attacking party had but gone for reinforcements, with which they returned, and driving out the owners, took possession of the kraal, whereupon the Sutu people collected to defend themselves and to protect the Princes, saying, "Let us avenge Ndabezimbi, and go back to our own homes, from which we have been turned out by Zibebu. It is only you, sons of Mpande, who have been restraining us all this time. But Maduna said, 'No, wait a little! Are we not still praying for Cetshwayo?'"—meaning that any act of violence on their part, even in retaliation, would prejudice the King's cause with the British authorities. And he reported the matter of Ndabezimbi to Malimati (Mr. Osborn) on his arrival, who said, "Truly, sons of Mpande, I see that it is you who are attacked this time. But are you not praying for Cetshwayo? And am I not attending to that affair for you? Let this be. You have not yet been given leave to assert yourselves."

The exact words of this speech are not vouched for, but the general tenor was to prevent the King's party "asserting" themselves. Siziba, a very trustworthy messenger, repeats Maduna's words after a subsequent interview with the Resident. Maduna did not tell this messenger much, only that he did not understand the Resident's words, for what he had said was, "I have always said that it would be right

for the Princes to be returned to their own homes." The Prince remarked, "Why does he speak evasively, saying 'I have always said' instead of 'I say'? And why does he not call Zibebu and speak before us both? Does he not know that if I went to my old home now upon this 'word,' Zibebu would attack me at once, and there would be shocking fighting? I am not at all afraid of Zibebu, but it would at once be reported that 'here is Ndabuko (Maduna) making a disturbance.'" Kilane, a messenger sent by Sir H. Bulwer to see what was going on, gave the same report of the matter to the S.N.A. and also spoke to him warmly on behalf of Dabulamanzi, when the official said to him (Kilane) "I hear that Dabulamanzi is making a disturbance. Do they think they will help themselves so? The power which will help them will come from the Governor [only it never did]. Dabulamanzi sees that his brother is gone to the Queen, and so he sets himself up." But the Government messenger replied, "No, sir! Dabulamanzi is slandered. It is not he who is making a disturbance, but John Dunn who wants to turn him out." A very brief report of Kilane's statement on his return is given in the Blue Book [3466, p. 89], but it includes nothing beyond the bare reply of Mnyamana to the "message" sent him by H.E., and does not touch upon what might be regarded, if desired, as mere talk, such as the above about Dabulamanzi. Mnyamana's reply, as it appears in the official report, is, however, sufficiently to the point, as far as he is concerned [*ibid.*].

“You ask me why I disturb the country,” he says. “I do not deny that I have had an armed force here with me, but it was not to disturb the country. It was to protect me, or the people under me, from Hamu, who has never ceased to trouble me, and continues to do so. I have sat still all this time and continue to sit still, because I fear [respect] the Government.

“Four of my principal kraals (one being that of my induna) have been seized by Hamu, the women and children driven out, and they are now occupied by Hamu’s people, and many of my people have in consequence deserted their kraals.

“Who am I that I should make war upon any one? What I did was in self-defence. I am ill, as you see me, or I would go with you to thank in person, but as I cannot go I send . . . one of my principal men with you as proof of my sincerity and [to show] that I now feel that I am known to the Government.”

The message for which he expresses his gratitude was, he said, the first show of interest in him from the Natal Government since the “settlement” after the war, and is as follows [3466, p. 58]:—

Natal, June 15th, 1882.

“Reports have reached the Governor here that the Zulu country is in a disturbed state, and that this disturbance is caused by you and others, with your support.

“It is said that you have collected an armed force for the purpose of attacking ‘Uhamu,’ an appointed chief in whose territory you live, and that you and others have collected an armed force to attack Usibebu.”

“Is this true?”

“If so, why is this?”

“Upon whose authority can you be acting?”

“If you consider that ‘Uhamu’ has wronged you, the way for you is clear, and if it is found that you have just cause of complaint, then justice will be done you, but you cannot take upon yourself a right that belongs to the Government only. Proceedings such as yours cannot fail to bring further trouble on the people of the country.

“The Governor, therefore, in order to save time, sends messengers direct to you with the expression of his trust that you will at once send the people you are said to have with you to their homes, and

that you will induce the others to do the same. If you have a complaint against 'Uhamu,' the Governor will be ready to hear what it is, and to cause it to be inquired into, and to set matters right.*

"You must know that the people cannot live in peace while armed parties traverse the country, and it has surprised the Governor to hear that you are the first to take up arms against another."

That Mnyamana or any of the "Sutu" party † had been "the first to take up arms," was a complete mistake, and the repeated admonitions to them to disperse, not to arm themselves, &c., &c., were practically commands not to defend themselves, and to remain quietly, each family at their own kraal, while the disloyal chiefs attacked and destroyed them piece-meal. A comparatively small body of armed men in this manner may easily overcome and put to death a scattered population of immensely larger numbers, and this is precisely what has been allowed, if not encouraged, in Zululand. In 1880 had Mnyamana and the Princes raised a standard for

* This and the former sentence, "the way for you is clear . . . justice will be done you," must have seemed to the Zulus an utter mockery! How often had Mnyamana and the Princes laid their complaints before "the Governor" during the past three years, and what justice had they ever received? Even the small and partial restitution of cattle which Sir E. Wood ordered to be made to them by Hamu, was never enforced, of which fact Sir H. Bulwer was perfectly well aware when he sent this message to Mnyamana, for he had mentioned it, and that "it is evident from Mr. Osborn's report of the 31st May [3466, p. 47], that the cattle were not paid at that time," in a despatch written the very day before (June 14th, 1882).

† The King's adherents, i. e. the great majority of the natives, have now become so commonly known by this name "Usutu," that it is hardly possible not to adopt it, though it properly belongs to Cetshwayo's own tribe only.

Cetshwayo * the numbers of his adherents would have been too great to allow of even a show of opposition, but the policy of the anti-Cetshwayo Government officials has all along been to encourage and strengthen the few chiefs who were willing to oppose him, while the remainder were kept down. In 1881 Hamu's *impi* slaughtered over a thousand (1200) unprepared men, who had they been collected and ready for the attack would have easily held their own. These, the Aba Qulusi, were amongst Cetshwayo's most loyal and courageous subjects. That the like murderous attacks on separate portions of the people contributed still further to the lessening of the numbers of the King's men after the (so-called) restoration will be shown in its proper place. Meanwhile there could hardly be a stronger proof of the great majority on the King's side than the fact that, even after the massacre † on repeated occasions of so many of them, they are still strong enough to hold their own.

The Zulus generally, however, were not so patient as Cetshwayo's brothers forced themselves to be for his sake. They rose throughout the country, and ran together in arms to help the Princes, and in an engagement which shortly ensued, they routed Hamu's *impi* completely. On this Hamu at once displayed that spirit, or want of it, for which he is

* As, without doubt, they would have done had they then known all that was to follow.

† It is impossible to call that a *battle* in which the slaughter is all on one side, as, for instance, one of Hamu's white men wrote of the Aba Qulusi, "Out of an army (?) of about 1500, few escaped . . . our casualties are eight killed and thirteen wounded."

famous.* He fled to his cave, sending messengers to Mnyamana and Undabuko, asking innocently *why they had attacked him!* and assuring them of his good-will to Cetshwayo. Zibebu's *impis* did more serious mischief before their career was stopped. They received several repulses at first, but Zibebu had then, as afterwards, white men with him, and, with their assistance and leadership, he succeeded in driving out one strong party, and burning their kraals, with three poor old women in them.

It would be wearisome to repeat the stories of all the attacks and reprisals which followed before the fighting was stopped, partly owing to Mr. Osborn's entreaties, and partly by Maduna's influence.

That comparatively few lives were sacrificed instead of the frightful slaughter committed on previous occasions by Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu,† is undoubtedly due to the newly revived hopes of Cetshwayo's return. The three unfriendly chiefs had not, at this time, the *power* to do as they had done before, while the leaders of the great mass of the loyal people had not the will to involve the country in a civil war of serious dimensions.

The heads of the Great Deputation saw the Resident at the Inhlazatshe on May 30th, and Mr. Osborn writes next day to Sir Henry Bulwer of the interview thus :—

“I have the honour to state that Undabuko and Usiwetu,

* Hamu was the only Zulu chief who deserted his king and country, and came over to us at the outset of the war of 1879.

† See vol. i.

accompanied by a following of about fifty men, came to me yesterday, and asked to be furnished with your Excellency's answers to representations made by them through me at Maritzburg on the occasion of their late visit to Natal.*

"With the view of insuring accuracy, I carefully noted down at the time what was said by them in making their application, and the replies I gave them. I annex hereto for your Excellency's information a statement of the particulars of the interview.

"The applicants' real desire is to secure for their occupation and use, and for that of their followers, a tract of land excluded from the territories of the appointed chiefs, and over which no such chief is to exercise any authority. I have already, on different occasions, explained to the applicants that the object they seek to obtain is impracticable, and advised them to come to some proper arrangement with a chief, by which they could secure sufficient land for their occupation and use. But as such an arrangement involved their recognition of the chief, they have *for this reason* † not been

* This, it will be remembered is what they were ordered to do by the Natal Government.

† It will be remembered that, at the Inhlazatshe meeting with Sir E. Wood (Aug. 31, 1881), the "word" they received was this: "You, Maduna, Ziwedu, and Dinuzulu, we give you to John Dunn [their worst enemy]. As for your cattle, if Zibebu has eaten up thirty, he shall give you back ten, or if forty, he shall give you twenty, and keep twenty in any case. But this is only on condition that you go to John Dunn; if you do not go to live under John Dunn, Zibebu shall return you none." There is no evidence that they were *ever* given leave to place themselves under any of the more loyal appointed chiefs, who would have treated them with due respect. Their choice lay between Zibebu, who had already treated them with violence and insolence, and Dunn, whose very name must have fired their blood after his behaviour to Cetshwayo. Mr. Osborn here leaves it to be supposed that the Princes were free to locate themselves in the district of any chief who would receive them, but there is not the smallest sign that any such proposition was ever made. The only alternative suggested, even at this late period, is from Sir H. Bulwer to Mr. Osborn [3466, p. 100]: "I am of opinion that it would be very desirable you should make an arrangement with Umfanawendhlela, in whose territory, I understand, the two brothers have been living, by means of which

willing to act on my advice. They, therefore, prefer their request to your Excellency, in the hope of realising their desire of being placed in a position which will render them independent of the appointed chief."

The most remarkable statement of this *ex parte* report is that the applicants' *real desire* was to secure for their occupation and use, &c., a tract of land independent of *the appointed chiefs* (i. e. the whole thirteen, including the eight friendly to Cetshwayo).

they and their immediate followers may have ground sufficient for the purposes of planting during the approaching season." Umfanawendhlela, it will be remembered, was the *ninth* appointed chief—neither heartily loyal to Cetshwayo like the eight who petitioned for him, nor prepared like the three, Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu, to oppose him. [The thirteenth, Hlubi, the Basuto, has throughout been simply obedient to the Natal Government, and would contentedly have accepted Cetshwayo's rule had the Government desired that he should do so.] It was never even proposed to locate the Zulus with any of the appointed chiefs really loyal to the King. The policy of the moment was to trample down, if possible, the hereditary dignity of Cetshwayo's family, and to teach the people—if that could be—that the members of it were now but common men. But, as it was also part of the South African policy of, not alas! the *moment* but the decade, to put a fair face on all things before the British public, such a despatch as the one now under consideration served the purpose well.

Sir Henry Bulwer's phrase "*their immediate followers*" is a somewhat vague one, to be accounted for, probably, by the fact that the followers of "the two brothers" numbered some thousands, every one of whom, however, would have claimed to be an "immediate" follower. When Mr. Osborn spoke to some of the chiefs a little later, proposing to take the Princes back to their homes, but not the tribe, "the latter naturally protested, and when the matter was reported to the Princes themselves, they said, "Is this the Governor's word, that we are to return alone? are not our people our garments? Are we to sit in our own kraals naked? Is this setting the country to rights? It is killing us again!"

Except as a mere assertion of Mr. Osborn's, and repeated on his authority by Sir Henry Bulwer, there is not anywhere the smallest trace of any such desire on the part of the Princes. Having been turned out of their homes by Zibebu and stripped of what little remained to them of their possessions, they had indeed asked for some place where they might lay their heads without being subjected to the insolence of their quondam subjects, Dunn and Zibebu, but the interpretation here given to their request by Mr. Osborn is one which utterly and cruelly misrepresents the character and conduct of these Princes. This is fairly proved by the Resident's own words. Having particularly stated that "with the view of insuring accuracy," he "carefully noted down at the time" what the Princes said, and what he replied, we may assume his report to express *all* they said, and it will be seen that it is quite impossible to extract any such meaning from the words as recorded by Mr. Osborn himself.

His statement runs as follows:—

"Inhlazatye, Zululand, May 30th, 1882.

Appear Undabuko and Usiwetu, accompanied by about fifty men. Usiwetu, addressing the Resident, says [3466, p. 39]:—

'We have come to see you and greet you. . . . Our words were spoken to you in Maritzburg; they are with you, and belong to you. We wish to hear from you about them. We ask your answer to them. We have nothing to add to what we said in Maritzburg.'

Resident.—The words you spoke to me at Maritzburg were, as you know, for the Governor's information, and not mine, and therefore, not to be replied to by me [*ibid.*, p. 40].

Uswetu.—We were told to come to you here, and we do so now. We ask you to give an answer to what we said to you at Maritzburg.

Resident.—You were told to come to me here to make your representation for the Governor's information.

Usiwetu.—When we were told at Maritzburg that we could not see the Governor, we stated to you the things we wished to know, and you wrote them down. We were told to return to Zululand, and come to you here.* This we have done now, and we ask for the Governor's answer.† We have purposely come to-day to receive it. We have not come to state any grievance. If you showed the Governor our words spoken at Maritzburg, we think you will be able to give us his reply to-day.‡

Resident.—You were told at Maritzburg to return to Zululand and tell me here what you wish to bring to the knowledge of the Governor; that I should show your words to him, and obtain his reply, which I would communicate to you. I am now willing to hear and write down anything you wish the Governor to know.§

Usiwetu.—It cannot be necessary that we should repeat now what we said to you at Maritzburg, and was written down by you. We said to you then that we had only two things to represent, viz. to pray that Cetshwayo may be restored, and to state our troubles (grievances) [that is to say, their persecution at the

* This statement of facts is strictly true.

† The Governor's answer—i. e. to their great prayer for Cetshwayo.

‡ Surely nothing could be more natural and reasonable than this slight doubt which appears from time to time in the words of the Zulus! They *still* believed that the British Government loved justice and mercy. Yet in answer to their earnest and repeated prayers and representations, they had not received the smallest portion of either. There were but two alternatives left them; either to lose all faith in England and her Queen, or else to believe (what is undoubtedly the case, as far as the highest Home authorities are concerned) that their petitions had never reached the ears of those for whom they were intended.

§ This reads more like the behaviour of a regular school bully than that of a representative of Her Majesty. It will be remembered how the same bullying took place on the hill near Maritzburg, when—although the Zulus reminded Mr. Osborn that they had already told him all they had to say before he left Zululand—the Resident insisted on their repeating it all again and again, asking the same questions at each meeting, and receiving (although under some quiet protest from the Zulus) the same replies.

hands of Zibebu and Hamu, which arose out of Cetshwayo's banishment]. We still make these representations, we have no other to make. We expected * that you would bring the Governor's answer, and we came here to-day to receive it.

Umtyupana (Jubane).—We are surprised. We were told at Maritzburg to return to Zululand and apply to you. You tell us now that you are unable to give a reply to our representations. The season is advancing, and we have no place to cultivate.

Usiwetu.—We shall be thankful if you will ask the Governor for an early reply. We have no homes.† Our great trouble [i. e. their immediate and pressing trouble] is that we have no land to cultivate.‡ We ask you to beg the Governor to give us a speedy reply, as our trouble is great.

Resident.—I will send to the Governor *the words you have just spoken* [author's italics], and communicate to you without delay any reply he may send."

English readers will probably find it hard to credit that the above speeches of the Zulu Princes were characterised by Mr. Osborn [3466, p. 42] as "neither friendly nor civil." While Sir Henry Bulwer [*ibid.*] writes to the Resident (June 10th): "I do not think the tone adopted by Usiwetu and Undabuko towards you in any way such as it ought

* The word most probably used here would be more correctly translated "hoped," "believed," "trusted," than "expected," or the latter in the sense of "looked for." But the word *expected* gives a short and unceremonious sound to Ziwedu's speech. The same effect is produced by the habitual omission of the universally used form of courteous address "*nkos'*" (sir), without which no Zulu would dream of speaking to a superior.

† This was literally true; the Zulu Princes were homeless and destitute, but for the loyal and loving support of the people who had been stripped of much of their wealth in consequence of their loyalty.

‡ As this actually meant that they had no means of support save from the charity of their brother's late subjects, their need might truly be called great, without that desire for independent power of which Mr. Osborn accuses them.

to have been." Surely only two classes of human beings could have submitted *more* quietly to the will of the ruling power—either spiritless slaves, dreading and obeying a tyrant's rod, or else the very few, the best and highest beings in the scale of humanity, Christian philosophers in the broadest, noblest sense of the words, who might see beyond the authority, and despise the tyranny exercised upon them. We could not expect the latter from these poor, untutored, yet noble-natured barbarians, and it is a disgrace to our name and nation that we should have tried to enforce the former.

The closing words of the Resident give, perhaps, as plain an example as can be desired of the persistent manner in which the *real main* desire of the Zulu petitioners, for Cetshwayo's restoration, was suppressed, put aside, and hidden from observation, while lesser but more immediate grievances were forced into the foreground as "the applicants' *real desire*." Men who hardly know where to turn for their own livelihood, and who feel that presently their wives and children as well will perhaps be asking in vain for food, may easily be led for the moment to speak of instant relief of their own and their families' wants as deliverance from "our great trouble," yet it does not follow that the very same men would not sacrifice their own lives and the well-being of their families most cheerfully to the release and restoration of a monarch so much beloved as was the captive Zulu King, Cetshwayo. And it is

an undeniable fact that the Zulus, while suffering most at the hands of their persecutors, never failed to put forward their "prayer for the Bone" as the first consideration to be named, and even when beguiled into earnest statement of their personal and immediate afflictions, *the King* was always mentioned first. "We said to you that we had only two things to represent, viz. to pray that Cetshwayo be restored, and to state our troubles," says Ziweedu; "we still make these representations, we have no other to make." Yet as soon as they spoke of the second representation without further repetition of the often stated "prayer for Cetshwayo," the Resident seized his cue. "I will send to the Governor *the words you have just spoken*," i.e. those about their landless and destitute condition, which he did, omitting from his covering despatch all notice of their principal and never-forgotten plea for their King, and asserting unblushingly that "the applicants' real desire" [i.e. only real one] was to obtain land for themselves, independently of any of the thirteen kinglets. There is no need to take anything beyond the Resident's own letter and report to convict him on this occasion (as on many others) of failing to represent the *real* cry of the people, and substituting for it some minor complaint, of which, cruel as were their personal grievances, they all lost sight at once, whenever the main object of their petitions was put forward.* Nor are such expedi-

* As at the Inhlazatshe meeting with Sir Evelyn Wood, Dilikana exclaimed, "O Zulus! is it possible that you are wasting

ents peculiar to Mr. Osborn. Sir Henry Bulwer had before him the "statement of the particulars of the interview" given at pp. 128-30, as well as the Resident's despatch, when he answered the latter, commenting upon the former. He also carefully omits all allusion to the first and main prayer, "that Cetshwayo be restored," and confines himself to the second, saying that if the two Princes, or either of them, "would desire to come into Natal to see me on this subject [i. e. the question of a place where they can be located, not, be it observed, of Cetshwayo's restoration], you may give them the permission to come, provided they do not come in with a larger number of followers than ten persons."*

And this was all! The Zulus had made this great effort to bring their desire for Cetshwayo's return to the knowledge of those who held him in captivity, and after travelling so far, enduring so much, and risking more, after praying in vain for an answer to their petition at Maritzburg, and being ordered to return to Zululand, and carry it again to Mr. Osborn, after being made to wait while the prayer—already

the time thus over your separate affairs? why do you not speak for the King's family . . . And our King? I thought our intention in coming here was to pray for him. [The literal translation, as given in another place, is "*your King*" and "*your intention*," but as Dilikana was one of themselves, and was merely recalling them to the point which they all had at heart, though they had been led away from it for the moment, the above rendering is the more correct.]

* This restriction would in itself prevent anything like a general or influential petition on the King's behalf.

well-known to the Governor—was sent back to him again, for the answer which the Resident might, at least, have brought with him, from Natal, when he returned; after all this, when the earnestly desired answer came, it contained not one word about their main petition, not even so much as an acknowledgment of its receipt.

This deliberate quashing on the part of Sir Henry Bulwer of the prayer in question is the more remarkable, since the last ten lines of Lord Kimberley's despatch to him of February 2nd, 1882, Table of Contents [3174] No. 8, "Informing him of his appointment as Special Commissioner for Zulu Affairs, and instructing him as to the line of policy to be pursued," run as follows:—

" . . . the chiefs and people, in order to avert the disasters which must result from a struggle for supremacy, *may desire that Zululand should be reunited under a paramount chief* [*ibid.*, p. 18].*

" *If any representation to this effect should be made to you from Zululand, it will require careful consideration.* But in any case it must be remembered that the British Government cannot put aside the engagements into which it has entered with the Zulu chiefs *as long as the chiefs on their part fulfil their obligations, unless in pursuance of the clearly expressed wish of the chiefs and people themselves*, and that in any alterations which may be made in the settlement, the main objects to be kept in view are the maintenance of peace and the security of the border."

Such representations had repeatedly been made to Sir Henry Bulwer: to twelve out of the thirteen kinglets one or other of Lord Kimberley's exceptions applied; while even if the Basutos had not been as ready as they were to acknowledge Cetshwayo upon

* Author's italics throughout.

the Natal Government bidding them do so, the forcing an alien race upon the Zulus at all was a monstrous piece of tyranny. We were certainly bound to reward the Basutos for their services to us against the Zulus in 1879, but we should have rewarded them at our own cost, instead of at the cost of the Zulus. It would have been no more than simple justice for the Government to remove the Basutos altogether, if necessary, buying suitable land for them within the Natal borders, but, as it was, Sir H. Bulwer had not even that difficulty to contend with, for the Basutos were willing to become subjects to Cetshwayo while he was willing to receive them as such.

Sir Henry Bulwer being determined to look upon the Princes (particularly Undabuko) as the sole disturbers of the public peace in Zululand, persistently ignores whatever he hears to the contrary. In enumerating the motives by which he supposes that they and others were actuated in joining together to petition the Government (or, as the Governor puts it, "creating a disturbance") he studiously avoids any mention of such a possibility as regard for Cetshwayo, in the existence of which sentiment he is resolved to disbelieve. Undabuko's intention, according to Sir Henry Bulwer, is [3466, p. 55] to make "himself master of Zululand;" when it is impossible to deny that an appointed chief has expressed himself in favour of Cetshwayo's return, the former has been "got over" by Undabuko; Umnyamana "has been led to join" the

Princes by every imaginable motive *except* loyalty to his King; reported attempts on the part of the Usutus to recover cattle and other property of which they had been robbed by Zibebu and Hamu, or even to obtain food for their children from their own kraals, from which they had been driven out, are always spoken of as "raids" upon Zibebu, &c.; Ndabuko always "takes up arms in his own cause," instead of, as it should be phrased, "in his own defence, and that of his people;" and, finally, the Governor's and Resident's despatches bristle with such expressions, hurled against the Usutus, as "actively conspiring" against the (three) appointed chiefs, "refusing to acknowledge" them, "disloyal conduct," "wilful disregard" of their authority, &c., &c., one and all of which mean that the people in question joined in the petition for Cetshwayo's return, or expressed their sympathy with it. This, and this only, is the meaning of it all; and it must be left to Sir Henry Bulwer to explain how he intended to carry out his instructions, and learn the real desires of chiefs and people, while an expression of a wish contrary to those of the Natal Government and the three chiefs favoured by it, was regarded by the former, and treated by the latter as rebellion and misbehaviour of the deepest dye.

From the accounts of what really happened after the return of the Great Deputation to Zululand, it would appear that restraining messages from Sir H. Bulwer were far more required by Zibebu and his associates than by Umnyamana and the Princes.

When serious hostilities appeared imminent, the Resident summoned the princes and chiefs of the loyal Zulus [i. e. loyal to their King] to meet him in the neighbourhood of Mnyamana's kraal [3466, p. 95], where he had gone to procure the dispersion of the force collected there for that old chief's protection against Hamu. Sir Henry Bulwer writes of this to Lord Kimberley, on June 26th [*ibid.*, p. 93]:—

“They delayed doing this [coming to meet the Resident, when called] for two days, but on the morning of the 17th instant they came, attended by about 1200 men.”*

Here Sir Henry Bulwer's arithmetic is in fault, since he subtracts 16 from 17 and gets 2. Mr. Osborn, in the despatch on which the Governor is reporting, says:—

“I started on the 15th. . . . I arrived the following day, and immediately placed myself in communication with them (Mnyamana, Undabuko, and Siwetu) requesting them and the headmen with them to meet me at my encampment. . . . To this message they answered that they would comply with my request, but they doubted their ability to come to see me on that day as some of their headmen who will have to be present at the interview were absent, and will have to be sent for.† Shortly after noon on

* Sir H. Bulwer concludes this short despatch, ‘He (the Resident) did not anticipate any trouble with Zibebu, who had always shown himself amenable, and disposed to be guided by the advice given him by the Resident.’ Are we then to suppose that Mr. Osborn was personally responsible for all Zibebu's violent and tyrannical conduct?

† Mr. Osborn here remarks, “From this reply I concluded, correctly as eventually appeared, that they would not come to me that day as they would take time for consultation in reference to

the following day, the 17th instant, Umnyamana, Undabuko, Usiwetu, and Tshingana, accompanied by about 30 headmen, and about 1200 other men, most of the latter being ringed men (Amadoda) [married men = householders, men of position, not mere young fellows of no importance] came up to me all unarmed,* having first duly announced their approach by messengers. On their arrival they greeted me in a friendly manner, and throughout the interview which followed their conduct and bearing was respectful."

Although the above seems a trifling point to insist upon, where so much is necessarily omitted to spare the time and patience of the reader, it is a characteristic instance of the manner in which Sir Henry Bulwer was led by prejudice against Cetshwayo, and therefore against his supporters, to adopt the style and language of a partizan in commenting upon what reached his ears concerning them, even on the rare occasions when his middlemen found it possible to furnish uncoloured accounts. No one can read Mr. Osborn's report and Sir Henry Bulwer's summary of it, without observing that the former for once speaks well of the conduct and manner of the Princes' party, while the Governor gives quite a contrary impression.

Returning to Mr. Osborn's account, it appears that, after hearing from him the object of his visit, namely, to disperse their army, they assured him

my visit." It does not appear *why* what they said should not have been the simple truth.

* In his report of what he said to them occurs the phrase "it is not proper, nor is it indeed possible to hold an inquiry while all the men are standing with their weapons in their hands."

[*ibid.*, p. 67] that it "was not their intention to proceed with the impi against any one, neither did they assemble the impi, the men forming it had come together of their own accord, to protect the chiefs, especially Undabuko and other sons of Umpande."

After a few remarks from the Resident upon the folly of taking matters into their own hands,* he continues, "I then added that the first step that should be taken was to disperse the impi by sending all the men assembled to their homes." The headmen objected to this, saying that advantage would be taken by Zibebu and Hamu of their exposed condition if the men were sent away, and they suggested that Hamu and Zibebu should be called upon to disperse their impis first.

"I at once pointed out the unreasonableness of this suggestion," says Mr. Osborn, "and after much argument on the part of the headmen . . . it was thought that a simultaneous dispersion of all the impis might meet the case. . . . After some discussion . . . they all agreed to my proposal for which they thanked me."

It does not appear why it should be "unreasonable" to expect one side to do what the Resident recommended to the other, as the "first step" in the "wisest and only proper course" [*ibid.*] for them to follow, but at all events he is able to report within the week that all the impis on either side were said to have dispersed.

At this interview the Resident directed Umnyamana and Undabuko to follow him to the Inhlazatshe,

* They had found but little protection at the hands of the authorities.

to state their case for the Governor's consideration, and they agreed to do so at once.

Their meeting took place on the 28th and 29th, and Mr. Osborn reports on July 2nd [*ibid.*, p. 93], saying, "I had hoped to be able to hear also Uzibebu and Hamu in reference to these matters. But a delay having occurred in their appearance or that of their indunas, I deem it advisable not to wait any longer" He incloses the following statements made before him :—

Hemulana (representing Umnyamana, who was too ill to attend): "I am sent by Umnyamana to speak for him, and to say that since the time of the war he has had the care of the King's (Umpande's) children [and grandchildren, e. g. Cetshwayo's children]. When the war was over the white chiefs said Umnyamana and those he had care of, and his people, were to continue to occupy their lands, and that the appointed chiefs were not to disturb them on the land.* Notwithstanding this, the chiefs soon after the settlement seized Umnyamana's cattle, and the cattle of the ex-King's brothers. They said they did this on the order of the Resident. After this General Wood came here to speak about our cattle. He said the ex-King's brothers were to remove into Dunn's territory. Very soon after he left the chiefs, Zibebu and Hamu had [the Princes'] cattle seized, took away or destroyed their

* On this Mr. Osborn remarks [*ibid.*, p. 94], "He, however, omits to mention the condition attached to this permission, with which he was and is well acquainted, viz. that all who lived in any territory had to recognise the authority of the chief of that territory. It was the wilful disregard of this condition by Umnyamana that led Hamu to act as he had done towards him."

This "wilful disregard" on the part of Umnyamana of the "authority of the chief," merely means that he "prayed for Cetshwayo," and sheltered the Princes when turned out by Zibebu. It is necessary to bear this fact in mind whenever Sir H. Bulwer or Mr. Osborn use phrases implying rebellious conduct towards the appointed chiefs. "Rebellion" meant affection for Cetshwayo, however peaceably shown.

grain, causing also loss of life. Umnyamana then came with them, Undabuko and Usiwetu, to the Resident as they had been driven away with the assegai. Soon after this the Resident went to Natal, and on his return he sent messengers to Hamu to advise him to hand over to Umnyamana the cattle awarded to him by Lukuni (General Wood). Hamu replied that he would not comply, as he had seized Umnyamana's cattle on the Resident's order, and he requested the Resident to send the messengers by whom he ordered him to make the seizures. Umnyamana says further, that Hamu attacked and killed the Abaqulusi in the presence of the Resident, who had gone to the spot to prevent his doing so. The Abaqulusi was the tribe who had charge of Umpande's sons remaining in the land.

“After this the sons of Umpande (Undabuko and Usiwetu) wished to go to Pietermaritzburg to see the ‘Makosi’ there, and to ‘konza’ (pay their respects to them), as they belong to them, and to state their grievances. They asked the Resident for leave to go, shortly upon which he himself started for Maritzburg.*

* It must be remembered that all this was addressed to, and reported by the Resident, therefore there is no want of candour in the omission of the fact that they “asked the Resident for leave”—*in vain*.

Throughout Mnyamana's messages and speeches, it is always evident how impossible it was for the Zulu mind to comprehend or adopt the new state of things forced upon them. It was less that they *would* not than that they *could* not accept the appointed chiefs in positions which all the traditions and ideas of the nation denied them. Men in some cases of lesser rank and power, in many instances of equal importance only, set above them by the mere arbitrary will of the conquerors who then quitted the country, could command neither affection nor respect, and had Cetshwayo fallen during the war, the thirteen Kinglets would have been done away with within the year. It was only the hope of the King's return which, after the first stunning effects of the war had passed away, induced the Zulus to submit, in order to propitiate the nation who held him captive, to the chiefs whom the Government had forced upon them.

Sir Henry Bulwer himself acknowledges this fact, that the Kinglets were not accepted by the Zulus, in his “Report on the Settlement of the Zulu country” [3466, No. 79], in which he says,

They then followed him, thinking, as they would find him there, that he would obtain access for them to the Governor, but Umnyamana has since learnt that the Resident met them twice outside the town, and refused to allow them to see the Governor. . . . On their return, they had no place to go to, as Hamu had seized Umnyamana's one [own] kraal called the Mavageni. . . .

"Umnyamana says that the Resident is already aware of the oppression suffered by the sons of Umpande, the children of Chaka, who was the friend of the English chiefs, and who belonged to them. These children belonged to the English chiefs. Must they continue to suffer? The season before last they were driven about and could not cultivate any crops, and again last season when they were driven away from their homes. Their cattle had been seized. What are they to do? Are they again not to be permitted to cultivate at the ensuing season which is near at hand? The land they were driven from was not required for any purpose, it is still lying vacant."

The remainder of Umnyamana's message is well summed up in the concluding sentence: "All the troubles in the country arise from the circumstance that the white 'Makosi' gave to some chiefs the lands which originally belonged to others, who were thus placed in a wrong position."

Nothing could better illustrate the complete folly of the "settlement" after the war of 1879, when one man [Sir Garnet Wolseley] imagined that by the mere power of his word, he could crush out all the traditions of a feudal people, destroy their respect for their hereditary princes and chief men, and force them to submit to the arbitrary rule of whomever he

"Do the appointed chiefs possess in themselves the paramount and supreme authority over the people? The people do not recognise that the appointed chiefs possess it" [*ibid.*, p. 141]; and though he denies that inferior rank on the part of the Government nominees interfered with their influence, he shows very plainly that they were in a false position.

chose to appoint. The thing was impossible, or, rather, it could only have been done in one way, i. e. by keeping a large British army indefinitely in Zululand, to force submission to the appointed chiefs. Under those circumstances, the third generation might, perhaps, have seen the actual change effected, or a shorter time, at the cost of some dozen heavy engagements, by which a generation might have been wiped out more speedily.

After Hemulana, Usiwetu's representative, and then Undabuko in person spoke to the same effect, the latter saying [3466, p. 97]:—

“We, with our people, and their families, have all this time been living with others. We cannot do so much longer, and if we are not to cultivate next season, I know not where we shall go. The short crops of last season will prevent others from continuing to keep us.”*

* On this Mr. Osborn remarks, “It must be remembered that General Wood arranged with Chief John Dunn for a suitable place for them in his territory, an arrangement which they would not avail themselves of.” No one was better aware than Mr. Osborn how cruel and absurd a proposition was the said arrangement, or how impossible it was for the Princes to “avail themselves of” it. He also speaks of a “counter statement” of Zibebu's that he had persecuted his brothers because they “had joined the Usutu party with whom they were actively conspiring against him,” and had taken part last year with Usutu *when the latter armed with the view of attacking him.*” These italicised words do not appear to have had any origin except in Zibebu's own mind. There is not the smallest sign of any such attack having been contemplated, and it is very certain that none ever took place, although Zibebu's misbehaviour to the Princes would have been more likely to precipitate than to prevent it, had anything of the sort been intended, as it

Of the persecution of these Princes by the appointed chiefs notice has already been taken, but the stories of the chief Umsutshwana and of the induna Ungamule, which follow, will be new to the reader [*ibid.*, p. 97].

Umsutshwana (chief of the Umhletshi tribe in Uzibebu's territory: "I come to state my complaints against Zibebu, who has oppressed me and my tribe, which is a large one, for a long time past, and is continuing to do so. Last year I informed the Resident that Zibebu had eaten up my tribe, taking away all our cattle. I could not then give the number taken because the tribe was so large, and lived on such an extensive tract that I could not ascertain it without calling the people together, which I would not do out of fear of offending Zibebu. I have not yet ascertained the number of cattle taken from us on that occasion, but I have now sent some men to find out; I believe that over a thousand head were taken. This seizure was made because we were charged with having aided Sitimela in the rebellion he got up against Umlandela,* which charge I and my people denied. Previous to this seizure Uzibebu charged us with secreting royal cattle, which charge we also denied, but notwithstanding which he seized and took from us 320 head of cattle as a punishment. The royal cattle that were kept in our tribe were collected by Dunn immediately after close of the war. The cattle so collected numbered 140 head and were taken away by Dunn; two head remained with my brother Umiti as his due for having taken care of the cattle. It was the custom that those who had care of king's cattle were to retain their reward when such cattle were removed. It was on account of those two head of cattle having been found in my brother's possession that Zibebu made the seizure of 320 head from us. After this Zibebu said he had heard that I had been to the Resident with Undabuko, and that I had spoken against him.

certainly was not. For the rest the "active conspiracy against Zibebu" began and ended with their petitioning for Cetshwayo's return. Sir Henry Bulwer and Mr. Osborn repeatedly speak of this "arming" and intended attack as facts, but there is no available evidence of anything of the sort.

* See vol. i.

I admitted that I had been to the Resident, but denied that I had spoken a single word to him. I said I never opened my mouth. As he, however, seemed displeased, I sent him an ox to appease him. He was, however, not satisfied with this, and demanded more cattle from me as "isivumu" (recognition); failing my compliance, I was to leave his territory with my people. He also accused me of having visited Mkosana on his return from Cetshwayo at the Cape. I admitted having been to see Mkosana, but denied that in doing so I had erred. To satisfy Zibebu I and my people had to pay him thirty-six head of cattle as "isivumu." . . . We remained at our kraals until Cetshwayo's brothers went to Pietermaritzburg about a couple of months ago. I sent men with them to represent me in the prayer for Cetshwayo's restoration. For having sent these men Zibebu was angry, and ordered me and my whole tribe to leave his territory at once. A few days after this order was given, one of Zibebu's own brothers came to me late in the evening and warned me and my people to leave our kraals at once as Zibebu's impi was coming to surround us.* On getting this information we slept in the open that and three following nights, fearing attack. During the third night Zibebu's impi did come and surrounded my kraal, and finding no people in the kraal the men of the impi destroyed all the grain and loose property they could find. . . . I do not know how many of the kraals were thus visited and plundered, but I have seen some twenty. . . . Our people gradually got pushed lower down as the impi approached, until they took refuge in an uninhabited part of Somkeli's territory, where they and all our families have encamped in the thorns (mimosa bush), and where they are still encamped. They have no huts there to go into, and their cattle and corn have been seized. . . . We do not know where to get food for our families. My father was a great chief under the Zulu kings, and when he died I succeeded him over our large tribe. I did not object to Zibebu being chief over me as the English said he was to be so. But Zibebu has no greater rank in the nation than I have,† nor is he stronger than I am; I could have resisted him with

* Umgamule says, "We do not like to mention the name of this brother of Zibebu's, as we fear that Zibebu will punish him severely should it come to his ears."

† Sir Henry Bulwer says [3466 p. 141] that the Zulus made no objections to the appointed chiefs on the ground of inferior rank, and that "as a matter of fact, the greater number of the appointed

success when he oppressed me, and I can do so still, but I refrain because he had been appointed by the English. I and my tribe now have suffered so much oppression from him, that I will never acknowledge him again. I will only acknowledge the English, and as you are put here by the English chiefs I will only acknowledge you as my chief, and as having authority over me and my tribe.* I will not acknowledge any other, I and my tribe always belonged to the King only, and the land on which we lived was ours. We did nothing to Zibebu to merit being treated in the manner described. I ask the Resident to send men to the spot to see whether or not what I have stated is true. I ask to be allowed to return with my people to our homes from which Zibebu has driven us, and that all our property, the cattle, grain, &c., which were unjustly taken from us by Zibebu be restored to us by him. I did nothing wrong to Zibebu, gave him no cause whatever to treat us as he has done. I restrained my people from offering any resistance when our cattle were seized, and the other acts of violence perpetrated against us. I did this because I was afraid of you (the Resident), as I might be blamed for any fighting and loss of life that might occur."

(In answer to a question from the Resident)—

"I did not come to report to you these things immediately on their occurrence as I was afraid of Zibebu. Whenever any one has

chiefs were men of high position in the country." It will be manifest at once that not "the greater number" but all of them ought to have been chosen from such, but "as a matter of fact," although most of them were of *high* rank, the greater number were not of the *highest* rank, and the only Prince selected, Hamu, was the one who had deserted his country to the invaders. Here we have Umsutshwana speaking of Zibebu, certainly (as the King's cousin) next in rank, as having no greater rank in the nation than himself, and most of the kinglets were inferior in position to some of the chiefs placed under them by Sir Garnet Wolseley's settlement.

* Such phrases as these are frequently quoted to show that the Zulus desired English rule—i.e. not Cetshwayo's—but the following words of this speech, "I and my tribe always belonged to the King only," indicate what in all such declarations was either spoken or intended, "let us have *English rule if (or since) we cannot have our own King.*"

been to report anything to you the chiefs * eat them up. I, however, come to you now, which is as soon as I could; I had first to see to the safety of the people of my tribe, and my own family."

Umgamule, an induna of Cetshwayo's "city of refuge" Ekubazeni, where he sent all the accused people whom he saved from death during his father Umpande's lifetime,* residing under the chief Umsutshwana, gave a like account of having been obliged to pay an "isivumu" of "20 head of cattle, four goats and two half-crowns" [*ibid.*, p. 99], of having been found fault with by Zibebu for friendliness to Undabuko,† and for sending to greet Umkosana on his return from the Cape,‡ for which last

* For full accounts see vol. i.

† He said, ". . . I noticed that Zibebu was not friendly towards me, and on asking him [why], he said it was because I had gone to Undabuko, when the latter sent for me a little time previous. I told him to remember that I was the induna [under Cetshwayo's rule] who had special charge of them [the Princes] and their house; if he did not wish me to have anything to do with them he should release me from them, and let it be known that I have no more to look after them. [That is to say that this honest man, having had a special charge conferred upon him by competent authority, could not think himself released from it except by competent authority.] He replied that he had nothing to do with this. I then saw that he was still angry, but said no more, and returned to my home, where I remained quietly."

‡ Could anything be more indicative of the *suppression* of Zulu loyalty to Cetshwayo than the fact that welcome offered to Mkosana—who, coming back from the King's place of banishment with the news that he was still alive and did not despair of seeing them all again, was like a messenger from another world to these poor faithful fellows—that such welcome was regarded and treated as an unpardonable offence by the few appointed chiefs most under white influence (i. e. "amenable")? nor is there the smallest sign amongst the official papers, that the Natal Govern-

offence Zibebu had seized his cattle and that of his people, "510 head of cattle and 400 goats." Umgamule appears to have done his best to avoid collision with Zibebu; refraining (as did Umsutshwana) from personally joining the Great Deputation on Cetshwayo's behalf,* and had endeavoured, in various ways, to propitiate Zibebu by treating him with due respect as an "appointed chief." But he knew that in their hearts they were loyal to Cetshwayo, and *that*, in his eyes, as in those of his patrons, was *the* unpardonable offence.

When Umgamule sent men to represent him (although he purposely did not go himself) with the Great Deputation, Zibebu warned him [*ibid.*], that "he (Zibebu) had already once hit me a blow, and created a sore on me; if I chose to rub and irritate that sore, and carry it to the Government (in Natal) as evidence against him, I may do so, but he would strike me again on the same spot, and bruise the sore." [N.B. This is the man who according to Sir H. Bulwer and Mr. Osborn "had always shown himself amenable" to the Government.] The narrator's account of the way in which they were driven from their homes, and their property confiscated or destroyed, agrees with that of the previous speaker, and he described how their families, women and

ment ever deprecated the actions of these chiefs in punishing every sign of loyalty to Cetshwayo, even after the Home Government had expressly stated its desire to know how "the chiefs and people" felt upon the subject.

* Though not from want of loyalty to the King.

children, were then still camped in the thorn bush with no other shelter than they could make out of branches and grass.* “Our men,” he says, “come out occasionally to the immediate neighbourhood of the homesteads from which we have been driven, and remain about the dongas (small ravines, dry water-courses) and bushes for chances to recover some corn or other property.” †

Sir Henry Bulwer’s comment [3466, p. 100] upon Mr. Osborn’s despatch of the 2nd and the above statements contains the following sentence:—

“There is nothing, as far as I can see, in the statements which you have forwarded to me that furnishes an explanation of Undabuko’s proceedings in taking up arms. He has not apparently attempted to explain it.” Determined prejudice could hardly go further! In the first place Undabuko is here forced into the foremost place, i. e. the position of responsibility, as the man who had ordered the Zulus to take up arms, although on all other occasions the Government had pointedly denied him the dignity of being a person of any consequence at all.

* This was in winter, when the nights are always bitterly cold, even when the days are warm, which is by no means always the case.

† A trustworthy Zulu, six weeks later (August 6th), said that the only disturbances since those which took place immediately on the return of the Great Deputation from Natal had arisen from some of the people turned out by Zibebu driving off the latter’s people (who had taken possession of their kraals), not in order to repossess them, but to take away some of their own stores of grain, without which they, with their women and children, would have perished, and that Mnyamana, Ndabuko, &c., were waiting patiently to hear the result of Cetshwayo’s visit to England.

It was only when a (supposed) fault was to be accounted for that Cetshwayo's brother was put in the foreground thus by the Natal Government. But it must also be observed that, although during this particular interview the question of *why arms had been taken up by those who had assembled to protect the Princes* was not apparently raised at all, Sir Henry Bulwer already knew, from Mr. Osborn's report of the previous conference, that of June 17th, precisely why they had done so. The chiefs then present had distinctly asserted—so writes Mr. Osborn [3466, p. 67]—that “the men forming it (the *impi*) had come together of their own accord to protect the chiefs, especially Undabuko and other sons of Mpande as they had heard that there were those who meant to attack and kill them.” And Kilane, a trusted messenger from the Government to Zululand, had reported to the S.N.A. on July 11th, ten days before Sir Henry Bulwer wrote as above, that it was a mistake to suppose that Ndabuko had attacked Zibebu; and when on hearing this, Mr. Shepstone appealed to Siziba (another Zulu messenger), the latter told him how Zibebu had made the first attack, and how “on this the Zulu people rose, saying ‘Who will refuse to give his life to-day? The sons of Mpande are attacked again! Let us go and fight for them!’ But Mnyamana and Ndabuko prevented them, saying ‘Do not let us attack!’” The S.N.A. replied, “It is well. I now understand, though I had heard another tale; Mnyamana is an *indoda* (manly, fine fellow) in that he has not

fought.” And he promised to report their words to the Governor.*

After careful consideration of all the evidence offered upon the subject, and cross examination of several Zulus, no unprejudiced mind could entertain a doubt as to the substantial truth of the stories of Umsutshwana and Ngamule.

But my readers will hardly have accompanied me so far without learning to be prepared for a determination on the part of the Government officials to give credence to *any* tale, however improbable, which they might receive from Zibebu, rather than to the sorrowful story of the sufferers from his tyranny.

Nor will they be disappointed. On July 27th, 1882, Sir H. Bulwer writes [3466, p. 116] to the Earl of Kimberley as follows:—

“Everything serves to show that Undabuko has been the prime mover in these disturbances. When he returned from Natal he evidently did so with a deliberately formed design to carry the agitation to the extreme measure of taking up arms, not, it is to be observed, in defence, but for aggressive purposes.”

This is truly an amazing statement, after which one begins to wonder how far the writer can be altogether responsible for his own words and actions. There is something hardly sane in this persistent

* The above does not appear in the Blue Book, which in fact gives a most meagre account of Kilane's report, although he was sent up especially by the Government, and it might have been imagined that they would have taken the opportunity of gaining all the information possible. Perhaps they did, but, if so, they kept it to themselves.

rejection of the most palpable truths by a man who, five years earlier * had shown so much ability and sense of justice as had Sir Henry Bulwer. What he means by "everything shows, &c.," and "it is to be observed" is simply and solely that Zibebu, in excuse for his own violent action, *asserted* it. He asks Lord Kimberley's "particular attention" to the statement of Sikota—i. e. Zibebu's statement made through his induna Sikota—and encloses the Resident's report on the whole subject. This is, of course, in precisely the same tone. It appears to him, he says [3466, p. 116], that Umsutshwana and the other chiefs—

"Voluntarily vacated their kraals, and removed their families into Somkeli's territory (i. e. into an almost uninhabitable desert, included in Somkeli's district) for safety in view of the open conflict then pending.† . . . Umsutshwana and the other headmen

* In his despatches before the Zulu war, in which he exposed the fictions by which his fellows were bringing about that war with a firm hand. Owing to his attitude on this occasion many felt a confidence in him on his return to Natal, which was not justified by his subsequent actions.

† Sir H. Bulwer explains this "open conflict then pending" by asserting (on Zibebu's authority) that a message was sent to Umsutshwana by Undabuko after the latter's return with the Great Deputation, bidding Umsutshwana to take up arms, as he had received authority to do this from the "Amakosi" at Pietermaritzburg [*ibid.*, p. 223]. In a later despatch, on still more worthless authority—viz. that of two men, one of them a petty official under Government, who living on Bishopstowe lands, acted as a spy, reporting to the S.N.A. Office all he could learn or invent of the Bishop's doings, and the other an induna of that office, but of whom the Governor speaks as "two trustworthy natives," which neither of them were—he asserts that by "Amakosi," Ndabuko must have meant his friends at Bishopstowe—not the Bishop himself, but his daughter (the present writer's sister) Miss Colenso!

of his party are very anxious that they and their people should be allowed to return to their homesteads. This Zibebu refuses to permit for the reasons given by his indunas."

Undabuko never made the statements attributed to him; he never did take up arms (except in self-defence), and certainly Miss Colenso never gave him any such advice, nor could the expression "Amakosi" have signified any one except the Government. Later on a Zulu messenger, Makeu, committed a fault which gave some retrospective colouring to Sir Henry Bulwer's suspicion, although the case was such a different one in some respects, as to leave it still improbable that any of the Zulus ever used the term "Amakosi" for the Bishop and his family. On this later occasion, after Cetshwayo's "restoration," Makeu had a message to carry from the Bishop to the King, requesting the latter to send down certain witnesses required upon a case on trial in Maritzburg, and in his anxiety to succeed in his mission, the messenger forgot, what he, like all others, had constantly been taught at Bishopstowe, that the simple truth, and that only, would ever serve a right purpose, and, to expedite matters, as he thought, he told Mr. Fynn, the Government official Resident with the King, that it was *the Governor* who had sent him. But on being pressed by Mr. Fynn, who had excellent reasons for doubting the fact, he acknowledged that it was *Sobantu* (the Bishop) of whom he had spoken as *Hulumendi* (Governor or Government). Sir Henry Bulwer spoke of this as "a remarkable instance of the way in which some of the members of the extreme Usutu party have come to look upon the Bishop of Natal, from the part which he has taken on their side in the political affairs of the Zulu country" [3705, p. 69]; but, as a matter of fact, it was nothing of the kind. It was a proof that Makeu had discovered from themselves, how jealous were the Government officials of what they chose to call "interference" on the Bishop's part, and that he knew very well that, far from the name carrying authority, Cetshwayo would be less likely to be allowed by his white tyrants to pay any attention to a request from *Sobantu*, than from any other white man in Natal [*ibid.*, p. 60]. Makeu was to blame for his untruth, and Cetshwayo reproved him for it, but it is less remarkable that *one* amongst the brow-beaten "King's-men," should have failed in strict truth, than that many should have adhered to it so accurately and unflinchingly, that none of the facts collected and published by the Bishop have ever been answered, except by mere contradictions

These reasons are recorded thus [*ibid.*, p. 119]:—

“They are his open enemies, and he would be bringing them back into the midst of his loyal people. They would rise against him and kill him if he allowed this. The heads of the Usutu party to whom they belong have already threatened to take forcible possession of part of his territory during next moon.”

Their being “open enemies” meant, as usual, that they had expressed their wish for the King’s return, and of the rest of the “reasons” there is not the smallest proof, except Zibebu’s own word, while it must be remembered that the “part of his territory which the Princes had—not “threatened to take forcible possession of”—but appealed to the Natal Government and Mr. Osborn to restore to them—meant their own kraals and land, from which they had been expelled by Zibebu, for no other fault than that of “praying for Cetshwayo.”

Now, it was well known before the Great Deputation left Maritzburg that the members of it expected to be attacked upon their return without having been received by the Governor, by the three unfriendly chiefs. Zibebu and Hamu, it will be remembered,

without proof, neither subsequent admissions from the men themselves—except in this single case—nor after events, having ever risen against them. This fact is, of course, partly due to the Bishop’s extreme care in sifting any information he received before accepting it, and to the Zulus being well aware that the truth only would serve them with him. Also, to much of his information coming direct from the Princes, men of natural sincerity and unimpeachable honesty.

Of the trial alluded to, and how right Mr. Fynn was in supposing that Government did not want witnesses to be sent from Zululand, a full account will be given in its proper place.

had threatened beforehand, "if you are rejected [at Maritzburg], and come back without what you are asking for, we shall wipe you out;" and they made their first attack upon the Princes, &c., within six days of their arrival, and without the smallest provocation; while Dunn, who had exclaimed in the streets of Maritzburg to some of the men from this district, "Only wait till we get home, and you will need a rope to reach from earth to heaven for you to climb to safety by;"* sent them a message as soon as they returned, "Prepare your weapons! Sharpen your assegais! Look out for a place of refuge, for I am coming."

Umsutshwana was privately warned by one of Zibebu's brothers that the threatened vengeance was about to fall upon him and his tribe, whereupon they escaped into the desert, and this is what Mr. Osborn calls "voluntarily" vacating their kraals!

Zibebu's story, which is simply a mass of false excuses, mere "reports," and plausible inventions,†

* This speech was afterwards put into the mouth of the favourite scape-goat, Undabuko, but it was never spoken by him, and the men to whom Dunn used the threat repeated it *at the time*, i. e. the same or the following day, with all the surrounding circumstances, to the present writer's family.

† Mr. Osborn writes to Sir Henry Bulwer on this occasion [3466, p. 117]: "Zibebu's statement, as made through his indunas, is more entitled to credence than that of Undabuko, and the other Usutu headmen. I have always found Zibebu straightforward and truthful in any transactions I have had with him." This is no more than the Resident's own opinion, and that opinion appears to be grounded solely on his personal inclination to *believe* Zibebu's assertions, which to the minds of impartial observers are by no means borne out by acknowledged facts. On the other

may be shortly summed up from the accounts of his own messengers, as follows:—

When Undabuko returned from Maritzburg, he called upon the people to arm against the kinglets unfriendly to Cetshwayo, as the King was coming back at once;* thereupon the whole tribe, living over a very considerable extent of country, left their homes, and taking with them their cattle and grain, went away into the bush country, in the middle of winter, leaving their huts behind them, and doing this to show defiance to Zibebu, and to gain favour with the returning King. Zibebu neither threatened them beforehand, nor molested their deserted homesteads; he merely refused to allow such rebellious subjects to return and set up a head-quarters of disturbance within his territory, especially as the tribe, not content with carrying off cattle and grain from the kraals of Zibebu's loyal people, on their first departure, made repeated raids from the bush country upon the quiet and inoffensive people within their reach. All this is a very pretty tale from Zibebu's point of view, and it is backed up by the reports of Mr. Osborn's messengers, sent to see, on

hand both Undabuko and Umnyamana bear high characters for truthfulness, not only amongst the Zulus, but amongst the Europeans who are personally acquainted with them.

* Ndabuko did nothing of the sort. He certainly urged the people to be firm in their peaceable petitions for the King, and they called upon each other to arm in his defence and that of the other Princes, as well as in their own, when threatened by the three kinglets. But this, under the vision of the official mind, always took the above form, on, apparently, Zibebu's original authority.

the Resident's account, what the state of things really was in the deserted homes of Umsutshwana's people. They "did not see any kraals of Umsutshwana's, of Umgamele, or of their people which had been burnt" [3466, p. 120]; but this may readily be accounted for by the fact that they went "in company with a man of Zibebu's to inspect the kraals" [*ibid.*, pp. 119 and 120], after first visiting Zibebu himself, and being directed by him to a man* who would "*be able to give us information,*" and that they "did not visit the whole district [a very large one]." Two further messengers were sent next by the Resident [3466, p. 116] "to make a thorough inspection," and these were accompanied by a couple of Umsutshwana's indunas; but no mention one way or the other of the destruction of any of the kraals appears in their report [*ibid.*, p. 180], forwarded by Mr. Osborn. They describe the deserted huts and emptied grain-pits, but repeat various tales gathered from one and another, accounting for the absence of grain in other ways than by Zibebu's act, or that of his *impis*. The various stories told on both sides here, and afterwards, to the Resident, would require much sifting and some personal knowledge of the speakers' characters to get to the bottom of them, but without entering into such wearisome details, it will be sufficient to put forward one acknowledged and undeniable fact to show that some portions of Zibebu's tales are in the highest

* A brother of Umgamule's, but one who had kept on good terms with Zibebu.

degree improbable, and that others are simply impossible.

Umsutshwana's tribe, and the others with them, were dying of want in the wilderness. The chiefs themselves report [*ibid.*, pp. 156, 182] the fact to Mr. Osborn repeatedly, and their two indunas, who accompanied Mr. Osborn's second messengers on their round of inspection, reported [3466, p. 182]:—

“On reaching the people we found them in dire distress and dying from want; they are all reduced almost to skeletons, and in addition to the hardships of hunger and exposure, they are suffering from disease in the shape of diarrhoea, caused by drinking the unwholesome water where they are encamped. The people told us to tell Umsutshwana that they were dying, and to ask him to come and see them; that they wished to see him before they died.”

And Mr. Osborn's own messengers confirm this account by the few words reported as their statement [*ibid.*, p. 181]:—“We saw that the people were suffering from want; they seemed to have but little food . . .”

It was a highly improbable thing that this tribe, on the vague report* of Cetshwayo's return, and for

* The messages and assertions attributed to Ndabuko are entirely imaginary, and the Zulus were not at all likely to act prematurely on such rumours as reached them. They are not prone to accept such readily as truth, which was sufficiently proved by what happened at the (so-called) restoration of Cetshwayo. The Government officials having omitted to give notice to the people of his actual approach, the greater part of them totally disbelieved it, and did not, therefore, at first go to meet him, those who did appear during the first few days being chiefly small bodies sent to see if there *possibly could* be any truth in the report. This fact was, of course, taken up at once by Cetshwayo's enemies to show that the people were not rejoiced at his return, although circumstances soon proved the contrary.

the distant hope of pleasing him, should have gone off in this hasty fashion into the wilderness to show their contempt for Zibebu. Nothing but an expected attack could have caused them to go off, leaving their huts behind, to expose themselves and their families to the inclemency of the season.

But had they, as is stated on Zibebu's behalf, carried off with them not only all their own herds and grain (except some of the latter which they are represented as coming back to fetch),* but cattle and stores plundered from their neighbours, besides making subsequent raids for the same purpose on peaceful kraals in their vicinity, it would have been quite impossible for them to have been so soon reduced to the condition above described. As to the kindred subject of Hamu and his complaints of raids upon him on the part of the Aba Qulusi, which occupy many pages of this Blue Book, it may be dismissed in a few words. In 1881 Hamu had attacked this tribe (for the old offence of loyalty to Cetshwayo), and falling upon them unprepared, had massacred "the greater number of them."† The remainder escaped over the border into Transvaal territory, and the "raids" complained of by Hamu in 1882 were simply reprisals on the part of the scattered remnant of the tribe, and attempts to recover not only some of the cattle of which they had been robbed, but women and children whom

* Their attempts to recover their own stores are always spoken of, officially, as raids, attacks, &c.

† See vol. i.

they had lost during the rout. The facts of this massacre by Hamu in 1881 are not denied by the officials, and Sir Henry Bulwer goes so far as to say [3466, p. 155] that “after Hamu’s severe (*sic*) treatment of the Aba Qulusi last year, we cannot be surprised that that people should have taken the opportunity of the first encouragement given to them in order to retaliate upon Hamu’s people.”*

* Hamu certainly appears to have shown himself throughout to be the most worthless of the Zulus, and conspicuously lacked the fine qualities which distinguished his half-brothers, Cetshwayo and Ndabuko. His desertion to us during the Zulu war might be excused as weakness rather than wickedness, but his atrocious slaughter of 1200 of the Aba Qulusi, a crime with which his subsequent actions have been quite in keeping, exhibited him in an unmistakable light. There is something almost absurd in his assertion that “he has done nothing to cause all this action against him” [3466, p. 159], and in the confidence with which he requests the Resident to obtain for him the return of cattle “raided from him by the Aba Qulusi a little time ago,” and of which the Boers (into whose territory, or that which they claim as theirs, the Aba Qulusi had retired) had taken possession [*ibid.*, p. 121]. Seeing that Hamu had driven out such of the Aba Qulusi as he had not murdered (for the slaughter of 1200 on one side with only 8 killed and 13 wounded on the other, can be called nothing less than murder), and had taken possession of all their worldly wealth, it may readily be imagined that any flocks and herds afterwards carried off by the remainder of the tribe, were, even if not their own identical beasts, a very reasonable substitute. Yet the Resident’s reply to his request is not based upon any such question of equity, but simply on the fact of “the Boers being outside Zululand.” How far even *that* can be truly said, seeing that they occupied a large portion of the country which British Commissioners had decided in 1878 to be “of strict right belonging to the Zulus” is a matter open to dispute. But here, as ever, the Boers come in to take advantage of the mistakes made by England through the folly or dishonesty of her representatives, and to reap the advantage bought by the sacrifice of her honour, and of the

This *way of putting it* is adopted in order to bring Ndabuko's name in again as the mischief-maker. "These acts of violence [raids by the Aba Qulusi] were committed in concert with, and as part of the movement of Undabuko in taking up arms after his return from Natal in May last [*ibid.*]," writes Sir Henry on August 30th, and Mr. Osborn, in reporting Hamu's complaints, remarks [*ibid.*], "Both the Aba Qulusi and the Pangesweni men belong to the Sutu party." Again the Resident had complained [*ibid.*, p. 117] on July 12th that—

"Notwithstanding the promise made by Undabuko and Umnyama, as the principal heads of the Usutu, that all their people assembled under arms would on the appointed day disperse to their homes, and remain quiet, they have failed to carry out their

blood of her noble sons, while she herself gains nothing but the distrust of the savage tribes which once believed in her word as in a religion, and the disapproval or the ridicule of other European States. This small matter of Hamu was a trifling point—but has it not been ever so? Who profited by the Zulu war of 1879? Not England, who lost a thousand men, besides honour and treasure. Not the Zulus, surely. But the Boers? Yes, they got nearly all they wanted—released from England's rule, against which they had not dared to stir while the Zulu power existed and that portion of Zululand, long known as the "Disputed Territory," which British justice, for once rightly personified in Colonel Durnford, R.E. (see note to p. xiv. of Introduction to vol. i., and *supra*, p. 14, *ad fin.*), had assigned to the Zulus, but which Sir Garnet Wolseley, in a mood of "expediency," gave back to the Transvaal. Yet they were not satisfied. They wanted *more* land, and first of all that bit of the "Disputed Territory" which had *not* been given them by Sir Garnet Wolseley. All through those troublous times in Zululand which succeeded our invasion, the cautious advances of the Boers may be traced, and again, after Cetshwayo's death, they appear, taking advantage once more of England's mistakes. This, however, is trenching on what properly belongs to a future part of our story.

promise in two directions. viz. in the north, where the Aba Qulusi up to scarcely a week ago remained as an *impi* encamped in the rocks at the Hlobane, from whence they repeatedly raided Hamu's territory, . . . ;" and, in the south, where the people of Umsutshwana encamped in the bush, and "carried on similar acts of violence in Zibebu's territory, and are still doing so."*

"I am strongly of opinion," continues Mr. Osborn, "that these acts of violence were continued by Undabuko and Umnyamana in order to keep up the war-spirit in their party, and to provoke retaliation by the appointed chiefs, and thus obtain an excuse to reassemble their *impis*."

This is a most wanton assertion for which there are not the smallest grounds except to the prejudiced mind of the writer. He says, "Both the chiefs Hamu and Zibebu faithfully discharged their *impis* on the appointed day," and makes the above statement to show that the Princes did *not*. Yet he himself on June 23rd reported [3466, p. 69] their having done so, and he must have been perfectly well aware that they could not be responsible either for the armed parties of Umsutshwana's people who issued from time to time from the bush to procure food for their starving families, nor yet for the forays of the broken clan of the Aba Qulusi in the north, with which Ndabuko and the other Princes had nothing whatever to do. To forbid the Princes to raise hand or foot in their own defence, or to assert their own authority, to do all that was possible to lessen that authority, and to counteract their influence, and yet to make them—especially Ndabuko—responsible for every wrong act of which any of the wide-spread royalists were accused—this was the manner in

* See note to p. 159.

which Sir Henry Bulwer, and those who worked under and with him, elected to carry out the wishes of the Home Government for the supply of full information as to the sentiments of the Zulu people; this was the treatment accorded to Cetshwayo's faithful brothers and loyal subjects; and this—in an even more cruel degree, and with far worse consequences—was how the King himself was crushed some twelve months later.

Before closing this part of our narrative, and taking leave of the events which preceded the “restoration” of Cetshwayo, it is necessary to draw special attention to one portion of the subject—one to which allusion has been made from time to time, throughout this work, namely, Sir Henry Bulwer's determined prejudice touching the influence of the Bishop of Natal and perpetual misrepresentations of all he did and said on the Zulu question. It was a prejudice kindred to, though not solely arising out of his other prejudice against Cetshwayo, for, under any circumstances, Sir Henry Bulwer would have objected to what he considered “unofficial interference,” or the smallest infringement of his prerogatives, his arbitrary power as supreme chief, &c., &c. He would have resented the most effectual assistance in his most cherished schemes, were it given by an “unofficial” person, unless by his own especial command, and under his own unquestioned directions.

His first complaint against the Bishop, in 1878, is a perfect illustration of the above. Writing on the subject in 1882, he says [3466, p. 71]—

“The Bishop and some of the members of his family had been in communication with Cetshwayo before the Zulu war, and their proceedings, which tended to prejudice the relations between this Government and Cetshwayo, had given me a great deal of trouble at the time when, matters being very imminent between the Zulus and the Transvaal Government, I had, with the object of maintaining peace, made a proposal that the dispute between the two parties, which concerned certain territory, should be the subject of an inquiry by a commission, afterwards well known as the “Rorke’s Drift Commission.”

The fact is that the Bishop’s only communication with Cetshwayo at that time, or, indeed, since 1874, was—in reply to messages asking for counsel—to advise him to do the very thing which Sir Henry Bulwer was just about (unknown to the Bishop) to suggest to him, i. e. to submit his case against the Transvaal to British arbitration. The effect of his advice must have been—not to give the Governor “a great deal of trouble,” as he says, but—to make Cetshwayo all the more ready and anxious to fall in with the Governor’s proposals. But, apparently, Sir Henry Bulwer would rather fail in his purpose than be indebted for its success to anything but his own position and authority.

The words “and some of the members of his family,” can only refer to the appointment of Mr. F. E. Colenso as one of the two Diplomatic Agents to Cetshwayo.* But, not to dwell upon the fact that their efforts, had Sir Henry Bulwer tolerated their appointment, would certainly have been in the same direction as his own, the Governor, when he wrote this despatch, knew that the Bishop had

* See vol. i. for account of this, and *supra*, pp. 50-1.

nothing to do with the appointment in question, and that he did not even know of it until after it was made. When he did know of it, he almost regretted it, for, having some comprehension of Sir Henry Bulwer's extreme jealousy for his own rights in native matters, he foresaw that the Governor might object, precisely as he afterwards did; and as the Bishop had, at that time, great hopes that Sir Henry Bulwer was doing his utmost to prevent the invasion of Zululand, he did not approve of anything that might put the Governor out. In a published letter of March 1879, addressed to Sir Bartle Frere, he speaks of the appointment as "a genuine effort [on Cetshwayo's part] in the interests of peace, though overruled and set aside by the English authorities [Natal Government, rather]. I had nothing, however, to do with this transaction," he adds, "though I did urgently advise him [Cetshwayo] to trust to the uttermost in the good faith of the English Government." Colonel Durnford, R.E., also looked upon the appointment (while he took for granted that Sir Henry Bulwer would recognise it) as the wisest step Cetshwayo could have taken, and more likely than anything else to prevent a collision between us, as rulers of the Transvaal, and the Zulus.

Let it fully be understood then, that the "communication" between the Bishop and Cetshwayo "before the Zulu war," i. e. for several years before the war, of which Sir Henry Bulwer speaks so resentfully as "tending to prejudice the relations between this Government and Cetshwayo," and

giving himself “a great deal of trouble,” amounted to nothing more nor less than this—that the Zulu King had sent several earnest messages to the Bishop of Natal, asking how he could best avoid offending his friends (?) the English, and prevent the threatened invasion of his country, and that the Bishop had advised him, in return, to “trust to the uttermost in the good faith of the English Government,” and to submit his case against the Transvaal to the decision of the Natal Government, i. e. that he should do precisely what Sir Henry Bulwer wanted him to do.*

The Governor continues [*ibid.*]:—

“But, putting this aside, communications, as I have said, existed between the Bishop and Cetshwayo before the Zulu war, and it was possibly owing to this circumstance that when Undabuko and Shingana came into Natal in May 1880, professedly to pay their respects to the Governor, they went straight to Bishopstowe.”

“Putting this aside,” there had been no communications *at all* since 1874, but if Sir Henry Bulwer refers to that period, he is, no doubt, right as to the origin of Zulu trust in the Bishop’s justice and humanity; but it is not easy to understand how a servant of the Home Government could regard the Bishop’s action on the occasion in question with anything but approval and respect, since the latter

* It is difficult to understand how, as a Christian man, and a preacher of the Gospel, the Bishop could have refused to give the advice for which, in the interests of peace, Cetshwayo asked, or how he could possibly have given any more fortunately in keeping with Sir Henry Bulwer’s wishes.

rendered that Government a palpable service, and his action was entirely justified by the Secretary of State's final decision. It may be as well to recall the facts, which have probably faded from the minds of those English readers who ever heard them, but which are not without an important bearing upon the subject of the present volumes.

In 1873 the Natal Government undertook a military expedition against the chief Langalibalele and his tribe, residing within the colony, and who were suspected, though, as it afterwards appeared, without good reason, of rebellious tendencies. The expedition, hastily undertaken on insufficient grounds, proved a disastrous one. The tribe, on hearing that the troops were advancing against them, left the colony, without committing any act of violence, or even of theft upon the scattered white population of the district from which they fled. Unfortunately, a party of them on their way through a frontier pass, came into collision with a small body of colonial troops under the late Colonel Durnford, R.E. The pass in which they met could easily have been held by the number of men under Colonel Durnford's command had they been trained soldiers, and resolute men like their leader. But, unhappily, they were but raw colonial recruits. The Colonel was too good an officer and soldier to fall back and allow the enemy to escape through the pass which he had been sent to hold, but the men with him had not courage, or perhaps it should be more fairly said, discipline enough, to stand the test of danger. They fled,

leaving their commander behind,* and, in consequence of their retreat, the natives opened fire upon them, killing the last three of their number. This unhappy incident caused a violent, and altogether unreasonable hatred against the absent chief Langalibalele, amongst the colonists, and when he was captured beyond the borders, and sent back in fetters to Maritzburg, public feeling demanded his destruction in revenge for the death of the three carbineers, with which the chief had nothing whatever to do. A farce of a trial followed in which the only fault proved against him was that he had *run away*. Nevertheless, he was condemned to death as a rebel, the sentence being commuted to banishment and imprisonment for life. Throughout the trial (at which he was allowed no advocate), it was repeatedly pleaded on his behalf that he had shown doubt of the good intention of the Government when summoned to Pietermaritzburg, *because he was afraid, remembering what had happened to Matshana on a like occasion some years previously*. But the plea was treated with contempt, as an aggravation of his fault, in that he had dared to distrust the good faith of the Government.

The Bishop of Natal, observing, in the daily published accounts of the trial, that this plea—again and again repeated—was always ignored, inquired

* After the whole of his white force had left him, Colonel Durnford was carried off the field, severely wounded and exhausted, by his faithful Basuto followers. For full account see 'A Soldier's Life and Work in South Africa.' A Memoir of Colonel A. W. Durnford, by Lieut.-Colonel E. Durnford.

into the meaning of it, and discovered the following facts. About fifteen years before, a native chief, by name Matshana, had been summoned in the name of the Government to a friendly meeting by Mr. John Shepstone who, after inducing him to come to him with his followers, unarmed, made a treacherous attempt to seize his person, in which many of Matshana's followers were slain, though he himself escaped. Now, this very Mr. John Shepstone was Crown Prosecutor in the case of Langalibalele, and his brother, Mr. (now Sir T.) Shepstone, who, as Secretary for Native Affairs, was responsible for, and cognisant of the whole affair at the time, was one of the judges. It is not, therefore, surprising that the Court treated Langalibalele's plea as only an additional offence, and did not inquire into its meaning. The Bishop, however, feeling that it was a crying injustice to the condemned man that his plea should be ignored simply because it was inconvenient to some of the Government officials to have it brought forward, sent a statement of it home to England. The result was that an official inquiry was held, in which the plea of the chief, brought to the notice of the Home Government by the Bishop, was fully justified; and the Secretary of State administered a severe reproof to the officials concerned.*

* "The question at issue was, not whether or no a certain shot was fired, but whether on a certain occasion a Government official had acted in a treacherous manner towards a native chief, thereby giving reason for the excuse of fear on the part of Langalibalele, treated as a false pretence by the Court, some members of which

It was but natural that the Bishop's action on behalf of the native chief, against whom the transient fury of the white population was aroused, should be very unpopular amongst the latter, as well as with those officials (Sir T. and Mr. J. Shepstone) whose action received censure in consequence; but it is difficult to understand why subsequent Governors should have owed a grudge to one who had exposed a disgraceful proceeding, with which surely no Englishman could feel the smallest sympathy, and who had done the Home Government a real service

were fully aware of the facts, and the prosecutor himself, the official concerned. And, further, whether the said facts had been concealed by high Government officers, and denied by them repeatedly to their superiors in England."—'History of the Zulu War,' Colenso and Durnford.

The finding was that Matshana *was* enticed to the interview on false pretences, that he was induced to come unarmed, and that he did so in good faith, that there was no truth in Mr. Shepstone's statements of a counter-plot on the chief's side, and that Mr. Shepstone *did* make a treacherous attempt to seize the chief, but that he did not attempt to shoot the chief, the shot being merely fired into the air. Yet the *Natal Mercury* of November 2nd, 1873, expressed colonial feeling thus: "It is still understood that Mr. Shepstone, in the minds of impartial judges, stands more than exonerated from the Bishop's charges." Nor can it excite surprise that the colonists took such a view since Mr. Shepstone was retained in his responsible position, and received further promotion. Surely no righteous government can be possible while the chief authorities consider that a serious offence committed by one of high position must be covered and concealed at all costs rather than that the offender should be cast out, and the evil thing removed from their midst. The adoption of the former policy with regard to the Government officials of Natal has cost England much in blood, in honour, and in treasure, and Zululand almost its very existence during the last ten years.

in showing who, amongst their servants in Natal, could not be trusted with the management of native affairs. Yet Sir Garnet Wolseley avowedly did so. During his rule in 1875, a friend, writing from Government House, explained to the Bishop that it was a necessary part of Sir Garnet Wolseley's conciliatory purpose (to the colonists) to show a certain amount of cold shoulder to those persons who had "achieved a striking victory over the legitimate authorities," and that such persons must make up their minds "not to be looked on afterwards with special favour."

And Sir Garnet Wolseley himself went so far as to reproach the late Colonel Durnford, because he had fought a like battle at the same time against official injustice on behalf of the Putini tribe,* and because, as the Colonel writes himself, "I went to Durban to meet my friend the Bishop when he returned from England,† thereby plainly showing my sympathy. . . . As a Government officer, I am told, *I should not have gone near him!*" ‡

There can be little doubt that Sir Henry Bulwer resented the Bishop's victory over officialism as much

* In this Colonel Durnford to some extent succeeded, partly because the case was a more glaring one, partly because he was—although an honest man—within the magic official circle, and could therefore partially *force* justice to the people in question; yet they have never received even the meagre sum ordered to be refunded them by the Home Government, and which has now been held for ten years.

† Whither he went to plead the cause of Langalibalele in person.

‡ See 'A Soldier's Life and Work in South Africa.' A Memoir of the late Colonel A. W. Durnford. (Sampson Low and Co.)

as, or even more than, did Sir Garnet Wolseley. It showed that the official character would not protect any one from the Bishop's sense of justice, and that, with him, even a Governor must stand or fall according to the righteousness of his actions and the sincerity of his speech. That any one beyond the official circle should presume to have, or at least to express, an opinion against an official action was intolerable to his official mind.* Yet that the Bishop was not given to interference in politics may be gathered from his having lived for eighteen years in Natal without taking part in them at all until this glaring piece of injustice was forced upon his notice in 1873.

The Bishop had had occasion to send to Zululand, i. e. to Cetshwayo, for some of the witnesses he required on this trial, and, as this was the only communication he had ever had with the King since his visit to Umpande in 1859, when he saw Cetshwayo, then a young prince, Sir Henry Bulwer can refer to nothing else when he writes, "But, putting this aside, communications existed between the Bishop and Cetshwayo before the Zulu war." Without doubt he is right in supposing that the events of 1874 encouraged the Zulus to go to the Bishop of Natal for justice and kindness in 1880. The fate of Langalibalele had created a profound

* Both Sir Garnet Wolseley and Sir Henry Bulwer seem to have considered themselves and other officials bound solely—right or wrong—to the Colonial Government of Natal, and to have lost sight of their far greater duty to the Home Government, from which alone that of Natal receives its importance.

interest in Zululand, and Cetshwayo had begged that the victim might be allowed to come to him, promising to be answerable for his good conduct. The offer was rejected, and those Zulus who understood the matter could not but wonder at the harsh and unjust action of the officials in Natal, and preserve a feeling of grateful affection towards the Bishop who had fought, almost single-handed, for humanity and justice to the black man.

He won the battle in the sense that the truth of his assertions was acknowledged by the authorities, but these latter contrived to make the victory of no avail, for the time at least. Langalibalele *still* languishes a prisoner, after eleven years' cruel banishment, and repeated delusive hopes held out to him by official persons that he would soon be released; and the Shepstone brothers, although one had been convicted of what the Secretary of State spoke of as "underhand manœuvres opposed to the morality of a civilised administration," and the other had helped to deceive the Home Government in the matter for years—these men have been advanced from honour to honour, and have had more to do with bringing about the "ruin of Zululand" than even Sir Henry Bulwer himself.

The Zulus, then, went to Bishopstowe—*on their way, not instead of*, to the Government—primarily because they had faith in the Bishop. But there were abundant lesser reasons which, granting the certainty of a kind reception there, would naturally lead them to choose the place as their last halting-

place within an easy distance of town. Sir Henry Bulwer persistently harps upon the Zulus going first to Bishopstowe. He makes it out a mark of great disrespect to the Government, and Mr. J. Shepstone, as Secretary for Native Affairs, supports the idea thus [3466, p. 230]:—

“It is the custom among natives for any deputation sent by one chief to another to proceed direct to their destination, report themselves, and have their lodgings pointed out to them, where they would also be fed;* but since the Zulu war, and since the Bishop of Natal interested himself in Zulu matters, I cannot remember an instance of a party of Zulus coming direct to the office of the Secretary for Native affairs as had been the custom for over thirty years, but on the contrary have gone direct to Bishopstowe, where they lodged, and where I must conclude was their destination.”†

One might imagine from the above that Zulus had been coming in this manner to Bishopstowe every few months since the Zulu war, whereas, as a matter

* Receiving the miserable amount of beef (or rather bone), and *sometimes* a little meal, with which the Natal Government habitually entertains even its most distinguished native visitors. The system, which is no credit to the British name, could never have been carried on so long, but for the universal hospitality of the natives themselves, those at whose kraals the visitors are located, making up the deficiency at their own expense.

† There is hardly a statement in the whole of this short “Report” of Mr. J. Shepstone’s which cannot be proved to be absolutely incorrect. It contains twelve distinct assertions, every one of which is directly contrary to the fact, besides incorrect inferences and insinuations. But what else could be expected when Government continues to employ a man not only convicted of having acted in a treacherous manner while officially employed in 1858, but also of having quite recently borne false witness before the Court of Inquiry presided over by Colonel (Sir G. P.) Colley, and having made statements which were, to use the words of that officer, “entirely without foundation.”

It has been argued, and on high authority, that Mr. Shepstone

of fact, but two parties in all had been there during the three years which had elapsed when Mr. Shepstone wrote this report. But what can the writer mean by "coming direct to the office, &c."? Surely not that messengers from Zululand are bound to travel, or have ever travelled, for four or five days, from the

in trying to seize Matshana at a friendly interview to which the chief had been invited on false pretences, was acting as a constable, and could not rightly be blamed for using means to "execute a lawful warrant," such as are made use of every day without reprehension for such purposes in all countries in Europe. It might be argued that there are marked differences between dealing with an "outlawed" native tribe, and with individual criminals in civilised countries, and Lord Carnarvon plainly took that view, for he wrote ". . . I must, even after the lapse of so many years, record my disapprobation of the artifices by which it is admitted Matshana was entrapped into the meeting, with a view to his forcible arrest. Such underhand manœuvres are opposed to the morality of a civilised administration; they lower English rule in the eyes of the natives." At the same time Mr. Shepstone was less to blame for the original action than were his superiors by whose orders he committed it, and the Bishop's position in the matter may best be given in his own words addressed to a friend who had made some of the above representations to him. "I never said that his [Mr. J. Shepstone's] act of 'murderous treachery' [the words were not the Bishop's own, but were used by Mr. (Sir Theo.) Shepstone in denying the act shortly after proved (as to the treachery) against Mr. J. Shepstone] disqualified him from public employment. But I said that his dishonest concealment of that act (if it really occurred), in his official report, but still more his suppression of the truth when he acted as public prosecutor against Langalibalele, and most of all his daring denial of it in the face of Lord Carnarvon, and of the whole world, flinging upon me the charge of a 'libellous and malicious falsehood'—if the act really occurred substantially as described in my story—unfitted him to sit on the bench as the distributor of justice in the name of England, not to speak of his acting as Secretary for Native Affairs in his brother's absence."

border to the city, without halting for the night anywhere under shelter? Or is it that he "must conclude" that the native kraals at which they slept upon the way were, therefore, "their destination"? The whole accusation is absurd. The Zulus chose Bishopstowe as their last halting-place simply as the house of a private friend who, they knew, would give them shelter while awaiting the well-known dilatory proceedings of the S.N.A. Office. Had they waited to find lodgings for the night till they were pointed out to them by its officials they might have slept in the open for some time.*

Sir Henry Bulwer's despatch alluding to his old imaginary grievances against the Bishop of Natal was written on June 30th, 1882 [3466, No. 42], but it was by no means the first of its kind.

About three months before he had reported to Lord Kimberley, on the authority of the British Resident in Zululand—

"the arrival there of a messenger from the Bishop of Natal to Umnyamana, with a message to the latter from the ex-King Cetshwayo. The message claimed to be of an authoritative character, giving instructions on the part of the ex-King to Umnyamana," who "was directed to send a certain message on the part of the ex-King to . . . four of the appointed chiefs . . . who were further [3247, p. 43] to be called upon to go to Umnyamana, Undabuko, and Uziwedu, and to explain to these three their conduct. Umnyamana was also to send to the parents of the girls who formerly belonged to the ex-King's establishment, and warn them that the girls, who, it may be mentioned, were after the ex-King's deposition

* As Dabulamanzi's party were told by the induna of the S.N.A., "go and sleep there [wherever you can], and come here again to-morrow."

restored to their families and allowed to marry, still belonged to him (Cetshwayo) and that they must not be allowed to marry. They must not think, the ex-King says, that he will not return; 'he is only away on a visit to his friends.' Fortunately, says the Governor, Umnyamana and the Princes were evidently sensible of the very grave importance of the course they were told to take and of the risk they would run in thus openly putting at defiance the four appointed chiefs . . . and in thus boldly asserting their authority, in the name of the ex-King, over the duly established authorities of the country. They therefore hesitated before committing themselves to so rash a proceeding, and laid the matter before the Resident."

And even after the Bishop's satisfactory explanation [3247, p. 48] he writes to him again [*ibid.*, p. 49], saying in effect, "I am glad to hear that you did not do it, but hope you will not do it again."* In fact he desires the Bishop to forward *no* messages at all from the ex-King to any one in Zululand, and the Bishop thought it wise for the King's sake at the time to comply with the request, while Sir Henry

* Sir Henry Bulwer did indeed, upon this occasion write to the Bishop demanding an explanation, but he did not wait for an answer before making the accusation to the Home authorities, and using the words "I have not as yet, I am sorry to say, received any reply from the Bishop." Yet his letter to the Bishop was dated March 30th, and received March 31st. The Bishop's reply is dated April 1st, and (the 2nd being a Sunday) was received April 3rd. This, however, according to Sir Henry Bulwer's style of calculation (see p. 137) would be a delay of five days on the Bishop's part.

The late Sir David Wedderburn, commenting with indignation upon the Governor's behaviour to the Bishop, writes to the *Daily News*, "To acquire the confidence of native races, to understand their wishes, and fearlessly to proclaim them when ignored by men in power, will always be offences in the eyes of certain officials, but Bishop Colenso is not likely to be deterred from committing such offences even by the arrogant letter which he has recently received [from Sir Henry Bulwer, June 16th, 1882]."

Bulwer still writes to Lord Kimberley on April 10th [*ibid.*, p. 47]:—

“From what I am told, I am led to fear that a great deal of harm has already been done by messages which have made their way into the Zulu country from Bishopstowe, and the effect of which has been to unsettle and disturb the minds of the people.”

This, in the Governor's mouth, always means leading them to wish or hope for Cetshwayo's return. To Sir H. Bulwer's mind Hamu's slaughter of over a thousand of the Aba Qulusi, and Dunn's of hundreds of Sitimela's people, were, it would seem, trifling disturbances compared with the most peaceful and orderly petition for Cetshwayo's restoration. But that the Bishop had done anything to “unsettle the minds of the people,” even in Sir Henry Bulwer's sense, was, as we have already seen, a purely imaginary notion. The facts in this case are as follows. The King, writing through his interpreter to the Bishop, requested him to send a message for him to Zululand, the character of which was by no means that of interference on his part as “King,” but of condolence and counsel for his friends and relatives (the Aba Qulusi) under the terrible calamity from which they had suffered,* and of consolation and advice for his family in their great sorrow. This message was to the following effect:—

“that Cetshwayo had heard of the massacre of the Aba Qulusi, and lamented greatly for them, and for the distress of his brother Maduna's family and tribe, which were his own flesh and blood;

* See vol. i.

that he himself could do nothing in the matter, since he had now no voice in Zulu affairs, but that Mnyamana should ask Hamu, Chingwayo, Umfanawendhlehla, and Zibebu, on behalf of Maduna, Ziwedu, and the Aba Qulusi, since they all belonged together, what wrong they had done, and why they had made the Zulus fight one another. ‘Let the Aba Qulusi be of good heart, and not disperse,* for I am going to the Queen in England, where all people are helped, not knowing, however, whether I shall succeed there. The English here are treating me kindly. Stay quiet only, and be of good heart.’—*February 13th, 1882.*”

This, it will be seen, was a very touching and harmless message from the captive King, as also were those about the girls, which had been equally distorted before they came into Sir Henry Bulwer’s hands. The tone of those really sent may be seen from the following extracts in Cetshwayo’s own words:—

“I beg you to send to Mbambisa and ask him if he will allow me to have one, at least, of his girls, Nobatwa, the eldest. Send to her, and hear from her own mouth if she would like to return to my family or not. She took care of me much more and much better than all my other Undhlunkulu.

“Talk and agree about this with Mr. John Shepstone [S.N.A.]. If Nobatwa objects to go to my family, that is another matter; but I am sure she is not against it.”—*February 2nd, 1882.*

And again:—

“To Miss Colenso,—Please tell Umkosana to send to Majiya and tell him to take care of those girls of his, and not to listen to those who would have them married off,† and, if he does not see

* “Scatter” as a family or tribe, not “disperse” as in *impi*.

† This, and other expressions of the same sort were, no doubt, held by the official mind to imply an attempt on the King’s part to forbid the girls of his late household marrying, even if they wished to do so. But this is a mistake. He wrote thus because he had heard from the men who had gone to him from Zululand,

that, he can send them to Maduna, to take care of them himself, or perhaps he might send them to Qetuka, and Umkosana might send also to Boro, as I have heard from Unconewana and party that his daughter Guyase is stricken with illness. Is there, then, no doctor that can attend to her? Take great care of that girl, who is left all alone, that I may not have her snatched away from me by death, as all the others have been. Ask Gobongo and Nhlaka, son of Madinda, to take care for me of the girls of their family, and ask Majiya to send to Somopo to do the same; for I have heard that one of those girls is married. Why did they leave Maduna? I mean Mkyokase and Mbimbikazana. I hear that Palane's daughters are married to Malambule. Are you, then, also eating me up? Are you, too, imitating the Zulu [viz. Zibebu, who had taken some girls of the Umdhlunkulu]? Are you quite sure then that I shall never recover? Chingwayo says, 'I lament for my family, which I hear is scattered, and a new family formed out of it,' that one of my wives has been taken by my own brother, who has built himself a family by her. By whom now can I be gathered together, since our king, who shall gather us, is now dead?"

"I am shocked that the family of Chingwayo, who died (went into captivity) with me, has now been plundered by his own people. Was, then, that brother of his pleased at this death of Chingwayo? I am shocked that, while a man is still alive, another man should take possession of his wives."—*February 13th, 1882.*

that some of these girls had been forced into marriage with Zibebu and others, against their will, and there was one piteous story to be told of the bride's distress throughout the marriage ceremonies, dances, &c. It must be remembered that all the girls of the Umdhlunkulu (royal household) were of a rank to admit of the King's taking any one of them in marriage if he wished to do so. It is to be supposed that a King who had won so much devotion from his whole people as had Cetshwayo, would be regarded with great affection and respect by the young girls of the household, every one of whom might hope to be raised to the position of a queen; nor can we judge of their feelings in the matter by our own English ideas, but rather as we should of those of any other nation in which polygamy is the law. It is very improbable that any one of these girls would have willingly resigned the hope of Cetshwayo's return, and if the chance of it kept them single for a few years longer, it was probably no very serious misfortune to them.

The message to Mnyamana, sent by a Zulu who had come from that chief and was returning to his own country at the time, was (so it is reported by several trustworthy witnesses [*ibid.*, p. 50]), correctly delivered to Mnyamana, and correctly forwarded by him to the Resident. Mnyamana and the Princes, always anxious to avoid displeasing the Natal Government, especially while Cetshwayo's fate was so uncertain, thought it best to mention the matter to the Resident before trying, as Cetshwayo suggested, to make friends with these four fiercest of the appointed chiefs. But the Resident appears altogether to have misunderstood the matter, and is reported to have answered that if Mnyamana "had sent this message to these chiefs, they would have said 'we are turned out' [i. e. of their authority], and would have reported it to me, and I should have agreed with them, and given them leave to fall upon you, and sweep you off."

Mnyamana was astonished at this view of the matter, saying, "Does he [the Resident] say that the message amounts to turning out the chiefs? I thought that it meant nothing of the sort, but was merely asking them to be friends again," and he and the Princes sent messengers in haste to inform the Bishop of what had occurred.

"These men" [*ibid.*], writes the Bishop of Natal, "when they heard in what form the message had been reported to your Excellency, expressed their astonishment, as it differed so materially from what they themselves had heard twice from Umnyamana—first, on its arrival, and, again, when he repeated to them what he reported to the Resident. They said they did not see how it was

possible that Umnyamana's messengers to the Resident should have mis-stated it; and they said that 'what alarmed Umnyamana was that the Resident seemed to have quite misunderstood the message.'

"Concerning the girls, these men brought no message to me from Umnyamana. They said that he had told them that kind words had come from the ex-King asking for certain girls. But they had never heard of any message sent for all the fathers of the girls of the Umdhlunkulu forbidding them to allow the girls to marry, and knew not where this statement could have originated."

Mr. Osborn, on the other hand, warmly asserts [*ibid.*, p. 54] that this version of the affair is the correct one, and gives it as his impression "that the party of Zulus represented by Umnyamana and Undabuko are deliberately misrepresenting matters to the Bishop with the view of serving their own ends."

It would tax the utmost ingenuity to imagine what "ends" could possibly be served by the intricate and aimless chain of deception of which the Resident here accuses men who bear the best character for sincerity with those—white as well as black—who know them well. Any one who cares to follow it out for themselves will see that the simple fact of their asking the Resident's leave to deliver any message at all proves that there was no deliberate misrepresentation on their part. They themselves are positive that neither did they make any mistake in transmitting the message—and, in fact, the error must have arisen at the Residency, though by whose agency does not appear.

Mr. Osborn writes [*ibid.*, p. 55]:—

"There was no misunderstanding whatever on my part, and I do not believe that it was possible that I could have misunderstood,

as the Bishop has been informed. No other reply was given by me than that already reported to your Excellency. The version of my reply set forth in the Bishop's letter, being that given to him by the two messengers from Mnyamana is, I say it emphatically, untrue."

This is decided language, but no one can study the Blue Books of this period [1880 to 1883] without discovering for themselves that Mr. Osborn's understanding, like that of his successive chiefs, and other members of the official clique, was habitually directed towards one side of everything connected with the subject of Cetshwayo's return. And it must be remarked that it is a very curious circumstance that he did not give the reply, the version of which he calls "untrue," since it is precisely in accordance with what both his own and the Governor's despatches show to have been their opinion, the latter writing, for instance, of the message [3247, p. 46] as "an attempt to subvert the established and duly constituted authorities of the territories concerned."

Sir Henry Bulwer writes [3247, pp. 43, 47, 54] three despatches on the subject to Lord Kimberley, on the 3rd, 10th, and 15th of April, all showing considerable animus. It had been put beyond a doubt that Cetshwayo had never sent, nor the Bishop forwarded, any message assuming authority on the part of the captive king, and as no message, after all, was delivered to the appointed chiefs, it was nothing more than indulgence of temper which caused him so to represent the matter by cablegram home, as to

elicit the following telegraphic despatch from Lord Kimberley to Sir Hercules Robinson:—

“Inform Cetshwayo report having been received from Governor of Natal, that visit used for purposes of agitation in Zululand, and interferes with due consideration of future. Her Majesty’s Government consider it necessary to postpone visit for a time” [3247, p. 50].

How that postponement ended we have already seen, but it was a cruel thing, and most wantonly brought about.

Following the Blue Books we come to four more despatches [3247, pp. 57, 59, 85 and 86], from Sir Henry Bulwer, of April 20th and 22nd, and May 12th and 13th, all insinuating charges against the Bishop with reference to the deputations, &c., and then to a small Blue Book of twenty pages [3270], which is full of unmistakable innuendoes of the same description, followed by another, containing a despatch [3293, p. 4] of May 30th, which is an open and unmeasured attack, given on the authority of “two natives, both trustworthy men,” not named, and who, from the nature of their reports, certainly do not deserve the title, as their statements are entirely false. These, and similar stories, the Governor sent home without first referring them for explanation or denial to the Bishop, who saw them first when they appeared in the Blue Book. A month later, June 30th, appears the long despatch [3466, p. 70, No. 42], already quoted, the remainder of which is entirely taken up with discrediting the deputations, and complaints of the Bishop’s

(supposed) action about them.* These points have been sufficiently considered in a previous chapter, but one sentence from the despatch in question may be quoted as an instance of the writer's wilful blindness to what he did not wish to see. My readers will not have forgotten the circumstance of the appointed chief Seketwayo sending down his "Letters Patent," by the hand of a member of one of the deputations, to prove, beyond doubt, that the man was sent by him, which action put it out of the power of any one to deny, or explain away this chief's participation in the prayer for Cetshwayo.

Sir Henry Bulwer, with the facts before him, writes: "The fourth messenger, Nozaza, may have been sent by Seketwayo." He does not even attempt to give a reason for thus adopting the potential mood in speaking of a proved fact. The whole despatch is taken up with attempts to show that the Zulu people did not really pray for the King, and

* The only tangible complaints are, first, that the Bishop had told the Zulus who came to him that if it was really true as they asserted, that "all Zululand" wished for Cetshwayo's restoration, they should go to the Resident and ask for leave to come down to Maritzburg, and make their wishes known in a proper way to the Government. And, secondly, that, on being asked by certain Zulus if it was true that Dunn had represented their paying taxes as a proof of their satisfaction at the King's absence, he showed them all he knew himself on the subject, namely, that the *Natal Mercury* had published Dunn's statement to that effect. Had every one in Natal combined together to deceive these poor Zulus, they might even have gone home believing that they were paying taxes to ransom their king, and Dunn might have continued to say what he pleased. Was this desirable, or did Sir Henry Bulwer think it so?

that the deputations were got up between the Bishop and Ndabuko. He never seems to have realised that, were this latter assertion true, his case was lost. When a national feeling is strong, and the hearts of a people are burning with suppressed desire, it is easy for one man to rouse them into expressing it, and no doubt Undabuko did hold, and now, again, holds that honourable position amongst the Zulus, doubly honourable in that while leading them to dare and to endure for their king's sake, he restrained them from all violence, and, except when they were actually attacked, and obliged to defend themselves, he induced them to try peaceful measures instead of force. But no one man, nor all the Zulu Princes together, stripped as they were of every vestige of authority save what the people *chose* to recognise in them, could have roused a cold, reluctant people—glad at heart to have escaped from the power of a tyrant, satisfied with the new rulers placed over them, and well aware that no harm could come to them for holding to the latter—to beg for that tyrant's return. Still less could one man in another land, one like the Bishop, known to have no political position, have brought this about, and have induced the Zulus, against their real desires, to labour and suffer as they did for Cetshwayo's sake. Apparently, the Earl of Kimberley thought likewise, and had observed that Sir Henry Bulwer's efforts were mainly directed to showing how much (in his opinion) the Bishop had had to do with rousing the desire of the Zulus for their King's return. The wish of the Home

Government was to discover whether or no the Zulus had such a desire, and that it was so was plain enough, in spite of every effort to explain away appearances. How the desire had been aroused was of comparatively small importance in deciding the question of the King's restoration, and this would be plain even to those who did not see how palpably extravagant and strained were the continual accusations against the Bishop, and did not know how untrue they were. It was, indeed, before the last named despatch (that of June 30th) could have been received, that Lord Kimberley decided that, unless there were some more urgent reasons than those of which he had heard, "it would not be justifiable to further delay" Cetshwayo's visit to England. That despatch of Sir Henry Bulwer's, as well as others which followed, including the long-delayed "Report" [3466, p. 134] on the "Settlement of the Zulu country," certainly gave no new and urgent reasons, though they are full of repetitions of the previous ones, everywhere mixed with extravagant charges against the Bishop, which, indeed, seem to grow the wilder as they produced, apparently, the less effect upon the Home authorities.

After a while a fine opportunity of this sort turned up, and the Governor writes to Lord Kimberley on July 22nd:—

"I have the honour to forward . . . a memorandum from the British Resident covering statements made to him by . . . messengers from Chief Dunn, in reference to a Natal native named Fanegana [Fanewana], who was brought by them as a prisoner before him.

"This man is a native of Natal, who has been living in the territory of Chief Dunn.* It appears that Chief Dunn lately discovered him endeavouring to stir up the people in his territory against his authority. The Chief Mavumengwana stated that Fanewana had sent to him to say that he had some words to deliver to him; and in the presence of Mavumengwana, of Chief Dunn, and of many others, Fanewana admitted that this was true, and that he wanted to give Mavumengwana a message from the Bishop of Natal. The message was to thank Mavumengwana for having sent a representative with the other people on their visit to Pietermaritzburg, and that the Bishop of Natal saw now that Mavumengwana joined with him in complaining.

"Chief Dunn thereupon sent Fanewana in custody of some of his men to the British Resident. When before the Resident, Fanewana denied that he had been sent by the Bishop with any message, and, moreover, denied that he had admitted having said so a few days before.

"There can be no doubt that the man has been frequently at Bishopstowe, but whether he was ever sent by the Bishop of Natal with this message is best known to the Bishop."

This despatch, with its inclosures, Sir Henry Bulwer forwards, as usual, without putting a question to the Bishop; but something of the matter leaked into the newspapers, so that Mr. Saunders, M.L.C., brought it up in the Legislative Council, declaring that this supposed emissary of the Bishop's had been caught "red-handed," and the Bishop wrote to one of the local papers stating that he had never sent Fanewana to Zululand on any business or with any message whatever—that, in fact, he knew little or nothing about him, and should not be likely to make a confidant of a mere stranger. But as he was unaware that the Governor had adopted the accusation, he did not address him directly upon the

* This does not appear from the evidence, i. e. that he was *living* there.

subject. Meanwhile a long string of variations of the same story were going home. A despatch of August 30th incloses a number of statements collected by the Resident from various Zulus, some four or five of which are held to implicate the Bishop in what Sir Henry Bulwer always chooses to call "the agitation under Undabuko." But nearly every tale is referred to the same individual, Fanewana, and they are all of such an extravagant and even impossible nature, that any one not determined beforehand to believe *anything* against the Bishop, would have dismissed them at once as the inventions [3466, p. 169] of an "apparently doubtful character," as he is called by the Governor's Private Secretary, if not half-witted, as some have said. Who in their senses could believe that the Bishop had made such statements or sent such messages to the Zulus as these [*ibid.*, p. 157]:—

"The Resident will continue to refuse to give you permission to come into Natal, but you are to disregard his refusals, and come into Natal whenever you wish, to talk with me about the affairs of Zululand." And again, that the Princes were to come to Maritzburg at once, to receive Cetshwayo, who was waiting for them at Sobantu's house.

Fanewana is here reported to have said that "*he had with his own eyes seen Cetshwayo at Sobantu's,*" which in itself convicts the man as an imposter, if sane. Sir Henry Bulwer, however, stops at nothing, and even brings the most serious charge against the Bishop of direct breach of faith, based merely on a report from the chief Siwunguza, that a Zulu named

Nhlebo had arrived at his kraal from Sobantu with a message from Cetshwayo.* To this charge the Governor appends the Bishop's promise that, in compliance with His Excellency's request, he would "not send any more messages on the part of the ex-King to any one in Zululand," and making no comment on it, nor bringing it to the Bishop's notice in any way, leaves it to be understood by the Secretary of State that the latter had committed a deliberate breach of faith.

On this the Bishop writes,† "I have to reply that, since I gave the above promise, which I did out of respect to His Excellency's wishes only, I have never received from Cetshwayo any letter except through the offices of the S.N.A. at Capetown and in Natal,—that no such letter contained any message from Cetshwayo to the Zulus,—that I have not received from Cetshwayo any message for them in any other way,—and that I have forwarded none whatever."

As to Fanewana, whether he was knave or fool, he had no connection whatever with the Bishop. He was first heard of as a messenger, or spy, belonging to the coast column of our army during the Zulu war, when, as he had relatives amongst the Zulus of Cetshwayo's *impis*, he was, no doubt, more than ordinarily useful in that capacity, though it is to be

* It is quite likely that persons in the colony in no way connected with the Bishop, may, unknown to him, have used his name with the Zulus for their own purposes. That such irregularities should take place was only part of the general confusion consequent upon our invasion of Zululand, and the prolonged absence of Cetshwayo.

† In his letter to Lord Derby, after seeing the Blue Book, containing Sir Henry Bulwer's accusations.

questioned whether service of that description was the best calculated to induce habits of strict sincerity of speech. Sir Henry Bulwer's words, "*There can be no doubt* that the man has been frequently at Bishopstowe," have no foundation at all except in his own determination to see everything from his own point of view, but that and other kindred matters are fully explained in the Bishop's letter to Lord Derby* and need no further consideration here. Many other instances might be adduced of the determined and groundless official suspicions raised against the Bishop in these Blue Books, but enough samples have now been given for our purpose, while those readers who are not already convinced would remain unmoved by any number of similar accounts.

* See vol. i. Appendix.

CHAPTER IV.

SIR HENRY BULWER had delayed his visit to Zululand so long that the main question of Cetshwayo's return had at last to be settled without the help of his Report. In expectation of his immediate arrival, the Resident sent him the following despatch [3466, p. 171]:—

“ INHLAZATSHE, ZULULAND, August 5th, 1882.

Sir,—As your Excellency is about to visit Zululand personally, I think it right to lay before you a *résumé* of the present political condition of the country, indicating those pending questions which by reason of their importance and urgency appear to claim your early attention.

“ 2. The first case for consideration is that in which Umnyamana and his tribe, and Undabuko and Ziwedu and their followers are concerned, and which formed the immediate cause of the late armed rising. Your Excellency is already acquainted with all the circumstances thereof, and I therefore need not recapitulate them, but I must state again that both Undabuko and Ziwedu continue to be anxious to be allowed to return to their former homesteads (in most of which the huts are still standing) in Zibebu's territory; and I think it not improbable, if permission cannot be obtained through your Excellency, that they will endeavour to occupy by force, if necessary. They ask to be allowed to re-occupy as soon as possible in order to commence planting. The appointed chief Zibebu will not consent to their returning to live in his territory.*

* That is to say, that as they had tried in vain every peaceable method of obtaining justice, and the possession of their own homes,

“ 3. The next case, which appears to me equally important and urgent, is that of the chiefs Umsutshwana and Umbopa, and the other headmen who with their people are encamped in the north-eastern part of Somkeli’s territory, and whose return to their kraal Zibebu will not permit for the reasons given by him. My endeavours hitherto to get Zibebu to allow them to reoccupy their kraals which are situated in his territory have not been successful, but, as I believe that the people, especially the families who are prevented from returning to their homes, are suffering much hardship from exposure and want, and that the sallying forth of men to recover corn, &c., resulting in hostile encounters, would be put a stop to if they could be allowed to do so, I have not relaxed my efforts to obtain Zibebu’s consent, and I am still in communication with him with that object.* The cases of Mahu, Hayiyana, and others [Zibebu’s brothers and cousins], who, with their followers, also seek to return to their homesteads, but are likewise forbidden by Zibebu, also claim your Excellency’s consideration. They, however, are not of the urgency attached to those of Umsutshwana and the others. In the meantime Zibebu complains that he and his people are constantly being attacked and harassed by small parties of these people, whose return to his territory he will not permit for the reasons given by him.” †

“ 4. Affairs in the territory of the appointed chief Dunn are also very unsettled. A section of his people belonging to the Usutu party, and headed by Cetshwayo’s half-brother Dubulamanzi, persist in refusing to acknowledge the chief’s authority within his territory, ‡ and he therefore desired them to remove out of his

Mr. Osborn thinks they may take the latter without leave at last. They could have done so by force all along, and nothing but their anxiety not to prejudice Cetshwayo’s cause by offending the “Government” had prevented their doing so.

* And this is the “amenable” Zibebu, who always pays such attention to the Resident’s advice, and of whom Sir H. Bulwer draws so flattering a portrait a little later. *

† The “reasons given” are always that the people in question are in rebellion against him, which may always be rendered that they refuse to repudiate their king.

‡ Because they had discovered that he gave out that their acknowledgment of his authority was a proof that they disowned Cetshwayo. Dunn had never a chance after the betrayal by his friend the *Mercury* of that piece of treachery.

territory, which they also refuse to do. Dunn wished to resort to arms to coerce them, but I advised him against this course, having reason to believe that the calling up of an impi by him would result in disturbances in other territories as well.* His loyal people † are very much unsettled, and are urging him to take steps to assert his authority, and to put an end to the state of unrest in their midst. Dabulamanzi keeps assuring the people that Cetshwayo is in Pietermaritzburg [*ibid.*, p. 172], and will soon be in Zululand; and although his well-known unscrupulous character and disregard of truth would, under ordinary circumstances, prevent much mischief from arising out of his representations, I fear that by dint of reiteration on his part, and repetition from mouth to mouth on the part of others, coupled with the fact that he is in constant communication with unauthorised persons (but given out by him to be the Government) in Natal, that he effects considerable uneasiness in the minds of otherwise quietly disposed persons.‡

* It is not very plain whether Mr. Osborn here means to imply that he would have encouraged Dunn to "resort to arms," i. e. to slaughter the Zulus in his district, had he not feared that his doing so would have caused "disturbances in other territories," but there can be no doubt that it was well for Dunn himself that in this instance he was restrained. The hope of Cetshwayo's return, while it made the people very anxious not to offend those who could permit or prevent it, had also strengthened their determination not to let their real sentiments be concealed or misrepresented.

† Dunn's "loyal" people were only those personally attached to his service, numbering few if any real Zulus.

‡ Dabulamanzi, after his visit to Maritzburg, became the pet official scapegoat, in place of Ndabuko, whose blameless conduct has made it rather difficult to find a peg to hang an accusation upon. Dabulamanzi being of a hot disposition, and, also, residing in Dunn's district, was a far more convenient victim. There is nothing, however, in the Blue Books to support such vague accusations as the above, and "well-known" is a convenient phrase, the use of which is not justified by the existence of newspaper and other uncertain reports. Dabulamanzi's brave and honest conduct on his brother's behalf in repudiating Dunn on hearing of his treachery was, without doubt, at this time his greatest offence in official eyes. Mr. Osborn here apparently accepts Dunn's account of Dabulamanzi's supposed sayings and doings.

The state of affairs in Dunn's territory, I submit, forms another case the urgency of which requires an immediate remedy.

"5. Hamu's affairs also merit the serious consideration of your Excellency, especially his conduct as an appointed chief. The extensive seizure he made from Umnyamana and his people, and, subsequently, his attack on and killing of the Aba Qulusi, and his conduct in regard to General Wood's award, also his latest act in seizing one of Umnyamana's own kraals, and another from one of his men, are proceedings the effect of which, as part of the causes, directly or indirectly, of the late risings,* appear to me to claim your Excellency's attention, as also the case of the Aba Qulusi, who insist upon being allowed to return to their homesteads, from which they were driven by Hamu last year.

"6. The appointed Chief Seketwayo caused his people to arm and to take part in favour of the Usutu in the late armed demonstrations.* It was out of his territory that the Aba Qulusi issued to raid Hamu's people.

"7. For this paragraph see note to p. 218.

"8. I may state here that Undabuko, Usiwetu, Umsutshwana, Umbopa, Mahu, Hayiyana, and the other headmen, with their followers and people, and the Aba Qulusi, all of whom are clamouring to be allowed to reoccupy their homesteads, say distinctly that they will not recognise the authority of the chiefs within whose territories these are situated; nor do they recognise those chiefs within whose boundaries they at present reside." †

* All these phrases in the official mouth refer to the arming of the Sutus and other loyal Zulus to protect themselves and the Princes from the threats of Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu, after the return of the Great Deputation. The whole of the circumstances have been so persistently misrepresented in the official despatches that it is necessary to remind the reader that there is no truth in the assertions that the Princes were the aggressors. The unfriendly chiefs threatened them before they left Zululand, hence, of course they were prepared for an attack on their return, but only in that sense can they be said to have "taken up arms" first, not in the sense of using them first, or of giving offence except that, as Zibebu says—*the fact of your going to ask for the "Bone" was an offence to me.*

† That is to say, they will not recognise any chief the recognition of whom would imply that they disowned Cetshwayo. But

The expected visit to Zululand never took place, although some time in September the Governor got as far as Rorke's Drift, and summoned Mnyamana and the Princes to meet him there. His own report of the proceedings is a very meagre one.

"My object," he says, "was to place the relations between Hamu and Mnyamana on a more satisfactory basis, and one less perilous to the public peace than was the case; and with regard to Ndabuko and Ziwedu, my object was to provide them with a suitable place where they could live and plant their crops" [3466, p. 212].

In the former case he "found it necessary to condemn in unmistakable terms" the conduct of Hamu; he "advised him strongly" to pay Sir E. Wood's award of cattle to Umnyamana through the Resident, and "decided that, pending the future settlement,* Hamu should not interfere with Mnyamana, or with any of Mnyamana's people, or attempt in any way to exercise authority over them.

"In the case of Undabuko and Ziwedu," he continued, "I made arrangements by which they will be enabled to return at once to their old lands in Zibebu's territory from which they were ejected last year.

* * * * *

"By these means the main causes of complaint on the part of Umnyamana, and on the part of Undabuko and Ziwedu against the appointed chiefs Hamu and Zibebu, will be at once practically removed without awaiting the new changes to be made in the settlement of the Zulu country; † and it is better they should thus

they were on good terms with Seketwayo, who had been loyal throughout.

* Namely Cetshwayo's return.

† The old mistake was here repeated of supposing it possible to separate the interests of the princes and people, or rather of shutting the official eye to the fact that they were one. Only the Princes and their immediate followers were to return to their homes, not the great tribe, or rather tribes, belonging to them. Such an arrangement removed no cause of complaint at all. But Sir Henry Bulwer would not believe in the national character of this loyalty to the Princes.

be removed beforehand, both in order to obviate present risks of collision,* and in order to prevent the inconveniences that might arise, at the time of the general change, from a too abrupt process of transition." †

The following statements, however, show what impression the Zulus received on that occasion, and how cruelly they must have been disappointed with the actual facts of the so-called "restoration." Without full official reports of what passed, it is impossible to speak with any certainty, but it is also impossible to avoid the conclusion that an attempt was made to induce Mnyamana and the Princes by bribes of land and position, to agree beforehand that Zibebu should possess an independent territory, and so to create another source of opposition to Cetshwayo, and virtually to deprive him of the support of his most important subjects. Both Sir Henry Bulwer and Mr. Osborn had repeatedly denied that either Mnyamana or the Princes were sincere in their petitions for the King's return, and had asserted that their "real desire" was to secure independent territories for themselves. This being the official belief, it would appear a feasible project to detach them from Cetshwayo's "party" by the offer of what was supposed to be their real desire. The single fact that the attempt proved an utter failure, as shown by the second of the three following statements, and by the absence of official reports of what passed

* Which risks had been allowed to continue for several years.

† The inconvenience of allowing Cetshwayo's return to herald in good luck to his most loyal subjects?

between the Government and the Zulu Princes and chiefs at Rorke's Drift in September 1882, is a conclusive reply to all the many efforts of the officials to discredit the Bishop's statements concerning the loyalty of these men. Had it been possible to shake that loyalty, and to induce them to desert Cetshwayo's cause, it would have thrown almost unsurmountable difficulties in the way of the restoration which Sir Henry Bulwer was so anxious to prevent.* But there was never the least chance of any such desertion, as the Governor might easily have learned from those who would never have advocated Cetshwayo's return had they not ascertained beyond a doubt that he would be gladly received by nearly the whole of the Zulu nation.

The first of these accounts was given at Bishopstowe on October 3rd by Mtokwane, a Zulu of good

* His utmost concession lies in the following passage [3466, p. 149]:—

“If it is considered that the necessities of the ex-King and of his position, which have created to a great extent the urgency of this question [of the future of Zululand], are such that he should be released from captivity and, if possible, restored to freedom and to some measure of authority in his own country, although the considerations which tell so conclusively [in Sir Henry Bulwer's own opinion] against his restoration to his former position, tell also against any restoration even in part; yet I do not think a partial restoration will be impossible, provided that we, on our side, are prepared to undertake such a measure of responsibility as will enable us to adequately secure the other interests and the other objects which are bound up in the question.” He then proposes annexation of part of the Zulu country, adding, “If we are not prepared to do this, then I believe the objections are insuperable.”

position and character.* He had taken up to Mnyamana and Ndabuko the newspaper accounts of Cetshwayo's visit to the Queen, his subsequent interview with Lord Kimberley, and the rejoicings of his whole party on hearing that he was to be restored. He stated as follows:—

“I called on the way up at Qetuka's † and heard that no one had been called to meet the Governor. I said, ‘Well! you ought to tell them all to go and pray for the King to the Governor, even those who are weak-kneed and afraid to come forward; or they will complain of you hereafter, saying, We were never told that we could pray for him.’ ‘Well!’ said Qetuka, ‘if Mnyamana sends for us, every one in this part of the country will come; there are none here who do not wish for the King.’

“Then I went on to the Prince Shingana and told him. Said he, ‘We have all been told not to go [to the Governor].’ Said I, ‘But do you not see that it will be the same as when Lukuni (Sir E. Wood) came? He heard no one speak, and then went back and said that the Zulus did not want the King.’ Shingana agreed, and sent to let many of the chiefs and people know that ‘here was the Governor come, and they should go and pray to him for Cetshwayo.’

“I went on and got to Rorke's Drift, on the Zulu side, on the very day on which Mnyamana, and then the Princes, had been sent for to come to the Governor. I gave the paper ‡ to Ndabuko, who said, ‘Let it go first to Mnyamana.’ So I took it to him, and he sent to a white man, a missionary, to ask him to read it to him. He came at once and read it, just as we have heard it at Bishopstowe. I told Mnyamana, ‘This is not written by Sobantu; it came from England, where the King is; it arrived one day, and I started with it the next. It is news which any one may see; you may show it to Mr. Osborn or to Mr. Jan [Mr. John Shepstone], or to the Governor himself.’ So Mnyamana said that we had

* Well known to the writer for some years as an honest and intelligent man.

† Qetuka, one of the great chiefs in Dunn's territory; a father-in-law to Cetshwayo.

‡ This was a London telegram from the local papers.

better take it to Mr. Osborn. We showed it to him, and told him what I had told Mnyamana, and he seemed quite astonished, and said that he should report it at once to Mr. Jan. So he crossed the river, and we went with him with the paper. Mr. Jan seemed quite angry, and said, 'What! Is Mnyamana to be told before the Governor? Is he an appointed ruler, then? Take back your letter!' So we took it back, and Mnyamana said, 'We had better bring it back to you (the Bishop),' and here it is! *

"The meeting had not taken place when I left. But Mnyamana told me that, when he was called, Mr. Jan in the Governor's presence told him 'Cetshwayo is coming back, the Queen is sending him back. But we want you now, Mnyamana, to separate for us what land shall belong to the Government,' and that he had replied, 'Since you yourselves, sirs, have told us that its owner is coming back, I can have nothing to do with dividing the land. You must settle yourselves with him these affairs of yours when he arrives.'

"I did not hear anything more. But already, before I got up, Mr. Osborn had called all the appointed chiefs or their indunas, and had told them 'Cetshwayo is coming back; the Queen is sending him; and any one who has got any of his property had better put it to rights.'"

The second statement is as follows:—

On November 20th, Nyokana and Batakati, Mnyamana's son, arrived at Bishopstowe. They were both present at Rorke's Drift, when Mnyamana went to the Governor (as above), and Mnyamana's son stated what his father told him, as follows:—"Mr. Jan began

* Here, as often before, it was an incautious speech of a Government official—the Secretary for Native Affairs—which alone gave the Zulus grounds for supposing that the Bishop of Natal had some peculiar power and influence beyond even that of the Governor himself. The latter's mail would seem on this occasion to have been delayed upon the road, since Mtokwane, coming from Bishopstowe, apparently delivered to Mnyamana and the Princes the published telegraphic news of the decision in favour of Cetshwayo's restoration before Sir Henry Bulwer had received it. The circumstance was a mere accident, but that it appeared to the Zulus to give proof of some occult influence on the Bishop's part was entirely owing to Mr. J. Shepstone's indiscretion.

by asking Mnyamana 'What were the words which I spoke at the time of Sir Garnet Wolseley's settlement?' Said Mnyamana, 'It is you, sir, who should repeat them.' But Mr. Jan said, 'No! the Governor should hear them fresh from your mouth, and then he will know that I spoke the truth.' So Mnyamana agreed, and said, 'Well, sir, you appointed some of the thirteen chiefs (naming them), and you were for appointing me, but I said 'No; am I not also going [off the scene] in that you are taking away the King?' And you denied it strongly, saying, 'Nothing of the sort! We are keeping you to be one of the chiefs.' But I declined, saying, 'No, I am chief already; I can have no new chieftainship. Appoint these chiefs of yours!' 'What?' said you, 'and so you approve them?' Said I, 'What have I to do with approving them? Am I not dead?' Then you said, 'Well, Mnyamana, we meant to appoint you; and still we leave the country in your charge. The regiments you will *tunga* (order to put on head-rings = marry) as you think best, leaving the young regiments; only in these latter you will raise an orphan (allow such to marry), as your custom is. Well, I received that word from you, and I endeavoured to carry it out. But I don't see that you told Zibebu about it; for they paid no attention [to me]; it has been nothing but sending *impis* and carrying off girls, and marrying even children [young lads]. Nothing has gone right since that day. You said that the thirteen chiefs were to be advised by me, and were to leave my own place undisturbed. They have done neither; nothing you ordered has been carried out. Said Mr. Jan, 'Yes, Mnyamana, I quite admit it. I have come to relieve myself of blame in this matter. I see that you remembered all that was said. Although you refused before, we shall appoint you now, and order that all your people, who are under Ntshingwayo and Hamu and Mfanawendhlela, shall return to you again. There is no great talk to-day, Mnyamana. Go now, and Mr. Osborn will follow, and will tell you what is decided. But there is one thing which I will tell you to-day, Mnyamana, and that is that your son [Cetshwayo] is coming back. I pray you for these appointed chiefs, Hamu and Zibebu. Can you not cut off for them a little bit of land, that we may have settled them before the King arrives?' Said Mnyamana, 'Out of what land shall I cut, sir? Are you, then, deceiving me, when you tell me that my son is coming back? If it is true, then it is for him to give them anything.' Said Mr. Jan, 'Very well, I understand what you say. We [Government] for our part, shall speak [at the proper time]. We shall now go on to Newcastle, and then

return home (to Maritzburg), and finally we shall return to you at Ulundi; it is there that we shall speak to you.' This was the end of the interview, and Mnyamana went back to his kraal to wait for Mr. Osborn. When he (Mr. Osborn) came, he went on to the old sites of the destroyed kraals, taking with him the Sutu indunas, Mgamule, Haiyana, Mangcengeza, and Vunda. I (Nyokana) was present when Vunda and Haiyana arrived, sent back to Mnyamana to report what had passed. Haiyana spoke, saying, 'Several indunas of Zibebu, Sikizane, Mqubula, and others were there. Mr. Osborn told us to point out the ridges dividing Ndabuko's land from Zibebu's. Ngamule said, 'No, sir, let Sikizane do that.' Said Sikizane, 'How can I divide the land, when it is all the land of Ishaka?' Ngamule replied, 'If you say that, you do not know the boundaries. Is there not the hill Mongoma (a hill in the midst of Ndabuko's district)?'*

"Said our men, 'Speak you, then, if you know.' But he would say no more, though Mr. Osborn questioned him. Then Mr. Osborn said, 'Let the Sutus speak.' But they said, 'How can we speak of boundaries when the Sutu country stretches even beyond Zibebu?' Said Mr. Osborn, 'I am only taking back the Princes to their kraals—not the tribe.' Said Haiyana, 'What about all of us?'" 'No,' said he, 'I have nothing to do with returning you; you will be settled by the King.'

"But when this was reported to them, the Princes said, 'Is this the Governor's word, that we are to return alone? Are not our people our garments? Are we to sit in our old kraals naked? Is this setting the country to rights? It is killing us again!' And Mnyamana agreed."

The third statement † is this:—

"About December 1st, messengers of rank arrived from Zululand, Fokoti, half-brother of Zibebu (but loyal to Cetshwayo), and two

* Here, plainly, Sikizane had some national feeling, while Mqubula wished to make Zibebu's point. There never yet was a powerful lord of any nation who had not followers devoted to him personally. Zibebu, as his father's son, had a large tribe of his own, and would have had a still more powerful personal following, but for the disloyalty to the King, into which he was persuaded by his white friends, and which lost him the support of many, even of his own family.

† There was a fourth made at another time by a fourth Zulu,

others, sent by Mnyamana and Undabuko, to report to the Governor that, inasmuch as at Rorke's Drift he had directed Mr. Osborn to restore the Princes and their people to their kraals, seven of the principal indunas of the Sutu tribe, together with a large number of the tribe, intended to accompany Mr. Osborn, on his announcing that he was about to carry out the Governor's promise. On seeing them, Mr. Osborn asked 'What is all this *impi*?' They replied, 'No, sir, it is no *impi*; it is only ourselves returning to our homes, as leave has been given for us to do; it is only ourselves, carrying our bundles.' Said Mr. Osborn, 'The authorities never said that you people, the tribe, were to return to your old homes; I am replacing the Princes only' [i. e. the Princes, and their "immediate followers" only]. Then he, together with Zibebu's indunas, cut off a small bit of land for the Princes, leaving all the land of the tribe with Zibebu. [Zibebu was himself a Sutu by birth, though of lower rank, of course, than the Princes, to whom he was second-cousin. He had, besides, lost influence with the tribe owing to his disloyalty to its head as well as King, Cetshwayo.] The Sutu indunas remonstrated, saying 'Did not the authorities say that we were all to return to our kraals? Why then do you separate the Princes to replace them alone? Finally they left, saying, 'Whither, then, is it meant that we should go, since all our land is given to Zibebu? Are we of our own accord to set our sheep (the Princes) alone in a tiger's den.'

"And when they reached Mnyamana and the Princes, these agreed with them altogether, saying, "You have done right, men of ours! For what purpose indeed were you taken out at all?' And, accordingly, they have sent down two of them to report this to the Governor, that "all that had come of his promises had been an attempt to hand over the Princes (to Zibebu), like a goat set in a trap for a tiger, and deprived of the people who had hitherto been their safeguard." *

but as it contains nothing that does not appear in one or other of these three, it is omitted.

* These men were kept waiting by Mr. J. Shepstone, S.N.A., for four weeks without receiving any "word" from him, and at last they found that he had started for Zululand without leaving any message for them except that "they might go." They had waited already two or three weeks before they came to Bishopstowe, and made the above statement. This is the favourite method of the

Although there is no official report of these conversations, Sir Henry Bulwer's short despatch [3466, p. 212] on the subject contains quite enough to show that the Zulu accounts are substantially true, that is to say, his summary of the Government propositions coincides with what the Zulus understood, and their report of their own replies may be depended upon.

Not that Sir Henry Bulwer allows anything of the sort. Having made up his mind that the Zulus could not possibly have any loyalty to Cetshwayo amongst them, proofs to the contrary had no effect whatever upon him. On November 24th he writes [3466, p. 235] inclosing

“a report I have received from the British Resident showing that Ziweðu and Ndabuko have now [?] raised a difficulty about returning to their kraals unless all the other people of the Usutu party belonging to Zibebu's territory are allowed to return also.

Then quoting a report that Mnyamana was beginning to interfere with some of Hamu's people,* he continues, “The fact is that though Mnyamana has ostensibly been one of the leaders of the party in favour of Cetshwayo's restoration, and his name has been made use of, and he himself has been made use of for the purposes of the agitation, now that the restoration is decided upon, he is exceedingly uneasy at the prospect. Rightly or wrongly, he is credited with having been the means by which Cetshwayo's hiding-place at the close of the Zulu war was discovered.”

Natal Government in dealing with inconvenient applications from natives.

* There is no proof that Mnyamana did any such thing, though no doubt Hamu would lose no opportunity of bringing the accusation. “Some of Hamu's people” may have meant people claimed by Hamu, who acknowledged Mnyamana. The accusation against the latter does not appear to have been sustained.

This passage is a complete libel upon the loyal old Prime Minister Mnyamana.* Whoever supplied Sir Henry Bulwer with his notions must have broken the Ninth Commandment most deliberately. Nor is this all.

“His present object, the Resident thinks,” the despatch to Lord Kimberley proceeds, “is to secure, if possible, an independent position for himself before Cetshwayo’s return. He is possessed . . . of one of the largest and most powerful followings in the Zulu country, and he may entertain the notion that if he can only persuade the Government to give him an independent position, he will be able to hold his own, and be secure from the consequences of Cetshwayo’s restoration to power. Undabuko, for other reasons, is credited with a similar design. He also, it is said, aspires to be an independent chief; and it is just possible that this desire on his part may explain the present attitude of the brothers in

* “The clearest headed man in Native Zululand, if not in Native South Africa. He has one great fault, one besetting sin, which has well nigh ruined him, and it is his fidelity to his dynastic King. . . . His kraals are located between the upper millstone of Zibebu and the nether of Uhamu, but all their grinding has not ground his fidelity to Cetshwayo out of him. Uhamu robbed him of 2700 head of cattle. The robbery was so unmistakably apparent that Government was compelled to order Uhamu to restore at least 700 head. The order is still uncomplished with. Mnyamana is without his cattle, and is being persecuted to the death, because he dares to have a claim which has been recognised in a half-hearted way by the Government. . . . It seems a pitiful waste of specially good material that a man of Mnyamana’s ability, who could be so useful to Government if only utilised, should be misused in the way he has been and is.”—Mr. W. Y. Campbell’s Letters, see vol. i. p. 27, *in notis*.

Cetshwayo, after his return to Zululand, heard that these charges had been made against Mnyamana, and said, with a laugh at their absurdity, “Do you not see that this was but an attempt to sow dissension between us? Were there any truth in the accusation, would Mnyamana have taken all the trouble he has on behalf of my family all this time?”

raising a difficulty about returning to their district unless certain other people are allowed to return also; their object being to build up a strong party of their own. . . . When it is recollected how urgently, and with what persistence the two brothers have been moving to be allowed to return to their own district, and what a hardship their expulsion from their homes has been made to appear, and I can well believe has really been, it certainly seems as if some undercurrent of motive were at work that they should now, when they have obtained their object, about which they displayed so much importunity, be unwilling to avail themselves of it.* . . . But this does not satisfy Undabuko's purposes. He is a troublesome, turbulent youth, and I freely recognise that no one is likely to keep him in such good order as Cetshwayo.† But whether he is so anxious for Cetshwayo's return as has been supposed is another question. There is good reason to believe that he had his own views as to what the agitation of last April and May might lead to.‡ . . . In fact, the greatest danger of the agitation . . . was that it would bring on, and it very nearly did bring on, a civil war, Undabuko heading the Sutu party with the real design of making himself the king."

* They had *not* obtained that object. No Zulu chief can be thus separated from his people, or would choose to live apart from them. This is the old mistake of insisting upon Ndabuko and the other Princes being regarded as heads of small parties only. The *whole* of the people driven out of Zibebu's territory were their people, and they could not, of course, return with only those whom Sir Henry Bulwer calls their personal followers.

† Ndabuko is about fifteen years younger than Cetshwayo, i.e. he is between thirty and forty, and very like him in face and figure, though not as yet quite so stout. He is a man of peculiarly quiet and dignified manners and steady conduct. Throughout the troubles of his country he has always been the most moderate in council yet steadily faithful to his brother, and, although by no means wanting in spirit, he has always kept the utmost restraint upon himself and upon his people, with the one exception of the first retaliation upon Zibebu in consequence of that chief's unprovoked attacks upon his people after the "restoration," of which more hereafter. Nothing more ludicrously inappropriate than Sir Henry Bulwer's terms could well be applied to this prince.

‡ By the expression "agitation" Sir Henry Bulwer always describes the orderly and peaceable Great Deputation.

It is difficult to comment with any patience upon such a mass of prejudice and assumption as the whole of this despatch, and there is no explanation of its absurdities, except that Sir Henry Bulwer, having become possessed of one idea to the extent of monomania, cuts every circumstance to fit that idea after the unsparing fashion of a Procrustes.

The simple statement of the Prince Ziweddu sufficiently explains the matter.* He went "to thank the Resident personally for his trouble in the matter of his and Undabuko's kraals;" but adds that they "cannot go to reside alone in their kraals, their people not being permitted to go to theirs. In the first place [*ibid.*, p. 237], they want their people to build their kraals for them, which they, the people, cannot do unless they are back at their own kraals. And, secondly, it would not be safe for them, Ziweddu and Undabuko, to reside by themselves near to Zibebu and his people."

Mr. Osborn's reply to this is that as he had directed Zibebu to allow not only the Princes, but also their personal followers, to return to their kraals (which the Resident describes as "spread over a tract of land of at least twelve miles long") therefore "the case is not as stated by you, that you and Undabuko would, under the arrangements made, have to reside there alone by yourselves."

Such a mistake might really have been made by a person knowing nothing of the Zulus or their language, and who was also slow of apprehension, but Mr. Osborn could not possibly have imagined that there was any falsehood in the Prince's speech, or

* And is corroborated by the Zulu statements previously given.

that he for a moment meant to imply that he and Undabuko would be "alone" by their two selves. The phrase was of course as figurative as the one given before—"Are not our people our garments? are we to sit in our old kraals naked?"

Amongst the people who were not allowed to return was Umsutshwana's tribe, still homeless in the "bush," and of whom Mr. Osborn had written on August 5th [3466, p. 171], that they "are suffering much hardship from exposure and want;" and of whose case he had then spoken as equally "important and urgent" with that of the Princes. No doubt there *was* "some under-current of motive" (as Sir Henry Bulwer says) in kindness towards their suffering people on the Princes' part. And, certainly, they had sufficient reason for feeling that with a comparatively small number of followers they themselves would not be safe within Zibebu's reach.

CHAPTER V.

ALL Sir Henry Bulwer's strenuous efforts to prevent Cetshwayo's return having failed, he turned his attention with equal ardour to the planning of arrangements which were well calculated to make that return as great a failure as possible. There were several palpable objects to be gained. He had always declared that Cetshwayo's restoration would be unwelcome to the majority of the Zulus, and dangerous to the peace of both that country and Natal,* and he owed it to himself to prove that he was right. Sir Henry Bulwer had said that the scheme could not succeed, therefore it must not succeed. It was also necessary to show both the King and his friends that they could not be permitted happiness and success against Sir Henry Bulwer's will, and it never seems to have occurred to him that there were really but two honourable courses open to him—either to resign his governorship, and decline to carry out the policy he had opposed so persistently, or to make up his

* Although so much was said beforehand in the Colony about the danger to Natal of the King's return, and although Zululand has been in so frightfully disturbed a state since his death, that particular argument has vanished altogether, having, indeed, been groundless from the first.

mind to it, and carry it out loyally, and in a friendly and generous spirit to the King. It is not easy to understand how the Home Government could possibly hope that the matter could be rightly managed in the spirit in which the Governor of Natal undertook it, especially as that spirit was shared by those through whom he worked. Unfortunately, also, there was no division in their councils as to the main point of keeping back as much territory as possible from the King, for in the proposed "Reserve" was realised the well-known Shepstonian project of a Black Kingdom beyond Natal, into which, many years before, Sir T. Shepstone himself contemplated leading off the native population of Natal to make room for the increasing number of whites. Such a proposition would naturally be very popular with the colonists, but it was open to the two objections, that the natives preferred to stay where they were, and where most of them had had their homes for many years, and that there was no empty country to send them to.* A plausible justification for taking part of Zululand for this purpose has been the alleged fact that the white population of Natal is crowded up by Zulu refugees, and that therefore it would be only fair, in the new settlement of Zululand, to secure their return to their

* On this point Sir Henry Bulwer writes, in August 1882 [3466, p. 149], "A restoration of the ex-King and the re-establishment of the Zulu power would be an effectual bar to the return of any of these people to Zululand. . . . The question is a very serious one to this Colony, and in dealing with the Zulu problem we ought not, I think, to lose sight of the bearing that the one question has upon the other, or neglect the opportunity we now have to deal with the Natal difficulty."

own country. Very easily might this have been done by simple agreement with Cetshwayo, who was quite willing to receive all who wished to come, but Sir Henry Bulwer would admit the possibility of no policy which would show any confidence in the King's good faith. He acted throughout, and in defiance of the most palpable facts, on the principle that the only way to induce Cetshwayo to keep his word, or the peace, was to put it out of his power to break either, although, as a matter of fact, he had no means whatever of binding the King, except by his word, and it is to Cetshwayo's scrupulous good faith that the Natal Government has owed its mischief-making power of the last two years.

But in point of fact there is no truth in the above plausible justification, and might, not right, is the only ground on which the white colonists of Natal can claim the land occupied by their native brethren. It is true that Zulus have left their own country, and settled in Natal since the latter became a British colony, but it is no less true that many of them, and of other tribes, have meanwhile left Natal, and settled in Zululand. It is impossible to learn the numbers in the latter case, as only the few who asked leave of the Government to go and live in Zululand are recorded, while most of those who went did so without leave, as, indeed, there was no reason why they should not. The two populations in Natal and Zululand lived in close friendship and intimacy, especially along both sides of the boundary streams, before the disastrous war of 1879, and Bishop Schreuder, "the oldest, most

able, and most experienced missionary in Zululand" wrote at that time: "The native tribes here on the border have these many years fraternised and had constant intercourse, partly intermarried with their Zulu neighbours on the Zulu side, and naturally their sympathies are divided between Natal and Zululand. And I have no doubt that many of the Natal border natives would think themselves safer over in Zululand, than in Natal" [2308, p. 70]. But that the emigration from Natal during the years of Cetshwayo's actual reign, from 1873 to 1878, was actually greater than the immigration into the Colony may be gathered from the colonial official returns, which show that the native population of Natal has not become larger during that period by even the number to be expected by natural increase. In 1854 it was reckoned at from 100,000 to 120,000,* and in 1877 it was 290,035.† In 1873 it was 279,895,‡ and through natural increase (say 2 per cent. per annum) would have been 302,965 in 1877, whereas it was only 290,035,§ so that since Cetshwayo began to reign it has been decreasing, through emigration from Natal to Zululand.

Now the native population of Natal in 1874 was

* 'Ten Weeks in Natal,' p. vii. By the Bishop of Natal.

† 'Natal Almanac,' 1879, p. 126.

‡ Official Returns.

§ "Yet most of Langalibalele's tribe had by this time returned to the Colony, who in 1873 had been terrorised out of it to an extent of probably double the whole number of people who have come from Zululand to live in Natal during the last six years." This was written, and all the above calculations made, by the Bishop of Natal in 1879.

281,797,* which by natural increase of 2 per cent. per annum, as in England, would have amounted to 287,432 in 1875, 293,180 in 1876, 299,043 in 1877, instead of 277,864, 252,024, 290,035,* a *decrease* being thus indicated of 9568, 41156, 9008 respectively.

It is, therefore, plain that Natal could found no claim to the practical annexation of part of Zululand on the grounds of having been hampered by emigration from thence during Cetshwayo's reign. As to what happened in and before 1856, if we go back to first causes it will be difficult to show that we have any right at all to Natal, except that of conquest, which right, when exercised by a civilised people, certainly should not involve the driving out of the natural possessors of the soil. On grounds of first principle the Zulu must have a better right to the country than any European people.

However, as no such return to first principles on the part of the aborigines would be for a moment permitted, do not let us commit the dishonesty of going back only just as far as suits our own interests, and stopping there. Let us rather consider what was the actual state of things when the largest immigration of Zulus since British occupation took place, viz. in 1856, for with regard to any of the original inhabitants we have no right even to raise the question of their claim.† During the civil war of 1856 some

* Official Blue-Books.

† One favourite argument is the assertion that the British found Natal almost empty of natives, who crowded into it after our occupation, from other parts, presumably for protection. But those

thousand Zulus, men, women, and children, took refuge in Natal, the native population of which was then about 120,000, where at that time there was plenty of room for them, and where, indeed, they were welcomed by the majority of the colonists, who obtained in them servants and labourers at a very low rate of wages, "the able-bodied men and boys, and the younger women and girls, being apprenticed out by the Government for three years, in the service of the white inhabitants, at the expiration of which time they were allowed to acquire the right to settle permanently within the borders of the Colony."* There may have been a few far-sighted individuals who foresaw that the day would come when the whites would want back the space in Natal then readily enough given, because not required by themselves, to the refugees, and who held that one stipulation of their reception should be that, when peace should be restored in Zululand, they should accept any arrangement which it might be found possible to make for their peaceable return to their own country.†

natives who entered Natal at that time were simply returning to their own country, from which they had been driven by successive waves of war, and would certainly have done so, sooner or later, in any case.

* 'Diocese of Natal: First Steps of the Zulu Mission.' By the Bishop of Natal, written in 1859. In 1881 the number of *Zulus* resident in Natal was calculated to be between 10,000 and 11,000, out of a native population of over 300,000.

† This might probably have been done without previous stipulation, and with the consent of all parties, at any time after Cetshwayo's accession in 1873, but certainly upon his "restoration" in 1883. Sir H. Bulwer's object, however, was to give the Zulu

But no such stipulation was made, and the refugees were allowed to purchase by three years' servitude the right to become Natal natives. The plan suited the requirements of the whites at the time, and we have no right to complain of the result, to turn the natives out, or to rob the Zulus of part of their country, in order that Europeans may have a larger share of colonial land.

Although very popular in Natal, and with the official clique, this plea for cutting off a third of Zululand from the King's dominions is but delicately suggested in the despatches home, which chiefly lay stress on the large numbers of actual Zulus who, it was assumed, would flock into the Reserve as soon as they knew of Cetshwayo's return, in order to escape from his rule, an assumption which was not borne out by circumstances when put to the test, but which was strongly urged by Sir Henry Bulwer in his despatch of October 3, 1882 [3466, p. 197]. This despatch requires careful examination, for it contains all the seeds of the lamentable condition of Zululand brought about by the Governor of Natal's marring of the good intentions of the Home Government. It would seem that the latter had not contemplated any division of the country, until urged thereto by Sir Henry Bulwer, for Lord Kimberley writes on August 17: "*We have accepted your advice that Cetshwayo's restoration should be partial*" [*ibid.*, p. 92], although at the same time

King not more subjects, but less land, and he was not anxious to make that restoration a brilliant success, pleasing alike to King, Zulus, and colonists of Natal.

intimating that H.M.'s Government were "unable to agree in your recommendation that the announcement to Cetshwayo should be postponed." The Home Government then decided that "on grounds of good faith, locations must be assigned to such of the chiefs as might not be willing to return under Cetshwayo's rule."* Well and good. To the equity of this no one could object, and Cetshwayo's warmest supporters would have approved of its extending further, and including *all Zulus* who were unwilling to accept the King. He himself agreed readily to the condition when it was fully explained to him, for he was sure that, if the land to be reserved was only in proportion to the reasonable requirements of those of his people who wished to leave him, it would be a small loss to Zululand. Lord Kimberley "concluded" that Sir Henry Bulwer "had ascertained from each of the appointed chiefs whether he would return under the rule of Cetshwayo, by communicating with them on the subject" [*ibid.*, p. 197]. But this the Governor did not attempt to do. He "had only seen three of the chiefs" himself, and had left the Resident to learn the wishes and feelings of the other ten. If there was any careful endeavour to obtain their genuine sentiments, no record of the attempt has been given to the public; yet it would have been quite possible not only to learn

* It should have been added, "and who have not forfeited their claim by breaking the conditions on their side." The *two* exceptions would have left none to provide for, except Mfanawendhlela, whose opposition cannot have been very strong, as neither he nor his people cared to remove to the Reserve.

the real views of the thirteen kinglets, but to obtain those of the other chiefs and heads of tribes and families by some simple system of ballot in each separate district, by means of which the voters might have been protected from the displeasure of the appointed chiefs if voting against their views. Nay, had the Governor been really as sure as he professed himself, that "not merely the majority of the appointed chiefs are individually opposed to the restoration of Cetshwayo, but that great numbers of the Zulu people have no wish to return under his rule, and would regard any obligation to do so as one of the greatest misfortunes that could befall them, and that many of them would be compelled to leave the country" [3466, p. 199], he would, as soon as he obtained consent from England to his proposed "Reserve," have caused every chief to be informed of the circumstances (not the kinglets only), and, fixing a temporary line, would have given notice that all who dreaded the King's rule might come over into the "protected" * district, the line to be advanced or withdrawn according to the numbers who crossed it. This, however, would by no means have answered the purpose of the annexationists, as in all probability not a single Zulu would have moved, and the line would have had to be withdrawn to the Tugela as before; for the converse direction that all

* This was the term proposed by Sir Henry Bulwer, but it was objected to by Her Majesty's Government (and "Zulu Native Reserve" substituted) on the grounds that it "would imply that the inhabitants are to depend for defence not on themselves, but on the British power" [3466, p. 217].

Zulus living within the proposed Reserve who wished to be under Cetshwayo's rule, should leave it, and cross into the territory assigned to him, was by no means equally fair. If there were people who would regard the King's return as "the greatest misfortune which could befall them," and who would "be compelled to leave the country," such would, of course, be glad of the refuge offered them, and accept it willingly, at the cost of a change of habitation and loss of accustomed homes and lands. But the Zulus inhabiting that part of the country next Natal, which Sir Henry Bulwer proposed to reserve,* did not at all see why they should be forced to choose between their King and their land and homes, when they desired *both*. So that while the number of people (if any) who genuinely and of their own will crossed into the Reserve really represent the proportion adverse to Cetshwayo's return, the fact that the inhabitants of the Reserve refused to go over into the territory left to Cetshwayo does not in the least show that they did not wish for his rule. Their argument was in effect, "We are Cetshwayo's people, and this is his country; we will not voluntarily give up either him or it."

Sir Henry Bulwer's calculation is that "of the appointed chiefs it would appear that five are disposed to acquiesce in the restoration, and that eight are not

* Of which Cetshwayo spoke as "the best piece of the country. The original Zulus live along there." And again, "The influential men occupying Dunn's territory, all along the Natal border, are favourable to my restoration; and that is why I want the reserved territory reduced" [3466, p. 245].

disposed to acquiesce." How this "would appear" when the above was written, we are not allowed to know, but the appearance was certainly a deceptive one.* Before considering the people, let us see what claims these thirteen kinglets of Sir Garnet Wolseley's had to be maintained by England as Zulu chiefs. Dunn may be set aside at once. To force him again upon the reluctant Zulus would have been a piece of tyranny which public opinion in England would never have permitted. Sir Henry Bulwer himself [*ibid.*, p. 204] acknowledges that Dunn, after the King's return, would have only some 500 or 600

* Mr. Osborn says, "The appointed chiefs, Chingwayo, Umfanawendhlela, Umgitjwa, and Siunguza, took personally no part in the arming [of the Sutus against Zibebu and Hamu's threatened attacks after the return of the great Deputation], and I believe they discountenanced the proceeding as far as they could. At the same time large numbers of their people did take up arms, and joined the impis under Umnyamana and Ndabuko. Chingwayo, Umfanawendhlela, and Umgitjwa exercise little or no control or rule within their territories; they are openly and persistently defied by the people, and as their own personal tribes are small and weak, they lack the means to enforce their authority."

If, as appears to be the case, the above are all the grounds upon which Sir Henry Bulwer held that *eight* of the kinglets were "not disposed to acquiesce" in Cetshwayo's return, he asserted it on meagre proof. Mfanawendhlela was always not "disposed to acquiesce," and the other two were what the Zulus themselves called weak-kneed and wavering. *On this very account* none of the three were respected by the people in their districts. Here we have from the Resident's own reports proof that large numbers of the Zulus in five out of the eight districts whose kinglets are claimed as opponents to Cetshwayo declaring in his favour, the three above and Hamu's and Zibebu's, while Dunn's large district was wholly for the King.

men at his command.* In addition to which, his slaughter of Sitimela's people was, if not a crime on the part of the Resident, a glaring breach of the conditions "on which alone" Dunn held his chieftainship. Therefore, as far as he was concerned England had not even to consider whether it would be more to her discredit to keep than to break a dishonourable engagement. Hlubi the Basuto, again, we had no right to force upon the Zulus. Not one man only, but a whole, though small, tribe of "400 to 500" (*vide* Sir Henry Bulwer) [*ibid.*], of alien, and at first, even unfriendly people, placed in possession of the land, and in authority over its inhabitants, was an intolerable grievance, which no one less indifferent to the feelings of the conquered race than was Sir Garnet Wolseley would have thought of inflicting upon them. Hlubi, indeed, was in a very different position from that of Dunn. The Basutos deserved reward for faithful service from the British Government to which they had ever been loyal and useful. We were bound to pay them for their services, but not out of our neighbours' pockets; we owed them something, much indeed, but we should have paid it honestly at our own cost, instead of at the cost of the Zulus. At the same time there need have been no difficulty about them, had we tried to settle matters amicably between them and Cetshwayo, as he would have accepted them as subjects, and they would readily

* This is far too high a calculation, and includes all the strays of various colours whom Dunn had "gathered round his fortunes," to use Sir H. Bulwer's phrase.

have submitted to his rule.* Hamu's claims can be disposed of in a word; by his slaughter of the Abaqulusi he had long forfeited his chieftainship. Zibebu had done the same, but to a much less undeniable extent. It is true that in his attacks upon his brother Haiyana, &c., in 1881, and upon Umbopa in 1882, lives were lost, and that those attacks were made without any provocation, except that the offenders had "prayed for Cetshwayo"; † but they were single instances, and less easily fixed upon him because they have never been acknowledged by the

* Sir Henry Bulwer himself says of the Basuto Hlubi, that he will always do precisely what the Natal Government desire him to do; and from some of his men (Basutos) the present writer learnt, before Cetshwayo's return, that they and their chief would be perfectly willing to pass under the Zulu King's rule if he were satisfied to receive them, and if the Natal Government would permit it.

† That Zibebu did regard that "prayer" as "intriguing" against him is plain from the official report [3182, pp. 50-60] of his own words, and he was certainly encouraged, if not actually induced to do so, by white influence.

1. "I punished this man for leaving my territory with Ndabuko without permission, to go to the Resident to get a pass to go to Maritzburg for the purpose of prosecuting his request for the 'Bone' Cetshwayo. [It will be remembered that Sir H. Bulwer had challenged the Bishop's interpretation of 'the Bone,' as signifying Cetshwayo.] I will not allow this."

2. "I have ordered this man and others to leave my territory at once, because they threaten to go again to Maritzburg to apply for the 'Bone.' I insist on these people leaving."

3. (*Ngatsha* speaks), "Eight head of cattle were seized from me for going with Ndabuko, &c., to Maritzburg to pray for the 'Bone.' *Zibebu*: "The man went without my permission. I did make the seizure, and will again punish any one who goes on this errand. I will not allow it."

4. "I made all the foregoing seizures because the people went with Ndabuko to Maritzburg to ask for the 'Bone' without my

Government like the actions of Dunn and Hamu, whose exploits in the killing line had been altogether too extensive for concealment. But Zibebu had taken part with Dunn in the slaughter of Sitimela's people, and both these chiefs had on that occasion broken another condition of their chieftainship (No. 6), by sending impis out of their own territories to assist Mlandela when the Resident had, as yet, given them no authority to do so.* But although this was done, not only without leave from but against the express orders of the Resident, it may be argued that their offence was condoned by the fact that when Mr. Osborn found that they had already disregarded his orders, he gave them leave to do it.

As an actual matter of fact these three, Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu, were the only ones who, left to

consent." (N.B. Although stress is laid upon "*without my consent*," it is plain enough that the prayer itself was the real offence.)

5. "The fact of your going to ask for the 'Bone' was *sentelela*-ing me." [This is a new word, which has come into use since the Zulu war, formed from "sentinel," understood as "one who watches and reports," but used here rather in the sense of giving offence.] To which Ndabuko replied, "*I have not understood that I am forbidden to bring to notice of Government acts oppressive against the people of the Government.*" And indeed Zibebu was acting in violation of the conditions of his chieftainship, by punishing those who went to Mr. Osborn to "*sentelela*" him.

* It is a fact, although an amazing one, that *afterwards* the Resident gave these chiefs leave to go and help Mlandela in driving out Sitimela, and killing his followers. Many of these were families including women and children, and had simply gone to see and greet their old chief's son Sitimela, who does not appear to have had any warlike intentions.

themselves, would have made any objection to Cetshwayo's return at all, and there is good reason to believe that, had Government efforts been as determinedly directed to inducing them all to accept the King, as it was to produce as much opposition as possible to his restoration, both Zibebu and Hamu would have returned to their allegiance under Cetshwayo, who was quite ready to forgive and forget in every case except that of Dunn. But this was not the object of those in authority. As Giusti remarks of his "officials," "the first thing necessary is to prevent the ruler and the ruled from understanding one another, for should a reconciliation take place, farewell to the golden age."*

Of the remaining nine appointed chiefs, Sir Henry Bulwer allows that five are "disposed to acquiesce" in Cetshwayo's return, which is a mild rendering of their eager desire for it. But of the other four whom he claims as holding his views on the subject, three were by no means averse to it, although sufficiently under the Resident's influence to be somewhat guided by his known opinions. They had all joined in the prayer for Cetshwayo, and two of them, Tshingwayo and the regent Siunguza (Gaozi's territory),† were amongst those who had sent money in 1881 to the

* Horner's 'Giusti and his Times,' p. 216. "Il Congresso de' Birri."

† Sir Henry Bulwer mentions Siunguza thus. Gaozi had been one of the most earnest in praying for the King (see vol. i.), and his people felt with him in the matter. Had Siunguza seceded from Cetshwayo he would not have taken a dozen followers with him.

Secretary for Native Affairs as earnest of their sincerity. The last one, Umfanawendhlela, was the only one of the Zulu kinglets who had not, by his own act, released the British Government from the foolish engagements made by Sir Garnet Wolseley—i. e. who had neither killed any of his neighbours' people, nor any of his own without trial, on the one hand, and who had not prayed for Cetshwayo's restoration on the other. He was the only one (except the Basuto Hlubi) who might with justice have demanded to be left in possession of the territory which he had neither forfeited, nor offered to resign, but of his claims Sir Henry Bulwer makes very light [3466, p. 213]—as he is unable or unwilling to come again under Cetshwayo's authority he will "probably be obliged to remove," but his removal "will not be attended with much loss," as the tribe of which he is the head is of "insignificant size."* It is apparent, therefore, that to keep good faith to the appointed chiefs was not Sir Henry Bulwer's object in insisting as he did on retaining Zibebu in power, for from that point of view Mfanawendhlela had by far the better claim. But the latter was a man of weak character and small influence, by no means so suitable a person as Zibebu to be left as a thorn in

* Sir H. Bulwer applies much the same argument to Tshingwayo and Umgitjwa, whose territories he also proposed to restore to Cetshwayo, but as they were not really averse to that restoration we need not consider their cases. Mfanawendhlela was a chief of comparatively small importance before the war of 1879, and, having been raised by the "Settlement" to a position which he could never have hoped to hold under other circumstances, he was, naturally, averse to losing it.

Cetshwayo's side, which was the real object of the retention of Zibebu as an independent chief.*

As for the people, who had a still greater right to be considered than the kinglets, their loyalty was very widespread indeed. Hamu and Zibebu, as princes of the blood royal, had each his own particular tribe, though even of their immediate followers many were loyal to the King, while large portions of their districts were inhabited by some of Cetshwayo's most devoted followers. The whole of Dunn's district was loyal to the King, and amongst the others it would have been hard to find any number of disaffected men together, though it is impossible to say that there may not have been a few here and there, since there never yet was any change of government pleasing to every individual in a nation. Sir Henry Bulwer, in fact, decided wisely, from his point of view, that to divide the country according to the feelings of the inhabitants was out of the question; and, truly, had those feelings been considered, it would not have been divided at all. He therefore fixed an arbitrary limit to his proposed

* The *Times of Natal*, a local paper, always opposed to Cetshwayo, and regarded until this change of front as the Government organ, says, on June 21, 1884:—"Just as we stated with good reason that Cetshwayo was presented with an ultimatum, that Zibebu was employed to intimidate him to surrender, and that eventually the King was poisoned at Ekhowe, and condemned the last two acts . . . so we now repeat that Zibebu was an agent of the Imperial Government, in so far as he was called in to intimidate Cetshwayo, and save the Government the cost of an expedition to arrest him; and so also we maintain that Zibebu was allowed to retain his chieftainship in Zululand, when all other chiefs were ousted, for what we will call prudential reasons."

Reserve, without any reference to the number of people who, according to his ideas, were to occupy it, and all the plans and precautions suggested by him were devised with the object of restraining Cetshwayo's imaginary cruel and revengeful inclinations, and restricting the power of which, as the Governor had said in 1880 [3466, p. 143], quoting the despatch at this time as expressing his opinion still, "he personally had made so ill a use." Mr. Osborn, of course, takes the same tone, and talks of protecting Zibebu's people from "the vengeance of Cetshwayo, which they know full well [!] will be very soon directed against them" [*ibid.*]; and again, saying that "they would almost immediately be made to feel the weight of his displeasure." *

* This is pure assumption, neither founded on past events nor justified by subsequent facts. The value of Mr. Osborn's memorandum as a statement of the truth may be gathered from his saying, "*This chief (Zibebu) and all the people in his territory are opposed to Cetshwayo's restoration, and will not again submit to his authority,*" and Sir Henry Bulwer only speaks of "inconsiderable exceptions" to the rule. Yet a great portion of the Usutus belong to Zibebu's territory, besides Umsutshwana's and Umbopa's tribes, and nine or ten of Zibebu's own brothers. Zibebu was told on one occasion by Ndabuko, in presence of the Resident, "Do you say that we are not to lament for the Bone? Does not all Zululand lament for it? Why, these very people of your own, who are now surrounding you, they lament for it too!" And all Zibebu's people present held up their hands, saying, "We agree! We are with you! We all lament for the King!" [Digest of Blue Books, by the Bishop of Natal, p. 278.]

True, Zibebu had driven out many of the loyalists from his territory, but, from his own account, he does not seem to have held the influence over the remaining inhabitants attributed to him by Mr. Osborn and Sir H. Bulwer [3466, pp. 183, 184].

"I am getting into hot water with all my indunas and brothers,"

The Governor remarks in this despatch [3466, p. 199] "that he should have been disposed to recommend the partition of the country by means of the White Umfolosi River from its source to the sea,"

N° I.



which would have produced the result given above, C standing for Cetshwayo, and R for Reserve.

he wrote on July 29th by the hand of his white "familiar," Colenbrander, and again, on the 30th, the latter writes, "I am also ordered to tell you that Zibebu's men are getting dissatisfied, and Zibebu fears that if this lasts much longer he will lose a lot of men. Undabuko has already succeeded in enticing away twenty-five kraals" [i. e. twenty-five kraals in Zibebu's territory had declared for Cetshwayo]. The supposed grounds of discontent, according to Zibebu's account, were that his men were restrained by the Resident from fighting, but however that may be, Zibebu's complaints betrayed the weakness of his position.

This astonishing proposition does not appear actually to have been made to the Home Government, but rather to have been thrown in to lessen by comparison the effect of what was to follow.

Mr. Osborn had suggested another means of curtailing Zululand proper, one which, under Natal Government management, has proved indeed a masterpiece of mischief, and which Sir Henry Bulwer adopted at once. The proposal was [*ibid.*, p. 199]:—

“That the appointed chief Zibebu should be left where he is, and that the territory now under him should, with certain modifications and changes, be constituted a separate territory under his separate authority.”

In support of this proposition the Governor proceeds to draw a remarkable portrait of the chief Zibebu, as follows:—

“He is a man of considerable force of character, moderate in counsels, strong in action, straightforward in his conduct, courageous, self-reliant. He was much opposed to the Zulu war, and urged Cetshwayo at the time to come to an agreement with the Government. Indeed, he spoke out his mind, it is said [by whom is this said?], on the subject with so much insistance as to give great offence to the ex-King.* But once the die was cast for war and

* Here the Governor assumes that Cetshwayo was not anxious “to come to an agreement with the Government,” yet no one is better aware than Sir Henry Bulwer how little the Zulu King wished for war with the British, and the Governor had himself repeatedly affirmed it. He writes [2584, p. 143, and 3466, p. 143], “I have never hesitated to say that I did not believe the Zulu King contemplated hostilities against this country. I have never hesitated to say that an invasion of Natal was one of the last things that would have occurred to the Zulu King to undertake, and one of the last things that would have found favour with the Zulu people.”

the British troops had crossed the frontier he was foremost in loyally taking his part against the invasion, although his district lay the most remote from the scene of war.*

Can this be Sir Henry Bulwer speaking, and his subject a Zulu! Ah! but a Zulu unfriendly to Cetshwayo, and with enough "force of character" (backed up by official encouragement, and white support) to make him a dangerous foe. With the exception of the little myth about his urging Cetshwayo (supposed unwilling) "to come to agreement with the Government," the description might reasonably have been applied either to the King or to his brother Ndabuko. Zibebu's claim to it is, however, less apparent.

"His relations with his people," continues Sir Henry Bulwer, in praise of Zibebu, "are marked by a personal kindness and consideration on his part towards them such as the Zulu people are strangers to as a rule. It is said of him and Umnyamana that theirs are the only districts where the men live to be old men, a saying which in a Zulu mouth is full of significance. Beloved by his own people, he is also held in respect by the Zulus generally on account of his well-known straightforwardness of character, his personal courage, and his open-handed generosity."

This is certainly a new view of Zibebu, never put forward before. His cousins the Princes, and his brothers Haiyana and others, whom he turned out of house and home for praying for the King's return,

* I cannot learn that any such notion with regard to Zibebu's having urged the King against war with the English (to which no one could be more averse than the King himself) is known to any natives conversant with Zulu matters. Zibebu is, at all events, known to be the man who broke the three days' truce by firing at our soldiers while bathing, and so brought on the most needless slaughter at Ulundi.

the chiefs Umsutshwana, Mbopa, &c., with their many followers, whom he starved by hundreds in the wilderness for no other offence, would probably tell another tale; nor is any authority given by Sir Henry Bulwer for an eulogy, the truth of which he had himself no means at all of testing. It is to be supposed that it originated with Mr. Osborn, although in the memorandum about Zibebu to which the Governor refers in his despatch [*ibid.*, p. 210], no more is said than that "the chief is popular with all but the Usuto party" (i. e. with all but the majority of the nation).

Again, Sir Henry Bulwer says, "as he [Zibebu] will certainly be amenable to the advice of the Government, we may depend on him on his part not to do anything that would bring him into conflict with his neighbours." It is, indeed, sincerely to be hoped that the murderous attacks made without provocation by Zibebu upon the Sutus in 1883 and 1884 are not proof that he has been "amenable to the advice of the Government."

Up to this time the Home Government had consented to nothing more than that "a convenient territory should be assigned to such chiefs as might be unwilling to accept Cetshwayo," and there are certainly no signs of their having intended that such "convenient territory" should comprise the best half of the Zulu kingdom. Sir Henry Bulwer now having thrown out the bold suggestion as above, *appears* somewhat to moderate his extensive claims, and draws back his proposed line for a Reserve, some way

to the south of the White Umfolosi, but at the same time with great ingenuity, strikes off from the territory to the north of that river an independent district for Zibebu. This ingenuity is shown first by the sentence [*ibid.*, p. 200]:—

“ . . . I am disposed to consider that the establishment of Zibebu in a separate territory is advisable, and it will also be in accordance with the views of your Lordships . . . that a convenient territory should be assigned to such chiefs as might be unwilling to accept Cetshwayo,”

as though the Reserve had not already been permitted for that purpose, and this for Zibebu were not *additional*. And secondly, by a still more artful phrase [*ibid.*, p. 201]:—

“ But this arrangement taking, as it would, so much territory from the country north of the White Umvolosi river, it would be necessary to add to the portion to be placed under the ex-King an equivalent extent of territory in the country south of that river; and this might be done by assigning to his portion the territories now under the chiefs Umgitywa and Umlandela, which in fact would furnish more than an equivalent to that placed under Zibebu.”


Here the writer speaks as though the territories in question were to be *given* to Cetshwayo from beyond or outside Zululand. In fact, he assumes the arrangement in Diagram No. 1, which he had merely mentioned as what he “ *should have been* disposed to recommend,” as already made, and then proposes to *give* Cetshwayo some land south of the White Umfolosi in exchange for the portion retained for Zibebu north of it. Nevertheless, in spite of the repeated statements of the unanimity existing between Zibebu and the people of his territory, Sir

Henry Bulwer found it necessary to shift that territory, giving up to the Sutus [on paper]* all that part of the country from which the Princes and loyal chiefs had been driven out, and making over in exchange to Zibebu the whole of Umgojana's territory. This appointed chief was loyal to Cetshwayo, and had, therefore, apparently no claims on the Government, although if Sir Garnet Wolseley's engagements with the kinglets were worth anything, it is not easy to see how the territory of one of them who had broken no conditions, could justly be given to another, merely because the former was willing to give it up to Cetshwayo. Sir Henry Bulwer's actual proposal for the division of Zululand was as shown on the next page.

So infatuated was he by his belief in Cetshwayo's wickedness, that he writes, "I trust that this partition may be found sufficient for the several interests concerned. If it errs at all, it errs, I think, in respect of the territory which we shall retain, by making it, perhaps, too limited for all the purposes

* By what can only be described as a juggling trick on the part, principally of the Resident, and one which was not set right when it was discovered by his superior officers, the Princes never actually got their land, though Mgojana lost his. This and the fluctuating boundaries left between Zibebu and the Princes was the immediate cause of the disturbances which took place later. If Zibebu's position as an independent chief was sure to prove a thorn in Cetshwayo's side, this bad faith to the Princes, and the utter sacrifice of their interests to those of Zibebu on the part of the Government officials, may truly be called the very point and venom of that thorn. The case will, however, be fully considered in its proper place.

for which it will be required;" and several pages follow of elaborate arrangements for the government of the reserved territory, showing at every turn the grand error underlying the whole scheme, that of supposing that half the Zulu people would quietly submit either to be turned out of their homes, and

N^o 2

deprived of their land, or else to repudiate their nationality, disown their King, and become subjects either of Zibebu, or of the Natal Government. Sir Henry Bulwer had very little knowledge of the Zulu people, their feelings and ideas, and he does not, of course, understand their language. He was, therefore, wholly dependent on interpreters, and

mainly on the Secretary for Native Affairs,* and sometimes on his brother, Sir T. Shepstone, for his notions. How they and Mr. Osborn could have deceived the Governor, or allowed him to deceive himself to the extent of supposing his plans feasible, is only less astonishing than was the ignorance of the same gentleman in 1878 of what would be likely to follow from a British invasion of Zululand.

Perhaps Lord Kimberley's personal acquaintance with Cetshwayo prevented his altogether taking Sir Henry Bulwer's view,† or perhaps he saw that the latter's propositions would make the whole restoration a farce. At all events Her Majesty's Government demurred to their being carried out in their entirety, and the Earl of Kimberley writes on Nov. 30th [3466, p. 216]:—

“Proceeding on the principle that no more country should be reserved than is necessary to enable us to fulfil our obligations to the chiefs and people unwilling to remain in Cetshwayo's territory, Her Majesty's Government came to the conclusion that it would not be desirable to reserve more than the country now under the

* It was through the S.N.A. that Sir Henry Bulwer obtained most of the false reports of the Bishop of Natal's actions, which the Governor accepted so readily and forwarded so diligently. But Mr. Shepstone's official word is of so little value after his official conviction of repeated falsehoods in 1874 that it is not worth while to consider in detail accusations which are made solely through him.

† Sir Henry Bulwer never saw Cetshwayo. He did not even visit Oude-Molen on his way through the Cape to Natal in 1882, when it might have been supposed that he would be anxious to obtain as much direct knowledge of the Zulu King as possible, in view of his proposed restoration. This fact in itself was prophetic of the spirit in which he would carry out, or rather mar, the *intended* restoration.

chiefs Dunn and Hlubi, especially as a large tract of country is to be assigned to Zibebu." And his Lordship further remarks that it does not "appear to Her Majesty's Government to be possible to conclude with any certainty, until Cetshwayo is actually restored, that your view that many Zulus will be compelled to leave the country replaced under his rule is well founded" [*ibid.*, para. 10, No. 114].

Well would it have been for all concerned had the Home Authorities but acted fully on this their just view of the case: had they refused to allow any but a *temporary* line to be fixed, and insisted upon an accurate report of the numbers who *desired* to be protected from Cetshwayo's rule, before making any final decision about the partition line.

Sir Henry Bulwer's elaborate plans [*ibid.*, para. 22] for the government of the "Zulu Native Reserve"* are temporarily put aside in the following sentence:—

"So much must depend on the numbers and character of the chiefs and people who may elect not to remain under Cetshwayo's rule, that it seems to Her Majesty's Government that it would be premature at once to settle the details of the administration of this Reserve. It will be sufficient at present to appoint a Resident Commissioner, with the general functions described by you, to take the necessary preliminary steps."

It is to be observed, also, that while in all Sir Henry Bulwer's many pages he puts forward solely and repeatedly the necessity of protecting Zibebu and others from injury at the hands of Cetshwayo, Lord Kimberley manifestly looks at the other side of the matter as well. While plainly putting a certain confidence (markedly absent from the Governor's despatches) in Cetshwayo's [para. 21] "engagement

* The title finally selected.

not to transgress the limits assigned to him," he remarks that "the position of Dunn . . . would be such as to render it not difficult to prevent him from giving cause of offence to Cetshwayo, more especially as it appears from your report that he has little or no hold upon the Zulus living in his country" [para. 13].

He also negatives a suggestion made by Sir Henry Bulwer of further conditions to be imposed on the King, saying :—

"I do not see any sufficient ground for varying the other conditions* communicated to him (the King) in England. They were well considered at the time, and having been agreed to by Cetshwayo, it is better that, unless for any very special reason, they should not now be varied" [para. 15].

In fact the entire despatch is in keeping with the treatment of the Zulu King during his English visit, and shows plainly enough that the Home Government intended rightly by him, and by the Zulu people, and that those are responsible for the lamentable results of England's well-meant efforts, who deceived her and her Government by the following devices :—

1st. By making it (falsely) appear that Cetshwayo was not well received by the majority of the Zulu nation.

2nd. By making it (falsely) appear that the Zulus resident in the Reserve were satisfied with the new arrangement, and that their remaining on their own land proved the fact, and by coercing them to produce that effect.

* The additional condition here permitted is that recognising Zibebu's territory as an independent one.

3rd. By making it (falsely) appear that Cetshwayo had broken his engagements, and had collected *impis* to attack Hamu and Zibebu, whereas he scrupulously kept his promises to the day of his death, and the Zulus who gathered around him did so to protect him from Zibebu's threatened attack, which nevertheless took place, unhappily, at an unguarded moment.

4th. And, finally, by preventing the truth on all these points being made known, by the unjust persecution of the only editor* in Natal who dared and desired to tell the truth, and by the introduction of the Bill known in Natal as the "Colenso Extinction Bill," and which although never made law in the form in which it passed the Legislative Council of Natal,† has had by the working of native law the effect mainly desired by those who framed it, namely, that of suppressing the truth in Zulu matters.

These are four very serious accusations, but each one of them will be made good in the following chapters of this work.


It may reasonably be assumed that when Cetshwayo was in England, and the conditions of his return were framed, the authorities there had no idea of depriving him of so large a part of his kingdom as "the country now under Dunn and Hlubi," especially as Sir Garnet Wolseley had been pleased to make over

* Mr. R. F. Statham, Editor of the *Natal Witness*.

† "Any person who shall knowingly harbour any" Zulu coming from Zululand without permission and a "pass" from a Government official, "shall be liable on conviction to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding three months, with or without hard labour, or, at the discretion of the Court, to a penalty not exceeding ten pounds."

to Dunn in 1879, so large a portion of Zululand, including the best and richest part of it; but Sir Henry Bulwer's audacious proposal that half (and the best half) should be retained, would almost seem to have taken their breath away, and to have induced

N°3



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C Cetshwayo in 1883

R. Reserve

Z. Zibebu

T. Country restored to the Tongas

D The part of Zululand, claimed by the Boers, adjudged to the Zulus in 1878 by British Commissioners, but made over to the Transvaal (then under British Rule) by Sir Garnet Wolseley after the War.

them to allow a partition, moderate in comparison with that displayed in Diagram No. 1, but still depriving the King of far more territory than can well have been contemplated in the first instance by Her Majesty's Government.

The boundaries finally fixed ran as given above, Diagram No. 3. To what a fraction of his kingdom

Cetshwayo was allowed to return may be best understood by a reference to this Diagram, which shows Zululand as it was just before the invasion of 1879, with the portion restored to him in 1883.

It was apparently simply on the principle of taking as much as possible from Cetshwayo that Sir Henry Bulwer made the Tongas a free gift of their country. There are no records of their ever having desired it, or of their ever having objected to being tributary to Cetshwayo, which state, as they were but a small tribe, had its advantages as well as its drawbacks, for it gave them a right to his protection in case of attack from the tribes beyond them. There are no signs even that the Tongas were consulted in the matter.

By this means Sir Henry Bulwer was again procuring those elements of discord which were the worst characteristics of Sir Garnet Wolseley's settlement, and on which the former himself lays great stress in his Report [3466, p. 138], speaking of "the weakness arising from the want of a duly recognised and adequate paramount authority,"* to his arguments on which point Lord Kimberley assents, pointing out that as Her Majesty's Government will not undertake to annex Zululand, "the only alterna-

* Sir Henry Bulwer appears to have foreseen that the same objection would be raised to his new settlement, for he gives an elaborate explanation beforehand of what he conceives to be the difference between the two. His argument sounds very like a riddle, and one which is quite beyond the comprehension of most people. ". . . By *paramount* authority," he says [*ibid.*, p. 139], "I do not necessarily mean *central* authority. . . . Supposing the paramount authority had been retained in the hands of the British Government under the settlement, it would have been paramount authority over every one of the thirteen states, individually and

tive which remained was the restoration, partial or complete, of Cetshwayo" [*ibid.*, p. 216, para. 5].

The closing phrase of the Earl of Kimberley's summary No. 115, "I concluded by instructing you to proceed with the restoration of Cetshwayo with as little delay as possible" [*ibid.*, p. 218], was plainly not a direction with which Sir Henry Bulwer was at all inclined to comply. The King had already been kept at his old prison, Oude-Molen, for more than two months when the above was telegraphed,* and he was left there still for another month.† Meanwhile, the Governor of Natal worked on with a perseverance worthy of a better cause. His suggestions for supplementary conditions had been put aside, except in the case of the supremely mischievous one of Zibebu's independence, into permitting which the Home Government was misled. But that was no reason for giving them up, and by dint of determination Sir Henry Bulwer succeeded in obtaining permission to "require Cetshwayo to engage that he will not punish girls of the royal house who have married during his absence from Zululand, and also

separately, and not a central authority over the whole Zulu country, although in that case the paramount authority, happening to be centred in the same hands, might have had the appearance of being a central authority."

* From September 24th to November 30th, 1882.

† Cetshwayo landed at Port Durnford January 11th, 1883. It is difficult to understand what the delay was for, as absolutely nothing was done in Zululand. Apparently Sir Henry Bulwer required the three months, as remarked by a local paper at the time, "to write his report on the affairs of the country which he has declined to visit."

that a general immunity shall be secured to all persons from molestation for acts done during that period” [3466, p. 219].

These conditions may be called rather an insult than an injury to Cetshwayo. Their framer assumed (as usual) the King's alleged cruel and bloodthirsty disposition, and wilfully overlooked the many proofs of his kindhearted and forgiving character which had been obtained since 1879.* The conditions were totally unnecessary, and had there been the smallest doubt upon the point, Cetshwayo's kind friend Sir Hercules Robinson might have been requested to ascertain what were the King's precise views on these subjects, and they would have proved to be all that could be desired.

These two additional conditions Sir Henry Bulwer sent to Sir Hercules Robinson for Cetshwayo to sign. “I telegraph these conditions so that your Excellency may, should you see fit, communicate with Cetshwayo without waiting for my despatch. If you think that conditions should be put in another form, please alter.”

* No one can read Cetshwayo's letters respecting the girls of the household without feeling satisfied of his right feeling about them, and surely some arrangement might have been made to release those who had been seized and appropriated by Zibebu, Hamu, &c., without their own or their parents' consent. English readers would naturally gather from the official way of speaking that Cetshwayo's downfall released a number of girls to follow their own inclinations in the choice of husbands, but in point of fact most of those who had married during his absence were forced into bonds which they and their parents regarded as degrading. Sir Henry Bulwer's fresh condition simply protected certain of the appointed chiefs from being called upon, at the instance of the parents, to set free the women they had tyrannically seized upon.

By an error in deciphering this message the words "Her Majesty's Government" were substituted for "Cetshwayo," and Sir Hercules Robinson replies at once, "As I have no responsibility whatever for the settlement determined on, I do not intend to avail myself of the opportunity which you so kindly afford me of communicating with Her Majesty's Government."

The touch of severity in this answer had, probably a deeper and worthier cause than can be explained by the error in the message, for Sir Hercules Robinson knew something of Cetshwayo, and those who have had the welfare of the Zulu King and people most truly at heart, have often thought that very different might have been the result had his restoration been placed in the hands of the Governor of the Cape.

But Sir Henry Bulwer was not alone in working out plans by which the well-conceived scheme of the Home Government for the redemption of Zululand was thwarted, and made to bring about the complete ruin of that unhappy country. Plainly he was thoroughly imbued with the old Shepstonian idea of the Black Kingdom, although, of course, he had his own particular version of it. Circumstances favoured the first move in that direction, though that was not the case for very long. The belief in the name of Shepstone which Cetshwayo had cherished for so many years, clung to him still, in spite of every disappointment, and, no doubt, he was wise enough to see that it would be well for him and for his people if Sir T. Shepstone would consent to stand their

friend. While he was still at Melbury Road a letter was written for the King to Lord Kimberley requesting that Zulus visiting Natal should be received by Sir T. Shepstone, of whom the King was represented as saying [3466, p. 93], "he knows all the affairs of my country. . . . I want Sir T. Shepstone to take care of me, and to be my mouth in Natal." A copy of the letter was forwarded to Sir Henry Bulwer with the remark [*ibid.*, p. 114]—

"It is of course impossible that this request should be complied with in the form in which it is made, but I would suggest that it might be desirable for you to consult with Sir Theophilus Shepstone as to many details of the new settlement of the country, and I should wish you to consider whether Sir Theophilus would not be the most suitable person to conduct Cetshwayo back to Zululand when the time comes for his restoration."

This was another fatal mistake. Sir T. Shepstone had said [2695, p. 67], June 4th, 1880, "I look upon the restoration of Cetshwayo as certain to produce most disastrous consequences;"* and Sir Henry

* Sir T. Shepstone spoke of Cetshwayo as "the representative of the sentiment, and of all those that cherish it in South Africa, that is opposed to civilisation, Christianity, and progress," which no one who knows anything of the Zulu King will now credit, unless "civilisation" by means of the "grog-shop," Christianity enforced at the point of the bayonet, and "progress" in the acquirement of the vices of the lower classes in a civilised nation are implied. Cetshwayo, naturally sagacious—*wise*, even, it may be said—as he was, could only judge of what he knew, and, being illiterate, he had not the means of knowing how little the Shepstones were really his friends. Could he have read the "memorandum" by Sir T. Shepstone, in question, he would never have said, "I want Sir T. Shepstone to take care of me, and to be my mouth in Natal," and to take advantage of his ignorance of the

Bulwer quoting the above passage in his Report of August 1882, says [3466, p. 144], "I have reason to believe that Sir T. Shepstone has not changed the views he then expressed. He certainly has not modified them." * How was it possible that any scheme should prosper the execution of which was left entirely in the hands of men who had strongly protested against it, who had staked their credit on its being certain to produce disastrous consequences, and who had never by so much as a word shown the least sign of an intention to bend their own views to those of the Government they served? With Sir Henry Bulwer's convictions, and Sir T. Shepstone's inclinations it was impossible that they should carry

other's real sentiments concerning him was as unfair in those who were aware of them as was the triumphant quotation of his words [3466, p. 138] condemning Sitimela, and approving Dunn's action towards that chief, which were spoken after hearing only the garbled official account of those proceedings (to be found in Blue Book 3466), an official report of which alone could reach his ears.

* Sir Henry Bulwer here speaks of Sir T. Shepstone as "one who during a long lifetime has had opportunities of knowing the native races of South Africa such, perhaps, as no one else had, who was engaged for more than forty years in active responsible relations with them, and whose judgment in all matters relating to them is beyond dispute" [2222, p. 175 and elsewhere]. That he could say this, and that the Home Government should act upon it is truly amazing, when it is remembered that Sir T. Shepstone had shown in 1878 the most absolute and, as it happened, fatal ignorance with regard to the whole Zulu question; that his Transvaal policy had been condemned and reversed; and, to go further back, that the same can be said of the native policy of 1873, for which he was far more responsible than was Sir B. Pine, although, as usual, the latter was made the scapegoat in that affair.

out successfully the policy entrusted to them, and its failure was a certainty from the moment Cetshwayo's restoration was confided to them. In truth he never was restored, and it is from that fact that all the bloodshed and misery of 1883-4 in Zululand has resulted.

In accordance with his instructions to consult Sir T. Shepstone Sir Henry Bulwer sent him a copy of his long despatch of October 3rd on his proposed new settlement of the Zulu country "for the benefit of his remarks and suggestions," and Sir T. Shepstone in return expresses his warm approval of the whole, saying [3466, p. 221]: "I have no criticism to offer; I think that the despatch is as complete as under the circumstances it can be made." This, be it remembered, was the despatch curtailing to the utmost Cetshwayo's territory and power, of much of which the Home Government were bound to disapprove. Sir T. Shepstone confines his further remarks to two points. The first is the proposed rate of annual hut tax, which in the official mind was already imposed upon the Zulus resident in the proposed Reserve, and to which Sir T. Shepstone objects, being of opinion that it should not be lower than that levied in Natal, "which," he says, "produces so handsome and unfailing a revenue" for that Colony.*

His second suggestion is a very mysterious one.

* How much of it is used for their own benefit, and what would the Natal Government do without it, if the natives left the colony?

It is that the proposed amount of the Resident's salary,* 1000*l.*, is, in his opinion,

“much below what he will require for his actual subsistence, to say nothing of the expenses incidental to his position, that he will continually be put to; a few years' occupation of such a position with such a salary would ruin any man not possessed of ample private funds, and these it would be scarcely fair to expect an officer to sacrifice for the good of the public service.”

The “expenses incidental to the Resident's position” were additionally provided for in Sir Henry Bulwer's estimate in the despatch on which Sir T. Shepstone is commenting, to the extent of 1968*l.*, [3466, p. 238] and as the utmost amount of “entertainment” possible at the Residency for many years to come would be an occasional beef-eating, it is not easy to see how he could be expected to expend even the 1000*l.* per annum, which Sir T. Shepstone thought far too little, living in the simple manner which would be natural and suitable to the country.

In spite of the repeated directions received from Downing Street that no more time should be lost, it was not until December 4th that Sir Henry Bulwer wrote to Mr. Osborn [3466, p. 251]:—

“I have now received the final instructions of Her Majesty's Government on this subject, and I *hasten* † to acquaint you with the nature of the arrangements which they have determined upon.”

And after doing so, he continues [*ibid.*, p. 252]:—

“It will be necessary that you forthwith communicate the deci-

* The salaries of the Secretary for Native Affairs, and of the Judge of the Native High Court (Mr. H. Shepstone and Mr. J. Shepstone) are 800*l.* respectively, and naturally there are in Natal much greater opportunities for spending than there could be in Zululand.

† Author's italics.

sion of Her Majesty's Government and the reasons for it (!) to the several Zulu chiefs and headmen and to such other people as *you may judge convenient.*"*

While leaving the mode of communication to Mr. Osborn's judgment, Sir Henry Bulwer requests him to bear

"strictly in mind the necessity there is for the announcement being made without delay, and that it is of the greatest importance that the changes which are about to be introduced shall be widely and fully made known and explained to the people throughout the country."

That these instructions were very inadequately carried out is plain from the fact, since placed beyond dispute, that the greater portion of the Zulus did not know of the King's approach until after he had landed, which was one of the reasons why his enemies were able for the moment to telegraph to England that Cetshwayo had but a poor reception from his people. It is probable, however, that there was more to blame in the vagueness of the notice given as to time and place, than in the lack of the actual announcement. The Zulus may have been generally told that the King was to be restored on such and such conditions, but the majority certainly did not know to a day, or even to a week, when he might be reasonably expected, and without some very explicit information of this sort they would naturally be apt to take general news from the Government, in whom they had had such frequent cause to be disappointed, with "a grain of salt."

Mr. Osborn announces on the 10th December that he was sent to summon "the different appointed

* Author's italics.

chiefs," and also "the chiefs of tribes and headmen" to come before him without delay to receive the communications I have been instructed to make to them" [3466, p. 284]. Umfanawendhlela was the first to come, and he, of course, "regretted the decision." "I was appointed by the Government," he says [*ibid.*, p. 280], "and have not transgressed the laws (conditions) under which I accepted my appointment."* Nevertheless, he does not appear to have had any dread of the King, though he objects to losing his "appointed" position of dignity, for he continues:—

" . . . It is good of the Queen to restore the King, as he is the son of my sister. I am glad that he is returning, but I cannot remain under him. I wish to go into the territory reserved by Government, not immediately, however, but soon after the King comes, as I wish to greet him first."

This, at all events, does not look like the terror and consternation predicted by Sir Henry Bulwer, and, in point of fact, Mfanawendhlela never took the trouble to remove, and had he done so, would probably have gone with his family alone.†

Hlubi was spoken to next, and he replied, as he was sure to do: "I belong to the Government, and so does the country. I am satisfied with what the Government thinks it necessary to do in the country, I have nothing more to say about it." But, as the

* He was in fact, it must be borne in mind, *the only one of the chiefs* unfavourable to Cetschwayo's return of whom this could be said.

† Mr. Osborn says that he "pointed out that he (Mfanawendhlela) had hitherto been utterly unable to exercise efficient control in his territory.

writer can affirm from personal and satisfactory information, he would have been quite content to come under Cetshwayo's rule, had it been so arranged.

Siwunguza and Chingwayo are represented as asserting that they would not live under Cetshwayo, and would move into the Reserve, but, like Mfanawendhlela, they never carried out their intentions, and, like him, they had little influence in their territories.*

Umgitywa, while saying that he would prefer to reside in the Reserve, expresses himself in a way which leads one to wish for a Zulu copy of what he said. His speech ends with, "The country belongs to the Government, who has a right to bring back the King into it. *I thank the Government.*"

These are the three of whom the Zulus usually spoke as being *weak-kneed*, without the courage of their opinions, which yet, but for white influence, would have inclined to the King, for whom they had all three "prayed" more than once.

Hamu's representative said merely: "Hamu has no people of his own tribe; the people belong chiefly to Umtshegula. Hamu will not remain under the King." † But we are not told what Umtshegula and his people say, although the chief is mentioned as present.

Seketwayo, Faku-ka-Ziningo, Umgojana, and

* Chingwayo was afterwards killed, while in attendance on the King, in Zibebu's attack upon the latter at Ulundi.

† This was not surprising, seeing what atrocious actions Hamu had committed. The slaughter of 1200 of Cetshwayo's most faithful friends being only one of his evil deeds.

Somkeli* expressed their pleasure in the King's return through their representatives, and although Umlandela's messenger expressed objections, Mr. Osborn does not appear to have given much credit to his words, and remarks that he will, in his opinion, "eventually elect to remain under Cetshwayo's authority" [*ibid.*, p. 288].

Dunn, of course, objected; and Zibebu had nothing to do but to send thanks (being ill at the time) for the favour shown him.

As to the people generally, a few of Dunn's personal followers expressed their natural dissatisfaction, and Dabulamanzi and the other chiefs of the district were what Mr. Osborn terms "loud" in their thanks, and "equally loud in denouncing Dunn."

"None of all the other chiefs, headmen, and people, offered any remarks," continues the Resident, "when I made the announcement to them, beyond thanking, in a civil manner, for the information they had received."

* Captain A. E. M'Callum wrote to the *Morning Post* of November 10th, 1882:—"That the old hereditary chiefs of Zululand are unanimous in wishing for the return of Cetshwayo, and that they express the general wish of their people in the matter, may be granted. I visited the chief Somkele at his principal kraal twice in the autumn of last year. He was most anxious for my opinion as to the chances of Cetshwayo's return, and when I observed that his place was already occupied, and his cattle gone, they would not have it, and an induna started up with the exclamation, 'that for cattle there was not a kraal in all Zululand that would not send him a beast, or a chief not a drove of oxen,' which sentiment was echoed and applauded by the crowd present. Nor shall I easily forget the looks exchanged when I gave it as my opinion that 'Cetshwayo would never be seen in Zululand again.'" But for the mischief-making of white, and, unhappily, official persons, such universal joy as that anticipated by Captain M'Callum would have undoubtedly attended the King's return.

But their thanks would hardly have been forthcoming at all had they been horrified by the tidings which, in point of fact, they did not know how to believe, after the long course of insult to which the family of the King had been subjected by British representatives and protégés since the war of 1879. And one would like to know how many were summoned, how many came, and more exactly, what they were told. There is no sign of their having heard a word about the time when they might expect the King; his arrival might have been six months distant for any hint contained in the reports and despatches on the subject of the communication to the Zulus; and this is, in all probability, the true explanation of the discrepancy between Mr. Herbert's statement [*ibid.*, p. 267] in the name of the Earl of Kimberley's successor, Lord Derby, to the Secretary of the Aborigines' Protection Society, that "It is believed that the measures which were being taken for bringing back Cetshwayo were well-known throughout Zululand some time before he arrived;" and the indisputable fact that the majority of the people were taken wholly by surprise. They were told that he was coming back—some day, and in some way, but when or how they were left to discover when he came.

Even now Sir Henry Bulwer had not given up all hopes of taking a little more country from the King. On the 27th December he telegraphed [*ibid.*, p. 239] home that the shape of the reserved territory was inconvenient, beacon No. 19 projecting into it

so as to divide it into two,* and again, on the 8th he inquired [*ibid.*, p. 254] whether Sir T. Shepstone might sound Cetshwayo as to any alteration of the boundary, to which Lord Derby replied that Sir T. Shepstone might sound Cetshwayo, but was not to press the proposal unless it was readily entertained as advantageous by Cetshwayo. This was hardly likely, since the proposal was simply to take another piece of country away from him.

On December 23rd Sir H. Bulwer wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies:—

“Sir Theophilus Shepstone, K.C.M.G., has, at my request, been good enough to undertake the service of meeting Cetshwayo, and formally re-establishing him in authority. . . . It is scarcely necessary for me to say that there is no one so well fitted by his experience, and by his acquaintance with the Zulu people, and with the circumstances of the country, to undertake this service.”†

True to his fixed disbelief in the general wish of the Zulus for Cetshwayo's return, the Governor next has some controversy with Lieut.-Gen. the Hon. L. Smyth, on the subject of the number of soldiers who would be required to escort the Zulu King through his own country, the nature of which controversy may be sufficiently gathered from its closing communication. The General was personally acquainted with

* This is a very wide figure of speech, as may be seen by reference to Diagram No. 3, p. 238.

† That is to say, from Sir Henry Bulwer's point of view, namely that Cetshwayo was a dangerous, untrustworthy savage and that his restoration must turn out a failure. Without at all supposing that Sir Henry Bulwer deliberately and intentionally set to work to produce this effect, it is plain that his prejudice had so hopelessly blinded him that he was incapable of seeing anything except in its light.

Cetshwayo, and had formed, of course, a very different estimate of him from that of the Governor, and the former telegraphed to Sir Henry Bulwer:—

“Had I known that escort was other than complimentary or that there was any doubt as to the reception Cetshwayo would get on route selected, I should not have urged the lower number (250, being in exact proportion to the available military transport resources).”

There was one further piece of mischief left for the Governor to do, and he now lost no time in doing it. On the 3rd of January he announced [*ibid.*, p. 274] the appointment of Mr. J. Shepstone, S.N.A., to be British Resident Commissioner for the time being in the reserved territory. It wanted but this—that the man whose sincerity had been doubted by the natives, and who had, a few years before, drawn down upon himself the severe rebuke of the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, should be placed in authority in the proposed Reserve—to fill up the measure of the evil days prepared by official duplicity and official wrongheadedness, for Cetshwayo and his people. It was in absolute defiance of the facts concerning Mr. J. Shepstone that Sir H. Bulwer selected him for a post requiring a thoroughly trustworthy person to fill it rightly, and despatched him to Zululand with that salary of 1000*l.* a year, which Sir T. Shepstone thought so much too little, “to proclaim and declare the reserved territory to be native independent territory, with a resident British Commissioner, who will represent the paramount authority.” That Mr. J. Shepstone was quite of one mind with his brother and Sir Henry Bulwer

is soon apparent. In one of his first despatches from Zululand he writes of "a strong feeling of enmity between the Dabulamanzi party, and Mavumengwana, *the latter, as I believe, staunch to us, while the others are, as far as I can gather, still intriguing.*" What a spirit was this in which to begin reserving country for those Zulus "who are unwilling to come again under Cetshwayo's rule," when such are at once looked upon as "staunch to us," and those loyal to their King as "intriguers"! To find that *the Government* so regarded the matter was enough to produce a fictitious appearance of inclination towards "us," on the part of waverers, or of men either cowardly, self-interested, or indifferent.

A little earlier (December 22nd) a Government Surveyor, Mr. J. E. Fannin, was sent up to mark out, and beacon off, Zibebu's new boundaries, in conjunction with Mr. Osborn, the Zulu Resident, and they were directed to "place beacons along the line so that no question or dispute may arise in the future." A comparison of Diagrams Nos. 2 and 3, will show that Zibebu received a considerable additional corner to the south of his territory beyond Sir Henry Bulwer's proposed line, which ran along a range of mountains as shown in Diagram 2, and to which line the Home Government had agreed, while removing that proposed for the Reserve further south. On consulting the Blue Books for the reason of this fresh concession to Zibebu,* we find that the line was

* A very important one, as the additional portion was part of that belonging to the Princes.

thus altered to please that chief by Mr. Fannin under Mr. Osborn's directions without even a reference to Sir Henry Bulwer for permission. At p. 55 of the Blue Book [3705, p. 55] occurs a sketch plan of the readjusted line furnished by Mr. Fannin, and at p. 58 is found a note from the Governor asking an explanation of the alteration which had been made two months before without his knowledge [*ibid.*, p. 58]. Mr. Fannin replies that [*ibid.*] "in laying down the line I acted, by direction of your Excellency, entirely under the instructions received from Mr. Osborn," and the reason given for the alteration was that the line fixed by Sir Henry Bulwer would have cut out a kraal which Zibebu especially valued, as it had been the residence of chiefs of the tribe for some generations, and that "Mr. Osborn was particularly anxious to avoid this, knowing the ill-feeling it would arouse among Zibebu's people."

The fact is that before Sir Garnet Wolseley's settlement aroused rivalry and enmity between the various chiefs, Zibebu and his cousins lived side by side in this part of the country, alike subject to Cetshwayo, and apparently at that time alike loyal to him also. The kraals of their people were inextricably mixed, and the land occupied partly by the Sutus stretched away far beyond even Sir Henry Bulwer's line.

"The line as made," continues Mr. Fannin, "cuts out about forty kraals of Zibebu's people; no kraals belonging to the Sutu party are within it."

This, however, could only be asserted from Zibebu's point of view, and from his own account. That of

the Sutus is a very different one, and, coming from Mnyamana, is far more worthy of belief than any statement of Zibebu's. Mnyamana sent the following message to the Bishop of Natal on January 31st, 1883 :—

“I do not see where the King is to put the Zulu people, they all wish for the King; but the land has been taken away from us. Mbopa's tribe,* Mfusi's tribe, [a third tribe and two sub-tribes mentioned], part of the tribe of Masipula (Mpande's prime-minister) and some of my people, all desiring the King, and even kraals of the Princes Ndabuko and Ziweddu, and those of large portions of their tribes, are given to Zibebu.† Seketwayo's land is reduced by what has been given to the Boers [the “disputed territory”]; and more land is to be cut off from him for Hlubi, the Basuto, besides all the district south of the Umhlatuze. It is a mere strip that will be left to Cetshwayo, and we do not see how this can be done. We protest against it, the whole Zulu people, both those who have always prayed for the King, and those who before his return were weak-kneed, and held back. We protest, all of us, against the cutting off of the land.” ‡

The conditions read over to Cetshwayo on the 15th of January, and those signed by him at Capetown on the 29th of December, distinctly stated that that portion of Zibebu's country which previously belonged to Ndabuko and Ziweddu would be restored to Cetshwayo, so that the Princes would be able to return to their own districts, and live there subject to the King's authority. §

* Mbopa should be remembered as the heroic Zulu who was tortured by us in vain to make him betray the King in 1879.

† This was actually done, though exactly the reverse was laid down in Sir H. Bulwer's scheme, &c., was stated in the “conditions” as delivered to the Zulus, and published in the local papers.

‡ Mnyamana, be it remembered, was the chief accused by Sir Henry Bulwer of wanting an independent territory for himself.

§ *Natal Mercury*; *Natal Times*; *Cape Times*, December 30th.

But this was not done. The kraals of all the important chiefs and tribes named by Mnyamana, including those of Ziweddu, and some of Ndabuko's, and those of large portions of their tribes, were left outside the beacons put up to mark off the King's territory, and in point of fact the boundaries to which Cetshwayo signed his submission were, on this side, quite other than, and stretching far beyond, those laid down upon the map, or beacons out. Both he, with the Princes under him, and Zibebu were thus given by the Government a claim to the same piece of territory. Under the circumstances could any arrangement have been made more certain to bring about war and confusion ?

It is impossible to say how far the difficulty may have been increased by Messrs. Osborn and Fannin's unauthorised alteration, for at most it merely made worse a situation which was already intolerably bad. But what is strikingly evident from the latter's reports [3705, pp. 56, 58] is the favour shown to Zibebu, and the anxious consideration for his wishes and feelings, at the expense of the Sutu Princes and people.

“Zibebu and a number of his followers were present at and took over from me all the beacons.”

“Although the new line cuts out a considerable number of kraals of Zibebu's people, still I think that on the whole he is contented, having had apprehensions that possibly more land might have been taken from him. None of his own kraals are cut out.”

“The chief and his people were exceedingly civil, and rendered me cheerfully all the assistance I required in building beacons, &c.”

Zibebu might well be content, seeing that the

territory assigned to him now was considerably larger than that given to him by Sir Garnet Wolseley, and while repeated mention is made of the kraals he lost by the new line the writers seem to forget that he received in exchange the whole of Umgojana's territory. It does not appear, however, that the Sutu leaders were consulted, or that representatives of theirs were present, so that Mr. Fannin's remark "no kraals belonging to the Usutu party are within it" (the line), seems to have rested on Zibebu's own statement. At all events he had it all his own way; to leave him in possession of a single favourite kraal, nearly a third of even that portion of the territory of the Sutus which Sir H. Bulwer proposed to return to them, was left to Zibebu, and "none of his own kraals" were now cut out, while no mention at all is made of the Princes' own kraals, and those of the other Sutu chiefs within Zibebu's new boundaries, beyond the following paragraph, by which Sir Henry Bulwer supplements Mr. Fannin's report:—"This [i.e. the statement "it cuts out none belonging to the Usutu party"] does not refer to the territory that was under the late appointed chief Umgojana, in which, together with some people belonging to Umgojana and a large number of people belonging to Usibebu, are the people of what is known as Masipula's tribe, which, under Maboko, *appears to have joined the Usutu party*" * [C. 3705, No. 36].

* [More correctly, "is well-known to be, and to have been all along, loyal to Cetshwayo and the national cause."]

CHAPTER VI.

THE steamer with the Zulu King on board reached the Cape on September 23rd, and he was landed there on the following day. He was, of course, eager to get home, and until he was actually landed at the Cape, it still seemed probable that he would be allowed to go straight on. There were several good reasons for this besides the manifest cruelty of delaying his return after it had once been agreed to, and the conditions settled in England. There was still, at the end of September, ample time for the whole thing to be carried out before the beginning of the season which would be an unhealthy one for the escort of British troops who were to attend the King, as well as for Sir T. Shepstone and other Europeans concerned, through the coast districts of Zululand. But Sir Henry Bulwer's successful attempts at delaying Cetshwayo's visit to England had of course correspondingly delayed his return to Capetown, which would otherwise have taken place in the very middle of the winter, or healthy season for the coast. A further delay of some weeks (for which it is impossible to discover even the shadow of a

good reason) enabled Cetshwayo's white enemies to represent that the summer season having (now) fairly set in, it would be unsafe to carry out the expedition for some months to come, not indeed, as it was freely suggested by the local papers, until the following April.

But there was another strong, and, it might be thought sufficient, reason for taking Cetshwayo on at once. A violent epidemic of small-pox had broken out at the Cape, and the port was cut off as a plague-spot from all others in South Africa by strict quarantine. The mere fact of landing the King there enormously increased the difficulties in the way of his immediate return to Zululand, and this fact was well known to all in authority at the time, and to the public generally.

The telegram in the *Natal Mercury* which announced Cetshwayo's arrival at the Cape, remarked also, "the small-pox epidemic continues to spread with unabated fury,"* and the same paper a few days later says, "Small-pox is terribly rife amongst the Kafirs at Alton, and not far from Oude-Molen." The Maritzburg correspondent of the *Daily News* sounds a more decided note :—

"To land Cetshwayo at Capetown under present circumstances, is to expose him to the grave risk of an infection which in his case, if he should unfortunately come in its path, could hardly be otherwise than deadly. Small-pox is spreading around Capetown with all the virulence which utterly undrained and thickly crowded suburbs can give to it. The picturesqueness of the villages that nestle under the shelter of Table Mountain, forms no guarantee against the outbreak of epidemics. In the midst of all these villages, composed as they at first sight seem to be of luxurious villas, there are

* *Natal Mercury*, Sept. 26th, 1882.

thickly crowded nests of Malays and half-castes, who defy sanitary precautions both for themselves and their neighbours. Their hovels are to the villas that line the high road and the railway, very much as the rookeries behind Oxford Street and Regent Street are to those thoroughfares. There is thus a regular chain of infection established from Capetown, and no one can tell when or where he may not come in contact with it. To land Cetshwayo and leave him there for an indefinite period under these circumstances is to commit an act little short of cruelty, not to speak of its extreme impolicy. It cannot be pretended that the state of things in Capetown was not known in England some weeks ago. *With the special view of putting the Colonial Office on its guard, I telegraphed home information as to the virulence and rapid spread of the small-pox in Capetown.** Supposing it to have been necessary to detain Cetshwayo till the arrangements in Zululand were complete, and supposing it to have been unadvisable to keep him longer in England, he might at least have been spared the risks of the metropolis of the Cape Colony."—*Daily News*, Oct. 19th, 1882.

Possibly in England, where more or less small-pox is usually to be found, but where, on the other hand, sanitary arrangements and regulations do much to minimise the chances of infection, the grave danger to which Cetshwayo was thus exposed may not have been thoroughly appreciated, but those in whose hands his fate really rested, i. e. Sir Henry Bulwer and his advisers, could not avoid being well aware of the fact, so that the landing of Cetshwayo at the Cape, and his detention there for nearly four months, is in itself a conclusive proof of their indifference to his life; if indeed it must not be called by a darker name.

He himself felt the disappointment bitterly, the *Cape Times* soon after reporting that

"The captive King at Oude-Molen is not in the happiest of moods, and the pleasure of his visit to England is fast disappearing under the detention at his whilom prison farm. Cetywayo hardly

* Author's italics.

comprehends the reason of his delay at Oude-Molen. He knows that the English Government are negotiating with the chiefs concerning his return, but he is of opinion that he could do that work better for himself than any representative of England could do it for him. He fancies, however, that his detention is owing to the fact of small-pox being in Capetown; and if this is the reason he wishes to know further why he was landed at all, and he says that even now he might be sent to False Bay and embarked from there. The people of Natal would not then put the ship in quarantine, because he has lived outside of the town, has no intercourse in town, and there is no small-pox at False Bay, where he understands he could embark from. Cetywayo will not return to Zululand with much admiration of the statesmanship of England. He wisely points out that if England has decided on his restoration, then that restoration ought to have been done properly.

After three weeks' anxious waiting he wrote as follows (dated 16th, forwarded 23rd):—

“I am writing to you, Sir H. Robinson, to ask you to consider my position here, as I am very anxious to get to Zululand and see how all my household are [*umuzi*, the family of a private man, but the people of a chief]. It was very nice to me when in England to hear from Lord Kimberley that I was going home, but it would be much nicer for me to hear of my leaving here.* The planting season is passing in Zululand, and I want to go and provide for my children. I know all the Zulu nation wishes for my return, and the chiefs will receive me heartily.† Speak to the Governor of Natal for me, and tell him to send for me soon. If the Natal [people] do not want me to land in Durban, I could be landed at Port Durnford. Now take notice of my pleadings, and get me removed soon. My heart is very small staying here so long. I do not hear any word from Zululand, or any answer to my former letters. I want to get a letter to tell me to start. Do your best for me, and be a friend of mine” [3466, p. 211].

* The extremely bald and imperfect translation of all these letters from Cetshwayo gives but a poor impression of the simple dignity of his actual language. The repeated rendering by the unsuitable word “nice” of every expression implying approval or satisfaction sufficiently illustrates the deficiency in question.

† Cetshwayo plainly here refers to the old hereditary chiefs, the great men of the nation.

And again on October 31st [3466, p. 215]:—

“I am writing to you, Sir H. Robinson, to tell you that I am nearly heart-broken staying here so long and not returning to my people. The time has lapsed which I was to have left here by. I thanked Lord Kimberley for his promise of my speedy return to Zululand, but I have been here now until I almost doubt of my release. I am writing this to you as Governor of his Colony. I am now very solitary, and my heart is very small. I ask you to plead for me and get me away soon. I say all these words to you for you to get me away soon. I have not as yet had any answer to my previous letters, and hear no tidings of my leaving here, and the time has now passed for my leaving here. The Queen released me and sent me out here quick, and why am I detained here for so long? it is very hard for me to stay here now. Will you telegraph for me to Lord Kimberley and ask him to send me out of this bondage soon? I expect [hope] to reach home and plant for my food before the season is out. I always write [appeal] to you and always will, and I am sure you will do your best for me. The Zulu people are all willing to receive me. I have spoken to Mr. Lister, my custodian, about exchanging a gun and a rifle I have here for two other rifles. I am sure he is trying his best. Could you get him some help? I want to tell you myself to-day that I almost got into trouble a few days ago by sending into Capetown to buy a few shot cartridges for my own use on this location. I want you to know this from my own lips. Do not forget me.

CETSHWAYO KA MPANDE.”

So the time dragged wearily on, and Cetshwayo was kept wearing his heart out at his old prison, without news of his family and people, without receiving any reasonable explanation of the delay—for indeed there was none to give—while his enemies, the Natal officials, did their very utmost to strew his path with thorns before he should set his foot upon it. No other preparations were made, not a single step was taken during all these months of delay except the preparation on paper of Sir Henry Bulwer's elaborate schemes for the King's destruction, until,

in December, the first movements were made to put those schemes into execution. [3466, No. 106].*

Sir Hercules Robinson telegraphs to Sir Henry Bulwer on Dec. 11th [3466, p. 243]—

“Cetshwayo has this day, in the presence of his three chiefs, signed two copies of the further conditions attached to your despatch of the 2nd December just received. I gave him your message about the huts.† He says he would like to fix permanent site of his kraal after his return, and meanwhile will only ask for a few very small huts to be erected at Ulundi, which will serve him to sleep in for a few nights. Umnyamana, or Chingwayo, or Seketwayo will suggest best site for these, as he does not wish them to be placed amongst the bones of those killed in war. He is most anxious to leave as soon as possible.”

The “further conditions,” it will be remembered, were the two framed by Sir Henry Bulwer in addition to those signed by the King in England; the one by which he was required to give up more than a third of his whole country,‡ which was an intolerable injury to both King and people, and the other by which he was made to promise that he would not

* Mr. Osborn directed to inform the chiefs and people of the new settlement, Dec. 4.

Mr. Fannin sent to beacon out Zibebu's new territory, Dec. 21.

Directions to Mr. J. Shepstone as Commissioner in Reserve, Dec. 22.

Instructions to Sir T. Shepstone about receiving Cetshwayo, Dec. 28.

[3466.]

† “I propose requesting Resident to have huts erected for Cetshwayo. Would you kindly ask where he would like them erected?” [*ibid.*, p. 243].

‡ The southern “reserve,” which is upon the map about a third of the whole country, and the richest part of it, is much more than a third of the inhabitable portion of Zululand, as that to the north-east is to a great extent malarious swamp, while the rich land to the north-west—the disputed territory—had been given to the Boers.

punish the girls of his household who had married during his absence, and "to secure immunity for the people in respect of anything done during the past three years," which were needless, and therefore insulting, stipulations. Cetshwayo had left England satisfied with the conditions there imposed upon him when once he had understood that the piece of land to be kept back from him was to be but an "*indawana*," a small place, a "little bit," i. e. enough for the reasonable necessities of those few Zulus who he knew would be all who would voluntarily elect to leave him. Cut down as the land he had inherited in trust for the Zulu people already was by encroachments from the Boers, the suggestion that any more should be taken away had been a bitter pill to him at first. But when he thoroughly understood, what was certainly then intended and explained to him, that the reserved land was to be only in proportion to the number of his own subjects who would not acknowledge him, he felt satisfied that it would be so small a piece that the loss would be but a trifling one. And so he agreed to the condition, with the rest, and reached Capetown content in mind, and determined loyally to stand by the promises which he had made. Then followed the long, disheartening waiting, the depressing presence of the deadly plague around him, the growing suspicion that England's fair promises to him would be thwarted by her colonial representatives, and that he would be kept a prisoner still, perhaps till death, but at all events until much of his country had been wrung from his future possession and that of his

successors by the ever-growing land-hunger of the whites. On December 7th the half-expected blow was struck.

Cetshwayo was told that Sir Henry Bulwer had sent "the conditions that the Home Government have finally arranged" [3466, p. 243] with reference to his return to Zululand; and the newly fixed boundaries of the Reserve and of Zibebu's territory (the retention of which in addition to the large Reserve was now explained to him for the first time) were pointed out to him upon the map. The news must have been a shock, indeed, and his first reply shows how thoroughly he understood the wide difference between what he had promised in England, and what he was asked to promise now [*ibid.*, p. 244].

"I have heard all you have to say [? have said], and I thoroughly understand it. *I also understand what was said to me by Lord Kimberley in England, and I know the replies I gave him.*"*

"I do not wish to make any reply till I get back to the Zulu country," he continued; "I will meet all my great men there, and shall [then] know all those who would like to leave the country that is set apart for me to govern. When I hear what my great men have to say, then I will make a reply" [*ibid.*, p. 245].

The King earnestly pressed this reasonable proposal and pointed out that his reserving his reply would make no difference in the result ("it will be all the same") † by which he expressed the fact that he had no power by himself to give up part of the country of his people. He could only consent as

* Author's italics.

† "I signed under protest, knowing that the land belongs to my people, and that I had no right to sign it away without their consent." (Account of Mr. Mullins, S. C. to the *Daily News*.)

far as he himself was personally concerned, but it was precisely the point on which neither he nor any other Zulu King could act despotically, or answer for the consent of the "great Zulu Council." It was in this limited sense only that he finally signed the condition after Sir Hercules Robinson had informed him that he would not be allowed to return to Zululand until he had done so, and his meaning is plain enough in spite of the halting and inadequate English translation of his words [*ibid.*, p. 245]:—"I submit to your explanations . . . but undoubtedly when I get back into the country you will hear more of what my great men have to say.* As for myself, I agree to the conditions."

Nevertheless he still pleaded earnestly that the matter might be reconsidered, saying

"Of course I have no chance of making any reply, my mouth is closed, but it is natural for me to ask for a chance of meeting the great men in the Zulu country previous to my making any answer to what you have said to-day. Any one else would do the same." [*Ibid.*, p. 247.]

And again he proposed that some influential white man should go with him to the Zulu country, and judge for himself. "I am certain if you went up and traversed the reserved country yourself, you would come to the conclusion that the greater part of the Zulu country was taken away from me," he says to Sir Hercules Robinson. The latter, it will be remembered, had pointed out two days before that he had "no responsibility whatever for the settlement

* These words were actually referred to in a leading London newspaper as importing a menace.

determined on" [*ibid.*, p. 241] and he was of course unable to give the Zulu King any encouragement to hope that the Home Government would think better of the decision arrived at.

"I should not be acting as a true friend to you, Cetshwayo," he said, "if I led you to think that you would gain any alteration of the terms by asking me to refer the matter back to the Home Government. It would only cause delay, and I do not think it would be any use! It would only be raising false hopes."

And he took great pains to make sure that the King thoroughly understood the conditions; for, says he, knowing something of Cetshwayo's character, and judging him truly, "if you know them, and say you will agree to them, I am quite sure you will keep your word." He made no attempt to answer the King's arguments, for indeed there was nothing to answer, nor is there any sign of his having for a moment stooped to the farce of making believe that the conditions were, or should be considered, satisfactory. He simply told the King what was demanded of him, and advised him, in a kindly way, to submit. At last Cetshwayo said, "I would be willing to write my name to-day if you asked me to do so,"* but was recommended by the Governor to take a few days for consideration, and full explanation of the conditions, and it was finally agreed that he should come to Government House three days later, the 11th December, and there give his signa-

* Always in the sense in which he had plainly expressed himself, that he promised for himself, and to the extent of his own power, though, without consulting the council of great men, he could not, in this matter, answer for the nation.

ture. He did so, accordingly, without making further remark upon the conditions, Sir Hercules Robinson telling him that all he had said on the previous occasion had been written down, and would be sent home to Lord Kimberley. The King's last quiet protest was, "I thought I should get away from here in a day or two, and it makes my heart sore that the time is so long" ("about 20 days") [*ibid.*, p. 248].

During the interview of the 7th, Cetshwayo had said to Sir Hercules Robinson that unless some provision were made for him (by the British Government) he should return to his country penniless.

"I lost all when I lost the Zulu country; I was rich before, but now I have not a halfpenny. I am going home, but my house is left destitute and hungry, I shall not have the means to buy anything on my return."

Sir Hercules Robinson replied [*ibid.*, p. 247] "anything of that kind I should, of course, have to ask Lord Kimberley about; and upon the 11th, after the conditions had been signed, he promised that he would telegraph home upon the subject [p. 250].

Some time previously (September 7th) Lord Kimberley had written to Sir Henry Bulwer of "the desire of Her Majesty's Government that all cattle formerly belonging to Cetshwayo and their produce should be collected for him before his return" [*ibid.*, p. 128], and he suggested that if it was found impracticable to collect the cattle which formerly belonged to the King, the natural alternative would seem to be that the chiefs and people who are willing to

receive him back should contribute to his support. But it was precisely the chiefs who had got possession of the great royal herds who were *not* willing to receive the King, Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu; and, as some of the loyal Zulus said to the Bishop of Natal after Cetshwayo's return, "He will certainly die of want, since, on the accusation that we were hiding royal cattle, they (the disloyal "appointed" chiefs) ate up our cattle also, otherwise we could have given him ours now." They did what they could, but Government had allowed them to be impoverished on account of their loyalty, while Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu fattened on the result. But Lord Kimberley continues, "Either, however, by the collection of his cattle, or by some other arrangement, it will obviously be necessary that proper provision should be made for his (Cetshwayo's) maintenance and support on his arrival in his own country" [*ibid.*, p. 129].

And how were these directions carried out?

On November 18th Sir Henry Bulwer replies to this despatch, inclosing the Resident's memorandum on the subject. The latter explains the undeniable possession by Dunn of large herds of "royal cattle," by the fact that Dunn having exerted himself in the collection of the cattle, after the British invasion of 1879 [*ibid.*, p. 284], was allowed by the military authorities to purchase a considerable number of them. It was, in the first instance, a paltry and discreditable action to be committed in England's name that, having wantonly invaded Zululand, slain, ravaged, and destroyed throughout the country, she

should demand, at the hands of the conquered people, their cattle—the chief means of their subsistence. The royal cattle, although looked upon as the King's property, were always given out by him for the use of such people as he considered deserving.

As no crops could be planted during 1879, the people had nothing to depend upon but their cattle. But to allow the traitor *Dunn* to take possession of the royal cattle, which he did at some nominal price (it is said of his own fixing), was an outrage to the feelings of the Zulus which no one less careless in such matters than Sir Garnet Wolseley would have committed. He, of course, is alluded to by Mr. Osborn's expression "the military authorities," and as he has shown so much favour to *Dunn* the latter probably made a good thing of his bargain. How many King's cattle he may have appropriated without even the pretence of payment is a disputed question between him and the Zulus. At all events he was not required to give up a single head to the King. Of the other kinglets, more especially *Hamu* and *Zibebu*, Mr. Osborn says in his reply [*ibid.*, p. 234], "there is, up to the present, no proof that they appropriated any for themselves." But he adds, "I am of opinion that a considerable number of royal cattle were never brought forward by people in whose charge they were on the King's capture, and that these remain still in their possession."

This was written on November 2nd, and on the 18th Sir Henry Bulwer writes, "I have, however, asked the Resident to ascertain if by any chance

Hamu or Zibebu, or indeed any of the other chiefs, are in possession of royal cattle" [*ibid.*].

On February 17th, 1883, Mr. Osborn writes again, "I am not aware of the wrongful possession of royal cattle by any of the chiefs or people, but at the same time I think it is not at all unlikely that cases of such possession do exist," showing how much the Resident's information had increased, and his ideas developed, during the four-and-a-half months which intervened. In fact, while Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu remained in possession of great herds of the King's cattle, the mere handful (310 in all, including 43 young calves) which were so magnificently presented to Cetshwayo in Her Majesty's name, was all the wealth of which he was possessed upon his so-called "restoration," with the exception of the presents given to him in England.

It will be remembered that Hamu had robbed Umnyamana of 1300 head of cattle in 1880. In 1881 Sir E. Wood ordered him to repay 700 head, and in September 1882 Sir Henry Bulwer repeated the command. Hamu promised to obey, but in October he sent "30 head of cattle, and 10 young calves" to the Resident as "full settlement of the award" [3616, p. 8]. These were, of course, declined, upon which Hamu made another attempt with a herd of 150 head, which met with a like fate. Mr. Osborn writes upon the matter [*ibid.*, p. 10]:—

"Hamu knows that he seized a great many more than the 700 head awarded by General Wood (to Umnyamana), and Sir H. Bulwer replies that, 'whether his continued neglect or refusal to restore these cattle is the result of his own personal disposition, or

of any bad advice that he may have received from others,* I know not; but in any case I fear that his obstinacy in this matter will lead to further trouble for which he must be held responsible."

Hamu never paid the cattle, which, had they come into Umnyamana's possession, would certainly have gone to support the King, and all the "further trouble" which fell upon the former was the direct result of either his action in this matter, or else his slaughter of the Abaqulusi in 1881.

Finding that his appeal to the Government through Sir Hercules Robinson produced no effect, the King borrowed 50*l.* from his kind friend Mr. Saul Solomon, in Capetown, in order that he might not return empty-handed to his family.† The following passage occurs in one of the local papers at the time:—

"The luggage of the King—a strange medley of blankets and pots and pans, just a gun or two—was despatched from Oude Molen yesterday, after having been carefully packed under the personal supervision of His Majesty. No prudent housewife was ever more scrupulously careful, on the occasion of shifting from one residence to another, of her household goods, than has been Cetshwayo, King of the Zulus, in superintending the despatch of all the worldly wealth with which he returns from his prison-farm to his kingdom. By an economy, the wisdom of which may be discussed hereafter, the Imperial Government have prevented Cetshwayo from taking back to Zululand anything in the way of luxuries. It may have been considered that those luxuries would take the form of guns and gunpowder. Strange to relate, however, the King's thoughts have been chiefly occupied in selecting articles, such as blankets and cooking utensils, which he thinks his family will be

* For once, apparently, the Bishop of Natal is *not* supposed to have given this "bad advice"!

† This loan was punctually repaid by the King through the Bishop of Natal.

badly in need of. . . . The one desponding thought in the King's mind at the present is that, although he may find his family in Zululand, he will be without the means of feeding them; for the cattle, which was his wealth in the days of old, was taken from him under the Wolseley settlement, and is not to be restored to him. There is a promise of some cattle being given to him; but this, like the arrangements consequent upon his restoration, is vague and undefined. The cattle which will be given to the King will, of course, be so given at the expense of the Imperial Treasury, and, in noting this fact, it is worthy of remark that the King will have to pay the cost incidental on the presence of a British Resident at Ulundi. How Cetshwayo, without any source of revenue, is to defray this cost, we shall hear hereafter."*

* It is a remarkable fact that this proposition was actually made, and that the Natal officials did allow the Home Government to fall into the error of supposing that it would be *possible* for Cetshwayo to "pay a round sum of say 3000*l.* a year to Her Majesty's Government, to cover all expenses incurred by them" [3466, p. 232].

In the first place, as the expenses incurred were all in consequence of the unjust war declared in 1879, if not with England's permission, at least by her representatives, it was acting on the old system of making other people pay our debts to charge Cetshwayo with the cost of his restoration. It was as unreasonable a notion as was the suggestion made in the Natal Legislative Council in 1880 that the Zulus should be called upon to contribute to the expenses of the war, i. e. that they should pay us for having wantonly invaded their country, and swept it with fire and sword.

But, besides the question of abstract justice, which, indeed, has had but little to do with any of our actions in Zululand, the demand was an absurdity in itself, of which the Natal officials must have been well aware.

The Zulu nation holds its wealth in cattle, of which, as we have seen, the loyalists had lost large numbers before the King's return. At the best of times to bring down 3000*l.* worth of cattle yearly, to Natal, would have been a heavy tax, made more so by the certainty of considerable loss upon the way, while, to collect the money by selling their herds under the pressure of necessity to traders, &c., would have been as bad. That money was a scarce commodity in the Zulu country is made plain enough even in the official Blue Books, where we find Ungamule saying that he and

Of the conditions the editor of the *Cape Times* remarked [*Cape Times*, Dec. 30th]:—

“He has been asked to sign; he has not been consulted as to the justice or the righteousness, or the possibility of the successful working of the conditions. . . . The arrangement is a game of chance. The terms on which he is restored to Zululand are the terms of the British Government. Cetshwayo had to choose between those terms, and an exile at Oude Molen.” And the writer predicted that the restoration would “please neither the restored King, nor the people of Natal, nor any one interested party or policy, and can only have one ending.”

Mr. J. Mullins (Zulu trader) said, “I asked the King how came he to agree to conditions such as we had heard of? He said, ‘It was not that I agreed to them. I had no choice given me. I was told that the country was to be cut off from the Umblatuze, and that to the north also a large piece was to be cut off for Zibebu; and that if I did not sign, I should never return, but remain always at the Cape. So I signed under protest, knowing that the land belongs to my people, and that I had no right to sign it away without their consent, and trusting that, as the English Government have listened to my prayer once, they will do so again, and set this thing right, and restore to us our country. And this is

his people had to pay an *isivumu* (tribute) to Zibebu of “20 head of cattle, four goats, and *two half-crowns* in cash” [3466, p. 99].

Sir Henry Bulwer speaks of “a number of the forfeited cattle, altogether nearly 200 head,” having been collected by Mr. Osborn for Cetshwayo’s benefit on his return, and, as we have seen, the number went up to 310 by the time he received them. What a contemptible little provision this was for a Zulu King may be gathered from the numbers which habitually constitute a royal herd. Zibebu (who had certainly helped himself freely to his neighbour’s property) was said to own 60,000 head of cattle in the early part of 1884, yet his possessions must have been far smaller than were those of the King before the invasion of 1879. This poor 310, however, was all that it was thought necessary to provide for Cetshwayo on his return, and the Zulus raised a subscription amongst themselves that he might have the necessaries of life. Yet, at the same time, the authorities proposed that he should be required to raise 3000*l.* a year to pay for his release, the expenses of a Resident, &c.!

what I shall tell my people when they inquire of me how I came to do this thing, and I shall tell them that they must be patient and quiet meanwhile. And do you say to Sobantu that I commend this matter to him, and that I pray him to bring it before the English Government, and not to do anything hastily, but just to let all my friends in England know what is being done here.' ”

The editor of the *Cape Times* remarks again, on January 5th, still speaking of the King :—

“ When he returned from England, it seemed to me that he had lost somewhat of his old vigour, and, in subsequent interviews, I thought that his captivity had impaired the intellect, which was so subtle and so vigorous when I had, on former occasions, controversies with him regarding the Zulu War. But yesterday morning's interview convinced me that any conception I had previously entertained, of any falling off in the King's mental powers, was entirely erroneous; and it was evident that the symptoms of lassitude and depression, previously noticed, had been caused by anxiety as to the arrangements which were being made for his return to Zululand, or doubt as to whether the return would be ever made.

“ After some talk I said, ‘ I hope, Cetshwayo, that you will have a long and peaceful reign in Zululand.’ He replied, ‘ I hope it will be peaceful; but, until I have seen Shepstone, and he has explained everything to me, I cannot tell what it will be.’ To this I rejoined, ‘ When you return to Zululand, be sure that you respect whatever is told you on behalf of the British Government, and on no account let any one tempt you to take up a position of hostility to England.’ The King paused for a few moments, and then he said, looking at me fully in the face, as if he was trying to enforce with his eyes the truth of what he was saying—‘ I have given my heart to the English. I promise that I will never forget that the English are my best friends, and I shall listen to the words of the Resident.’ In all the arrangements which have been made, Cetshwayo has had no voice. He only knows that Usibepu, whom he cordially mistrusts, is to remain an independent chief; and that Dunn and Hlubi are to be tribal chiefs. He regards himself as a king under the protection of England, or, as he himself puts it, he is an English governor. He does not comprehend the exact position he is expected to assume; but he

says he would rather go back to Zululand and die than remain in exile.'”—*Mercury's* Corres., Capetown.

With that innate good taste and courtesy for which, according to his lights, Cetshwayo was certainly distinguished, he wrote to Her Majesty, the Queen, upon the day of his departure for Zululand, a letter which was translated as follows [3466, p. 268]:—

“I am writing to you, Queen Victoria, to thank you for releasing me from the cruel [painful] bondage I was recently kept in, and to say that I am this day leaving the shores of South Africa for my native land.

“I thank you for your kindness, and hope that I will be able to sleep safely in my country. Keep my feet off the ground as a mother would do her infant.

“I do not want to get into trouble any more. Do not think that Cetshwayo will ever neglect you, and if you ever again hear idle reports of me, ask me to come to you and explain all myself. I am the child of the White House; keep me and watch over me always.

“I conclude by thanking you for your kindness to me; and when I leave this place trust to prosper in your name. As long as I am alive I will always want to hear of you.”

Meanwhile the Reserve was in a state of extreme disquiet. What had hitherto been known as “Dunn’s territory” formed the greater portion of it, and the majority of the chiefs over whom he had been placed, with most of their followers, were staunch adherents of Cetshwayo’s. Leader amongst them was the Prince Dabulamanzi, who had taken so active a part in petitioning for his brother’s restoration, but who, with so many others, was now called upon to choose between that brother, and their lands and homes in

the Reserve. Dunn's few immediate followers, and one or two vacillating and insincere men, alone were ready to reject the King, though there were some others who, apparently suspecting a trap, temporised a little, and did not venture to reject the proffered British "protection" while Cetshwayo's return seemed a doubtful matter, but who speedily spoke their minds when once their own eyes had seen him.* But until he arrived what must not have been their anxiety and doubt. They saw amongst them Mr. J. Shepstone, representing towards them that British power which they had such good cause to dread, and his tone to them was plainly this:—

"Choose now between the protection of England through Natal, with the favour of her officials, and that of your old ruler Cetshwayo whom we swept away, and whom we mean to bring back (some day), and to place with very little power or wealth, over a portion of the land only."

That such was the tone if not the actual wording of Mr. Shepstone's communications to the Zulus is

* Colonel Durnford, R.E., related a case of similar distrust in 1874. Having procured the release of the Putini tribe, taken prisoners without grounds in Natal during 1873, he induced the Government to offer small loans of money to the destitute people until they could raise their crops, but he had to use his personal influence with them before they would take the loan. "They would not take Government money because they feared they would be put in jail some day, if they took it," wrote Colonel Durnford. "I think this is a very striking fact, as showing the utter want of confidence of the natives in the *justice* of Government. They feared a *trap*, laid by Government, and baited with money. If they took the money, and could not repay it when called for, Government would put them in prison, or place them to work as bondsmen."—'A Soldier's Life and Work in South Africa,' edited by Lieut.-Col. E. Durnford, p. 97.

evident enough even from his own despatches, in an early one of which he speaks of Mavumengwana as "*staunch to us*,"* and of Dabulamanzi as "intriguing" for the King. In the same letter [3466, p. 290] he himself mentions the incredulity with which the news of the King's return was received, and quotes their reply: "When we see him with our own eyes, we will then say that Mr. Jan has spoken truly."

In all his despatches he shows the same spirit, thoroughly in accordance with Sir Henry Bulwer's views, and it might be imagined from their perusal that he had been sent to the Reserve not to encourage the people there to choose freely, and without fear of the consequences of speaking out their wishes, but rather to induce as many as possible to side with "us" against Cetshwayo. That the Natal Government should set itself in opposition to the Zulu King as a rival can never have been intended by the Imperial Government. The Reserve was to have been a refuge for such Zulus (if any) as were terror-stricken at the news of Cetshwayo's approach, not as a change of residence for every one who, after carefully weighing the pros and cons, might decide that his interest would be better served by his becoming a British subject. The Home Government plainly only meant to take from Cetshwayo as many of his old subjects (if any) as dared not remain under his rule, with land to correspond to their number, and they certainly had not the smallest intention of offering the nation a choice between British rule and that of

* See last chapter.

their King, which practically was what was done in the Reserve. But the Natal Government was determined only to leave to Cetshwayo as many of his people as were so deeply devoted to his person that they were ready to run any risks, and to endure any hardships for his sake. And considerably astonished must the said Government have been to find how many came under even this extreme category.

Mr. J. Shepstone proved himself a most capable agent in carrying out this policy. No one could have done it more successfully. An official of a higher stamp would have been obliged very soon to represent to his chief that British supremacy in the Reserve must be established by force, or not at all, since the majority of its inhabitants were totally averse to the whole proceeding. Not so Mr. J. Shepstone. He served his immediate superior better, though his country not at all.* A plain statement of the facts concerning the Reserve, made to the Home Government, would at once have brought the scheme of reservation to an end which would by no means have suited the plans of his chief, Sir H. Bulwer, nor those of his brother, Sir T. Shepstone. But "Mr. Jan" had no such scruples. The Zulus living in the intended Reserve did not prove so grateful for the proffered British protection † as Sir

* Supposing that he calls himself an Englishman.

† Sir H. Bulwer originally proposed the title "protected territory" for the reserved portion of Zululand, but the Home Government would not authorise the use of the term on the grounds that it "would give rise to misapprehension, and weaken the sense of responsibility of the inhabitants for their own pro-

Henry Bulwer had confidently expected would be the case. This was an annoying circumstance, but not irremediable, and, of course, no reason at all for modifying the proposals of the Government. No doubt Sir Henry Bulwer sincerely desired the happiness and prosperity of the Zulus, or rather of those Zulus who would submit humbly and gratefully to his arrangements for their good, but they must be happy and

tection," &c. In fact the Home Government had set their face against annexation whether open or disguised. It was the *thing* they objected to, not the name, except so far as the latter might give rise to misapprehension as to their intentions. Sir Henry Bulwer takes an entirely contrary view, having, indeed, never given way a hair's breadth in the whole affair except under downright compulsion. As the *Diamond News* of February 22nd, 1883, remarked, "his attitude greatly resembles that of a sulky child, who, obliged by a superior power to perform some unwelcome task, is determined that it shall be done in such a way as to give no satisfaction whatever to his masters." Accordingly he writes on February 15th, "In withdrawing the use of the term 'protection,' in order to avoid misapprehension, I hope indeed it is not to be understood that the protection itself is withdrawn. This is a matter of vital importance. The establishment of our direct protection, authority, and rule over one portion of the country, was, I submitted, an indispensable condition to the restoration of Cetshwayo to the other part" [3616, p. 25]. This, he maintains, would not be annexation, because the country was not to be used for British colonisation, that is to say he meant England to have all the responsibility, the odium, the expense, and possible loss of life involved by the annexation of a reluctant country, without the single advantage to be gained by such a course. And in the face of all prohibitions from the Home Government, and the almost universal discontent of the inhabitants of the proposed Reserve, he carried out his plans to the utmost extent possible, produced absolute anarchy in Zululand, and has finally forced England into as unpleasant and humiliating a position as her worst enemies could desire.

prosperous in the way which he thought best for them, or not at all. Mr. J. Shepstone acted on the palpable though intangible lines laid down for him, and carried the system out to an extent which probably Sir Henry Bulwer could never have sanctioned had the details been forced undeniably upon his notice.

The first thing to be done was, of course, to get as many chiefs as possible to declare against Cetshwayo. Mr. J. Shepstone set about this busily, and, by the middle of March, produced a list which has a formidable aspect in the eyes of the uninitiated to whom one Zulu name is much the same as another except for degrees of difficulty in the matter of pronunciation, but which loses much of its importance when submitted to any one acquainted with the subject. Up to January 12th, 1883, four chiefs only had "declared their intention of remaining under the protection of the British Government" [3616, p. 6], two of whom returned to their allegiance to Cetshwayo the moment their own eyes told them that he had returned, while a third, "Ndosi," appears somewhat oddly upon the scene, having been dead many years, his *son and successor* dying also about 1872.* On February 9th, Mr. J. Shepstone reports the names of thirty-one chiefs and headmen who, he says, elect to remain in the intended Reserve, after

* The fourth, Ngidhlana, a younger brother of Cetshwayo's, had belonged to the opposite party in the civil war of 1856, and fled for a time to the Transvaal, but, returning to Zululand, was received by Cetshwayo, and placed at the head of a kraal. He was, however, a man of no importance in the country, and would have carried no following with him.

taking some time to consider their decision, and who, with the four others mentioned already, make up thirty-five. He concludes [3616, p. 33], "I . . . hope now in a few days to obtain those of the remainder, who are on their return from Cetshwayo." But, before this, a list had been sent to Sir Henry Bulwer by Mr. Fynn, the Resident with the King, of thirty-one chiefs and headmen residing in the proposed Reserve [3616, p. 34],

"who believed it was not Cetshwayo who was coming back, but an image of him. They therefore preferred the plan of the Reserve territory, but, now that the Zulu nation have really seen their King alive, Cetshwayo, they wish to adhere to him, hence the salutation of all, Who is it; is it him? [*sic*]. It is; it is Cetshwayo himself, and alive."

Upon this list appear eight of Mr. J. Shepstone's thirty-five, amongst them one Palane, of whom we shall hear again, a chief who was almost the first to meet and welcome the King when he landed, and who explained his previous action on the above-mentioned grounds. The list was taken down by Mr. Fynn from the mouths of ten headmen (sent to him by Umnyamana on the King's authority), the names of two of whom, Sirayo and Sigananda, appear on the list itself. Nevertheless, so suspicious was Sir Henry Bulwer of every word in favour of Cetshwayo that he persists in speaking of "*Cetshwayo's representations*" and "*the headmen . . . whom Cetshwayo claims as his adherents.*"

Many of these men who, in utter disbelief that the King would ever return, had accepted the proffer of British protection in preference to the uncertainty

existing before that return throughout the Zulu country, proved, from the hour of the King's appearance amongst them, his most loyal supporters. A little later (March 11th) Mr. J. Shepstone speaks of one of them (Zeise) as "one of the extreme Usutu [i. e. loyal] party" [3616, p. 86].

Of the thirty-one reported by Mr. Shepstone on February 9th as desiring British protection, eight withdrew their names as soon as they had seen the King themselves, and five others soon after showed their loyalty to him by their actions. Yet Mr. Shepstone gives all their names, without exception, in his subsequent list of March 22nd [pp. 125 and 126]. But few of the chiefs whom he can justly claim as "staunch to us" are men of much importance, or with large followings, while five of the six whom he calls "chiefs and headmen who have not declared themselves either way" were precisely the five most powerful chiefs in the Reserve (equalled at most by one upon Mr. Shepstone's list) with large tribes, thoroughly loyal to Cetshwayo. Why they had not declared themselves, and what measures were taken to secure declarations favourable to the establishment of the country south of the Umhlatuze under British authority, we shall presently consider.

While there was a hope of inducing the Government to see what a mistake they were about to put into practice, the active and energetic Prince Dabulamanzi spared no pains to open their eyes to the fact, and industriously spread the news that the Queen had no wish to deprive the Zulus of any portion of

their country, and only proposed to institute a Reserve because she had been given to understand that many Zulus desired it. Cetshwayo's own replies to the questions of his people upon the subject were to the same effect, and of course the Bishop of Natal could only answer in similar terms those sent to learn the truth from him before the promulgation of Sir Henry Bulwer's "additional conditions" (containing the boundaries fixed without any reference to the wishes of the people). The newspapers had, indeed, made public the just and reasonable intentions of the Home Government some months before anything was heard of Sir Henry Bulwer's scheme for check-mating them. On the other hand, the Zulus had nothing to convince them of their coming misfortunes except the word of two Government officials, Mr. Osborn and Mr. J. Shepstone, whom they had long learnt thoroughly to distrust. This state of feeling aroused great indignation on the part of Mr. Shepstone, who writes repeatedly and vehemently to Sir Henry Bulwer upon the subject, accusing Dabulamanzi of outrageous conduct, and, as a matter of course, announcing that "Bishop Colenso" was at the bottom of it. The (apparently) half-witted Faneyana is again quoted, with as much assurance as though the Bishop of Natal had not long since made it plain that he knew very little of the man, and had never put the smallest confidence in him, and the name of another supposed "emissary," Mabika, is given, who was absolutely unknown at Bishopstowe. On the authority of these two very

doubtful characters, with a little assistance from the estimable Dunn, Mr. Shepstone writes that they were "sent by Bishop Colenso, with a message from Cetshwayo" to Umnyamana, the message being of a most sanguinary nature. Dabulamanzi, assisted [only] by Faneyana and Mabika, and authorised by Cetshwayo and the Bishop of Natal, is represented as "causing mischief," spreading "false statements with a mischievous intent" [p. 2], and much more to the same effect, and Mr. Shepstone declares that in consequence his own action is "hampered" [p. 7], and that his authority will be undermined. Yet, not to give too much importance to the movement, he says that Dabulamanzi "*appears to be the only agitator*" in the territory; "he has aids, *but they do not appear,*"* except the two named above. So we are required to believe that the inhabitants of the proposed Reserve being (so the officials maintained), with but few exceptions, altogether adverse to Cetshwayo's rule, and eager to put themselves under British protection, were yet withheld from doing the latter by the (from the official point of view) unwelcome word of one who was, in official parlance, a person of "well-known unscrupulous character" [3466, p. 172] and untruthfulness, &c. &c., assisted by two vagabond natives, simply because he spoke—or was supposed to speak—in the names of "Sobantu" and Cetshwayo. This implies an influence on the part of the Bishop and the King to which the former, certainly, laid no claim. On such flimsy evidence

* Author's italics.

and mere rumours, however, Sir Henry Bulwer once more seizes upon the oft-refuted idea of the Bishop's interference, coupled, of course, with an accusation against Cetshwayo of breaking faith. Without even mentioning the matter to the Bishop, he writes [3616, p. 26]:—

“Already the partisans of Cetshwayo in this country have taken advantage of the disavowal there has been of any intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to annex the country, by endeavours to persuade the people living in the territory that it will come under Cetshwayo, that the action taken by the Resident Commissioner * . . . has been the act only of the local authorities of Natal, that it has been and will be disowned by Her Majesty's Government, that the people must place no faith in the Resident Commissioner,” and more to the same effect.

It is hardly necessary, perhaps, to say that the Bishop had nothing whatever to do with any such messages, while the words really spoken by Cetshwayo were simply such as he had spoken to Mr. Mullins,† as shown, indeed, by Mr. J. Shepstone himself, who, after all his angry denunciations on the subject, remarks [3616, p. 12]:—

“The object Cetshwayo has in sending messages is obvious, viz. to show to the satisfaction of the Government that no necessity for a reserved territory exists; this I am convinced from the wording of the messages.”

It is difficult to understand why, in this case, any objection should have been made to the said messages. If this was all, what had Cetshwayo done which he had not a perfect right to do? It was absurd to talk of “unsettling” what had certainly

* Mr. J. Shepstone.

† See pp. 21 and 27.

not yet been settled. The Zulus of the proposed Reserve had still to choose under which authority they would place themselves, and, until that was done, there could surely be no reason why Cetshwayo should not exercise such influence as his mere word might have over the people. The Home Government certainly did not mean to take from beneath his rule any Zulus who *could* be thus influenced to adhere to him, and if he could have thus shown "to the satisfaction" of that Government that no Reserve was needed, it would certainly have been very much to their satisfaction indeed.

It is easy, however, to see how readily the prejudiced official mind might misinterpret the King's actual words, of which misinterpretation a single instance will suffice as an example.

The King said, ". . . and I shall tell them [his people] that they must be patient and quiet meanwhile," i. e. while he appealed on their behalf to the British Government. And this he said, knowing well that they would not submit to the partition of the land, and that it would take all his influence to induce them to remain quiet even for awhile. But Mr. Shepstone's version of Cetshwayo's words is that the latter has directed "all living in the country between the rivers Umhlatuze and Tugela, who prefer becoming the subjects of Cetshwayo, to remain where they are [to remain quiet—make no disturbance] and to inform me of their determination to do so, as he (Cetshwayo) will see that they are not disturbed" [3616, p. 16].

That part of our story of the ruin of Zululand which describes the return of Cetshwayo and the period immediately following it, demands special attention, as the official (and other) labour which was spent in misrepresenting the events of these few months, and deceiving the British Government and public, exceeded, perhaps, in extent and persistence, the industry of the Zulu King's foes during all the preceding years.

Every care had been taken by the Natal officials to prepare a failure for the policy they opposed, but that was not enough : great pains were also required to represent all that happened as being in accordance with the predictions and desires of the official circle concerned. No one more thoroughly equal to the task could have been selected than the person who undertook the greater part of it, and it requires some knowledge of the subject, and no little care, to fully expose the fact that his reports are written entirely in support of a preconceived plan.

Meanwhile special correspondents of the local papers were extremely useful in preparing the official way.

A Mr. Carter, editor of the *Times of Natal*, acted as correspondent to that paper and to the *Natal Mercury*, these two journals, but especially the latter, having always been Cetshwayo's bitter opponents, and the latter the special supporter of Sir Bartle Frere's policy.* This correspondent

* The editor of the *Mercury* was also Durban correspondent of the (London) *Times*. One instance will suffice to show the

somewhat overshot the mark, for, from first to last, his accounts were so laden with malice towards the Zulu King, groundless and violent accusations, and coarse sneers, that every temperate reader must have felt repelled by them and disinclined to accept the conclusions of so palpably prejudiced a writer.

On the other hand, Dr. Seaton, the correspondent of the *Natal Mercantile Advertiser*,* a Natal colonist of some years' standing, and who frankly acknowledged that, to begin with, his sympathies were all against Cetshwayo, evidently endeavoured to describe accurately what he saw and heard, although he occasionally makes mistakes through want of acquaintance with the Zulus, their manners and customs, and, above all, their language, being, therefore, very much at the mercy of interpreters, of whom, according to Mr. Carter, "there were many in the country and in the service of the diplomatic circle." This latter was, like Dr. Seaton, utterly unacquainted with the Zulus themselves, their language, and their country, and had, moreover, for his interpreter, Mr. M. Oftebro, one of Dunn's late "magistrates," and especially hostile to Cetshwayo, his father having been a noted supporter of Sir Bartle Frere's war policy.

animus of this writer. "In that will consist his opportunity, ever present, so soon as he may be ready to begin the 'spear-washing' process, and so soon as he tires of that gentle mood, which made him so piteous a spectacle at Oude Molen, and which touched the hearts of so many of his visitors."—*Mercury* (S. C.), Jan. 7th.

* And also, it is understood, of the (London) *Standard*.

The actual truth may be best gathered by a comparison between, first, the account of the Zulus themselves; second, that of the two newspaper correspondents—the one honestly trying to make his way to the truth through considerable difficulties, and, although starting with a prejudice against Cetshwayo and the restoration policy, forced, by a respect for the truth, continually to take the King's part,* the other violently opposed to him, and supporting through thick and thin the ideas and intentions of the officials; and, thirdly, the actual official account carefully prepared, a little later, with the object already mentioned. What the bias of this latter was likely to be was early detected by one certainly not predisposed to suspect it of injustice in this case [*Advertiser*, Jan. 26th, 1883]:—

“ We repeat here,” writes the editor of the *Advertiser*, “ because of its great significance and importance, a statement from the letter published this morning from our special correspondent with the expedition in Zululand. ‘ I regret,’ our correspondent says, ‘ to have to note it is unquestionable that, from Her Majesty's Special Commissioner downwards through all the chief officials, there is

* Dr. Seaton writes on January 19th:—“ It is true that, failing as an inventor, I might develop my facts to further some special line of policy, or to laud or abuse some individual; but you have pitilessly tied me down to the truth.” This respect for fact was so extraordinary, and so objectionable, in the eyes of Cetshwayo's white opponents, that they immediately referred it indignantly to the Bishop of Natal's influence. The editor of the *Times of Natal* (Carter) went so far as to write of Dr. Seaton as “ a gentleman who, we may say, without any breach of confidence, is a personal friend of Bishop Colenso,” the mere *fact* that the Bishop and Dr. Seaton did not happen even to be acquaintances, having only once met, casually, many years before, not being worth consideration.

a decided feeling against Cetshwayo, or, more correctly to express it, a desire to minimise any spontaneous outburst of welcome on the part of the main body of his future subjects."

And the writer describes the process as

"a sort of wet-blanketing, indescribable in detail, but all tending to make it appear that, however enthusiastic the reception of the King may be, it is not due to the spontaneous feeling of the Zulu nation, but to the direct order of Her Britannic Majesty's representatives."

All accounts agree in describing the Zulus as greatly alarmed by the entry of the troops. The *Mercury* correspondent says [*Mercury*, Jan. 4th]:—

"I believe they are dubious as to the meaning of the entry of troops; the word of the white man, of course, counts for nothing with them now. Marching as we are, as though in British territory, and with the British flag flying at the Headquarter lines, the Zulus may be pardoned if they fail to understand the full meaning and intention of the *umlungu* (whiteman) now."

The *Advertiser* describes the fear and distrust shown along the line of march, and Sir T. Shepstone speaks of "a very serious distrust of, and disbelief in our professed intentions," as having soon become very evident. "It ['our programme'] seemed to them so preposterous and improbable that they could not accept it as true" [3616, p. 41].

The escort, in fact, was large enough to rouse suspicion and dread in the natives, consisting of about 440 Europeans, of whom 429 were regular troops, each with 180 rounds of ammunition, and about 60 natives, described as "Sir T. Shepstone's body-guard of armed Kafirs," including mounted

Basutos and Edendale men who had acted as scouts during the Zulu war, with a train of about 150 wagons, and it was sent under the direction of Sir T. Shepstone himself.

It is no wonder that the Zulus should have been even more distrustful than the appearance of British troops would naturally make them after their experiences of 1879. The rumours of Government intentions with regard to the Reserve which had reached them were quite enough to produce doubt and dissatisfaction.

What was generally known to the people was the original intention of the Home Government to restore Cetshwayo "on the principle that no more country should be reserved than is necessary to enable us to fulfil our obligations to the chiefs and people unwilling to remain in Cetshwayo's territory" [3466, p. 216]. It was carefully explained to Cetshwayo himself in England that the only reason for reserving *any at all* was the (supposed) existence of Zulus adverse to his rule, and that the extent of the Reserve would be in accordance with their number. All Lord Kimberley's replies to his representations on the subject were on this understanding, and the facts had been freely published in the local papers, and were well known to the Zulus through those amongst them who had visited Natal between August 1883 and January 1884. This they believed, and had good reason to believe, was the truth, the Queen's word, and a promise in which they might hope. Cetshwayo's release was granted to the prayers of

his people; his complete or partial restoration rested with themselves, and depended on their own unanimity or division. The majority were, therefore, naturally and rightly extremely anxious to show that they were all loyal to Cetshwayo, and upon this feeling are founded all Mr. J. Shepstone's accusations against Dabulamanzi of "intriguing" in the Reserve. But of the distortion of the original intentions of Her Majesty's Government by Sir Henry Bulwer, and of the "cutting off" of half the country by an arbitrary line which had nothing to do with the number of *izihlupeki* (dissatisfied-injured ones), they knew nothing until within a few weeks of the King's arrival. Mr. Osborn only received his orders to make it known on December 8th, while Mr. John Shepstone, to whom the instruction and arrangement of the Reserve was entrusted, did not reach it till the end of the month (December 30th), ten days before Cetshwayo landed [3466, p. 288]. It is perfectly plain indeed that the Zulus simply did not believe a word the latter official said, as shown by his own report that their reply to him was "when we see him [Cetshwayo] with our own eyes, we will then say that Mr. Jan [Mr. J. Shepstone] has spoken truly." This distrust was not remarkable: for these simple people have no further confidence in any one whom they have once known untrue, and Matshana, be it remembered, had been a resident in Zululand ever since the treachery practised against him in Natal, 1858, and lives there still. These facts should be borne in mind in reading the following Zulu account,

given by messengers especially sent for the purpose by Mnyamana, once more the Prime Minister of Zululand :—

On February 10th Mtokwane, Melakanya, and Mbewana reached Bishopstowe from Zululand. Mtokwane stated as follows.

When we last returned from Natal, taking up the news that the King was starting from the Cape we found that Dabulamanzi and most of the headmen had been called and had gone up to Mr. Osborn. We gave the copy of the telegram * for Dabulamanzi to his mother. When we reached Mnyamana's, the royal women wept for joy, but said, "It cannot be true that it is time to meet him on the shore."

Mnyamana himself told us, "We have just come from Mr. Osborn, who said that we were to build a kraal for the King. But I refused, saying that I was not going to make such a fool of myself. I am now laughed at as the man of 'the coming-back King,' and as the man of 'the dog-King,'† and I am not going to be 'King's kraal man' into the bargain. Besides, a royal kraal cannot be built until the King himself has pointed out the site." They could not believe that our statement was true; but, as we persisted in

* This was a Cape telegram, cut out from the *Mercury*, giving the date on which Cetshwayo was to start from the Cape.

† "As to Zibebu, his heart was hardened again by seeing that the Governor's word about the restoring of the Princes (Ndabuko and Ziwedu) to their old places was only a mockery. He says: 'These are your Kings—the only ones you will ever get!—these dogs which Sobantu (Bishop Colenso) has bought and sent up to humbug you! You thought that the Governor was going to take your part; but you see you were mistaken, just as you were before when Wood came!' And truly he was right there, for we did expect great things when Wood came, and we were horribly disappointed. 'And,' says he, 'it will be just the same again this time, when, as you say, you are going to meet the King. Or, if he is brought back, he will only be allowed to be a kinglet—a chief over a tribe, like the rest of us—not a king.'" This was related on another occasion. The dogs spoken of were some fine English ones, brought back by the King, which he sent on before him from the Cape, and which were kept some little time at Bishopstowe.

going to meet him at the landing-place, they sent messages by us in case we proved to be right.

So we two (Mtokwane and Melakanya) went to meet him. At the Prince Siteku's we heard of Mr. Jan [Shepstone]. He had called SIWUNGUZA* to him at Entumeni, who, on hearing Mr. Jan's words, said, "If it is really true, Sir, that you are bringing back the King, you will have won the hearts (*tola*) of all Zululand."

We then came to *Dabulamanzi*, not at his own kraal, as he had been with the other headmen to Mr. Jan, who told them, "We are now bringing back the King. But the country is to be cut off at the Umhlatuze; this land now belongs to the (*Hulumente*) Natal Government; and any one crossing the Umhlatuze will require a pass. Whitemen will not be allowed to live there, but those Zulus who are dissatisfied at Cetshwayo's return."

And, *Dabulamanzi* and his party having gone, Mr. Jan said the same to *Mavumengwana* and his party, viz., "We are bringing back the King; those who wish for him, let them cross the Umhlatuze, and those who don't wish for him let them stay where they are, or, if on the other side, come over." Said *Mavumengwana*, "If you say that you are really bringing back the King, then we see that we are born again, for we all belong to him." Said Mr. Jan, "Why, I thought that you were an *isigele* (= one who has withdrawn from Cetshwayo)." Said he, "It is all right, now that the Inkos' says it. All that I did was to hold my head down as one being killed. It is all right since it is you who tell me that he is coming back."

Mr. Jan had already said the same words to *Sigcwelegcwele* and party, viz., "This land south of the Umhlatuze now belongs to the Government." *Sigcwelegcwele* answered, "We all belong to the King, if you say that he is coming back; we all belong to him in the face of Dunn. We only put ourselves under him while the King was gone." *Manyonyo* also was there. Some of *Dabulamanzi's* men were present, who told him, and he told us.

We went on to the sea, and there we found at a certain kraal *Dabulamanzi's* son, and some others. Said they, "You are going to no purpose. We have been beset and are driven off, it being said that we are *Dabulamanzi's* spies, sent to frighten the people

* Throughout this narrative the names of Sir Garnet Wolseley's kinglets are printed in small capitals, and those of chiefs lately under Dunn, living in the intended Reserve, in italics.

into saying that they want the King when they don't." * *Dabulamanzi* had sent a messenger to *Somopo*, to tell him to stand firm, and say nothing to Mr. John's words about cutting off the land, but merely to thank for the King's return.† But that messenger, before he reached *Somopo*, was frightened back, being told "Down here on the coast *Dabulamanzi's* men are being arrested for telling the people what to say." So he went back and told the Prince, who sent and ordered his son and party to retire a bit, and they were just packing up when we arrived. We said, however, that we should go on, and they made up their minds to stay by us. The first ship had now appeared, and some said "The King has come!" But we told them "The right day has not come; this is the baggage-ship, which we were told would come first." ‡

In the morning early *Palane*, a chief living near the coast, passed with his men, over 100, having been called by Mr. Jan. We asked him to announce us to *Somtseu* (Sir T. S.) as people from *Mnyamana*. The headman of the kraal at which we had slept went with him, being one of *Palane's* tribe. We two followed, and on the way we met this headman coming back to us, accompanied by two Natal native policemen armed with guns. He said,

* "DABULAMANZI'S DEVILRY.—Very nasty rumours are flying about here. *Dabulamanzi* is trying all he can to cause trouble, telling the people that, when the ship arrives, they are to seize the King, and kill the white people as they are only a few. I should not be surprised at any moment to hear that the troops are in laager, as the present temper of the country is anything but satisfactory."—*Mercury* (S. C.), Jan. 11th.

† *Dabulamanzi's* efforts to make plain the fact (which he had every right to suppose that the Government were ready to receive with a view to decreasing the size of the reserved country), viz. how large a proportion of its inhabitants were loyal to *Cetshwayo*, were always spoken of in indignant terms by the officials and their friends. He did nothing more, however, than investigation will show that he had a perfect right to do. Such "rumours" as the above are, of course, simply absurd, and have not the shadow of a foundation in fact.

‡ These men were authorities on the point, because they had received the telegraphic news of the King's departure at *Bishopstowe*, and had been told there by what day he might reasonably be expected. *Official* notice of the sort the people certainly never received.

"I am come to fetch you." But the policemen, when they saw who we were, men well known to them in Maritzburg as messengers to the Government and to Sobantu [the Bishop], gave in, saying, "Oh! is it you?" and let us alone. We left them sitting there in the road, and accompanied the headman to Somtseu. Said I, "So! we are to be shot down here!" "Yes, truly," said the headman, "if you had made any resistance, they were to fire upon you, and, if you had escaped, I was to be held responsible."

When we reached the camp, we found that Mr. Jan was there with his brother and the latter's son [Mr. A. Shepstone]. In another tent were Mr. Jan's Indunas, Luzindela, Tom, and Mtungwana, and Somtseu's [Sir T. S.] Induna, Mqundane, sitting eating beef with Palane, Habana, and some of their men. Mqundane came out to us, saying, "So! is it you? Why, then, did you not come in yesterday, since you had arrived?" Said we, "Where was the need of hurrying? The King has not arrived yet. Sobantu told us to go and tell Mnyamana that the King was now coming, and that we should just be in time to meet him here, and should find Somtseu here too." Luzindela tried to make out that we had come to Mr. Jan. But we said, "No such thing! We have come to meet the King with Somtseu." Mqundane announced us and took us in to Somtseu. He said, "What! is it you who have been carrying letters from Sobantu, and telling the people that the little whiteman Mr. John has no commission, and speaks falsely if he says that the land is to be cut off?" * Said we, "We have nothing to do with the present state of affairs in

* "We learn that Dabulamanzi has been at his old games again, sending round on the sly to the people, telling them not to believe what Mr. John Shepstone tells them, as the whole of the country is to be given back to Cetshwayo, and all who say they wish to be under the English Government will be killed. It remains to be seen whether this troublesome chief will be allowed any longer to propagate falsehood and foment intrigue." Telegram sent by Mr. John Shepstone.

The correspondent of the *Advertiser* remarks upon the above that the statement is glaringly false, and "must have originated in either an insane or spirituously-excited brain. And," he continues, "were proof to the contrary required, the fact of only eight mounted men being drawn up on the beach to receive the King would show that such an idea never entered the heads of those in authority." As we have already seen, what Dabulamanzi did tell them was that

southern Zululand, nor with those words which you say have been spread. We were told by Sobantu to tell Mnyamana that the King is now coming, and to come on and meet him here with you. Who are they that have accused us, that you should treat us as enemies and arrest us? Set them here before us! You know us, Sir, well enough; have we concealed words from you? We do not deny that we have brought telegrams. We answer nothing to the charge made against us, but ask you to set your informant before us.* This he refused to do, and told us to return to the kraal at which we had slept. But we said, "No, Sir! we have come to meet the King, and here he is arriving!" "No!" said he, "Do you want to run and tell him that I have been ill-treating you?" and he insisted that we should go back to the kraal. "He had some business to attend to now, and he would send for us, when the time was come for us to see the King." The King landed that very day; but night came, and Somtseu had not sent for us.

Well! we went away as ordered, though we had great difficulty in persuading *Melakanya* to go. And Mqundane told us that the order was that, "if any Zulu showed his face on the shore, the soldiers would speak to him with bullets. Only Natal natives might remain." And presently we saw all the Zulus, who had gone down to different parts of the shore, running back in troops, saying that they had been threatened with bullets. Their numbers could not be counted by tens; they were more like 900 or 1000. We did not speak with Mr. John, who went off in John Dunn's carriage just after we arrived.† From the kraal where we slept we could not see the shore because of the bush.

as the Queen had said that only land enough for those adverse to Cotshwayo was to be reserved, they had the matter in their own hands. But as Mr. J. Shepstone was doing all he could to induce the people to be what he called "*staunch to us*," i. e. to reject their King, he, of course, highly objected to Dabulamanzi's proceedings.

* Mr. J. Shepstone had just (between 7th and 11th January) reported to Sir T. Shepstone that Dabulamanzi and *messengers from Bishop Colenso* were said to be making these very assertions [3616, pp. 4-16]. By thus reproaching these respectable men, who had lately been at Bishopstowe, and bore a very different character from that of the wandering Natal natives Faneyana & Co., Sir T. Shepstone would appear to have accepted the accusations against the Bishop as well as against Dabulamanzi.

† An encouraging sight for the Zulus!

Sir T. Shepstone speaks of these men as "belonging to Umnyamana," and as calling themselves "messengers from Bishopstowe in Natal." This way of putting it is merely an echo of Mr. J. Shepstone's accusations against the Bishop of Natal, as the men were messengers *from* Umnyamana *to* Bishopstowe. Sir T. Shepstone also complains that they *did not wait for his introduction*, yet from his own words "I promised that *when Cetshwayo should be landed* I would have them introduced" [3616, p. 41], it is plain that he, personally, prevented these men from being present at the King's landing. When, unable to wait any longer, they went of their own accord to Cetshwayo *next morning*, Sir T. Shepstone had not yet sent for them, as proved by his words "they did not wait for my introduction."

Every precaution, in fact, was taken to prevent a large and enthusiastic gathering of Zulus to greet the King on landing. No official notice of the day having been given, such Zulus as found their way to the spot in good time were either misled, or frightened into retiring. The authorities wished that the landing should be conducted in as quiet and private a manner as possible, and laid their plans accordingly. The *Natal Witness* correspondent says:

"It had come to the ears of the 'authorities' at Government House that a very considerable number of Zulus, including Dabulamanzi's son, if not Dabulamanzi himself, resident in the annexed district, were going down to Port Durnford to meet the King, by way of protesting against the annexation and learning from Cetshwayo's own lips if it were really a fact, as they declined to credit Mr. John Shepstone's statement. Mr. John Shepstone left Entumeni on the

7th, arrived at John Dunn's place on the 9th, and slept there, riding on next morning with an ex-magistrate of John Dunn's to Port Durnford, where he ordered the Zulus assembled on the beach to retire, under threat of being fired upon—in other words, 'singed with bullets [*natsha izinhlamvu*].' These Zulus had to be cleared out of the way—presumably by Sir H. Bulwer's orders—before the landing was effected. The fact that this threat was uttered, rests, we believe, on indisputable evidence, and no doubt will ere long be made a subject of considerable inquiry. Having, by means of this threat, sent the Zulus away from the beach, Mr. John Shepstone disappeared again, leaving those who had charge of the landing arrangements to carry them out, undisturbed by the presence of any of Cetshwayo's subjects."

And on January 11th the Maritzburg correspondent of the *Daily News* telegraphs, "No official intimation has been given to the Zulus of Cetshwayo's return at a certain date. Hence many hesitate to move and welcome him. This hesitation will be officially represented as hostility or indifference." On the same day the *Advertiser* S. C. telegraphs to Durban, "Very few come to meet him"; and a Durban telegram is sent to England, "Very few chiefs came to meet the Zulu King."

The Government might have had reasons which seemed to them to be sufficient for smuggling Cetshwayo on shore quietly. It is quite possible that Sir Henry Bulwer and Sir T. Shepstone were really apprehensive that disturbances might arise from a great gathering of the whole Zulu people at Port Durnford. Such anxiety may have arisen because they thought that in their joy at the return of their King, the Zulus might be carried away by the excitement of the moment into rioting, which, begun in good part perhaps, might end in blows. Or fears of disturbances may have been dictated by their knowledge of how exceedingly unpopular would be some of the "conditions" of the restoration—such as the practical annexation by England of a third of Zulu-

land, and the exaltation of Zibebu to a rank almost equal to Cetshwayo's own.

Whatever the cause, genuine anxiety on the part of the authorities to prevent a collision, which they honestly believed might result from a very large gathering of Zulus to meet the King on landing, could hardly have been censured by any one. In that case the reason would have been plainly stated, and both Cetshwayo and the public should have been given to understand that the fact of the Zulus not having crowded to welcome him *on landing* was no measure of their real feelings towards the King, but the result of express orders on the part of the authorities, and of threats from their subordinates. Instead of any such explanation, every effort was made to lead the public to believe that, as the *Natal Mercury* telegraphed home to the *Times*, "Zulus do not want, and never have wanted, the King." Sir T. Shepstone, although it was his own subordinates who had warned the people from the shore with the threat of bullets, and he himself had ordered Melakanya and his fellows to wait for a summons which had not come the morning after the King's arrival [3616, p. 41], thought himself justified in assuring Cetshwayo "that no such influences were being used as far as I knew" [*ibid.*], and in expressing in his official report his surprise at the little enthusiasm created amongst the Zulus by the reappearance of their King [*ibid.*, p. 58]. Such a phrase can only refer to the actual landing, at which the people were not allowed to be present to show their enthusiasm, for, when the few

days necessary to spread the news had elapsed, all accounts agree in describing the joyous greetings received by Cetshwayo, though the unfriendly correspondents seldom fail to use the word "apparent" on such occasions.*

The circumstance of the Zulus being driven away by threats from the shore having been published in the *Daily News*, Lord Derby telegraphed to Sir Henry Bulwer for an explanation [3466, p. 254]. The Governor referred the matter to the Commandant, who, of course, "knows nothing about what is stated in *Daily News*," but referred it to the officer in command of the escort. That officer equally of course replied that no such threats had been used, and Sir Henry Bulwer telegraphed back that there was "*no foundation*" for the statement [3466, p. 267]. But no one had ever said that the threat was a military one. It was made quite independently of the military authorities, so that the honest denial of the officers in command served a most dishonest purpose.

The Zulu story continues:—

Next day we got up early and made for the tents. There was Mqundane, Sir T. S.'s *induna*, who said, "Well! where were you

* "It is obvious, from our correspondent's faithful picture of what took place at the various camping-grounds, that Cetshwayo is being warmly welcomed back by his people. Privately we learn that he is being received with open arms, and that the Zulus are really rejoicing greatly that Cetshwayo is once more back amongst them. This is a fact about which there can be no doubt, and which should not be ignored, whatever may be thought, or said, of the lesson it teaches or the results likely to accrue from it." Ed. *Advertiser*, January 17th.

yesterday? Why did you not come?" Said we, "You know that we were waiting to be called, according to Sir T. Shepstone's orders that we were not to go alone and inform (*ceba*) against him." We went on and found them loading the King's baggage on a wagon, and we set to work and helped—when suddenly there was the King himself close to us! I shall dream of it when I am dead and buried. He knew us at once, and asked us where we came from, and we said "From Sobantu, and since from Mnyamana." We told him that Mnyamana had been ordered to build a kraal for the King near Ulundi, and had refused to do so, as we have described. Said the King, "I know all about the kraal; the white men have told me. My father, Mnyamana, however, was quite right." We said that Mnyamana also had told us to tell him that he would have been with us himself to see if the King was really coming, but he did not know what HAMU and ZIBEBU might do in his absence, and that the royal women had said that they would start directly Mtokwane came back and said that he had seen the King, but not before, and not for any one else's calling. We told also what Mr. Jan had been saying about cutting off the land. The King said, "So you have been told that the Umhlataze is to be the boundary of Zululand instead of the Tugela?" We said, "We don't understand it; but Mr. Jan said so." Said he, "I too begin to hear something of the sort" [i. e. at the Cape, not in England].

The King sent us to tell Mnyamana to come to him, and to bring the Zulu people, and his wives and children, but to bring them gently and not hurry them.

But, before we started (Jan. 12th), *Palane's* people had arrived to greet the King, among them the very men who had been with *Palane* to Mr. Jan the day before, swarming around him, men and women, till the soldiers exclaimed, "What! the King is beloved by the women also!" Even the old women insisted on being helped with an arm, and brought to him. Soon after we started we met one of the King's mothers, the *Inkosikazi* of the *Dukuza* Royal kraal, going with a party to meet him. We heard afterwards that she was quite overcome when she reached him, weeping and sobbing there at the wagon till she had to be carried away fainting.*

* With characteristic good taste and feeling, Mr. Carter writes of this scene as follows:—"Next came half a dozen wizened and worn old ladies, one of whom was related to his Majesty. She, making more bold than any who had preceded her, put her head on

And all that day as we went, we kept meeting streams of people going to the King, having now heard for certain that it was he himself. For the word had been widely spread that it was not Cetshwayo whom Somtseu was bringing back, but Mbulazi [Cetshwayo's brother, whom many of the Zulus believe to be still alive and hiding in Natal, though he was killed in the Zulu Civil War of 1856].* It was this belief which made Palane move his cattle to begin with, across the Umhlatuze; the huts were not moved, nor the women and children, and the cattle were driven back again as soon as it was certain that it was Cetshwayo.†

the footboard of the vehicle and simply howled until requested and able to subdue her emotion.”—*Merc.* S. C. Jan. 10.

* “All kinds of absurd reports are going round the country, relating to the settlement of the Reserve. One is to the effect that Mbulazi, Cetshwayo's brother, who was killed at the Tugela in Mpande's time, has turned up alive, and is to be given the Reserve. This report is firmly believed by many of the natives.”—*Corr. from Hlubi's District, Times of Natal*, Jan. 17. Sir T. Shepstone mentions the same belief on the part of the Zulus [3616, p. 41].

† Sir T. Shepstone writes of Palane's arrival. “Shortly after we had resumed our journey, a headman with about 150 followers came up to the vehicle in which Cetshwayo was travelling, with loud expressions of welcome and assurances of loyalty and devotion, driving a fine ox as an offering; he declared that he had kept his people together during Cetshwayo's absence, that he had never gone to the white, nor to the black, and that now he presented the people as a body undiminished to their rightful chief; the boundary, he intimated, was but a nominal thing, and that it did not matter on which side of it people lived; and these professions were vociferously, and with the greatest apparent heartiness, assented to by the people.” The writer proceeds to describe the very different terms in which the same chief had spoken to him the day before Cetshwayo's arrival, and how he had actually begun to move across the river to avoid being under Cetshwayo, and he points out how difficult it is to gather from the professions of the Zulus a correct estimate of their real feelings. “The sequel has, I understand, proved, as I believed at the time it would prove, that the loudest professions were not the truest.” It is difficult to understand what was meant by this latter general phrase, since, as a rule, it has been

“Ngcongewana told us that the King had been landed roughly—that he was pushed into the sea some way off from the beach, and had to walk ashore, all wet and buffeted by the waves, and his luggage was knocked about, and some of it broken and carried away by the water.”

The Zulus having been prevented from seeing Cetshwayo's landing, this gap in their story must be supplied as well as may be from the accounts of the European correspondents of the Colonial and English papers. The *Briton* arrived on the morning of Wednesday the 10th of January. No attempt, however, was made to land Cetshwayo and his party till

precisely the Zulus whom the officials always styled “loud” in their loyalty to Cetshwayo, who have proved it most completely, both at the time, and before Sir T. Shepstone wrote, and ever since. But Palane's altered tone is easily explained by his utter disbelief in the King's return (although he had, of necessity, to assume in his speech the truth of what the “authorities” told him) and the pressure of British influence brought to bear upon the Zulus to the south of the Umhlatuze. Sir T. Shepstone's whole implication in this passage is that the loyalty expressed by the Zulus generally to Cetshwayo was unreal, or frequently so, and that their expressions in favour of his return must not be taken as showing their real wishes, and he gives this story to illustrate this opinion. But it would rather seem to tell the other way. There was nothing to prevent Palane's carrying out his first expressed intentions, and crossing into the Reserve, except that when his own eyes told him that the King had indeed returned, he had no longer any wish to do so. Later on, indeed, when it became apparent that the Natal Government were opposed to Cetshwayo's interests, he deserted again to the Reserve, being a man of weak character, who did not prove staunch to any side. But in this he was quite an exception to the general rule with regard to those who professed warm loyalty to Cetshwayo, and most of them supported him to the last. Palane was one of those whom official influence made disloyal; if rightly exercised, it would have kept him loyal and content.

the afternoon, the authorities thereby losing the chance of landing them with any comfort as the surf was sure to become boisterous later in the day. The King took a very courteous farewell of the officers, and descended into the life-boat, the guard of marines on the poop presenting arms. He managed to take his seat in the stern without much difficulty, and without the slightest discomposure, maintaining the same smiling countenance as when saying "good-bye." He seemed to enjoy the trip to the cargo-boat, distant about a mile, and laughed at his followers about their fears, &c. He was obliged to scramble up the side of the cargo-boat, and had some difficulty in maintaining his footing, but was the loudest in laughing at the difficulties of his four friends, who were fairly rolled on board. On nearing the shore he eagerly scanned those assembled, and seemed disappointed to find that they consisted almost entirely of white men, viz. Sir Theo. and Mr. A. Shepstone, Colonel Curtis, eight other officers in undress uniform, eight mounted infantry, five Natal natives, servants of Sir T. Shepstone, and about thirty other soldiers, with their trowsers turned up and their jackets off, lounging about. Besides these there were two or three traders who were acquainted with the King, and who had come to see him land, and not more than half a dozen of his subjects.*

* An eye-witness states that the on'y Zulus present, on being released from the tow-rope, hastened to give the royal salute "Bayete!" to their King, who recognised them at once, and on one of his attendant chiefs saying "Who are these?" replied, "Do

Owing to there not being sufficient depth of water, the surf-boat could not be brought close up to the beach, and remained at some yards' distance, with about two feet of water between her and the shore. The height of the boat's stern above the water was at least four feet, and the height above the beach at least six, and down from this height the whole party, women as well as men, had to jump, assisted, or rather dragged, by the soldiers who waded into the water for the purpose. There were two mule wagons on the beach, and, had one of these been backed into

you not see them? They are Majiya's boys." N.B. One of the King's wives is a daughter of Majiya.

The officials had laid their plans very craftily, not merely for disappointing the King, but for minimising any appearance of enthusiasm on the part of the Zulus, and securing that the absence of "devoted and loving subjects" should be reported to England at the very first moment, as by the special correspondent of the *Natal Mercury* and *London Times*. But the matter was very soon explained to Cetshwayo by Mr. Mullins [special correspondent for the *Daily News*], who rode out into the surf and told him that numbers of Zulus, who had come to receive him with open arms, had been driven away from the shore by the order of the authorities, and who had a second interview with him later that same day, at which he says the King told him, "You were quite right in what you said to me on the beach about the people being prevented from coming to welcome me. I have now heard from one of Palane's people that they were there and were ordered off with the words "Be off! what business have you here? Ware bullets!" We have been having quite an argument about it, Somtseu [Sir T. Shepstone] and I, for I said, "This is not right that my people should be prevented from coming to me. Let them come and speak with you before me, that I may hear what they have to say." And at last he agreed that the old men might come. But I said "No! They must none of them be forbidden, not a child should be prevented from coming if it wishes."

the water, the party might have landed dry-shod and in perfect comfort. This, however, did not seem to occur to any one. On landing, which he did not accomplish without a wetting, Cetshwayo happened to get on the opposite side of the warp from Sir Theophilus. After surmounting this difficulty, and just as the King and Sir Theophilus held out their hands, a wave more intrusive than its predecessor interposed itself, causing a general recoil. After this they approached again and shook hands, but not very effusively on the part of the King, who, instead of remaining in conversation, almost immediately turned to watch the disembarkation of his impedimenta. He was apparently much more gracious when two Zulu traders approached him shortly after. All being stowed away in the mule wagons provided, the King himself declined to ride, saying that the walk would stretch his legs and do him good after being cooped up so long. He invited Sir Theophilus to accompany him on foot; but Sir T. very wisely declined to encounter more than a mile of heavy sand. So far the story is gathered from the accounts of the correspondents of the *Witness* and the *Advertiser*. The former having an intimate acquaintance with the Zulu King and people, their country, their customs, and especially their language, was not obliged to be dependent on official information, or on a prejudiced interpreter, and had therefore a great advantage over his brother correspondents. Accordingly, the *Mercury* S. C., Mr. Carter, decidedly objected to his presence. The following extract,

coarse and offensive in its tone as usual, is taken from the said Mr. Carter's account :

“The landing was an even more laughable incident than the transfer of the party from the *Briton* to her boats. The stern of the surf-boat could not be hauled up above the water line, and as the tide was rising, the chance of wetting was ample, especially to Kafirs fearful of the boisterous waves, and the natives too corpulent to be agile. Each of the ladies was drenched with the surf, entirely owing to their hesitancy. It was the same with the Indunas and their handboxes. One of the soldiers aiding in the disembarkation made a treble attempt to receive on his shoulders and carry high and dry the portly monarch. It was as if a steam hammer was set to crush up a nut when Cetshwayo, with his royal trousers turned up over the calf of the leg, slid over the stern on top of the soldier. [Cetshwayo, hesitating, while sitting on the gunwale of the boat, to take the leap which would land him on his native soil, was slightly helped—not exactly kicked—by Jack's toe to land, with a “Now out of this with your carcass, you black beggar!”* *Ibid.*] The latter was driven on to his knees, and, sliding over the head and back of the man, the King came down on his feet on the sand, and at the same moment an unfriendly wave swept in and drenched him up to the waist. Not in the least disconcerted by either the accident or the laughter of the spectators, he walked quietly on to dry land, and then, turning to the receding wave, shook his silver-headed cane at it. Sir T. Shepstone stepped towards Cetshwayo, proffering a hand and words of welcome; but in between the two lay the shore end of the warp. This rising a foot from the ground, and with the rock of the vessel, interposed a slight barrier. The Special Commissioner extended his hand across the warp, but Cetshwayo drew back with a motion of which the equivalent in words would be, ‘Wait a minute, there is plenty of time for our exchange of greetings;’ and the Commissioner of Her Majesty had to defer to the wish of His Majesty of Zululand North. [Sir T. Shepstone, coming to shake hands, had to wait the convenience of Cetshwayo, as the sea water rushed up between them, and Cetshwayo showed

* Probably the man, who so insulted the King, was not a British sailor, but a long-shore man belonging to the Port Elizabeth cargo-boat.

no desire to wet his feet to grasp the proffered hand. *Ibid.*]* Facing each other, the two principal actors in the scene, and on whom all eyes were turned, shook hands and spoke a few words; but His Majesty cut the ceremony short by advancing a few steps down the beach, and, beckoning to one of his Indunas, turned his back on every one, and, with legs astride, carried on an animated conversation with his follower on the subject of the landing of the rest of his baggage, the delivery of each bag and small package from the surf-boat to the beach engrossing the attention of the restored potentate. [She (the *Wolverine*) had already put ashore Cetshwayo's baggage—enough to load three wagons—in trunks, hampers, baskets, crates, bandboxes, and flimsy packing cases. A sideboard—or rather the remnants of one knocked almost into matchwood—formed part of the pile. *Ibid.*] One or two old traders in Zululand, who knew the King personally, advanced to his side and offered their hands, which the King shook, with a word of recognition, but without taking away his attention for a minute from the landing of his small effects. So he stood unapproachable, as it were, save to his Indunas, till he was asked to get into the light spring wagon provided for him; but he replied he would rather walk, and he did so all the way to the camp.”—[*Mercury* S. C. Jan. 10.]

Had there been any wish to do honour to the restored King, and so to carry out the intentions of the Home Government in the kindly spirit in which they were conceived, some attempts at display would certainly have been made. The music of a military band (the presence of which was especially prevented by Sir Henry Bulwer, *vide* Official Report), a few extra yards of bunting, some hearty cheers from the soldiers present, any signs of joy and good-fellowship would have changed the whole face of things in the

* “The manner in which he [Cetshwayo] treated Sir Theophilus on landing was almost tantamount to studied disrespect, and his haughty demeanour since has been the subject of remark by every one who witnessed the landing.”—*Mercury* S. C., Jan. 11.

eyes of all. Even as it was, with the cold frown of the officials upon all that concerned the King, the joy of the people would and did break forth, but what would it have been had all possible been done by the "official circle" to encourage enthusiasm, and to smile upon Cetshwayo's return? On the contrary, those officials were determined that no grace that was not absolutely compulsory should be shown to the Zulu King by them or those under their control. If he was welcomed at all it should be by the unaided—and, to the best ability of the officials, repressed—efforts of his people, and who does not know what a chilling influence may be cast on the most genuine enthusiasm by a cold and unsympathetic eye—especially when that eye is the eye of authority. "A sort of wet-blanketing, indescribable in detail," so the official method appeared to a bystander who was certainly not prejudiced in favour of Cetshwayo beforehand, but who soon remarked, "However one may object to the political error of his return, no one coming in contact with him can help admiring the man."*

In point of fact it must be evident to every unprejudiced reader that Cetshwayo displayed on this occasion a true magnanimity which placed him far above his persecutors as a human being. He had

* It is a curious proof of the feeling of the party against the King that even this correspondent, who plainly did his best to give a true picture of events, always *apologises* if he has any kindly remark to make about him. "I must plead guilty," "I must confess," &c.

just been grossly insulted (it is to be hoped that it was by "a mere colonist,"* and not by a sailor in the service of the dear old country), he was landed and received more like a prisoner, or a criminal on his way to gaol, than a King returning to rule his people. Acute, as his worst enemies acknowledge him to have been, he could not fail to be instantly aware of the grudging spirit in which the Natal officials received him, and the mere fact that the creature who had insulted him was not punished, nor even, it would seem, reproved, and that no apology even was made to the King for the occurrence,† must have identified the officials with the insult in any less generous

* The term "mere colonist" which has, on a previous occasion, given so much offence in Natal, has simply been misunderstood by those who would have a right to object to a contemptuous phrase as applied to themselves. The meaning of the expression, as it has been and now is, used, is "a colonist, *and nothing more*," i. e. a person who has no aims and object beyond selfish advancement, who looks upon the aboriginal inhabitants of the country to which he migrates, as having been solely created to serve him, and minister to his comfort, and who does not care at all for the welfare and honour of the mother country, except as far as his own personal interests are concerned.

† This, plainly, was the case, as there is not the smallest record of any such amends which, had the matter been felt as strongly as it should have been by the officials, must have been related. Indeed Sir T. Shepstone in his report, written long after the fact of the insult had been published, makes no allusion to it at all, but ignores it, and incidentally disposes of the attempted charge against Cetshwayo of "studied disrespect," &c., in one paragraph. "The landing, being on an open sandy beach, was inconvenient and disconcerting, and for the first few minutes Cetshwayo seemed excited, and a little bewildered. He soon, however, recovered his self-possession, and expressed his pleasure at meeting me" [3616, p. 41].

mind. He, however, evidently thought both the action and the person beneath his notice, and thereby saved the officials from a difficulty which they certainly did not deserve to escape. His quiet and undemonstrative manner was due to the exigencies of Zulu etiquette, but, under the circumstances, it must have demanded a determined self-control of which the officials took advantage though they did not acknowledge it.

In Sir T. Shepstone's report of the King's landing and installation, he proceeds to bring a serious charge against him, which is, however, as usual, founded upon anonymous information [3616, p. 42].*

"In the evening" he says, "intelligence was brought from a little distance inland that, shortly after he had landed, and during his walk to the camp from the beach, Cetshwayo had sent a message to the Zulu people by one of the Zulu pioneers engaged on the beach, the native [? one of Sir T. Shepstone's Natal natives] who brought this intelligence had himself, he said, heard the message being repeated by the Zulus to each other, to the effect that Cetshwayo wished it to be known that he had returned; that he desired all the people to come and meet him with offerings of welcome; that they were to disregard the alleged curtailment of his territory; that he had heard nothing in England of the Umhlatuzi river being the boundary; that it was only a Natal device, which he would defeat."

Sir T. Shepstone could not say that Cetshwayo had not a perfect right to send the first part of this

* As the accusation is the same as that brought by Mr. J. Shepstone, and as the latter had visited his brother "to confer with" him "on the proceedings of Dabulamanzi," the day before Cetshwayo landed, it is not difficult to see where he got his suspicions.

message, though he *implies* some blame by writing [*ibid.*]

“he justified, or excused his having sent this [portion of the] message by saying that it had been foretold [by the whites] that he would not be welcomed, and he wished to counteract the influences which he believed were being used to keep the people from coming to him with the object of making this prediction appear to be true.”

This was the actual fact, and it argues singular ignorance on the part of Sir T. Shepstone, as to the doings of his subordinates, that he could write “*I assured him that no such influences were being used as far as I knew.*” The spirit in which his mission was undertaken is plain enough from his own words [*ibid.*], that he

“did not interfere with the messengers which at all our halting places he (Cetshwayo) sent to the people throughout the country, especially to the Reserved Territory, because, after the explanation he had given me on the evening of his landing, I did not wish to restrict his efforts to procure for himself a reception and welcome that might have the appearance of being general and hearty.”*

As England had decided to restore Cetshwayo it should have been her Commissioner’s part to assist, and not merely to refrain from preventing his satisfactory reception—far less to hinder it.

The words attributed to the King about the

* The *Advertiser* S. C. writes that on this occasion Sir T. Shepstone informed Cetshwayo that “the final act of restoration would take place at such time as he (Cetshwayo) might consider most convenient, with a view to notifying his people to be present. Therefore, of course he sent messengers “throughout the country.”

Reserved Territory were altogether denied by him, but Sir T. Shepstone says:—

“I met with abundant evidence to show not only that this repudiation could not be relied on, but that in the speeches which he frequently addressed to the different groups of people who came to see him along our route, he usually made identical *or similar* statements.” *

Had Cetshwayo really acted in this manner he would have shown himself a mere imbecile instead of the able and sagacious man which Sir. T. Shepstone himself had previously represented him to be. “Cetshwayo is a man of considerable ability,” he wrote in 1873, “much force of character, and has a dignified manner; in all my conversations with him he was remarkably frank and straightforward, and he ranks in every respect far above any native chief I have ever had to do with” [c. 1137]. And again, he speaks of the “great ability and frankness” of Cetshwayo, and of the “straightforward manner” in which he insisted on his councillors “going direct to the point.” Yet he now suspects him of the most puerile conduct, of doing daily and openly what he at the same time assured Sir T. Shepstone he was not doing, and when such denial would have been perfectly useless had he really done that with which he was charged. For, be it remarked, there could be no concealment, since the “groups of people” (not a few individuals, but hundreds at a time) met him upon the open road, and there was nothing to prevent any of the officials or their subordinates from

* Author's italics.

hearing every word that passed. That they frequently did so is evident both from the newspaper reports and from Sir T. Shepstone's own mention of what was said by one and another, but that he never himself heard anything of the sort which he here describes is plain from his own phraseology, "I met with abundant evidence to show," and "it was frequently brought to my knowledge," though we do not hear how, or by whom.

But Cetshwayo never made the speeches attributed to him. In reply to the questions naturally put to him by his people as to the truth of what they had heard of his having signed away half of their country he spoke precisely as he had spoken to Sir Hercules Robinson at the Cape.

He maintained that what he had promised in England, when only "one small tract near the Tugela" was to be reserved for any who did not wish to live under him, differed materially from the conditions which he was compelled to sign in Capetown, by threats of not being restored at all, if he did not sign them; and he said that these last emanated from Natal (Sir H. Bulwer), not from the Queen—all which was perfectly true. While he was further entirely justified in concluding that if—as became more obvious day by day—no considerable number of Zulus could be found "who did not wish to live under him," then none of the country could be cut off, since the supposed existence of such Zulus was the only reason given for such a partition, the English Government repudiating any annexation.

And so reports Mr. J. Mullins, who was the first to greet him at Port Durnford, having received many kindnesses from the Zulu King during his life as a trader in the country :—

“I asked the King ‘How he came to agree to conditions such as we have heard of?’ He said ‘It was not that I agreed to them, I had no choice given me. I was told that the country was to be cut off from the Umhlatuze, and that to the north also a large piece was to be cut off for Zibebu, and, that, if I did not sign, I should never return but remain always at the Cape. So I signed under protest, knowing that the land belongs to my people, and that I had no right to sign it away without their consent, and trusting that, as the English Government had listened to my prayer once, they will do so again, and set this thing right and restore to us our country, *and this is what I shall tell my people when they inquire of me how I came to do this thing, and I shall tell them that they must be patient and quiet meanwhile.*” (Author’s italics.)

As Mr. J. Shepstone writes (January 16th, 1883, [3616, p. 12]) :—

“The object Cetshwayo has in sending messages is obvious, viz. to show to the satisfaction of the Government that no necessity for a reserved territory exists; this I am convinced of from the wording of the messages.”

Thus, from the account of the official who had the best means of knowing, it is plain that the King’s messages were such as he was fully justified in sending, and from that of the correspondent of the *Advertiser* it would be seen that they were sent quite openly, and that Sir T. Shepstone directed him to send them.

The newspapers unfriendly to the King, of course eagerly seized upon this accusation against him. The following passage from the *Mercury S. C.* may be

given as a specimen of their unmeasured and unscrupulous hostility :—

“ In my last letter I referred to the desirability of some check being put upon Cetshwayo’s tongue, and some intimation being given him as to what would be more becoming in the conduct of one in his position. While I was writing, Her Majesty’s Commissioner was actually engaged in that necessary but disagreeable task ; and now, if Cetshwayo has any sense of shame left in him, if he has any love of truth in his soul, if he esteems those who speak the truth, and is averse to a lying tongue, he ought to be thoroughly abashed ; for by his own mouth it has been proved that his first act on being restored to his country was to lie to the people. He told them again and again that the whole of Zululand was his once more, and that the Queen had told him so, and there was therefore no reliance to be placed in the story circulated by Mr. John Shepstone, that the Umhlatuze was to be the boundary. Cetshwayo reiterated this falsehood so openly and freely, that it was absolutely necessary for the Special Commissioner to take notice of it, and he did so yesterday. Cetshwayo was summoned to speak with Sir Theophilus, and the latter read over to the King the conditions he had signed, and asked him if those were the conditions he had agreed to. Cetshwayo acknowledged that they were, but then renewed the complaint it is said he made at Capetown as to the injustice of the new settlement. That, however, was somewhat wide of the point at issue, and, as an excuse for his persistent lying since he has been in the country, is a poor one. . . . If Cetshwayo commences his career in Zululand by misleading the people and stating in regard to the conditions of his restoration what he knows to be untrue, it would be hardly fair to expect that his pledged word, either verbal or written, will be respected by him in regard to other matters.”—*Mercury S. C.*, Jan. 16.

The statements which Cetshwayo really made are borne out both by the official reports of his interviews with Lord Kimberley and, later, with Sir Hercules Robinson, and by the passage upon Zululand in the Queen’s Speech at the opening of Parliament, February 15th, as telegraphed to Natal :—

“ *It had been decided to restore to Cetshwayo the greater part of the*

territories under his rule before the Zulu War." So runs the telegram in the *Witness* and *Advertiser*; but, curiously enough, not a word of this appears in the *Mercury* and *Times*. As the *Witness* says (Feb. 17), "As everyone here is aware, Cetshwayo has not as yet had restored to him "the greater part" of these territories. He has had restored to him *less than a third of them*, while the best part of the country had been taken away."

While two of the three messengers from Umnyamana returned to tell him that the King had really come, that they had seen him with their own eyes, and that his wives and children were to be brought to meet him, but "gently" and without hurry, we may accompany the escort, with the King in charge, on their way to Emtonjaneni, where the re-installation was to take place. But Cetshwayo was still treated virtually as a prisoner: the escort was manifestly a guard of honour to Sir T. Shepstone, but only a prison-guard to the King. There was a marked contrast in this respect between British and Colonial treatment of Cetshwayo. In England such slight restraints as had previously been imposed upon him were removed from the moment the Queen's pleasure with regard to his release had been communicated to him, and the terms of his restoration accepted. He was then a free man and a sovereign once more, and the difference was quietly but unmistakably marked by the removal, on departure from England, of the prefix "ex" from the luggage which had been addressed at Capetown "ex-King Cetshwayo."

Before he returned to the Cape the Earl of Kimberley had indicated this change in his despatch

to Sir Hercules Robinson, "conveying instructions as to the King's treatment during the interval before his restoration" [3466, p. 115], saying that "no renewal of the former act for his detention would, under present circumstances, be required," and that "Cetshwayo should, of course, be treated with every consideration." The only caution imposed being that "careful attention should be paid to his proceedings in order that Sir H. Bulwer may be made acquainted with any matters which may affect Zulu affairs."

"You will, I am sure, bear in mind that all communications with Cetshwayo connected with his restoration should be carried on in such a manner as to encourage him as much as possible to look upon the British Government permanently as his friend."

Such were the kindly intentions of the Home Authorities, but there is no sign of their having been carried out by the Natal officials. Cetshwayo is said to have "complained that he did not like being treated as a prisoner in his own country," and this may very well be true, although it was stated by the S. C. of the *Natal Mercury*. The same writer speaks of "the place which belongs to the King, and which was proper for one in his position, a prisoner, by the grace of his conquerors, suffered to return under certain restrictions." Sir T. Shepstone's own report, supplemented by the newspapers, shows that this was precisely the position he was required to occupy, and that the special "consideration" and friendliness prescribed by Lord Kimberley were conspicuous by their absence. Describing the first

day's journey from Port Durnford, Sir T. Shepstone writes [3616, p. 43]:—

“The day had been hot and our first march tedious, because we travelled but slowly, and stopped frequently to admit of the people living near our route satisfying themselves, by seeing and speaking to Cetshwayo, that it was really he.

“The recognitions were always clamorous, and sometimes touching. In the evening I sent to Cetshwayo to express my hope that the day's journey had not been very fatiguing to him, and to tell him that in consequence of the heat and unhealthy nature of the Umhlatuzi valley which we had already entered, and which would, from that point, take us two days to traverse, it would be necessary to start very early on the following morning. He sent back to say that he could not possibly start at all next day, so great was the fatigue that he felt.”

Cetshwayo was no longer a young man, being over 50 years of age at this time, and he had spent three years in captivity, living a sedentary life, and suffering much in health in consequence, but still more from anxiety of mind. No doubt he was much knocked up by the fatigue and excitement of the first day's travelling, combined with the disappointment so wantonly inflicted upon him by the authorities at his landing. However, Sir T. Shepstone persisted in requiring that he should start again early on the morrow, and, as Cetshwayo still demurred, requesting that a Zulu kraal might be chosen in the neighbourhood where he could rest until he felt able to resume his journey, the Special Commissioner threatened him with the departure of the troops, accompanied by himself (Sir T. Shepstone), if he did not submit. Cetshwayo was far too anxious to keep on good terms with England to offend her repre-

sentative, and therefore gave way, though he did so saying, "it is death either way," meaning that both staying and proceeding were equally bad. Without a very sufficient reason, this conduct on the part of Sir T. Shepstone was arbitrary and inconsiderate, and it must be acknowledged that such reason is not shown. It would almost appear that he was needlessly alarmed about the "heat and unhealthy nature of the Umhlatuzi valley, as, although it took more than "two days to traverse" it, nothing more was said upon the subject of its unhealthiness. The Lieut.-General commanding in South Africa reports on February 11th the return of the troops, writing [3616, p. 21], "The health of the men has been very good, there being but one case of enteric fever at present. The loss amongst the animals has been only six horses, one mule, and two oxen;" while Sir T. Shepstone himself telegraphs from Etshowe, on his return, "Just reached here, all well." Had the valley been so unwholesome at the time as to make it imperatively necessary to put aside Cetshwayo's wishes and comfort, the two days and nights which could not be avoided would surely have produced more serious effects than the "slight attacks of fever" [3616, p. 16] reported as having occurred amongst the troops, and all but one of which had disappeared by January 31st. But supposing the move to have been necessary, the necessity might certainly have been placed before the King in a more courteous fashion. Sir T. Shepstone "sent" what may be called his orders, instead of visiting the King

to explain the matter personally, and he overcomes the latter's objections, not by the apology which was certainly due, but by threats. Nor, if there were any sufficient grounds for the Commissioner's first-mentioned reason, can the same be said of his second, the palpable invalidity of which somewhat weakens the effect of the first? Sir T. Shepstone writes:—

“I then reminded him [Cetshwayo] that the troops were neither mine nor his, but the Queen's; that they could not remain in Zululand longer than the service they were engaged upon could reasonably be expected to require.”

No precise limit had been, or could be, placed to the use of the troops, and Her Majesty the Queen, we may believe, would certainly not have considered an occasional day's rest, when the Zulu King felt that he required it, as beyond what could “reasonably be expected” from his escort. From the accounts given by the special correspondents very scant ceremony seems to have been accorded to the King and his party, and the correspondent of the *Mercury* appeared throughout to consider that it was an almost intolerable insolence on the part of Cetshwayo to be a King, so that the smallest signs of his knowing himself to be one was unendurable indeed.

The *Witness* S. C. writes:—

“It was related or alleged how he had kept his escort waiting some morning for a couple of hours because it did not suit his pleasure to pay attention to *reveille*, and how, on one occasion, his womenfolk were so indisposed to leave their beds that some of the soldiers had found it necessary to pull their tent about their ears, as a gentle reminder that it was morning and time to get up, and

that they were still somewhat under the care of the British Government."

The party "reached the highlands of St. Paul's Mission on the 14th, and stayed over the 15th to reorganise and rest the cattle. On the latter day I had my first formal interview with Cetshwayo . . .*" writes Sir T. Shepstone [3616, p. 44], and then relates how he read over the conditions of restoration, asking the King when he had done so with each, "whether that was what he had understood in England, or Capetown; and to each he replied in the affirmative. He spoke, however, strongly . . . against the curtailment of territory north and south; of the hardship of being compelled to live side by side with Dunn and Zibebu; went into the particulars of his conversations with Lord Kimberley and Sir Hercules Robinson, and the conclusive answers which, as he thought, he had given to each of these authorities on different points; he concluded with these words, 'After all the whole country is yours; you will yourselves see the inconvenience which your arrangements cause and remove it yourselves; I still hope.'"[†]

At this interview, Sir T. Shepstone laid it down, as absolutely essential, "that the Zulus, and especially the young men, should not approach the camp, or be present at the ceremony of installation, armed, and that I should prefer that the young men kept away altogether. . . My fear of the consequences, if this stipulation were not strictly enforced, was amply justified by our subsequent experience."

* "He then went on to speak very gratefully of what the English people had done for him, and wished that it might be his good fortune to find an enemy to the English within his reach; how gladly he would fight for them, he said, and mix his blood with theirs. He spoke warmly on this subject, forgetting probably that the condition which forbade his re-establishing the Zulu military system would deprive him of the power of showing his gratitude in this way." [3616, p. 44.] Thus writes Sir T. Shepstone, "forgetting probably" that a call for assistance from the English would at once annul that condition.

† Cetshwayo's inextinguishable faith in England arose from his appreciation of the national character at its best. His belief clung to him to the last, and may be said to have caused his death. Had he not believed in England, he would, humanly speaking, be alive and happy now. It is a sad assertion for a loyal English writer to have to make, but no good will ever come to our country through denial or concealment of the truth.

What was meant by this last sentence is known only to the writer, as not the smallest disturbance occurred to justify his "fears," and he himself reports on Jan. 29th, "Installation carried out this afternoon successfully and most satisfactorily," and the party returned to Natal without annoyance of any sort. But the common sense of the stipulation in itself must be called in question. Cetshwayo—newly arrived, kept in complete subjection, denied all power except purely moral influence, while that influence was lessened as much as possible by the studied contempt with which he was treated by those who had him in their hands—was required to prevent the Zulus from coming armed to meet him. Meanwhile the conditions on which the latter were expected to obey were these. To come altogether unarmed would have been a total reversal of the established habits of the people. "Every Zulu is an armed man, and never moves without his weapon," wrote Colonel Durnford, R.E., in 1878 [2144, p. 237], and the statement is equally true to this day. Since this has been the case habitually and in times of peace, was it likely that the whole Zulu people would assemble together, doubtful as they were of British good faith, many of them uncertain as to whether the King had really returned, and all of them exceedingly anxious as to his safety? Nor was their anxiety vague and general only. Dunn had repeatedly threatened to prevent Cetshwayo's restoration by violence, and had even announced to the authorities through Sir Garnet Wolseley, that he intended to prevent it [3466, p. 1].

More formidable than Dunn, however, were Zibebu's threats. The tone of this chief varied according to the apparent intentions of the Natal Government to support or to brow-beat Cetshwayo, to an extent which makes it sadly evident that it needed but decided encouragement on the part of that Government to have induced Zibebu to submit quietly to the King. At one time he said, "If the King is brought back, I shall know it before any of you, and I shall be the first to go and meet him, and we shall have made it all up before you (the Usutus) arrive."

But then, again, after learning a little more of official feelings and intentions, he laughed at those who hoped for the King's return, saying, "If he is brought back, he will only be allowed to be a kinglet—a chief over a tribe, like the rest of us—not a King." Up to the very last it seems that he was still doubtful as to whether he should not go and pay homage to Cetshwayo, and his people declared afterwards that had the King paid him the attention of sending for him, he should have obeyed. But the official circle made a special point of preventing this—it would not at all have suited their ideas for Zibebu to recognise Cetshwayo as his King. So when Zibebu rode into the camp on January 27th with about 40 armed and mounted followers,* he went away again after an interview with Sir T. Shepstone, without making any attempt to see

* Sir T. Shepstone says "about a dozen," but apparently he did not see them all, as every other account speaks of "forty," and the *Mercury S. C.* adds, "He left the main body of his followers some miles behind."

Cetshwayo.* But before this, about the time of the King's landing, reports had spread amongst the Sutus, especially the Prince's followers, over whom Zibebu had tyrannised so long that he (Zibebu) had evil intentions with regard to them, and that so soon as they should have started to greet the King, the chief *impis* would attack their homes, and those who remained in them. The rumour may have been without foundation, but after all that that particular branch of the Sutus had suffered at Zibebu's hands, it was not singular that they believed it, and hurried back to their kraals, having already set out to meet Cetshwayo when it reached them. No harm resulted however, except a little delay in their arrival at Emtongjaneni. They had also in their charge Cetshwayo's wives and children, and many other women, about 200 in all, and it was absurd to expect that in the disturbed state of the country they would travel across it unarmed.

Sir T. Shepstone makes a great deal of what he calls the "secret arming" of the Zulus, always maintaining, upon anonymous evidence, that it was done by the King's orders. Yet he says himself that Cetshwayo requested him to sanction his having a sufficient force of his own people to protect him, when the British escort should leave the country, as it was disturbed, and "a madman might kill him;" in

* "When asked if he meant to visit the King, he replied, 'Certainly not, *unless* ordered by Mr. Osborn.' That gentleman would give no such advice, neither would Sir J. Shepstone; rather, on the contrary, they all wished Zibebu away."

other words, Dunn might fulfil his threats or induce Zibebu to do it for him. The unfriendly newspapers always made a point of attributing this "arming," secret or otherwise, to what Sir T. Shepstone calls "the Usutu (or Cetshwayo's) party" [p. 45]; but Sir T. Shepstone himself writes that "most of this secret arming was, of course, adopted as a precaution against each other by the numerous sections who had for some days been assembling near us *awaiting the arrival of the Usutu party,*"* and it is plain enough that there was no difference in this respect between one tribe and another. It was *inevitable* that the order to come entirely without weapons would be disregarded, and Sir T. Shepstone's mistake was in giving an order which he knew beforehand could not and would not be obeyed, and the only result of which was to make it appear that Cetshwayo himself was acting in defiance of the Commissioner's wishes.

Sir T. Shepstone repeatedly refers this "secret arming" to Cetshwayo's instructions, and his despatch gives a *general impression* which is no less mischievous because it is somewhat intangible, that the King was acting in bad faith—that he was privately arming his people, with intentions unfriendly to the whites, while denying to the Commissioner, personally, that he was doing anything of the kind. What Cetshwayo denied we may feel sure he did *not* do, for all who knew him will agree with Sir T. Shepstone's estimate of him made a few

* Authors italics.

years before, that he was "remarkably frank and straightforward." But it does not appear that he did deny having given the command in a certain, and it would seem justifiable, sense. Sir T. Shepstone says that, in answer to his questions, Cetshwayo replied that he had sent messages directing his people to come armed, but "with the condition, however," that they "*were not to come armed to the camp.*" [3616, p. 47.] What more could the British Commissioner require? He certainly had neither the right nor the power to decide that one portion of the Zulu people throughout the country should be disarmed, while the remainder retained their weapons. The camp was his own ground, where he could command, and the Sutus, at all events, came to it unarmed.

A great deal was also made of what Sir T. Shepstone calls "the mysterious conduct of the Usutu party" [47], i. e. their supposed delay in coming to meet the King, which the Commissioner implies, and the correspondents assert, was in consequence of their having no real wish to see him restored. Indeed the *Mercury* did not hesitate to repeat once more the long-exploded slander about Ndabuko desiring to secure the crown for himself, and declares that he and Mnyamana, who "are the leaders of the Sutu party" "*will be the first to join Zibebu.*"* Had there been such delay it could have been accounted for more rationally by many another

* Subsequent events have so entirely annihilated this charge that it is only worth recording as an instance of bitter prejudice against all that belonged to Cetshwayo.

supposition. But upon a calculation of days and distances it becomes apparent that there was no real delay at all, and, therefore, no "mysterious conduct," on the part of the Usutu party. Until Mtokwane returned from Port Durnford after seeing the King, the Princes and Mnyamana had no certain knowledge of the truth, and the royal women had declared that they would not believe it except from Mtokwane's own lips. He and Melakanya, another thoroughly honest man, gave the story of their journey, without, of course, knowing that the question of time spent upon it would be raised, but simply in the usual minute Zulu fashion, which too often consists of an accurate but monotonous repetition of "we rose in the morning, travelled all that day, and slept at So-and-So's kraal" *da capo* to the end of the journey, but which in this case happens to prove useful. They left the King on January 12th, the third day after his landing, and late on the 7th day (Jan. 16) they reached Umnyamana and the royal women, having been five days on the road. As they are both of them practised and extremely active "runners" and carried such important news, we may conclude that their journey was performed as rapidly as possible, which, indeed, is shown by a comparison of time and distance and the very difficult and broken country through which lay their route. The kraal at which Umnyamana awaited them was as far, if not further, from Emtanjaneni, the place chosen for the reinstallation, as was the Inhlazatshe residence, and they "had audience" with Umnyamana upon January

17th.* On the 18th and 19th Mnyamana was sending out messengers to call the people, the 19th being also a day of heavy rain. On the following day (Jan. 20th) cattle were killed, on the 21st the meat (provisions for the road) was cooked, and on the 22nd the party started, but turned back on the 23rd and lost some time through the false report which reached them of Zibebu's intended attack. The parties reached the vicinity of the British Camp at Emtongjaneni on the 26th and considering that there were at least 200 women on foot amongst them besides children, and that Mnyamana himself is an old man, who also made the journey on foot, as he does not ride, they certainly do not appear to have loitered upon the way.† It is plain

* Showing that they must have arrived the previous evening only, too late to be received.

† Mr. Osborn incidentally confirms this in his "memorandum" of January 19th. He speaks of the cattle (310) which he is about to hand over to Cetshwayo, as having "left Inhlazatshe for this place (Emtongjaneni) about six days ago," and they had plainly not then arrived, as he refers with uncertainty to any that may possibly have died on the way. And Dr. Seaton writes:—"I learnt to-day the cause of the delay in the arrival of Mnyamana, Ndabuko, and Somkele. It seems that on Wednesday Ndabuko and Mnyamana were informed that Hamu and Zibebu had raised a large *impi*, and intended burning the kraals of the Sutu party. They therefore turned back. They returned again to the Imfolozi yesterday, but fully armed with war-shields and assegais. . . . [This is a mistake, they brought only, their small travelling-shields (*amahau*) not the (*izihlangu*) large war-shield]s. On being asked why they came armed when they had been ordered to come without, they replied, 'We have been eaten up once already—[i.e. after the meeting with Sir E. Wood at Inhlazatshe]—and do not want another dose; but we shall not appear before Somtseu [Sir T. S.] with arms.' The Sutu party and Somkele are expected to form a junction with Cetshwayo's people, and their united followings are due in camp to-morrow."—*Adv. S. C.* January 26th.

that there was no avoidable "delay" at all in their arrival, nevertheless great capital was made out of their supposed disinclination to appear. This was less remarkable on the part of the special correspondents, or others writing at the time, and who did not know the country, and could not judge of the distances to be crossed, but took their cue from the solemn official whisper "mysterious" delay. But it is somewhat singular to find the same mistake made by Sir T. Shepstone in his report, dated after his return to Natal. From what he says the reader must inevitably gather not only that "Umnyamana . . . and Undabuko still held back," and delayed the fulfilment of his mission by doing so, but that they were, meanwhile, not upon the road, but "in the valley near our camp," from whence, he says, they "held frequent communications with Cetshwayo" [p. 48], and where they were "still mustering in considerable strength." All this was written of "the 25th of January," but the main body of the Usutu, as we have seen, could not have reached the neighbourhood of the camp until the 26th. No doubt small parties, and individuals, had hurried on, impatient to get sight of Cetshwayo, although they would, of course, await the arrival of their principal chiefs before formally presenting themselves. This, and the manifest readiness on the part of Sir T. Shepstone to suspect sinister meanings in every action of "Cetshwayo's party," and to exaggerate the gravity of the situation,* may account for the assertion that

* And so point the moral of all the official jeremiads about the *danger* involved in any restoration of Cetshwayo.

“it is, however, quite certain that Cetshwayo was in constant communication with the heads (?) of this force.” But when he writes, “It is difficult even now (Feb. 27) to say with confidence whether the object of this was merely to protect Cetshwayo, when the ceremony should be over, or whether some other undertaking was contemplated,” and actually mentions as worthy of consideration an anonymous report sent in by Mr. Osborn, of intended violence to the white party, on the part of the Sutus, one is forced to the conclusion that either Sir T. Shepstone had lost his nerve and saw dangers in every bush, or else that the scare was part of the official policy to injure Cetshwayo in the eyes of the Home Government and public. After the sad and terrible circumstances at Isandhlwana, just four years previously, the civilians of the party might readily be excused for fancying dangers where in truth they did not exist, but due consideration of the very different circumstances of the case, added to the fact that the installation took place without the slightest sign of violence, actual or intended, should surely have prevented the introduction into a serious despatch—written afterwards by one whom most readers at home would take as an undeniable authority—of accusations and insinuations against the King, founded on the report of an unnamed “Zulu headman,” who, from Mr. Osborn’s own account, was evidently a traitor and a spy, and, as a personal knowledge of the Sutu leaders, their views and feelings, enables one to add, a liar as well.

The Zulus had, indeed, unhappily for us, shown how they could fight when attacked, but they have

never, in any of their dealings with the English, shown the least sign of a treacherous spirit, and Cetshwayo himself was above suspicion of such a thing, as well as above the folly of imagining that anything could be gained by it. Mr. Osborn's report was this:—

“My informant states that, owing to what he heard said by men of the Usutu party [this was before the main body could have arrived] he thought it behoved the authorities with the column to be on their guard. That the Usutu are all arming and coming to the re-installation armed. Cetshwayo had sent out word that they were to do so, and that those that had no shields and assegais should make them at once. It is alleged that Cetshwayo said that certain conditions will be promulgated by Sir T. Shepstone, to some of which he will agree, but there are some arrangements, which Sir T. Shepstone will make known, to which he intended to object; he alluded to the cutting off of portions of Zululand for the Reserved Territory, and for Zibebu, as this was not ordered by the Government in England, and was being done by Sir T. Shepstone, who has all along been against him [in this garbled edition of what Cetshwayo really did say, honestly and openly, to everyone, from Sir Hercules Robinson downwards, we probably have the grain of truth in this bushel of falsehood]. He has got Sir T. Shepstone in the open now, and, therefore, requires people to come armed. There is but a small company of soldiers here, who would be nothing for his people; at Isandhlwana they finished a large lot of soldiers, the few now here are of no account. It was also secretly mentioned by the Usutu that they contemplated stealing Cetshwayo during the night, so that Sir T. Shepstone would not be able to read the terms and conditions in his presence: he would thus be able to re-enter upon his position as King without any restriction” [3616, pp. 61 & 62].

Mr. Osborn calls this farrago of nonsense “information received by me privately *through a trustworthy channel,*” * yet continues [p. 62], “*My informant is a Zulu headman, who has opportunity of learning what*

* Author's italics in this and following sentence.

may be going on amongst the Usutu. I think it advisable that precautionary measures be taken for safety of the column."

One sentence from Sir T. Shepstone's despatch is sufficient to disprove the whole of this statement [3616, p. 52]. "He (Cetshwayo) stipulated that during the ceremony (of re-installation) he should sit close to me, and be near 'our own troops,' alluding to Her Majesty's soldiers." This stipulation was made immediately before the ceremony [29th January] and would certainly have been the last thing Cetshwayo would have desired had he arranged a treacherous attack with his people. Umtokwane says, "Of course the people with Mnyamana came armed, with the country in such a state of uncertainty, and reports flying about Zibebu; but they laid aside their arms when they approached Entonjaneni, and came to the meeting without them." The *false* rumours about Zibebu received colour from the true ones, viz. that, to quote Mnyamana's words, "Here is Zibebu, cutting off the land up here, taking also half [*the whole*] of what was called Mgojana's territory, saying that it is his." Most of Masipula's tribe* and some of Mnyamana's people lived in "what was called Mgojana's territory," but where he does not appear ever to have been able to exercise any authority, and, as we know, the beacons line gave to Zibebu

* Masipula was Prime Minister before Mnyamana, and his tribe is about as strong as the whole tribe of Zibebu's father, a large part of which did not recognise Zibebu on account of his disloyalty to the King.

a large portion of the Prince's land, which they had been promised should be restored to them. Sir Henry Bulwer imagined that by simply selecting a line of his own upon the map, and sending a Government surveyor to beacon it out, he could force these brave and independent people to give up their homes and lands to Zibebu, or else to submit to the latter, and desert the King. This was a fatal mistake. It would have needed a British army to enforce the decree.

If Sir T. Shepstone thoroughly refutes himself in the above sentence as to the King's feelings and intentions when the actual day of re-installation had come, he does so equally with regard to the previous interval while awaiting the arrival of the Zulu nation (or "Sutu party") at Emtonjaneni. He writes [3616, p. 46]:—

"On the second day after our arrival Cetshwayo sent to say he wished to go down towards the Ulundi to meet his brother Undabuko and the people [i. e. his wives and children, &c.] . . . I replied that I could not assent to the . . . request, because I had not yet given him over to the people. . . . Two days after this, however, I was surprised by the information that he had gone down without my knowledge, leaving camp very early, and returning about noon. I took no notice of this information having reached me."

Had Sir T. Shepstone taken notice of the information, i. e. had he made full inquiries into its truth, he would have discovered that it was entirely without foundation, as *Cetshwayo made no such expedition whatever*,* restraining his natural impatience to go to

* The writer is able to assert this on the best of authorities in the matter. Two natives were sent (with Government sanction)

meet his family and brothers, in obedience to Sir T. Shepstone's wishes. But, although this is the fact, it is plain from Sir T. Shepstone's belief and statement about the King's supposed private expedition, *that Cetshwayo might have made it had he chosen*. What, then, was to prevent his thus going down, joining the Usutus, and remaining away altogether? Had there been any such scheme as that suggested by Mr. Osborn's "trustworthy" informant for "stealing" the King, and murdering the escort, with Cetshwayo's connivance, the latter's escape from the camp would necessarily have been the first step taken, and according to Sir T. Shepstone's own showing, there was nothing whatever to prevent its being taken.

Sir T. Shepstone, indeed, while impressing in a general way upon his reader that his opinion was in no way affected by the smallest confidence in Cetshwayo's good faith, or in Mnyamana's word,* decides that "although such a project might be talked about, as," he says, "it evidently had been,

by the family at Bishopstowe in 1883 to announce formally to the King the loss of his best friend, the Bishop of Natal. They were old servants of tried honesty, *and they were the first and only messengers ever sent from Bishopstowe to Zululand*. They were directed to ask the King for the truth of this report, and they learnt from him personally that it was *entirely without foundation*.

* Sir T. Shepstone says, "I did not feel much confidence in Mnyamana's word." It is impossible to find any warrant for this insinuation against Mnyamana. In the official Blue-books we find that even Sir H. Bulwer and Messrs. Osborn and J. Shepstone speak of the staunch old Prime Minister with some respect and consideration.

by the young soldiers, it was far too hazardous a one really to attempt." The assertion, "it evidently had been," is based entirely upon the word of this Zulu headman, to whose warning it was not thought necessary to attend, and, in fact, only enough of the rumour is retained to give a general colour of danger to the enterprise, and of contemplated treachery on the part of Cetshwayo, for suspecting which there were never the faintest grounds. To those who have had any personal acquaintance with the King, the accusation is simply ridiculous.

Mtokwane continues, "On the 17th day (January 26th) we two were sent on to announce the royal women to the King. He told us to bring them on at once, which we did." The special correspondent of the *Advertiser* describes the scene as follows:—

"About 5 P.M. a great shouting was heard in the neighbourhood of the King's camp. I happened to be passing very near, although the thick mist and rain rendered any object invisible at more than thirty yards. On approaching, I discovered a body of about 200 women, followed by about 60 or 70 *umfanas* [attendants] carrying baggage, consisting principally of mats and pillows. These were the King's wives (about 20), accompanied by the wives of the Sutu chiefs and a miscellaneous collection of attendants. At a given signal they all rushed forward towards the King's tent with a most doleful wail, intended to represent their misery during his long absence. They fairly precipitated themselves at the door of the tent. . . The principal wives were admitted into the tent, and, judging from the sounds which penetrated to the outside, this man of many wives was in a fair way to be o'erwhelmed with evidences of affection. . . The whole of the accompanying ladies were permitted to kiss the King's hands or feet, and then the carriers were also permitted to view him, after which they dispersed to the several huts. Last of all the children, led by the son and heir, entered the tent. The son merely shook hands with his father, whilst the four girls saluted their parent much as English

children would have done. They remained with him for a very considerable time. Their appearance bore witness to the good treatment they had met with during his exile, as they were all as fat and sleek as young pigs, and quite pretty for Kaffirs. Dinuzulu . . . is the image of his father, and so fat that, although only 14 years of age, he must weigh at least that number of stone. . . . He was evidently fully alive to his position, as he trod the earth as if he owned it. In receiving the congratulations of the numerous Indunas he maintained a *sang-froid* worthy of his birth. The evening was miserable, and there was such a lack of accommodation for the immense harem, that Mr. Dunn, the King's interpreter, had to vacate his tent in favour of some of the wives, whilst the greater part of the attendants had to content themselves with the questionable shelter of huts constructed of small bushes, supplemented later on by one of the large ambulances."—*Advertiser* S. C. January 26th.

N.B. It would seem that absolutely no provision had been made, even for Cetshwayo's wives and children, by the leaders of the "escort," although Sir T. Shepstone must have well known the numbers of those coming.

Sir T. Shepstone relates how Cetshwayo sent next morning (27th) to say that he wished to have his family presented to him [Sir T. S.], and accordingly the principal women paid him a visit [3616, p. 49].

"On my greeting them," he writes, "they said they had come to pay their respects to me, and to express their thanks for the return of their husband; they then at once plunged into political questions, spoke of the appointed chiefs and their conduct towards them during Cetshwayo's absence in the bitterest terms" and "discussed the curtailment of territory as an injustice and a wrong." The S. C. of the *Advertiser* writes, "The ladies certainly did not err on the score of diffidence. Sir Theophilus had told them to speak without fear, and they obeyed him to the letter, not, apparently, quite to his satisfaction," and Sir T. Shepstone himself remarks, "I could not of course argue with these ladies, so I asked them what their husband said on these subjects."

This was not, perhaps, quite fair upon Cetshwayo, but the women appear to have been equal to

the occasion, for, although Sir T. Shepstone says, "They were a little embarrassed by the question" (?), he records, what seems to have been their most discreet answer, that "he [the King] would say nothing until he had heard what I had to say upon them."

The royal women cannot, of course, have complained "of the appointed chiefs," i. e. of the whole 13, as they had had nothing to do with most of them. But Zibebu, the one specially favoured and approved by the Natal Government, had turned them out of their homes, and treated them with the greatest contumely, and Hamu had behaved but little better. It was in support of these chiefs that Mr. Osborn's "white subordinate" insulted these respectable women in their misery and destitution, jeering at them when they begged Mr. Osborn to give them a "letter" to the authorities in Maritzburg in order that they might go down themselves to represent their wrongs, and saying, "*I will write the letter for you, and say in it that you have committed adultery!*" It must be acknowledged that the royal women had deep cause for complaint against the Natal Government, and their reproaches might well be "not quite to the satisfaction" of their *father*, as Sir T. Shepstone says they called him, and who had not raised a finger to assist them during the long years of their despair.

The same evening, Sir T. Shepstone arranged with his (Natal) native headman Umgundane to go early next morning into the valley to inquire what the rest of the Sutu party, who had not come into

camp with the women on the afternoon (5 P.M.) of the 26th, were doing. He writes [3616, p. 49] :—

“I wished him to try and see Umnyamana and Undabuko, Cetshwayo’s full brother, to remonstrate with them on the delay which they had caused, and were still causing, without comprehensible reason. He found Umnyamana and Ziwedu, one of Cetshwayo’s half-brothers, at the head of one party, and Undabuko at the head of a second. He did not meet Undabuko, but he and his force were pointed out to him not far off, and he could see that his following was large, and fully armed, as was also the force of Umnyamana and Ziwedu.* My messenger at once protested against this array, and the delay that had detained us so long, and was still keeping us day after day from fulfilling our mission. Umnyamana said they wished to celebrate a dance at the burial-place of Cetshwayo’s ancestors, and that they would then come up. Umgundane objected to the dance being held before the restoration had taken place, and remonstrated strongly against the armed force.”

* The *Mercury S. C.* says, “From a friend who went [rode] through yesterday, and who saw these men *en route*, I received a note . . . to say that they had their ‘war-tails,’ and ‘war-dress’ with shields and assegais, and that, as they advanced, they sang Cetshwayo’s war-song.” The fact that they did *not* bring their *war-shields*, but only the small shields used on festive occasions (frequently as we use umbrella or parasol), is enough to show that their “tails” and “dresses” were put on as a gala-dress, and not for war, as their assegais were carried according to custom, since every Zulu is an armed man, and never moves without his weapon. And these weapons were “put out of sight” [*Mercury S. C.*] or rather *left* [the truth] “in the kraals in which they tarried [slept] before coming on here.” As to the “war-songs,” the term is mistakenly applied. They were songs of joy, and chants in praise of the *ancestral spirits*, which are sung on all great occasions, and are, some of them, very ancient. One particularly mentioned by the newspapers, “He is the bird of Zululand,” was composed in honour of Cetshwayo’s father, Mpande. Cetshwayo’s own particular song of praise, i. e. the one composed in his honour, commences thus: “Uzitulele, Kacali’muntu” (“He keeps the peace and attacks [*begins at*] no one”).

The whole of this passage is painfully misleading. The reader, once more, can only gather from it that Sir T. Shepstone's messenger found two Sutu parties encamped in the valley, having been there for some days at all events, and perversely refusing to advance. But as we have already seen, they *could* only have arrived the previous day, even if the whole party had been together, which they plainly were not, since Mtokwane says that on starting from Mnyamana's kraal "we two went ahead with the royal women," but upon the alarm about Zibebu "the people turned back, and Mnyamana waited, partly for them, partly for those coming from a distance." It might very well happen, indeed, that a day's halt before entering the camp would be required to collect the stragglers, while it certainly seems to have been as well that the whole party, numbering many thousands, did not press on, that wet evening, to the camp, where, as it is plain from the account of the *Advertiser* special correspondent, no accommodation had been provided even for the royal women. It was not fit weather for lying in the open, if that could be avoided; and from what the *Mercury* special correspondent says of their having left their weapons at the kraals where they slept "before coming on here," verified by Mtokwane's words, "they laid aside their arms when they approached Emtanjaneni," it would seem that they had found some shelter for their chiefs, at all events, at this their last halting place. Again, the intention to hold the dance—in their eyes a solemn religious ceremony — according to Zulu

custom, would naturally cause some delay, and, although it was given up at Sir T. Shepstone's command, it was the right and proper thing to do. The order to omit it was another intended *lessening* of Cetshwayo in the eyes of his people, to make him appear of secondary importance to Sir T. Shepstone. Anything that had, or was expected to have, such an effect was, surely, a mistake, since not the Commissioner, but the King, was required to rule the Zulus, and for England's influence we had to depend on either *the King's goodwill and power*, or else upon a British army. As a matter of fact, it was rather the feeling of the nation than Cetshwayo's personal dignity which was hurt by the prohibition. The proposed ceremony was one of thanksgiving for Cetshwayo's return, offered to the *Amadhlozi*, ancestral spirits, the beneficent Power believed in by the Zulus, and which contains the germs of a higher religious faith. That it is a very real belief, as far as it goes, may be gathered from the fact that, while grateful to "the Queen," to "the English authorities," to "Sobantu," to all to whom they felt that they owed the King's return, yet the more thoughtful amongst them* never failed to refer their good fortune back to the *Amadhlozi* as the first cause of it, much as Christians speak of having been saved, or assisted, *under Providence*, by one another. The postponement of this ceremony in honour of the

* That is to say, amongst the untaught heathen, who had nothing to guide them beyond the first movings of their Maker's Spirit within them.

Amadhlozi to that over which Sir T. Shepstone was to preside was an affront to the former which was unpalatable to the people.

Finally, the message sent to the Sutus, that Sir T. Shepstone "positively forbade these armed forces coming near the camp," while he obliged Cetshwayo to send "an order prohibiting their approach with arms" [3616, p. 47], was more likely than anything else to make them pause in their advance. Nor was this singular. Sir T. Shepstone acknowledges that the parties of Zulus who arrived before the Usutus were all armed, and says "we were surrounded by armed bodies of men" some days before Umnyamana and Undabuko arrived. Why, then, were these last only desired to present themselves unarmed? If the other parties were their friends no harm could follow, for Sir T. Shepstone himself says [3616, p. 48], "My personal conviction was that the only risk to the column was its becoming involved in any party disturbance." On the other hand, if the former parties were inimical to the Sutus (and therefore to the King), which is freely implied, though apparently without any foundation, the arrangement by which the latter *alone* were obliged to come unarmed was one which deliberately left them and him at the mercy of their enemies, if enemies they had been.

This may seem to be a waste of argument upon a very small subject, since the Sutu chiefs came into camp next day, the 28th, without their arms, as desired, and the "delay" of which so much was made by the official party, amounted, after all, to one

whole day and part of the next. But it is precisely because so much is officially made of it, because the whole narrative is tinctured with the accusations against the Sutus of failing to respond to the King's call, of carrying arms, and of doing all they did with some dark and sinister motive, that it becomes necessary to make plain to every reader that there was no such failure, no "delay" which is not reasonably accounted for, and that in the matter of the weapons the Sutus were not in the least to blame. We have discussed (*supra*, p. 328) the alleged "secret arming:" Sir T. Shepstone says that:—

"Cetshwayo felt no confidence that the prestige which attended his return would save him from the stroke of a fanatic; he added that should assassination be his fate, the British Government would do nothing beyond expressing regret, and asking for information, and, by the time information was forthcoming, it would be found inconvenient to do anything in the matter, and so the assassin would go free, and his fate be unavenged; he therefore desired Umgundane to press upon me the necessity for his people coming armed, that they might protect him, and that at least they might be allowed to bring their arms to a certain distance from the camp and place of meeting.* Umgundane thought that there would be no objection on my part to this; but when he told me I was unable to consent, because, although I felt sure it would be done, whether I consented or not, it was very evident that if it were known that my sanction had been given, very serious use might be made of it."

* The embargo laid upon their arms was enough in itself to cause doubt and distress in the minds of the Zulus. Matshana Mondisa was amongst them, and he, at least, must have remembered how nearly he had lost his life the very last time one of the name of Shepstone had called upon him and his people to come to a friendly meeting without arms. It will take generations yet to wipe out the distrust of the good faith of the Natal Government engendered by that one act of treachery.

The "prestige" which attended Cetshwayo's return was certainly conspicuous by its absence, so far as the white authorities could make it so, for he was treated with neither confidence nor respect by them, though he merited both, as he proved during the remainder of his life beyond question.

The Zulu account continues :—

"Next day (Jan. 28) Mnyamana and the Princes arrived . . . they went to the King, and then to Somtseu (Sir T. Shepstone), and then back to the King, where all the crowds of Zulus had formed a circle, and were singing the songs of Tshaka. The King sat and talked with mothers and wives, telling them about his journey, and now and then calling out some one to speak with him. He said, 'I went, and went and went, and crossed the water [? the Solent], and went to the Queen, to whom people generally are not allowed to go. When I reached her, she shook me by the hand; I felt it up to my shoulder; I felt that the Queen is strong' [in a figurative sense. The Zulus believe that in such circumstances virtue passes from the superior to the inferior.] He said that the Queen was about the height of his mother Songiya. But we did not hear all he said; it is his mothers who know all about his stories."

It was upon this same day that Zibebu visited the camp with about forty mounted followers, as previously mentioned. Sir T. Shepstone writes :—

"He had first reported himself to Mr. Osborn, whom he regarded as his immediate chief, and asked to notify his approach to me. Our camps were so situated that in coming to me he had to pass within about 50 yards of that occupied by Cetshwayo, 250 yards from ours. As he did so, the men and women at Cetshwayo's tents, Zibebu afterwards said, filled his ears with the scoffs and ill names which they flung at him, but he rode past without noticing their unmannerly conduct.* He said that he had come to pay

* He appears to have ridden past the royal tents, and women, without saluting either, which was certainly "unmannerly" on his part, and there were ample reasons for any "scoffs," &c., from "the men and women at Cetshwayo's tents."

his respects to me, that he felt constrained to do so, although he had been advised to delay coming because the valley of the White Umvolozi was full of the Usutu party, and they would kill him; he did not believe, he said, that they would venture to touch him, and they had not, for he had come safely through them.* He denied having any of Cetshwayo's cattle,† or that he contemplated, or had given any reason to the Usutu party to suggest that he contemplated, attacking any of them,‡ and that party knew full well, he said, that both allegations were untrue; he added, 'I know my boundaries,§ and, *unless the Government order me,*|| I will not overstep them; but if they are invaded I shall defend them, and the invaders must take the consequences.' He seemed much hurt by the insults which had been offered him as he passed Cetshwayo's tents. He said he had done more to support Cetshwayo's family during his captivity than anyone else."

Zibebu's audacity in the above statements is simply amazing. His method of "supporting" his King and cousin Cetshwayo's family had been to turn them out of their kraals, women, children, and all, robbing them of all their possessions, destroying what his impi could not carry off, on more than one occasion killing several of their retainers, and driving the Princes and all those who adhered to them out of his territory, for no further offence than having "prayed

* It was not likely that, after all the injuries the Sutu leaders had endured for Cetshwayo's sake at Zibebu's hands, they would throw away the fruits of that endurance now. Zibebu was perfectly safe until his next aggression upon them.

† This was a most audacious falsehood. Zibebu was well known throughout Zululand to have appropriated immense herds of royal cattle.

‡ Except the very good reason that he had done it before repeatedly. Markedly, when they had left their homes to attend Sir E. Wood's meeting at the Inhlazatshe in 1881.

§ Which includes a large portion of the territory belonging to the Sutu princes, and which Sir Henry Bulwer had promised should be restored to them.

|| Author's italics.

for Cetshwayo." The very men and women of whose scorn Sir T. Shepstone says Zibebu complained so pathetically, were some of those whom he had treated in this manner, and much of whose land and cattle he was still allowed to possess, while his graceless disloyalty, encouraged by the Natal authorities, was one of the main causes of their present disappointment and anxiety.* How he could have any right to feel "hurt" by their indignant contempt is known only to himself and to his official apologists. Sir T. Shepstone continues :—

"At the outbreak of the war he had strongly opposed Cetshwayo's determination to accept war [*sic*—poor Cetshwayo!], and related as an instance that he met Dunn bearing a letter from Cetshwayo to the English, which Dunn told him would certainly cause war, and that he took it from Dunn and destroyed it, and went to Cetshwayo and told him that he had destroyed it to prevent war; that afterwards, when war had actually commenced, he felt it his duty to stand by his chief, although he thought him in the wrong, and that he did more fighting, and showed more energy in carrying on hostilities, than any other Zulu noble,† and now this was his reward."

* Amongst other acts of robbery and violence may be mentioned (1) his having taken four girls of the royal household as wives for himself, and two others for two of his brothers, against the will of the girls and of their parents. (2) His having embezzled a large sum of money, which had been entrusted by the King, before the war, to one of his (Zibebu's) headmen for trade with the Tongas. Besides the herds of royal cattle which he appropriated, he had robbed the King's mother, brothers, son, and others, on one single occasion, of over 500 head (taking 52 head from the mother, 77 from one brother, 24 from another, 15 from the little Prince, and so on, a long list). Amongst other items enumerated as appropriated by Zibebu are 100 *leather petticoats*, just purchased from the Tongas by Cetshwayo for the women of his household.—[Bishop of Natal's Digest of Blue Books and Notes, p. 776, &c.].

† It is a noticeable fact that while Sir T. Shepstone graces

It is hardly necessary to reply in detail to the above ludicrous attempt to revive the long-exploded notion that Cetshwayo was in the wrong with regard to the war of 1879, or that he even "accepted" war in any other sense than that he fought when his country was attacked, and both Zibebu and Sir T. Shepstone seem to forget that one of the methods in which the former showed his "energy in carrying on hostilities" was by breaking the three days' truce, and so bringing on the quite needless slaughter at Ulundi. As to the little story about the letter, if there is any truth in it at all, it certainly tells against, not the King, who could neither read nor write, but Dunn, who was Cetshwayo's adviser and secretary then. It is impossible to avoid observing that in the whole of Sir T. Shepstone's report there is not a kindly word spoken about any single Zulu who was not personally opposed to Cetshwayo. Zibebu is the most favoured, certainly, of these few, and Sir T. Shepstone expresses much anxiety for his safety when he left the camp; needlessly it would seem, as he was riding with a troop of horsemen, and had an armed body of foot close at hand, while any attack upon him from the Sutus would have been an action totally out of keeping with the forbearance they had shown towards him for so long, and was less likely than ever to be committed at this critical period. But others who

Zibebu with this unusual and fine-sounding title, he pointedly avoids using the word "king" concerning Cetshwayo in the whole of this long despatch of twenty pages, but applies the term "chief" to him repeatedly, both before and after the re-installation.

were looked upon as more or less "staunch to us" receive their share of consideration from the Commissioner. He demands sympathy for Tshingwayo, who, he says, with Hamu,

"could not perceive the justice of their being forced to leave their homes and fields to seek for new ones, to gratify one man,"* and continues, "It was touching to see the condition to which Tshingwayo was reduced; he who commanded the Zulu army in its victorious attack on the Isandhlwana camp now received a storm of jeers and abuse from the young soldiers † gathered round Cetshwayo's tents, and narrowly escaped a severe beating from them, all, he said, because he had been ostracised by the Usutu party for having been appointed a chief over a section of the country by the British Government."

This is all very well from Tshingwayo's point of view, but the *facts* were somewhat different. He was unpopular with the Zulus generally, including those of his own district, not because he had "been appointed a chief, &c., by the British Government," but on the following grounds:—For several years he had remained loyal to Cetshwayo, joining in the "prayer" for him, and proving that he did so sincerely by contributing what was, for him, a considerable sum of money, as part of one which was sent down to the Natal Government with a view *to purchasing the King's release*. ‡ But, as time went on, he was reduced from

* Sir Henry Bulwer says, "Tshingwayo has no tribe, only a small following." He plainly did not find himself "forced to leave" his homes and fields, for he never moved after all.

† Tshingwayo contributed 6*l.*, Seketwayo 3*l.*, Siwunguza 5*l.*, Mynamana 5*l.*, Sitshaluza 5*l.* The money was taken by the Natal Government and given to the destitute Princes, who had been turned out by Zibebu.

‡ Tshingwayo would appear, however, to have recovered him-

his allegiance, either by the sweets of independence, or by official influence, and, for a season, renounced Cetshwayo. As Sir T. Shepstone tells us that this chief came into the camp ill-affected towards the King, it hardly seems remarkable that he should have been stigmatised as a turncoat and a traitor by the loyalists.*

Another chief towards whom indulgence is shown by Sir T. Shepstone is Mfanawendhlela, who came into camp on the 22nd to pay his respects to the Commissioner, to whom he brought a present of three head of cattle, but "he brought nothing for Cetshwayo" [p. 47]. He "seated himself in a chair which was carried for him by an attendant," and explained that although he did not intend to quarrel with Cetshwayo, who was, he said, "his friend, and the son of his sister," he did not wish to come under his authority again, yet would not leave his lands, i. e. move into the reserved territory. He went into the history of his ancestors, and the wars of Chaka, to show that the

self, for he was in attendance on the King at Ulundi, and was killed there, when Zibebu and his white confederates attacked the royal kraal and murdered the old men, women, and children, a few months later. It does not quite appear why his having led the attack upon the Isandhlwana camp should have given him a claim to especial favour, for it was made against the King's orders, and proved more disastrous in the end to the Zulus than to ourselves. The King spoke to the present writer on this point at the end of 1881, adding that he was well aware that his soldiers had that day deprived him of one of his best friends—referring to the late Colonel Durnford, R.E.

* Mfanawendhlela himself brought five head of cattle to the King a little later.

land which he occupied was, by rights, his own, independently of any Zulu King,* and, which was more to the purpose, he claimed that he had not broken the conditions on which the English had secured it to him. This was perfectly true, and as Mfanawendhlela was the only one of the thirteen kinglets who had neither broken the conditions nor "prayed" for the restoration, it was, as Sir Theophilus Shepstone remarks, a "serious position" for him to take up. But Mfanawendhlela was not personally hostile to Cetshwayo, and there was no reason why, with a little encouragement, he should not have resumed the satisfactory position which he had held under the Zulu King up to 1879, except one which it has not occurred to Sir T. Shepstone to mention. During the King's exile Mfanawendhlela had built a kraal for himself, right in the

* He said that Chaka had conquered what was once the land of his (Mfanawendhlela's) ancestors, but did not disperse the tribe, and that Panda had followed in Chaka's steps in this matter, and had paid the tribe the compliment of *asking permission* to build Nodwengu (where he was afterwards buried). Cetshwayo, in his turn, apparently, had treated his uncle well. But the tribe had dwindled to, as Sir Henry Bulwer says, "an insignificant size" [3466, p. 203], and as to the people of the district assigned to Mfanawendhlela by Sir Garnet Wolseley, Mr. Osborn pointed out to the chief, and he "frankly admitted," before Cetshwayo's return, that he had been "utterly unable to exercise efficient control" [*ibid.*, p. 287] over them. But if the claims of the aborigines to territory in Chaka's time were to be considered, we might find ourselves rather uncomfortably situated in Natal, and, in point of fact, many more modern and more urgent ancestral claims than those of Mfanawendhlela were disregarded in the new settlement of Zululand, but were not thought worth mentioning, because those who were the losers were upon Cetshwayo's side.

midst of the sites of the Royal kraals, and had planted mealie grounds over the spot sacred in the eyes of the Zulus, where the old King Mpande was buried, and the chief knew very well that he could not be allowed to retain that position after Cetshwayo's return. He did not wish to leave it, and this was why he would neither submit to the King nor move into the Reserve as he was free to do. Sir T. Shepstone's previous account of another and older burial-place of Zulu Kings, given in his "Report" of 1873, shows in what estimation such sacred spots were held by the Zulus [1137, p. 10].

"It is still considered sacred," he says, "and is preserved from all desecration. No twig or branch is ever broken from any tree growing on that ridge; no Zulu allows his walking-stick to rest on its soil; the annual grass fires have for very many years been prevented from sweeping across it; snakes and lizards of various unknown kinds and of marvellous size are said to reign there; no one disturbs them; the spirits of the dead live in them!"

As Mfanawendhlela was a connection only, and not a descendant of the royal house, his desecration of Mpande's burial-place was a less serious crime in him, personally, than it would have seemed in the eyes of the Zulus had he not sprung from another original tribe. And there was this further excuse for him, that at the end of the war of 1879 Mpande's grave was opened by the order of a British officer, and the bones removed, apparently under the impression that the act, by showing contempt for Zulu prejudices and Cetshwayo's line, would completely crush the national energies, and make the Zulus feel

themselves most thoroughly conquered. The removal of Mpande's bones did not destroy the reverence of the Zulus for the spot where he had been buried, as his spirit was supposed still to haunt the spot.* But whatever palliations may be found for Mfanawendhlela's desecration of the ground, it was not possible

* The Zulu feeling upon the matter is shown by the account given of a solemn investigation made in 1880 by order of Mnyamana and the princes, into the condition of the rifled grave.

“On the return to Zululand of the late deputation, as they had heard reports, both in Zululand and in Natal, that the grave of (Panda) Mpande had been opened, and the bones of the old king taken out and carried away by the English, which they were loth to believe—they determined to send five men of rank, two from Maduna, one each from Ziweddu and Mnyamana, together with Jojo, who had helped to bury the king and had been put in charge of the grave, to go and see if anything had really been done to it.

“By Mnyamana's orders they took with them two head of cattle, one from Langazana, widow of Senzangakona, father of Tshaka, Dingane, and Mpande, the other from Mpande's son, Msutu, whose kraal was near the grave, that they might pay their respects with them, i. e. sacrifice them, at the grave to the spirit of the deceased. And they did so, saying, ‘Oh! Father, no! Think not that we have come to disturb you! We have only come to see what treatment you have received here.’

“And when they had dug down and examined, behold! the grave had been opened and disturbed, and the bones of the king were gone, and there were left only blankets, disarranged and rotten, and mixed with the earth that has fallen in since the grave was disturbed. The white men in their digging had begun some way off, and had dug a road or trench till they reached the grave, and took out and carried off the bones it contained.

“So they returned to those who had sent them, and reported what they had seen. And they have left the grave open, so that those who doubt may see and be convinced that this thing has really been done by the English soldiers. ‘But we, Zulus, are amazed at it. For did Mpande ever fight or quarrel with the English?’”

that Cetshwayo should allow it to continue, and this was the chief's real reason for objecting to the King's return. On leaving Sir T. Shepstone he passed the encampment of Cetshwayo, whom he had not on that occasion intended to visit,* but who sent several messages to ask him to do so, to which he at length consented. Sir T. Shepstone remarks that the case "afforded Cetshwayo an admirable opportunity for marking the commencement of his new rule by showing a spirit of compromise, such as would be in harmony with the conditions under which he was to be restored to authority," and the King had evidently come to the same conclusion himself, for he not only distinguished his uncle by pressing him to visit him when he seemed reluctant, but he also waived his immediate right to the royal site, and burial-grounds, until the crops already planted should be reaped for that year. But Mfanawendhlela wanted no compromise, he wished to retain the whole, and that was what the King had no right or power to permit, and "they separated without coming to any arrangement" [p. 48]. The chief's affectation of pomp in causing his chair to be carried after him was not unlikely to give offence at the commencement of the interview.

Sir T. Shepstone's account hardly gives the reader a clear impression of the state of the case between King and chief, as he makes no mention of the royal burial-ground, speaking only of "old sites," as of

* Not, we are given to understand, however, from ill-will, but "because of his not having performed some ceremony necessary after death in his family." [3616, p. 48.]

kraals. The omission may be explained by the circumstance that Panda's grave was made *in* his royal kraal Nodwengu, from that time set apart as sacred, while Cetshwayo's kraals, the new Nodwengu and Ulundi, were built not far off. All these "sites" were within the territory now held by Mfanawendhlela, and, as already mentioned, some of his mealie-grounds were planted right over the grave. It will be seen at once that an account of the dispute which omits these facts is unfair to the King. Mfanawendhlela acknowledged afterwards that he was afraid at first, on account of what he had done, to go to the King, but that, when he found that he was not severely reprimanded, as he had expected, and, probably, felt that he deserved, he regretted that he had brought no offering to Cetshwayo as well as to Sir T. Shepstone, and sent one head of cattle to the former, to make amends.

Mfanawendhlela was brought into camp by one of the evil *genii* (white), of whom each chief who showed himself hostile to Cetshwayo seems to have had at least one at his elbow, to point out to him the way in which he should *not* go. These men have done more mischief in Zululand than the whole thirteen kinglets put together could have contrived without them, as we shall have occasion, later on, to show. The one in question was a Dr. Oftebro (not Sir Bartle Frere's supporter, but a relative). The *Mercury S. C.* writes of a third member of the same family—that he "was really the European who captured the King at the close of the Zulu war." Young Oftebro's visit to the camp, a day or two before his relative brought

in his chiefly puppet, was the occasion of the one faint word of commendation spoken by the *Mercury* of the King.

“To-day he (Oftebro) waited on Cetshwayo, and shook hands with him; the last time his hand was laid on that of the King, was when as a loyal servitor of Her Majesty [N.B.—He was neither an Englishman nor a soldier] he entered the hut in which the King was resting, and forcibly drew him outside to be made a prisoner by Major Marter. Cetshwayo received his visitor, who came as the representative of his father [a violent opponent of the King, and although a missionary, a strong advocate for war in 1879], with a good grace, and, if not with actual warmth, letting bygones be bygones, and expressed a wish to see him again. This be it related to the King’s credit, that he bore no illwill to the one who (he knew perfectly well) had been mainly instrumental in effecting his deliverance to the then enemy of Zululand,” and who, it may be added, was still thoroughly hostile to Cetshwayo.

The above is all the notice that was taken by his enemies of this magnanimous conduct on the part of the Zulu King, who might in this have taught a lesson to many a civilised magnate. The official report makes no allusion to the incident, but the *Advertiser* points out that it *promises well for the future*.

Instances might be multiplied of the manner in which every incident was made to tell in some way against Cetshwayo. Plainly “the King could do no right,” and if, by any chance, he did a thing for blaming which no reason could be found, his *motive* was immediately called in question. But we have lingered long enough upon the way, and must hasten on to give some account of the “reinstallation” which closed this chapter in the melancholy history of the ruin of Zululand.

CHAPTER VII.

THE Sutu leaders put in an appearance, as already stated, on the 28th Jan., but there is a curious difference between the accounts of Sir T. Shepstone and of the *Mercury* S. C. as to the hour of their arrival. The former writes [3616, p. 51]:—

“Mnyamana did not fulfil his promise of coming to the camp until afternoon, when he appeared with Undabuko and Ziwedú; they came from having seen Cetshwayo to go through the usual interview with me.” On the other hand the *Mercury* says, “At about 11 A.M. some dozen horsemen were descried, coming over the brow of the hill above the camp. . . . The mounted men, who were Undabuko, Mnyamana,* Ziwedú, and others . . . went straight to the King’s camp.”

Apparently they did arrive soon after eleven A.M., but Sir T. Shepstone only counts their arrival from the hour at which they came to *him*, and the *Mercury* S. C. expresses himself very indignantly at what he calls a “flagrant act of discourtesy, and breach of etiquette” on the part of the Sutu chiefs in going first to the King instead of to the Resident and Commissioner. On examining Sir T. Shepstone’s report, however, we find, not only that he says nothing about this “flagrant act of discourtesy,” but that it had

* This item is a mistake. Mnyamana does not ride.

been the usual practice, to which hitherto no objection whatever had been made, for the Zulus to go first to their King. In paragraph 20, Sir T. Shepstone says [3616, pp. 43 and 45], speaking of "the groups of Zulu men and women, varying in number from 250 to 20 or 30," who "met us on our way," that "their uniform practice was, after congratulating the chief [King] to come in the same vociferous and excited way to thank me for his return." And again, paragraph 25, "Among those who came to see Cetshwayo, . . . and, as usual, afterwards to see me, were two of Panda's widows." Why, therefore, the Sutu should have been severely blamed for doing what all those who came before them had been allowed, or apparently expected to do, it is not easy to understand. The official report does not, indeed, find any direct fault with them on this point, but the statement that "Mnyamana did not fulfil his promise of coming to the camp until afternoon, seems to endorse the reproach which the *Mercury* S. C. had made.*

* This correspondent was avowedly in the confidence of the officials, to such an extent indeed that his report was said to express throughout Mr. Osborn's views and feelings, and those of the authorities generally. Dr. Seaton says of him, "My worthy confrere of the *Mercury*, representing the feelings of those in authority, has been, by special invitation, placed in possession of them [the conditions of the restoration] this evening [Jan. 28th]. Indeed nearly all official communications have only reached me second-hand through him."

The *Mercury* S. C. is so eager to find the Sutus in the wrong that he complains that when on their way to Sir T. Shepstone's tents "they met Mr. Fynn, the new Resident to Cetshwayo." . . . "not one condescended to salute or recognise that functionary." As Mr. Fynn had not yet been introduced to them as "Resident," there was

As far as Mr. Osborn is concerned the accusation against the Sutus was palpably absurd [3616, p. 45]. He had only met the party at Emtoujaneni on the 17th, and therefore could not possibly have acted as master of the ceremonies between Sir T. Shepstone and the 3000 Zulus "roughly estimated" by the officials, as having "presented themselves to see and welcome Cetshwayo," before that date; and, in the presence of his official superior, Sir T. Shepstone, the Resident would not, of course, have been put first by the Zulus. Zibebu and Mfanawendhlela alone seem to have thought of begging his countenance and introduction (Sir T. Shepstone says "they went first to Mr. Osborn, to ask that officer to introduce them"). Certainly, whether the Resident himself was to blame, or whether the fault lay with

not of course the smallest reason why they should salute him, unless any amongst them chanced to be numbered amongst his private acquaintances.

A curious instance of the manner in which this correspondent (Mr. Carter) made opportunities for speaking against Cetshwayo may be found in a passage written by him on January 23, that is to say, some days after the arrival of the party at Emtoujaneni. "The renowned 'Coward's Bush,' where a slow death, by puncturing in the armpit with an assegai, was meted out to those who had lacked courage in the face of an enemy, is nowhere near here."

The incident referred to occurred about sixty years before, in the time of Tshaka, and has never been repeated since. The writer does not mention this, but would leave his readers, unacquainted with the fact, to suppose that the practice was continued under Cetshwayo, who never sent out an *impi* during his reign. Otherwise, except to raise a prejudice against Cetshwayo, it is difficult to see why this matter should be dragged into his narrative, as the place in question was "nowhere near here."

those from whom he received his orders, he had obtained very little influence over, or affection from the Zulu people generally. A few there were, of course, personally attached to him, but the majority had no confidence in him, and the Sutus, especially, had little cause to love him. A firm yet gentle hand, and, above all things, absolutely just and impartial treatment, was what the Zulus had required, and Mr. Osborn had not the requisite characteristics for the task.

“On the morning of the 29th January,” writes Sir T. Shepstone, “every arrangement was made for carrying out the restoration ceremony, and, should nothing happen to prevent [it], the return of the column towards Natal. Mr. Osborn, Lieut.-Col. Curtis, and I, had arranged the programme of the proceedings. About 800 yards from our camp a natural circular depression in the open grassy ridge, well suited to the purpose, had been selected as the spot on which the meeting should be held, and Mr. Fynn [the King’s future Resident] had undertaken the marshalling and seating of the people in readiness to receive us. I sent my secretary, Mr. Arthur Shepstone, to explain the whole programme to Cetshwayo and to inform him that, as, in going to the spot selected, I should have to pass near his camp, I should call for him, and we would proceed together to the place that had been selected for the ceremony. He thanked me and expressed his full approval of the programme, except that, he said it was his place to come to me, rather than mine to call for him; but as he would meet me on my way, and as I waived his coming to me, he was content. He stipulated that, during the ceremony, he should sit close to me and be near ‘our own troops,’ alluding to Her Majesty’s soldiers.* By noon the troops had formed line behind the flag-staff, facing the assembled Zulus, who numbered about 6000.†

* It has been pointed out before that this stipulation alone is a complete answer to all the official suggestions of intended treachery on Cetshwayo’s part.

† Sir T. Shepstone had insisted on the exclusion of the “young men” from the ceremony, threatening Cetshwayo that [3616, p. 51]

When all was ready I started from the site of our camp, which had during the morning been moved a short distance, so as to be ready for our homeward march, and proceeded with Mr. Osborn and my secretary to meet Cetshwayo, who with Mr. Fynn, Mr. R. Dunn, and his native attendants proceeded with us to the place of meeting, where we were received with a general salute and took our seats under the flagstaff, Cetshwayo sitting on my right, and Lieut.-Col. Curtis on my left . . . and the Zulus forming a large semicircle in front [3616, p. 51].

Before describing what passed at this ceremony, let us consider the situation from the Zulu point of view.

Cetshwayo had been brought back to Zululand, Her Majesty's Government having decided to restore to him as much of his old kingdom as possible without breaking our word to those Zulus to whom we had promised exemption from his rule, and who might find it impossible to return to their national allegiance. The Home Government expected, and Cetshwayo was satisfied, that if this exception were honestly made, the portion of Zululand to be reserved would be so small that neither King nor people need complain of its loss as a condition of independence. And this was the widespread understanding and feeling amongst the Zulus generally, the majority being either ardently eager, or else quite willing to show their loyalty to the King. There was, of

“if he would not heed my warning, the consequences must be borne by him, for I should take measures myself to have my determination on this point carried out.” [N.B.—How? His force numbered 250 soldiers and some dozen civilians.] If the “Amadoda” present numbered 6000, 12,000 Zulus must be far under the mark of those who had come to welcome Cetshwayo.

course, a discontented minority—when is there not? But these, without Natal Government suggestions and encouragement, would have been gradually absorbed by the national sentiment until no opposition except that of Dunn remained.

It should have been the Natal Government's part to bring this about, as far as possible, by moral influence and without coercion, but either the notion of practically annexing a large part of Zululand, or else that of founding a "Black-Kingdom" under British rule, or sheer opposition to the restoration policy, so far guided the actions of all the officials concerned, that the very opposite line was taken; a large part of Zululand on one side, and a lesser, but still important portion, on the other, was cut off beforehand, and it then became the business of the officials to prove that this was necessary. It was only during the last few weeks before the King's return that this arrangement was made known to the Zulus in the proposed Reserve, i. e. the portion chiefly affected, by the mouth of a Government official who had long lost his character for truth amongst them. They could not believe the evil tidings. The original plan, the news of which had reached them direct from England, had seemed to them so just and good, so altogether, therefore, what Cetshwayo himself, and their other best friends, had taught them to expect from England, that they could not believe that it had really been thrown aside, and they came to meet the King and to hear the conditions of his restoration from Sir T. Shepstone, still incredulous

of the fact that half their country had been taken from them.*

Sir T. Shepstone explains that his object in excluding the young men from the meeting was to

* This is no mere figure of speech. According to the *Mercury's* semi-official exposition of the new settlement, "three-eighths" of Zululand formed the "Reserve," "one-eighth" was cut off for Zibebu, and "four-eighths, or one-half," was left to Cetshwayo. But the writer says nothing about the fact that much of what was thus "left" is barren and stony land, and that another large tract on the coast is swampy and fever-stricken, wherein few people can live, while the land in the Reserve is for the most part excellent, and to a large extent possessed by chiefs and their tribes who were thoroughly loyal to the King. The same correspondent remarks: "On the plateau [at Emtanjaneni], I suppose, the ceremony of installation . . . will take place, and from there Cetshwayo *will, if the day is fine, be able to take in at a glance the whole of his new territorial possessions.*"—*Mercury* S. C., January 22.

The diagrams and distances given in these pages are taken mainly from the authorised official map, made by Captain Alleyne, R.A., in December 1879, and appended to Blue Book C. 3466. But it has been found necessary to supplement its use by reference to a map compiled "from original sources, and from personal observation and information," in 1878, by the late Colonel A. W. Durnford, R.E. This latter sketch, although made after a (necessarily) rapid personal examination of the country, and without those advantages of leisure and complete scientific appliances which, probably, render Captain Alleyne's map the more correct in outline, differs singularly little from the latter, and more favoured work, in that respect, while it remains the more complete in others which are especially valuable in a map of a new and uncivilised country, viz. in notes of natural features, "bush," broken and difficult country, marsh, swamp, &c., &c., and gives, therefore, a truer idea of *what was left to Cetshwayo* than does the authorised edition, which does not so plainly indicate what extent of country is habitable or the reverse. To exhibit *other* omissions from the latter which Colonel Durnford's map supplies, it may be mentioned, that, while Captain Alleyne's gives "*Emtanjaneni range*" only, we find in Colonel Durnford's "*Emtanjaneni, reputed highest point in this part of Zululand*" (which observation chances

prevent the serious catastrophe of "factious disturbances" arising "*among so large and so many-minded an assemblage of barbarians, &c.*" In the use of the term "many-minded" he would appear to have been mistaken, for, with a few exceptions (i. e. of late "appointed chiefs"), the great gathering appear to have been entirely of one mind on the only two important points, feeling great satisfaction at Cetshwayo's return, and utter dissatisfaction at the partition of the country. There does not seem to have been the smallest symptom of the discord amongst themselves apprehended by the Commissioner, although the fact did not result from the absence of the younger men, for Mtokwane describes how, notwithstanding the mass of the people was left at a distance at first in consequence of Sir T. Shepstone's orders, they could not be kept away, but "just came up of their own accord, by twos and threes, till the whole place of meeting was crowded."

Already many who had been, for a time, and during the King's absence, led away from their allegiance, were returning to Cetshwayo of their own accord, and these were well received by the stauncher loyalists, one of whom told the Bishop of Natal, "*We do as you advised, and think kindly of them, as woman-*

to prove important now, since this was the spot selected by Sir T. Shepstone for the ceremony of re-installation, as "the highest and most open land in the country" [3616, p. 46] and also that "Point Durnford," though already of historic importance in connection with the Zulu war, and marked upon the older maps (in memory of Captain George Durnford, of the 27th Regiment, who died there), is not indicated at all in Captain Alleyne's map.

*kind, who must be forgiven for weakness, and the King just holds out his arms, and they run under.”**

But how would it be likely to affect these weak ones when they should hear from the Queen's representative that the King's arm was in future to possess no power either to save or punish, when they should see that the officials, one and all, treated him in a grudging, suspicious spirit, as one who must be bound and restricted in every imaginable way, before the farce of setting him free should be carried out? To obtain Cetshwayo's promise to observe certain conditions, and to place a Resident with him to see that they were carried out, was no more than would have been right and reasonable on the part of the

* Amongst these were two headmen, former adherents of Dunn's—Sikunyana and Sigewelegewele. The latter's conduct is put forward by the King's opponents as a proof of “the terror of Cetshwayo's presence,” since, says the *Mercury S. C.*, “this man was one of those who fled for his life into Natal during Cetshwayo's reign.” This is a characteristic distortion of the actual facts, which were as follows:—After the fight between the Tulwana and Ngobamakosi regiments at the Feast of First Fruits in 1878, Hamu, being Induna of the Tulwana, laid the blame on Sigewelegewele, the Induna of the Ngobamakosi, and finally “went away home in great wrath saying that Sigewelegewele should be killed before he would be appeased. And, as the chiefs sided with Hamu in this matter, Cetshwayo sent a reprimand to Sigewelegewele, bidding him fly to the forest, and that the Ngobamakosi should guard him, as the Zulus would kill him. Therefore he and the Ngobamakosi fled, and lay hid at the Ngoye, until all who had fought had been fined, Sigewelegewele himself being fined 100 head; and so that quarrel ended, and Sigewelegewele returned home’ (*Dig.* p. 262). The King having thus protected him in old days, the man's conduct in welcoming him back is hardly “extraordinary,” and does not need to be explained, as due to “the terror of Cetshwayo's presence”!

great Power which had conquered and now restored him. But surely these conditions should have been officially imposed upon the King and his great council only,* and it should have been left to Cetshwayo himself to make known, at his own pleasure, to the people generally, that such and such unpalatable changes were compulsory, and to let other more agreeable ones pass as acts of grace on his own part. So would all the legitimate desires of the conqueror have been fulfilled in the establishment of gentler laws, and the removal of what was called "the military system," and consequent supposed "standing menace" to Natal, while Cetshwayo's power over the hearts and wills of his people would have remained uninjured, or even have been augmented. But this was not the

* In point of fact it was this *great council*, composed of the aristocracy of the nation, and therefore, naturally, highly conservative, which required to be checked in the unsparing application of the "ancient [and severe] laws and usages" of the people. Cetshwayo himself had always inclined towards mercy, and would have gradually introduced a milder code even without the British admonitions, which, indeed, *might* have been used so as to assist instead of hindering him in his task. The notion that his rule was ever an irresponsible despotism is almost as unfounded as that which represented him, individually, as a ruthless tyrant, exercising his cruel powers to the utmost. An instance of his humane and reasonable disposition is mentioned by Sir T. Shepstone [3616, p. 53] in his Report, where the latter says that the King mentioned, in assenting to the second of Sir H. Bulwer's "Further conditions" (i.e. the one by which the girls of the royal household who had married during his absence were left "unmolested" with their husbands, parents, guardians, and other "relatives," &c.), that "even if it had not been proposed to him, he should have acted in accordance with its provisions of his own free-will."

aim of the Natal officials, though manifestly the Home Government desired nothing better. The latter can never have intended that conditions of the King's restoration should be read out in the ears of the whole assembled people by which they learnt that practically he would in future have no power over them at all, no means of enforcing obedience, of carrying out old laws, or of making new ones. He might not require them to work for him, nor forbid their leaving the country to work for others. Natal was to control his trade, his treaties, and his succession; not only might he punish no crime, but also he might right no wrong committed during his absence; he was required to prevent this, and to permit the other, but he was allowed no means whatever of upholding his authority beyond "a few police." * He was, in fact, deprived of all that constituted kingly authority, or (in its present uncivilised condition) could constitute it in Zululand, except the birth-right, which could not be taken from him without the annihilation of the nation, i. e. the respect due to the rightful heir of all the old Zulu kings, still—as they believed—advised and watched

* The *Mercury S. C.* says that Cetshwayo reminded Sir T. Shepstone that there was one condition which the latter had forgotten, viz. that he (Cetshwayo) could have a force of police, and that Sir T. Shepstone replied "Yes, it is true," and that the conditions "said nothing against Cetshwayo's keeping a few policemen to preserve order. He could have just a small number of people around him, and that would not be considered unlawful."

A reply was given in the House of Commons, be it observed, to the effect that *no restrictions had been placed upon the number of armed men that Cetshwayo might employ.*

over by their spirits. At a later date this sentiment alone sufficed to save Cetshwayo's life from Zibebu's spearmen, who had already wounded him unawares, and it was greatly enhanced by the personal influence of the King's own moral character.

In fact, Sir T. Shepstone's mission was an attempt to force what might be called a free charter upon a people utterly unprepared to receive it, who had no written laws, and who, as Sir H. Bulwer previously pointed out, required, therefore, to be ruled by a "duly recognised and adequate paramount authority."

The conditions having already been given [p. 76] need not be recapitulated here, but some further remarks are necessary upon the second and very important one against "the existence of the Zulu military system or the existence of any military system or organisation whatsoever," within Cetshwayo's dominions.

This condition would no doubt have been modified, or rather explained, had the Home Government understood more upon the subject than they learnt from Sir Bartle Frere and other South African officials. Her Majesty's Government believed, beyond question, that by this condition they were simply abolishing a standing army, and thereby depriving the Zulu King of the (objectionable) power of attacking neighbouring states. They certainly cannot have understood the truth, namely, that the condition as it stood, abolished not merely the fighting power, but also the equivalent of the whole civil service of a civilised country. In the latter

there is an exchequer, supplied by a system of taxation, from which, and certainly not from the Queen's private purse, the civil servants of the Crown are paid for their services. In Zululand no system of taxation has yet been started,* and it certainly could not be brought to bear suddenly in a crisis such as we are describing, and by a ruler deprived of all but moral force.

“The King's work,” of any kind, whether civil or military, is performed by levies of young men, called *amabuto*, which word is commonly translated “soldiers,” but which properly means *collections*, whether of soldiers, workmen, of boys, or of girls. The system is of very ancient, immemorial date, and exists amongst all the neighbouring tribes, Swazis, Tongas, Pondos, and is strictly kept up to this day by many of the chiefs in Natal under British rule.†

* By the end of February the King had received as free-will offerings from his people over 1000 head of cattle, of which he had already had 600 head slaughtered in order to provide food for those who came to him. He directed Mnyamana to tell the people that all who were able to do so should bring a “thank-offering” in money, and that he who had only a shilling to give, “let him not despise it, but bring it.” No compulsion whatever was used, but the call was responded to so readily, that Cetshwayo was very soon able to acquit his debt to Mr. Saul Solomon of 50*l.* The *Natal Times* and *Mercury* did not lose the opportunity of trying to make out that the King was already afflicting his people, and the former attempts a sneer in the words, “His Majesty was graciously pleased to have it [the money raised in the above manner] appropriated to his own private uses, and has accordingly stuck to it.” One would like to know how these editors and correspondents would have had Cetshwayo act!

† Report of Natal Native Commission, 1882, p. 5.

Tshaka's innovation upon this system was to forbid the marriage of these levies until the chief pleased, as is the practice in some Natal tribes to this day. And Cetshwayo would have made no objection to the removal of this restriction. The young men would then have still been called out by the King in regiments for planting, weeding, kraal-building, &c., as is done by chiefs in Natal, or for road-making, as is done by the Natal Government, or for police purposes, for which no provision whatever is made in the conditions. As the second condition stood it struck at the root of all established law and order in Zululand. The King was forbidden to exact any of the above services, although it is plain that in no country can government be carried on without either such direct service, or else its equivalent in taxation.

The Home Government was, no doubt, utterly unaware of the sense in which their condition would inevitably be received, but it seems incredible that the Natal officials, especially Sir T. and Mr. J. Shepstone, and Mr. Osborn, should have been equally ignorant. They were, of course, well aware of the native customs in these matters, and the absence of an explanatory speech on the part of Sir T. Shepstone cannot easily be accounted for except by the supposition that the full meaning of the condition was intended by them. That it cannot have been an oversight is sufficiently proved by Sir T. Shepstone's reply to Cetshwayo's reminder, and his use of the expressions "a few policemen," and "he could have

just a small number of people.”* But if further proof is required, it may be found in an incident which Sir T. Shepstone records, though without giving it its full value, towards the close of his report. He says that, just as the meeting was breaking up, Cetshwayo asked him “to direct the people to assist in building a kraal for him,” showing plainly enough that the King understood the prohibition concerning “Amabuto” in its full, or Zulu sense.

Sir T. Shepstone consented that the order, on this occasion, should be given in his name, and the fact of his doing so, without fully explaining both to Cetshwayo and to his “Resident,” Mr. Fynn, that there was no restriction whatever upon the calling out of the people for peaceful purposes, speaks volumes for the official intention. Nor was this all. A great number of people gladly took advantage of this special permission to gather round their King, to rejoice in his return, to perform the necessary labours for his comfort, and, very shortly, when rumours of Zibebu’s sinister intentions† reached

* The local papers fully endorse this view, and as there was no official contradiction, they must be held to expound the official intention. The *Times of Natal* remarks, “There is nothing said in the conditions of restoration as to the means of preserving the country ruled by Cetshwayo from internal strife. Cetshwayo is not to establish any military kraals or military system. But the chiefs [Zibebu, Hamu, &c.], on the other hand, have their men drilled, and an organisation, now more or less perfected, which may be employed in an effective manner, should the leaders determine to use force to retain the territory given to them by Sir G. Wolseley’s settlement.”

† To be related in a later chapter.

them, to protect him from danger. This would seem a natural and innocent proceeding on their part, and also on the part of the King who permitted and encouraged it. Yet no sooner was it known that he had not been left to the "few policemen" specified by the Commissioner, that a large and loyal body of his people clung around him, in spite of the discomfort, and even want, which inevitably attended the service of a King without a revenue, a court without accommodation, no sooner did this disappointing fact become known to Cetshwayo's white enemies in Natal, than he was promptly accused of breaking the conditions of his restoration, and levying an army as soon as he was left alone.

Sir T. Shepstone, indeed, with the curious *acquired* suspicion of Cetshwayo's good faith which tinges his every word at this time, says that he consented to the order being given in his name because "at the moment" he "could not see any objectionable use that might be made" of his complying with the King's request, and he adds, "I afterwards found [though he does not tell us how] that this had been construed to include the inhabitants of the Reserved Territory, upon whom it was considered that a direction from me would be felt to be binding" [3616, p. 56]. But the writer is entirely mistaken in his view of Cetshwayo's motives. These were twofold—first his wish to show that he scrupulously obeyed the commands of the British Government, however difficult and irksome that obedience might be, and, secondly, not that any of the people from the

Reserve should be forced by the Commissioner's order to render service to the King, but that the very large number from thence whom he knew to be warmly attached to him should neither be prevented from staying with him now, nor punished for having done so on their return to their homes in the confiscated territory. Sir T. Shepstone remarks that "a great number of young men" ran off, to evade the order as soon as the proclamation was made, but it is a question of how many the "great number" consisted, or whether all those whom Sir T. Shepstone observed really ran away. A few did, no doubt—idle young men, apparently, who were glad of any excuse to escape hard work. Sir T. Shepstone records an interview, which gives this impression, with "several young men" whom he met on his way back to Natal, "some of whom" had been present at the ceremony, and who, when asked why they had not stayed to build Cetshwayo's kraal, replied [3616, p. 57], that "such work was no longer theirs," as they lived on the "Reserve" side of the Umhlatuze. They continued "we have been spoilt by the last three or four years *for such service*," * i. e. for work,

* A curious little insight into the dreaded "military system" was given by this young man. He is reported to have said, "We used to think that our military system was a good thing, although we had to serve [work] so many months near the chief, with so little to eat, that, when our term was ended, it was as much as many of us could do to crawl back to our homes to get food and recover strength." If there is any truth in this statement, it would hardly seem as though the service of the King was likely to make his men very formidable opponents in battle.

and the remainder of the sentence, "we have found what it is to sleep without feeling alarmed in the night at the bark of a dog, lest it might be the approach of a party sent to destroy us," is curiously out of keeping with the evident meaning of the former phrase. The implication is altogether false; Cetshwayo's previous reign had been remarkable for its clemency, while the appointed chiefs, Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu had killed or "eaten up" more Zulus in three years than Cetshwayo in the whole six of his actual reign. The whole passage, in fact, gives the impression of having been spoken by a rather conscience-stricken young man, who was not, at first, quite sure that he would not be reproved by the white chief for shirking his work, and who, when relieved from this anxiety, was inclined to be more voluble than exact in the statement upon which he grounded his excuses. A general permission to pay Her Majesty's taxes or not at pleasure, might possibly affect a few easy-going Englishmen in like manner.

The Zulu report of the speech with which Sir T. Shepstone opened the meeting at Emtonjaneni, is so *naïve*, so concise, and (as may be judged from a comparison with the English reports) so exactly what the people really understood by what was said to them, that we cannot do better than give it entire. They related that

"Somtseu said, 'My children! the Queen is restoring Cetshwayo out of pure kindness. My children! there is nothing to pay for

it; the Queen requires nothing from you.* The property, the King's cattle, which have been eaten up, are to be theirs for ever who now possess them, my children! That is an old story.† And the royal women (*isigodhlo*), who have been taken, they will belong to those who have got them. And the people's cattle, which have been eaten up, they are to be theirs for ever who have got them, my children! All property which has been eaten up, whether of King or people, the King will not interfere with it. This land which has been cut off by the Umhlatuze belongs now to the Natal Government.‡ It will not be inhabited by white men; it will not be inhabited by Natal natives; § it is to be for the dissatisfied (*izihlupeki*) here in Zululand. The King will not enrol soldiers; he will allow the young people to go and work for themselves; he will have just a few youths—a mere handful—of policemen to do his work for him.¶ He will just stay by himself. Land has been cut off also for Zibebu; he is installed as a king, and is to rule his country as hitherto. The strip between the two districts is to belong to the King. He will have nothing to say in these matters; they are all settled; the Governor has set his foot down on them. Here is Mr. Fynn, who has been appointed across the sea to remain with the King; for it is he who will talk over matters with him, and send them on in letters to Maritzburg. And if the King wants guns, he must ask Mr. Fynn, and if he refuses, the King must let it alone. Here also is Mr. Osborn, who has hitherto had the care of Zululand.' Said Mr. Osborn, 'I was ordered to look after Zululand; I now give it back into the King's hands. I give it back, O Zulu (Cetshwayo)!'"

* "We do not want your cattle; we do not want your women. We want nothing from you for bringing him back. We simply give you him back by the grace of Her Majesty."—*Mercury S. C.* (This writer makes Sir T. Shepstone say "*I do not hand him over to you because it is my wish that he should return. I do so because I am ordered to,*" which, although the exact state of the case, was probably not exactly what the Commissioner's speech expressed.

† This is a *variation* on Lord Kimberley's instructions. "It is the desire of Her Majesty's Government that all cattle formerly belonging to Cetshwayo, and their produce, should be collected for him before his return" [3466, p. 128].

‡ N. B.

§ "He could have just a small number of people around him."—*Mercury S. C.*

The newspaper accounts of this speech are considerably longer, but much to the same effect, and both they and Sir T. Shepstone's own report cannot fail to seem somewhat unfriendly and suspicious towards Cetshwayo, to the unprejudiced reader. The King's disabilities and restrictions were plainly expounded to the people; Sir T. Shepstone told them that although he was restored, it was not to

“the same seat that he had occupied before; it did not empower him to kill without full and fair trial, or upon the irresponsible declarations of witch doctors,* or to interfere with girls marrying or being given in marriage, or to exact military service in any way” [i. e. any service at all]; that he was prohibited from “going behind the event of his restoration; what took place during his absence was not to be the subject of blame or punishment.” [The property, the King's cattle . . . are to be theirs for ever who now possess them, my children! And the royal women who have been taken, they will belong to those who have got them . . . my children!]

The principal point omitted from the Zulu report is Sir T. Shepstone's allusion to the failure of Sir Garnet Wolseley's settlement, which the *Mercury S. C.* records somewhat quaintly, though quite in accordance with the Commissioner's own report:—

“After these chiefs [the thirteen kinglets] had been appointed some time, we saw a thing we did not expect. The people and the chiefs quarrelled among themselves, and so we found then that this ruling by chiefs would not do. . . . And when we saw this, we recollected that we had Cetshwayo, and that he was still alive, and we thought we would bring him back.”—*Mercury S. C.* Compare Sir T. Shepstone [3616, p. 52].

The “conditions” were then rehearsed. When the one concerning Zibebu's and the Reserve terri-

* Cetshwayo had always been averse to capital punishment, and had prevented it literally in thousands of cases. He had also very little faith in the witch doctors.

tories had been read, Cetshwayo endeavoured to record his protest against the Capetown (i. e. Sir H. Bulwer's) rendering of the English intentions (as he had never failed to do whenever he was required to assent to it), but he was not allowed to speak then, and but little notice was taken by the "authorities" of his subsequent remarks. The assembled chiefs, however, asserted their right to speak upon the point.

Now, one very serious official fault had been committed with reference to Zibebu's boundaries. Six separate official communications fixing them had been made in less than four months, and of these six communications, the first, second, and fifth gave one line, the third and sixth gave another, and the fourth gave a third. All three decisions were officially delivered to the Zulus as England's final word upon that boundary, and it is hard to see how a better plan for making war in Zululand inevitable could have been adopted.

The first of the six communications was made by Sir Henry Bulwer's orders to the Sutu Princes in October 1883 [3466, p. 213], and was to the effect that

"the portion of Zibebu's territory to which Undabuko and Ziwedu, and certain other chiefs* belong, should be taken from under Zibebu's authority, and included in the part of the country which is to be placed under . . . Cetshwayo." †

* "Umsutshwana, Umbopa, Mahu, and others," mentioned by Sir H. Bulwer in his despatch of Oct. 3rd [3466, p. 200].

† Zibebu receiving full compensation by the addition of Umgojana's land to his territory. See diagram, p. 238, *supra*.

It is quite plain that in making this arrangement Sir Henry Bulwer intended to restore to the Sutu Princes and people the whole of "their old lands," for he continues—

"In this way the immediate and real grievance of the two brothers will be removed," and "the main causes of complaint . . . on the part of Undabuko and Ziweddu . . . will be at once practically removed."

This was also the arrangement explained to Cetshwayo at Capetown on December 7th, as stated, evidently with authority, by the editor of the *Cape Times*, in his issue of December 30th :—

"Zibebu is to be left an independent chief. That portion of his country which previously belonged to Ndabuko and Ziweddu will be taken away from him and placed under Cetshwayo, so that Undabuko and Ziweddu will be able to return to the King's country, and live subject to his authority."

A third communication [3616, p. 44] to the same effect was made by Sir T. Shepstone at a "formal interview" with Cetshwayo, held upon the way to Emtanjaneni, on January 15th, 1883, in presence of the three chiefs who had attended the King to England, besides the principal persons of the British expedition, and others accompanying Sir T. Shepstone. The account of the "conditions," then read over by the Commissioner to Cetshwayo, and officially communicated to Mr. Carter, was published in both *Natal Times* and *Mercury*, and contained the following passage, almost identical with the statement of the *Cape Times* :—

"From Zibebu's territory and authority will be taken away . . . the country that belongs to Ndabuko and Ziweddu, and this will be placed under Cetshwayo, so that these chiefs can return to their own districts, and live subject to Cetshwayo's authority."

It is, however, plain that Sir Henry Bulwer had been altogether misinformed as to the extent and position of the Sutu lands, for, in his despatch of October 3rd [3466, p. 200], he defines the district to be returned to the Princes as "all that extent of country situated between the range of hills lying to the north-east of the Black Umvolosi and that river." He fixes the said "range of hills" as the boundary between Zibebu and the Sutus, in ignorance of the fact that there were Sutu lands and kraals far to the north-east again of the range, and this second arrangement, which limited them to the country on the one side of the range, was communicated to Mr. Osborn on December 22nd [3466, p. 271], with directions for beaconing it out with the aid of Mr. Fannin.

It was this narrower boundary-line which was announced at the reinstallation, and which, although very different from, and less satisfactory than the one to which Cetshwayo had signed submission (under protest) at Capetown, and which had been read to him again on January 15th, he was required to accept before the assembled people on January 29th.

"From Zibebu's territory and authority will be taken away all the country situated between the range of hills lying to the north-east of the Black Imfolozi and that river. This is the country that belonged to Undabuko and Zivedu, and this will be placed under Cetshwayo, so that these chiefs can return to their own districts, and live subject to Cetshwayo's authority."

By this arbitrary and entirely incorrect definition, "*this* is the country, &c.," the whole meaning of the sentence is altered, or rather reversed, and a cou-

siderable portion of the Sutu territory left to Zibebu. Nor was this all. So far the confusion, though sure to produce disastrous consequences, may be explained by sheer blundering on the part of the officials. But what is to be said of the fact that the line actually beacons out by Mr. Osborn's orders was drawn considerably to the south-west of even Sir Henry Bulwer's boundary-range of mountains, taking another large slice from the Sutus, while the only reason given by Mr. Osborn (and, apparently, accepted as satisfactory by Sir Henry Bulwer), for the alteration is that it was made *to please Zibebu!* [3705, p. 55].

At the very time when Sir T. Shepstone announced to the people that Zibebu was to have up to the range of hills in question, his boundary was newly beacons out, by which he got a good piece more of the Sutu land, so that when the Sutus returned home they simply found that they had been deceived. What is still more remarkable is that, although it was Mr. Osborn himself who "readjusted" the line (to please Zibebu) entirely on his own responsibility, and without any reference to his official superior;*

* It is a somewhat remarkable fact that, while Sir Henry Bulwer himself could not fix these boundaries without first referring them to the Home Government, Mr. Osborn should have taken upon himself, apparently without rebuke, and certainly without subsequent rectification, to choose another line and to have it beacons out, without consulting any one except Zibebu, for whose gratification the alteration was made. This is the way in which England becomes involved against her will in wars with savage races, towards whom her officials elect to act, not according to her directions, but according to their own inclinations.

and although he went straight from doing this to Emtanjaneni, and was present at the reinstallation, he nevertheless permitted Sir T. Shepstone to announce one boundary to the people when he knew that another had been beaconsed out. Apparently he did not even report the considerable alteration he had made, for on April 14th, just three months later, Sir Henry Bulwer writes to Mr. Fannin asking for an explanation of the variation as shown by the latter's survey of the line marked upon the map, which the Governor had only just received. This map and accompanying documents [3705, p. 57] were sent by Mr. Fannin to Mr. Osborn when the latter was at Emtanjaneni for the reinstallation, i. e. before the end of January, but were "unfortunately left behind with his [Mr. Osborn's] other papers" [3705, p. 55], writes Sir Henry Bulwer, and only forwarded by Mr. Osborn on April 6th. Mr. Fannin's reply is this: "I acted, by direction of your Excellency, entirely under the instructions received from Mr. Osborn," and he explains that the latter's alterations were made to meet Zibebu's views, and, especially, to retain for him an old kraal belonging to the chiefs of his tribe which he valued. There were, of course, such kraals situated far down the territory of the Sutus, for Zibebu and his sub-tribe, the Mandhlakazi, were themselves part of the great Sutu tribe, and they and the other sub-tribes had lived interlaced as it were, and without attention to strict divisions, for generations, until the white invaders sowed dissension between them, and turned

their assegais against each other's hearts. But the accompanying statement that "no kraals belonging to the Usutu party are within Zibebu's line," is absolutely incorrect, for not only Mbopa's whole sub-tribe* and those of several other Sutu chiefs were left within it, but even the kraals of the King's late mother, and those of the Princes Undabuko and Ziweddu themselves, and a large portion of their tribes were given to Zibebu, i. e. either left, through misapprehension, outside Sir Henry Bulwer's line, or else deliberately cut out by Mr. Osborn's "readjustment."

The question of Sutu *versus* Zibebu cannot be rightly followed unless the reader first understands the full meaning of the term "Usutu." Its origin was as follows:—

"The chiefs and headmen under Songiya, Cetshwayo's grandmother, were considered to belong specially to him from his birth, e. g. Mbopa, Songiya's brother, Mapéta, Zibebu's father, and Mfusi, indunas, and Mfinyeli an innceku, of Mpande's kraal, Umlambongwenya, with the sub-tribes under them. From among these the young Prince collected the youths who should form his own personal following, and with them founded the ukuBaza kraal.

"When Mpande sent an *impi* out against the abaSutu (Basutos) under Sikwata, father of Sikukuni, the Zulus brought back much cattle, which were greatly admired, being very much larger than the Zulu cattle, 'they would swallow, at a gulp, water enough to satisfy a herd of the latter.' So the ukuBaza lads would say, boasting, 'We are the Sutu cattle! See how we drink our beer!' And then they took the word 'uSutu' as their distinguishing cry, and used it in their games, pelting one another with mealie-cobs,

* Mbopa's tribe is particularly mentioned by Sir H. Bulwer as one which will receive back their lands by his new settlement. This is the same chief who proved his loyalty to Cetshwayo so triumphantly under torture at the close of the Zulu war.

&c., before there was any idea of their fighting. And, when afterwards the ukuBaza had become a powerful kraal, filled with men saved, when condemned to death, by Cetshwayo's intercession, its people still kept the cry 'uSutu!' Being thus the distinguishing cry, in peace and in war, of Cetshwayo's special kraal, it became the war-cry of his party in the civil war with his brother Mbulazi in 1856. Since then it has become a national cry, as the whole Zulu people are uSutu, as belonging to Cetshwayo, and would use the word as a war-cry, or in its proper place on great occasions, as during the great National Feast of First Fruits, when, after shouting their own separate distinguishing cries, and being all marshalled in order, the whole assembly would shout 'uSutu' immediately before singing the 'National Anthem' in honour of Cetshwayo, viz. '*Uzitulele! Kaqali'muntu,*' 'He-keeps-quiet-for-himself! He-does-not-begin-to-attack-any-one!'"*

Each chief's following has its own distinguishing cry, besides the national one, except Cetshwayo's original Ukubaza kraal, whose cry was the same as, i. e. had become, the national one upon his accession. Zibebu, therefore, was himself "a Sutu," until he was set up on his own account by Sir Garnet Wolseley, and started a fresh distinguishing cry of his own.

Sir T. Shepstone summarises the subjects on which the chiefs addressed him at the meeting thus [3616, p. 54]:—

1. Thanks for Cetshwayo's restoration.

2. Admiration of a government and people that could perform such acts as to treat kindly, and ultimately to reinstate, an enemy captured in war, that enemy being the chief who had carried on the war.†

* This account of the "origin of the name Usutu" is taken from the Bishop of Natal's 'Digest of the Blue Books, with Notes' (unpublished).

† This is a somewhat ambiguous phrase. The Zulus certainly said nothing meant to imply that Cetshwayo had sinned against the English, by whom he had been invaded and conquered.

3. Objections to the retention of the Reserved Territory.

4. Protest and bitter feeling against Zibebu's elevation to independence, and against any portion of Zululand being allotted to him.*

5. Disappointment that the programme of the meeting did not include requiring all the appointed chiefs to attend, and to give an account of their stewardship.

6. Cetshwayo's forfeited † cattle, which had not been handed over, as they ought to have been, to Her Majesty's Government. ‡

7. The women and girls of the royal household; these were, however, but slightly alluded to, since Cetshwayo had himself publicly expressed his special approval of the provision regarding them.§

* This was the universal feeling of the Zulu people, with the exception of the Mandhlakazi tribe, naturally attached to their chief Zibebu, but of which some important sections left him when he turned (or rather *was turned*) against Cetshwayo.

† Cetshwayo's "forfeited" cattle, i.e. those of which "we" robbed him in 1879. Sir Henry Bulwer makes a great point of impressing upon Cetshwayo that he had no *rights* whatever in this matter, that the cattle he received (the poor little 310) were a gift from England's grace, for which he should be humbly grateful, since *all* the said "forfeited" cattle belonged by right of conquest to England. But by the Earl of Kimberley's despatch [3466, p. 128] of Sept. 7th, 1882, England resigned that right in favour of the Zulu King, therefore Sir Henry Bulwer's rebuke to the King, through Mr. Fynn, for referring to the cattle as "his," was uncalled for; and when he writes [3616, p. 30] that Cetshwayo "has no right or claim to any of them beyond what Her Majesty's Government may choose to give him," he forgets that Her Majesty's Government had chosen, some months before, to give Cetshwayo back whatever "right or claim" they had themselves.

‡ e.g. the great herds, numbering thousands, in the possession of Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu.

§ Nevertheless, that part of the clause which protected the chiefs who had carried off girls against their own and their parents' will, from even the payment of a fine was passionately protested against. See Mayepu's speech, p. 133.

Sir T. Shepstone says that "although he [Cetshwayo] took the credit of having, beforehand, approved of the one [condition] by which he had bound himself to make no claim upon the husbands,

8. Attachment of the people to Cetshwayo, and clamorous calls for such as did not like him to step forward and show themselves. These were responded to by the appointed chiefs Siunguza and Umgitshwa in person, and by the representative of Umlandela.

From Sir T. Shepstone's own more detailed account of what passed concerning these three appointed chiefs, as well as from the reports of both Zulus and "correspondents" present, we may gather that there is a looseness of expression in this last paragraph which is rather misleading. The "calls" to which the two chiefs and the representative of the third "responded," were not for those who "did not like" Cetshwayo, but *for those appointed chiefs who were accused of robbing and murdering the people placed under them.* The people asked [Sir T. S., 3616, p. 54]:—

"Why they were not present to answer for themselves? Siunguza . . . took notice of this, and said that he was an appointed chief, and that he was there to answer for himself."

parents, relations, or guardians of the girls of the royal household who had become married during his absence in respect of any such marriage, he had given the people to understand that in every case he should expect to receive a girl, a child of any such marriage, or other compensation equivalent thereto." It is a curious fact that Sir T. Shepstone, who is held to be such an authority in Zulu matters, should have made the mistake of thus representing the "Royal Household" as a sort of *tax in girls* levied by the King for himself, instead of being a position of honour in the eyes of the Zulus, as it really was. In point of fact, by the above-mentioned arrangement, the King would have restored to the child the rank and position lost by the mother, and it was about the only kindness he could now show to the latter. Cetshwayo's own letters from Capetown about the girls of his former household, some of which appear in the Blue Book, are sufficient to show how kindly his feelings and intentions were towards them.

The appointed chiefs whom the people chiefly, and with good reason, accused, were Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu, who were *not* "present to answer for themselves," and of these three Cetshwayo accused only the two latter, having been misled by *official* reports of the Sitimela massacre into believing that Dunn was not guilty.

Sir T. Shepstone continues—

"Cetshwayo had shown an inclination to shield all the appointed chiefs, except Hamu and Zibebu, from the reproaches cast upon them, and Siunguza, in allusion to this, asked, 'How does Panda's son [Cetshwayo] know that two only of the appointed chiefs have shed blood; does he say so because those two are not present?'"

If Siunguza really asked this, it is no wonder that, as Sir T. Shepstone says,

"Some confusion was here caused by the clamour of the Sutu party, and a body of young men, which was checked by Cetshwayo's demanding for the speaker a fair hearing. Siunguza then came to the front, and, after protesting against the interruption, declared that he went to the white people for protection; he thanked for the restoration of Cetshwayo to his people, but said that he would himself remain under the Queen. Umgitshwa, another appointed chief, presented himself to answer any charges that might be brought against him, and to declare that he could not accept Cetshwayo's rule, but in spite of Cetshwayo's endeavours he was interrupted so boisterously that he could not proceed."

Siunguza was not, according to Zulu customs, the rightful chief even of his own tribe, as he was only uncle to the heir. The people would only acknowledge him under pressure from Natal, and the mere fact of the King's return relegated him to his natural position. But he was also unpopular on account of his late cowardice. He had been amongst the first

to "pray" for the King's return, but, when he found how greatly displeased the Natal authorities were at the prayer, he was readily induced to deny having joined in it, to disown his own messengers, and even to "eat up" their cattle, at (as he himself stated) official instigation.

Mgitshwa also was not the natural head of his tribe, being brother to the rightful heir. On Cetshwayo's return both he and Siunguza inevitably lost the position into which, by Dunn's advice, Sir Garnet Wolseley had forced them; and this by no will or wish of the King, nor, necessarily, misconduct on their own part, but simply by the operation of natural laws.

The other reports, from Zulus, and from the correspondents, hardly bear out Sir T. Shepstone's view that these chiefs spoke in a manner positively adverse to the King, or that they said they "could not accept" his rule. From these accounts it appears that their main point was to justify themselves in the eyes of King and people by attributing whatever unpopular action they had taken as appointed chiefs to the orders of the English authorities. The first order given them by the latter after the appointment of the kinglets in 1879, viz. to collect and hand over all the King's cattle, was a bad beginning for the appointed chiefs' chances of popularity. Even by carrying it out honestly they were forced to deprive a number of people of their chief means of subsistence, while it opened the door to tyranny and plunder on the part of the less well-disposed kinglets.

And to this must be added all the coercion, either directly ordered, or indirectly permitted, which was used to suppress the petitions for the King's return [see vol. i.]. It was these matters, and no inability to accept Cetshwayo's rule, as such, which made these chiefs, in official language, "*staunch to us.*"

The Zulu account of their words is that

Siunguza said "Yes, sirs, we were appointed by the English. And what I have done, that has been found fault with, has been done by the order of the English authorities [Mr. Osborn]. We thank on seeing this son of the Queen; but we don't know who are the 'dissatisfied ones,' for whom the land is to be cut off, and we don't know where the King is to put his people."

Mgithswa said the same.

The interpreter of the *Advertiser* S.C. has rendered the phrase

"What I have done . . . has been done by order of the English authorities, thus I am one of those [who were] appointed; *but I had to go to the authorities to get protection from the Zulus,*" which is manifestly an error, as no such incident or necessity had ever occurred.*

But he also gives what is evidently the same as the Zulu report of the remainder of Siunguza's speech, thus:—

"You see the people all cry to you. They are not satisfied at the two words [viz. that he is restored as King, and at the same time is stripped of his country]. If he is a king, the country belonged to him. You, our King [addressing Cetshwayo] are the only one that has suffered."

While the *Mercury* S.C., with his usual twist, gives it, "What has Cetshwayo come here for? He has

* See Sir T. Shepstone's version (p. 128), which merely implies that he *now* "went to the white people," &c.

not room to live!" Yet even this account shows nothing of the repudiation of Cetshwayo implied in the official report.

"I am here ready to answer for my acts. Those who have done wrong you must not mix up with those who have not done wrong," said Siunguza, according to Mr. Carter, and Mgitshwa follows in this report with "What I have done I have done as a chief, and because I was an appointed chief, and I merely collected cattle according to orders. I had my orders to do so, and I did it."

The latter part of Mgitshwa's speech, as given by Sir T. Shepstone—i. e. that the chief came "to declare that he could not accept Cetshwayo's rule"—would seem to have been privately communicated to the officials by Mgitshwa as what *he had intended to say*, as all reports agree in showing that he never got further in his speech than his justification of himself, when, as Sir T. Shepstone says,

"He was interrupted so boisterously that he could not proceed." "A representative from Umlandela," continues this writer, "expressed this appointed chief's regret that, being old and infirm, he could not be present to welcome Cetshwayo back, but that he intended to remain a subject of the British Government."

The Zulu report is that

"Mlandela's mouth-piece said 'Sirs, Mlandela thanks for the King's return. If he were only younger he would be here in person. Mlandela died when the King was taken away, and he held down his head grieving, until he was roused by the Sitimela affair. It was for that reason only that he fled to Dunn.'"

In point of fact, Mlandela's weakness was rather of mind than of body. He knew very well that his own conduct in the "Sitimela affair" would not bear investigation, and that the King would shortly find this out when he came to hear the truth from Somkele

and others concerned. Cetshwayo was prepossessed in Mlandela's favour, partly through official (mis)representation, and partly because the chief was a nominee of his (the King's) father, Umpande; but Mlandela's own guilty conscience and Dunn's influence caused him now to hold aloof.

As illustrations of the other clauses of Sir T. Shepstone's summary, it will be sufficient to quote a few specimens which are taken mainly from the Zulu account of what passed, as being more detailed than the short official report, and very much more accurate than those of the correspondents.*

The old Prime Minister, Umnyamana, made the

* Mr. Carter's interpreter was Martinez Oftebro, one of Dunn's late overseers, who was strongly opposed to Cetshwayo, as a matter of course. His rendering of Zulu passages is always markedly prejudiced, and often offensively so. A striking instance of this appears in his translation of the words of the headman Vumandaba, who said to the King, "The English have restored you with kind hands, let your hands be kind towards them also—let bygones be bygones (as to the Zulu War.)" In fact, let us "forget our sufferings, and be friends with the English, who have now shown us the great kindness of restoring our King," would have been an honest though free translation of Vumandaba's speech. Now the adjective *hle*, here rendered "kind," signifies in Zulu all that is desirable, pleasant, acceptable, proper, &c., and might as correctly, under suitable circumstances, be translated "clean." Accordingly Mr. Carter's interpreter makes Vumandaba say to the King, "As you have come back with clean hands, keep clean hands, and don't act as you did before." But the Zulus indignantly deny that Vumandaba (who was thoroughly loyal) intended the smallest reflection upon the King's previous reign, and the *Advertiser* S.C., Dr. Seaton, writes, "From the result of numerous inquiries I find that the man simply meant to congratulate the King on being able to recommence his reign with 'clean hands,' and to let bygones be bygones, wiping out all remembrance of any former offences." [*Adv.* S.C., Jan. 24th.]

opening speech. He thanked Sir T. Shepstone for bringing back "the Bone of Senzangakona,"* that is, for the King's restoration, and said that Cetshwayo was "now the son of the Queen, not of me,"† i. e. that his rank was now much higher than it was before; but he protested against Zibebu's elevation, and the division of the country, saying,

"If you now speak of cutting off the country, and of leaving the King stripped of his cattle, what is to become of him?"

Sir T. Shepstone says that [3616, p. 54] Umnyamana's short introductory speech "gave the cue," and that

"the majority of the forty, or more, speakers that followed, adhered, with varying emphasis, to the programme that had thus been suggested."

It would, however, more accurately express the facts of the case to say that Umnyamana shortly stated what were the strong feelings of the assembled Zulus, and that, therefore, each speaker who followed him expressed the same with "varying emphasis," according to their different powers of self-control. It is hardly strange if some of the speakers were vehement, seeing how greatly they were disappointed by the boundary conditions, and that the very man who was to benefit more than any other by the partition of Zululand was the one from whom the country had already suffered so much, their grievances against whom they had depended upon

* Senzangakona, Cetshwayo's ancestor.

† Umnyamana always called the Princes his sons.

Cetshwayo's return to set right, and of whom Sir T. Shepstone says [3616, p. 54]—

“They accused him of every kind of violence and atrocity, and of being a persistent disturber of the peace of the country. Some speakers described the position in which Zibebu had been placed as intended to be a trap to cause Cetshwayo's downfall.”

Hemulana (one of Mnyamana's chief councillors) said—

“We thank you, son of Sonzica (Sir T. Shepstone) for bringing back the ‘Bone’ of Senzangakona. But even to-day in bringing him back you are killing him, killing him, I say, as you have done all along! Did you not set him up at first and then destroy him for nothing? Did you not take him to his Mother (the Queen) and bring him back, and now do you cut off the land, saying, ‘it is for those dissatisfied’? Where are they? You have taken the King's and the people's cattle, and given them to those chiefs whom you set up! You have taken the royal girls and have given them to those chiefs of yours! The Government left them all the cattle [at the former settlement]; but you to-day have taken them! You have taken these our children, and given them to common people! You have taken these our cattle, and given them to common people! And do you to-day set up these chiefs of yours, and give them the King's property? What is he to live upon? We thought that this King was now a child of the Queen. Do you mock us in saying that you are restoring him? We thought that you would go back to the appointment of the thirteen chiefs [i. e. examine into their conduct], when it was ordered that they should not shed blood, but should govern the land quietly, since he, ‘the shedder of blood,’ as you called him, was removed. We thought that you would inquire how these chiefs came to do as they have done, killing our people, and seizing our daughters, and eating up our cattle. What sort of settlement is this, sir? We do not call it a settlement at all. We say that you are killing us also to-day as you did before.* How do you decide? What

* The speaker refers to the Blood River Meeting between Sir T. Shepstone and the Zulu Indunas (Oct. 18th, 1877), about the “Disputed Boundary” question, when Sir T. Shepstone (according to the Zulus) threatened to take away their land as far as the

sort of a judgment is this? Where is Hamu? Where are Zibebu and Ntshingwayo?* Where is John Dunn? Have they not come to you, and did you not send them back? Do you leave out the real offenders? Whom did the King kill?—since he killed no white man, no policeman [Natal native messenger], no Zulu. Those who have killed—you have sent them away. Where are they? We want them to be here; we want them to be questioned. Name them, then, these men you speak of as ‘dissatisfied’! Show them to us! You are his enemy! You are in arms against him! You have come to kill him!’

Said Somtseu, “Do you say that I am his enemy?” Said he, “Yes! you are his enemy from the beginning! You are the author of all our troubles! Why don’t you inquire about those kinglets of yours, those murderers? You have sent them away and allowed them to keep all the King’s property? How will you deal with us? We shall arm, and seize the cattle, and stab those who try to keep them! For we have learned that with the Government one who spills blood is not blamed; on the contrary he is praised, and is given the women, and the cattle, and the land of the peaceable ones.”†

This was pretty strong speaking, but Hemulana belonged to the most powerful tribe in the kingdom, and could not easily be silenced. It was another matter when Dabulamanzi rose and spoke something to the same effect. He said—

“We thank you, sir, for bringing him back. But since it is we

Umhlatuze, and parted from them angrily. Other speakers, it will be seen, regarded this action as the beginning of sorrows, and Sir T. Shepstone as the origin of all.

* “Ntshingwayo came to Emtanjaneni, and so did Hamu’s son, as well as Zibebu. They went first to Mr. Osborn, and then to Somtseu, and then went away, without coming to the King. We say that they were prevented from coming to him.”—*Mtokwane*.

† Melelesi, one of the chiefs from the Reserve, spoke in the same strain. “Is this how the Queen restores him?—when some of his own kraals are in the land which you gave to Zibebu, and others are south of the Umhlatuze? And, if he were coming down some day to Maritzburg, it is we, living south of the Umhlatuze, who ought to go in front of him.”

of that district [the Reserve] who came down to the authorities in Maritzburg, praying for him, and saying, 'This chief and that chief are troubling us, but we cannot fight them because they too are Cetshwayo's people,' tell us now, who are these 'dissatisfied ones,' for whom you are cutting off the land? Do you say that you are restoring him, this son of the Queen, while all the time you are destroying him, just as you did formerly? Sir, you are killing him still as you did before, when you first made him King, and then killed him. Say, then, son of Sonzica, show us these 'dissatisfied ones,' for whom you are cutting off our land, the land of the King! Say 'I cut off the land for this one and for that, who do not wish for the King'! Do you say that we are to move? Where will you put us, then, since you are eating up all Cetshwayo's land? *Tell us where you fix Zibebu's boundaries.** Why do you come and give the land to the very people who have been killing us? Do you approve of their bloodshedding? You have come to kill him, not restore him!"

Dabulamanzi, unhappily for himself, belonged to the Reserve, the people of which were required either to give up their homes and lands, or else to express themselves willing to submit to British rule. He was also in very bad odour with the authorities for having done his best to make the Queen's good intentions known to the Zulus, and to encourage the latter to speak the truth without fear, on the subject of their loyalty to Cetshwayo, yet to remain where they were, i. e. not to remove their families from the proposed "Reserve," and so "prove to the satisfaction of the Government that no necessity for a reserved territory exists" [3616, p 12]. It is no wonder that he was not popular with the officials who wished to prove quite the reverse "to the satisfaction of the Government," but it was surely a little strange that the Special Commissioner should so far

* Author's italics.

lose his temper as to call Dabulamanzi a "boy," and tell him to hold his tongue? The chief is a bearded man, with a son (then) of nineteen or twenty. He was a noted Zulu soldier and general,* and, failing a succession of Cetshwayo's mother's house, he would, under Zulu law, succeed to the throne of Zululand. "*Tula wena' mfana*" (Be silent, you boy!) was hardly a suitable phrase to use to such a man, and to English readers it will probably occur that Dabulamanzi showed more dignity in not resenting it than did Her Majesty's Commissioner in applying it.

Mayepu (late headman of Dunn) said—

"Sir, can we say that you *are* restoring him? No, you are killing him! † There are daughters of mine belonging to the royal household who have been taken [against their wills and the wishes of their parents] by Zibebu. All have perished, girls, cattle, and land! Do you think that we brought forth children for a dog like that? I would rather cut my throat before you here," and he came forward before Sir T. Shepstone, making the sign of cutting his throat, but crouching because of the King. ‡ "Is the King, then, to pick up food like a bird, as he can?"

* But was not in command at the attack upon the Isandhlwana camp, as frequently stated.

† The verb *bulala*, "to kill," is used by the Zulus in a figurative sense, for all severe injury of any sort, as well as for the infliction of actual death.

‡ The Europeans (? civilians) of the installation party seem greatly to have resented the homage paid to Cetshwayo by his own people. The *Mercury* S.C. describes the latter as "cringing, creeping, and fawning [upon the King] in a manner that has excited the disgust of the meanest European in camp." The writer was probably qualified for making this assertion, but one would like to know whether he himself is too independent spirited to uncover to "God save the Queen," or whether it is only reverence to the black monarch that strikes him with disgust.

Msutshwana * said—

“Has not Zibebu, even this day (i. e. quite lately) killed a man—since the King has landed? I have not yet had time to report it. He killed him as he went back from you, sir [the “killing” was here meant literally]. Do you, sir, give all our property to Zibebu? My father Mfusi was as great a man as his father Mapita. Give us back our property, or set Zibebu before us, and examine the case. You are not giving a fair judgment, but are taking his side against us.”

Haiyana (Zibebu’s elder brother) said—

“We ask, sir, where is Zibebu? Whereas he is Mapita’s son, I am Mapita’s eldest son; here, therefore, sir, is Mapita speaking to you. We thought that you would have brought Zibebu face to face with the King. Have you cut off for him a portion of our country, and ordered him to go away privately? We thought that you had come to wash out his crimes; but have you come merely to support him, and hush them up? What is Zibebu that you should give the country to him?”

Magondo, Zibebu’s other brother, said the same. The *Advertiser* S.C. quotes him thus :—

“Our sympathies are with Undabuko. It is not one day since we complained to the British Resident that Zibebu was killing the Queen’s people; but to no purpose. We only know one King—Cetshwayo.”†

Undabuko, the King’s brother, said—

“All this time we have been carrying our grievances to Mr.

* *Msutshwana*, chief of the tribe, turned out by Zibebu to starve in the “bush.”

† Sir T. Shepstone says, “It was remarkable that the most uncompromising denouncers of Zibebu were his own brothers; I unrequired the reason of this, and found that they had had a family quarrel and been obliged to leave.” But it must be added that the “*family quarrel*” meant that Zibebu was furious with his brothers for joining in the prayer for Cetshwayo’s release, and that their having “*been obliged to leave*” means that Zibebu turned them out of house and home, and drove them by force of arms from his “territory” for having “prayed.”

Osborn, and we hoped that to-day you would call us and Zibebu, and look into the matter.* But to-day you are cutting off our land for Zibebu, so that even my own kraal (*Kwa-Minya*) is given to him, and my brother *Ziwedu's* own kraal (*Emateni*), and a large number of others belonging to our people.†

Ziwedu, the King's half-brother, spoke to the same effect.

The *Mercury* S.C. gives his speech as follows:—

“You have brought the King back! But what is he going to eat [how is he to live]? Zibebu has taken some of his cattle, and you have divided the country, so that there is nothing left for the King. What are we going to do? We have nowhere to live now. The country is not large enough. For some time past, since we heard that *Cetshwayo* was coming, we said to ourselves ‘We are going to live now!’ But now we say that we continue as dead men.”

Somkele spoke like the rest, as also did *Sigananda*, *Nobiya*, *Qetuka*, *Mabuzi*, these latter four being chiefs from the proposed “Reserve.” All gave thanks for the King's return, and all protested against the division of the country. Towards the close of the meeting some excitement was raised by recriminations between those who had taken opposite sides in the *Sitimela* affair. *Mlandela's* messenger having

* Zibebu was ordered by Sir E. Wood, on August 31st, 1881 [3182, p. 103], to restore to *Ndabuko* and *Ziwedu* on their quitting his territory (which they did) “one-third” of the cattle he had seized from them; and Mr. Osborn writes, December 20th, 1881 [*ibid.*, p. 134]: “By Y.E.'s award, on the complaint of *Ndabuko*, Zibebu became liable to restore to him upwards of 200 head of cattle.” By February 10th, 1882, he had restored seventeen head and two calves, and has restored none since, though he has made other extensive confiscations [*Supp. Dig.*, pp. 284-5].

† This was actually the case, although Sir T. Shepstone had just announced the contrary to them.

given that chief's version of the matter, the (loyal) appointed chief, Somkele, who had taken Sitimela's part at the time, rose and strongly denied the truth of the tale, his people supporting what he said, until Cetshwayo put a stop to the dispute, saying [*Advertiser S.C.*]—

“ We have not come to hear [try] cases, but to hear the law from Somtseu [Sir T. Shepstone].”

“ At last [Zulu account] came Mkosana, sent by the King to tell Umnyamana to finish, as he was the principal person present.

“ So Umnyamana thanked again, and said that Somtseu must not be angry with them for speaking out their minds. To whom were they to speak if not to him ?

“ Said Somtseu, ‘ Very well, Umnyamana, I have now put him in your hands, ’ and he took leave.”

The *Mercury* special correspondent gives Umnyamana's concluding speech thus:—

“ The cattle make two different sounds when they bleat, and there are heard two different sounds among the Zulus [i. e. upon the Sitimela affair, the dispute about which had just been stopped, and to the ‘ arguing ’ upon which Umnyamana had, says the *Mercury S.C.*, objected]. We have stated our grievances to you, Somtseu, because we want you to hear us. We have our hands open to receive, and you have been good enough to give us the King, and now we thank you for your kindness.”

The official report omits all mention of the dispute about Sitimela, which is described by the correspondents as the main disturbance of the day, the only other occurring when Siunguza and Umgitshwa tried to justify themselves. Sir T. Shepstone, on the other hand, writes [3616, p. 55] of Dabulamanzi's speech—

“ This was the only occasion on which I found it necessary to interfere during the three hours occupied by talking ; but I felt

bound to attempt, at whatever risk there might be, to prevent the discussion from degenerating into excited and dangerous as well as untruthful declamation."

There is certainly nothing *untruthful* in what Dabulamanzi said, judging from any of the reports of his speech, or even from the fragment quoted by Sir T. Shepstone himself,* and the chief does not appear to have been more "excited" than many of the other speakers. But the circumstance which leads one to feel that Sir T. Shepstone must have made some mistake in this portion of his report, possibly through incomplete notes taken for him at the time,† is that he *here* introduces Umnyamana's apologetic speech, which was not spoken till the end of the meeting, and then in direct allusion to the dispute about Sitimela, and not in connection with Dabulamanzi's speech at all. Sir T. Shepstone writes [3616, p. 55]:—

"Umnyamana apologised for Dabulamanzi's language by saying that all cattle did not low in an identical voice; that the lowing of one was pleasant, that of another unpleasant, and that I must think nothing of the expressions which Dabulamanzi had used."

The Zulus say that Sir T. Shepstone "was plainly angry" with Dabulamanzi, but whatever apology his displeasure may have drawn from Umnyamana,

* "To you Zibebu's blood is as sweet milk, it must be preserved, and taken the greatest care of; while ours is worthless and common, and may be shed by any one disposed to shed it." This, unfortunately, was not "untruthful," though it might well be "objectionable" to those who deserved it.

† The Zulus say that Mr. A. Shepstone cannot possibly have taken down all that was said at the meeting, and that during part of the time he was not writing at all.

as master of the ceremonies, the simile about the lowing of cattle was used simply with reference to the difference of opinion concerning Sitimela, and had nothing whatever to do with any of the subjects properly appertaining to the re-installation ceremony.

Recording a final incident, Sir T. Shepstone says [3616, p. 56]:—

“To enable Cetshwayo to move comfortably down towards Ulundi, and to afford him shelter until huts should be built for him by his people, I presented to him, in the name of Her Majesty’s Government, the little waggon in which he had travelled thus far, and the six bell tents which he had occupied from the time of his landing.* He thanked very much for them, and said that they would be a great convenience to him. I trust that my having done this will meet with your Excellency’s sanction. The meeting and ceremony, and arrangements for Cetshwayo’s comfort, including *the loan* † of two waggons to convey his baggage, being over, we took leave of and wished him every success.”

The *Advertiser* special correspondent records the above act of generosity thus:—

“On leaving, Cetshwayo was presented with the five tents he was using, and the ‘red ’bus’ which had transported himself and ‘the ladies of the Royal House’ from Port Durnford. But in order not to overwhelm him with too great a weight of obligation, the value of this gift was carefully lessened by the abstraction of the four mules and harness.” And the Zulus say, “the four mules, which had dragged it hitherto, were taken away by Somtseu’s party.”

With this magnificent parting-stroke the Special Commissioner returned to Natal with Her Majesty’s troops, leaving the Zulu King bound by his loyal

* It will be remembered that Sir Hercules Robinson had promised to get these bell tents for Cetshwayo if he could do so.

† Author’s italics.

word not to defend himself, not to help himself, not to allow his people to do either one thing or the other for him, and with orders to enforce vexatious laws, yet to raise no force for the purpose. Meanwhile Zibebu was placed with uncertain boundaries to provoke his neighbours, and with no restrictions whatever against arming his people, or collecting his *impis*, if he chose.*

Before leaving this portion of our subject it may be as well to realise what were expressed as Sir Theophilus Shepstone's own conclusions upon all that had passed between Cetshwayo's landing at Port Durnford, and his re-installation as King over a small portion of his original kingdom.

The 52nd paragraph of his report [3616, p. 58] runs as follows :—

“52. A feature which I should be wrong not to bring to your Excellency's notice was that on every occasion when I was addressed

* “We hear also that Zibebu is actively engaged in mounting and drilling as many of his men as he can” [*Times of Natal* (Carter), Feb. 27th]. “Cetshwayo is not to establish any military kraal, or military system. But the chiefs [i.e. Zibebu and Hamu], on the other hand, have their men drilled, and an organisation, now more or less perfected, which may be employed in an effective manner” [*Merc. S. C.*, Jan. 24th].

“While Cetshwayo is subject to the English Government in many things, and rules his country only in conjunction with the British Resident attached to him, Zibebu is free of any such restraint, and therefore practically enjoys more power in Zululand, and holds a far higher position, than Cetshwayo himself. It would not be unfair to compare Cetshwayo to a *chief* in Zululand . . . and at the same time it can be said without fear of contradiction that Zibebu is now the only *King* in Zululand” [*Times of Natal* (Carter), Feb. 17th]. This is certainly not what the Home Government intended.

by Zulus, whether in large or small numbers, by men or by women, on the subject of Cetshwayo's return, all concluded by impressing upon me that unless the hand that restored him, meaning Her Majesty's Government, also controlled and guided him [? supported and protected him], there would be little hope of peace and quiet for the country, because, added some of them, and especially the women, he will be misled and importuned and guided by those who love blood and covet other people's property."

The first portion of this accusation may be rectified and made to agree with the facts of the case by a slight alteration of terms as suggested above, but it is difficult to account for the latter except either by adopting Sir T. Shepstone's own view [3616, p. 43] of

"the puzzling phases of Zulu conduct . . ." which "compel recourse to knowledge, other than that to be gathered from their professions, to form a correct estimate of their real feeling," or *else by assuming misrepresentation of the words of these people.*

The present writer by no means assents to this sweeping assertion of Zulu insincerity, having found the proportion of honest, straightforward speakers amongst this people at least as large as would be expected amongst Europeans under similar circumstances. There were, no doubt, many of the weaker sort and sex, who, knowing that, in case of further war, they could not help themselves, desired to stand well with both sides, and took the opportunity of commending themselves to Sir T. Shepstone's kindly notice. The common people were, of course, wildly ignorant of what was to be the fate of the country. The English had once before swept it with fire and sword, and carried off the King without any apparent cause; now they

were bringing him back again, but who could tell with what intent? He was plainly still a prisoner, and the very sight of our troops was enough to terrify them with recollections of shot and shell, of cannon and of rockets. Under these circumstances whatever tendency to untruth and equivocation there might be amongst the Zulus would naturally take the direction indicated by Sir T. Shepstone in paragraph 52; although the meaning which he attaches to the "feature" is manifestly incorrect. That the majority of the Zulus, men and women, rejoiced greatly at Cetshwayo's return has been sufficiently proved in these pages. That he himself had always been inclined to a comparatively merciful form of government, and was of too decided and sagacious a character easily to be "misled" or "guided by those who love blood, and covet other people's property," has already been made equally apparent. It is remarkable, also, that while Sir T. Shepstone makes a general statement upon this subject, without giving a single instance, or quoting a single name, the correspondents make no allusion to the circumstance whatever, which is especially singular in the case of the *Mercury* special correspondent, who never loses an opportunity of crying down Cetshwayo, and the restoration policy. Nor can the omission have been made to screen the speakers, which could not have been either possible or necessary if "all" or even the majority of the Zulus spoke in the same manner, while the like care in the case of single individuals, said to have spoken against the King (e. g. Mfanawendhlela,

Siunguza, and Mgitshwa) was certainly not observed. It can only be said that the determined prejudice evinced by the Natal officials engaged in the affair is sufficient in itself to justify the assertion that they were utterly unfit to be entrusted with the re-installation of Cetshwayo.

Sir T. Shepstone's next paragraph may also be given in full.

“ 53. When Cetshwayo landed he was in an aggressive humour,* he thought that he could without difficulty take command of the country, and that the messages sent by him to the people would be instantly obeyed.† He was not sparing of these, and the tone he assumed was that of a ruler already in possession, and inclined to insist upon his rights.‡ If he had succeeded in his efforts he would at once have become master of the situation, and the expedition would have been placed in very awkward circumstances.§ In his first message to the people, which he sent without my knowledge, and in many subsequent speeches, he showed his inclination to repudiate the condition which provided for the reservation of

* The account given by the *Cape Times* of the mood in which Cetshwayo left Capetown, and by the *Natal Advertiser S. C.*, of the bright and happy spirit in which he landed at Port Durnford, dispose of this charge.

† This assertion has already been sufficiently dealt with.

‡ Cetshwayo naturally felt himself a King again as soon as he set foot upon Zulu shores, especially after the considerate treatment which he had received in England. It was not to be expected that he should understand or conform to the rigid system of etiquette apparently required by Sir T. Shepstone, i. e. that he should consider himself a mere private person, or rather a humble prisoner until the Special Commissioner's word suddenly made him a King once more.

§ What can Sir T. Shepstone possibly mean by this. He cannot, surely, intend to countenance the absurd suspicions of Mr. Osborn's informant about Usutu plans for attacking the expedition? The notion is too preposterous to have been seriously entertained for a moment by any member of the official clique.

territory.* . . . It was not until after several days' personal observation of the anxieties and misgivings of the inhabitants as to the consequences to them of his assumption of rule over the country† that Cetshwayo seemed to realise the change that had taken place in their minds, and became nervous and apprehensive of the consequences of his restoration to himself.‡ There can be no doubt that the fears of the people were very great,§ and that their distrust in the possibility of Cetshwayo's being restored without reviving the old régime, very strong [*sic*], || so strong indeed that but for the conditions, and the trust of the Zulu people that Her Majesty's Government will permanently secure to them the privileges

* What Cetshwayo really meant and said on this point has already been made plain. The passage omitted here is the one about the girls of the Royal Household, already considered at p. 127.

† Rather of the consequences to themselves and to Cetshwayo of the *impossible* state of things ordained by the "conditions."

‡ On finding that Zibebu and others were encouraged to be hostile towards him.

§ First at the reappearance of British troops, and then at the rumours that Cetshwayo was to be restored shorn of all power to help or protect them in any way.

|| What "old régime" is here indicated? It had long been proved that Cetshwayo's previous rule had *not* been the cruel and tyrannical one which the apologists for our invasion of Zululand in 1879, had tried to make it out. The devotion of his people to him during the war, and, afterwards, when they suffered ill-treatment, and even torture, rather than betray him to his pursuers, their persistent entreaties for his restoration and joy at his return were sufficient to establish this point, without the fact that there were only six cases in which a person had been killed by Cetshwayo's order during his whole reign, each of the six being a man convicted of some crime, or Undabuko's touching statement made in 1881, "there has never been known one like him among us Zulus before, so good, so kind, so merciful. Our fathers, who were old when we were born, all say so; and we, who have grown up with him . . . we have seen no one like him. For those three Kings who were brothers, our fathers, they killed people, great and small, and for a little thing, a mere nothing—it was their custom. But he is of an entirely different nature; he shrank from shedding blood."

which the conditions are intended to confer.* My belief is that the restoration would have been attended with unmistakable proofs that we were forcing a dreaded ruler upon an unwilling people, in so far as the great majority were concerned. Fortunately, however, the scheme under which this measure has been carried out, contains so many self-adjusting balances, all the springs of which, in the case of Cetshwayo, as in that of the people, are put into operation by the instincts of self-preservation and self-interest, that if only time can elapse to enable the people to acquire such confidence in the intentions of Her Majesty's Government, as will encourage them to resist the efforts which Cetshwayo and the Ultra Usutu

* Sir T. Shepstone himself says, "very little reference was made by the speakers to any of the other conditions; the land question seemed to engage all their attention," and, in fact, it was not possible that the majority should at once take in the probable bearing upon themselves of most of the conditions. There were 13 in all, including Sir H. Bulwer's. Two (5 and 10) did not necessarily affect the Zulus at all; five (3, 6, 7, 9, 11) were such as they could not thoroughly comprehend without deliberation and experience [3466, p. 113]; one, (8) "I will not sell, or in any way alienate or permit or countenance any sale or alienation of any part of the land in my territory" [p. 114], was already a law of their own which had existed as long as the Zulus themselves; another (1) was a matter of course, "I will observe and respect the boundaries assigned to my territory by the British Government," and was too vague for comment, while the second, and the latter half of the fourth, however well-intentioned, or salutary, were innovations on old-established customs and prejudices, the introduction of which is sure to meet with opposition, whether amongst blacks or whites. Of the remaining two, Sir H. Bulwer's definition of No. 1 was protested against by every speaker, and his other, concerning the girls, was a mistake [3616, p. 54]. The really humane portion of it—protecting the girls from punishment—was unnecessary, and might safely have been left to Cetshwayo, while the rest was an altogether unjustifiable interference with the social customs of the people, and with the rights of the parents. It is plain, therefore, that Sir T. Shepstone was mistaken in attributing the Zulus' acceptance of Cetshwayo to their confidence in these conditions, against which they protested as far as they understood them, or felt that they were affected by them. (See end of this chapter for copy of conditions.)

party will, it is to be expected, make to overbear them; this self-adjusting machinery will act in the direction of ultimately securing peace to the country, and will grow stronger by such action, but it must not be forgotten that the foundation of the whole scheme is the retention and firm rule of the Reserved territory, and the presence with Zibebu of some efficient representative of the Government to guide him in the very difficult position in which he is placed."

If any readers have followed the story thus far, and still retain that faith in Sir T. Shepstone's conclusions upon Zulu matters, with which, perhaps, they began, it is time for them to lay this volume down, for they would not be convinced though one rose from the dead to inform them. But to those who are not to be blinded by authority, by official statements, and a respectable name, it must by this time have become patent that this official report does not harmonise with the actual facts of the case such as they are undeniably shown to have been after a careful examination and comparison of several different accounts. We have seen that Cetshwayo left Capetown and reached Port Durnford with feelings of sincere gratitude, friendship, and respect for his "friends" the English, but that he was met, on landing, with cold suspicion from the leaders of the British expedition, and actual insult from their subordinates. His spirits were soon damped by this treatment; he found that his loyal subjects were prevented by threats from offering him a welcome, while the few who were his enemies, e. g. Dunn and Zibebu, were treated with special favour, and allowed to utter threats concerning him unchecked. He found that he was still a prisoner, and that the white

men in whose power he was were not his friends. Naturally he became "nervous and apprehensive," as all this was made plain to him day by day; but it was this, and no "change that had taken place" in the minds of his people which thus affected him. As for them, their "anxieties and misgivings" were only too natural and well founded, but they were certainly not in the direction suggested by Sir T. Shepstone. He says that "their distrust in the possibility of Cetshwayo's being restored without reviving the old régime" was very great; but what their expressed distrust and disappointment really meant he might have gathered from their own speeches, even as recorded by the *Mercury* special correspondent. What they felt was that Cetshwayo was not a King, *could not be* a King, if thus stripped of half his kingdom, and all his property and power.

"We were very glad to hear that he was coming back; *but, still, if you had brought him back as a King, we should have been more thankful*" [*Mercury* S. C.]. "We thought you would make the King a greater man than ever, and make the [Zulu] country larger instead of smaller." "We thought that, as he is now the son of the Queen, she would give him some of her land as well" [*Advertiser* S. C.]. "Instead of your taking land away from him, we thought you would give him more country than he ever had before. But now, to-day, when we hear your words, we are very much disappointed. We who live on the other side of the Umhlatuze [in the proposed Reserve] let us speak of these things" [*Mercury* S. C.].

After all that had happened, it is amazing that Sir T. Shepstone could still speak of Cetshwayo's restoration as "forcing a dreaded ruler upon an unwilling people"; the words are simply an echo of Sir Bartle

Frere's old, exploded war-cry. But the concluding passage of the quotation is neither more nor less than a full confession of the intentions with which the Natal officials undertook to carry out (and spoil) the just and wise intentions of the Home Government. The Zulu people's personal interests were to be enlisted against the King: his power and influence were to be lowered as much as possible: his territory curtailed: Zibebu set to oppose him on the one side, the Reserve to entice and draw away his people from him (if possible) on the other: the "conditions" binding him not to strengthen his authority by its use even within the narrow limits assigned to him, he was to become a mere puppet, and the "self-adjusting machinery" of disorder and misrule was to "act in the direction of ultimately securing peace to the country" by—bringing about Cetshwayo's death, the division of Zululand between ourselves and the Dutch Boers, and the utter destruction of the Zulu nation!

*"Terms, Conditions, and Limitations of Cetshwayo's restoration;"
assented to by him in England, August 1882.*

1. I will observe and respect the boundaries assigned to my territory by the British Government.

2. I will not permit the existence of the Zulu military system, or the existence of any military system or organisation whatsoever within my territory; and I will proclaim and make it a rule that all men shall be allowed to marry when they choose, and as they choose, according to the good and ancient customs of my people, known and followed in the days preceding the establishment by Chaka of the system known as the military system; and I will allow and encourage all men living within my territory to go and

come freely for peaceful purposes, and to work in Natal, or the Transvaal, or elsewhere, for themselves or for hire.*

3. I will not import or allow to be imported into my territory, by any person upon any pretence or for any object whatsoever, any arms or ammunition from any part whatsoever, or any goods or merchandise by the sea-coast of Zululand, without the express sanction of the British Resident, and I will not encourage, or promote, or take part in, or countenance in any way whatsoever, the importation into any part of Zululand of arms or ammunition from any part whatsoever, or of goods or merchandise by the sea-coast of Zululand, without such sanction, and I will confiscate and hand over to the Natal Government all arms and ammunition and goods and merchandise so imported into my territory, and I will punish by fine or other sufficient punishment any person guilty of or concerned in such unsanctioned importation, and any person found possessing arms, or ammunition, or goods, or merchandise knowingly obtained thereby.†

4. I will not allow the life of any of my people to be taken for any cause, except after sentence passed in a council of the chief men of my territory, and after fair and impartial trial in my presence, and after hearing of witnesses; and I will not tolerate the employment of witch-doctors, or the practice known as "smelling out," or any practices of witchcraft.‡

* An account of the full meaning of the so-called "military system" has been given at p. 371 *supra*.

† The "British Resident," to whom such power was given, should have been such as Cetshwayo desired, viz. an English gentleman of position and education, sent to be the eyes and ears of the Queen, not a mere young official of the Natal Government, imbued with all its prejudices and completely under its influence.

‡ The custom of "smelling out" may be applied either to the pointing out of a thief or murderer, or to the discovery of a lost snuff-box or of a cow which has gone astray. Though forbidden by law in Natal, and punished, when found to have been practised in serious cases, it must be often "winked at" by the authorities in Natal, being continually practised in minor matters all over the colony, and even in the streets of Maritzburg, close to Government House. The *Native Commission* says (p. 14, par. 44), "The general opinion seems to be that the influence of these doctors is on the decrease, from their practices being dealt with criminally;

5. The surrender of all persons fugitives in my territory from justice, when demanded by the Government of any British colony, territory, or province in the interests of justice, shall be readily and promptly made to such Government; and the escape into my territory of persons accused or convicted of offences against British laws shall be prevented by all possible means, and every exertion shall be used to seize and deliver up such persons to British authority.

6. I will not make any treaty or agreement with any chief, people, or government outside my territory without the consent and approval of the British Government. I will not make war upon any chief, or chiefs, or people, without the sanction of the British Government; and in any unsettled dispute with any chief, people, or government, I will appeal to the arbitration of the British Government, through the British Resident.*

7. The nomination of my successor, and of all future successors, shall be according to the ancient laws and customs of my people, and shall be subject to the approval of the British Government.

but we regret to have heard that, in order to discover thieves, *white men at times employ such men.*" And in one of Lady Barker's books will be found a full account of a "smelling out," which took place at her house as an afternoon's amusement under her patronage, and in the presence of Sir T. Shepstone. The Rev. R. Robertson states of these "doctors" (*Digest*, p. 698) that Cetshwayo "has twice during the last ten years very considerably reduced their number," and Major Poole says (*Digest*, p. 713), "Cetshwayo once had serious thoughts of getting rid of these pests, and told them that, as his companies were suffering from there being so many of them (witch-doctors being exempt from soldier's service), he should collect them, and order them to build a kraal in some out-of-the-way part of the country, and live there together, away from everybody else."

* The condition, "I will appeal to the arbitration of the British Government through the British Resident" must have appeared to the Zulus as simply adding insult to injury, after their experience (under Sir G. Colley, Sir E. Wood, and Sir H. Bulwer) of the futility of appealing through Mr. Osborn to the Government, and, still more, after their appealing patiently and perseveringly to the British Government in the matter of the disputed territory, the result being that at last it was proved to be theirs, and then annexed to English territory, and finally given to the Boers.

8. I will not sell, or in any way alienate, or permit or countenance any sale, or alienation of any part of the land in my territory.

9. I will permit all people now residing within my territory to there remain upon the condition that they recognise my authority, and any persons not wishing to recognise my authority, and desiring to quit my territory, I will permit to quit it, and to pass unmolested elsewhere.

10. In all cases of dispute in which British subjects are involved, I will appeal to and abide by the decision of the British Resident; and in all cases where accusations of offences or crimes committed in my territory are brought against my people in relation to British subjects, I will hold no trial, and pass no sentence, except with the approval of such British Resident.

11. In all matters not included within these terms, conditions, and limitations, and in all cases unprovided for herein, and in all cases where there may be doubt or uncertainty as to the laws, rules, or stipulations applicable to matters to be dealt with, I will govern, order, and decide in accordance with ancient laws and usage of my people.

These terms, conditions, and limitations, I engage, and I solemnly pledge my faith to abide by and respect in letter and in spirit, without qualification or reserve."

As to the "further conditions," these were devised (apparently) by Sir H. Bulwer, and heard by Cetshwayo for the first time on December 11th, when he was required to sign them, without being allowed to say a word—without being consulted as to the justice, or the righteousness or the possibility of the "successful working," of those conditions—"Cetshwayo had to choose between those terms and an exile at Oude Molen" [p. 275 *supra*]. It may be observed that Cetshwayo does not appear to have been informed as to the extent of territory cut off for Zibebu, which was larger even than he had under his rule before, and included the kraals and people of the King's brothers, Ndabuko and Ziweddu.

Additional Conditions, framed by Sir H. Bulwer, and imposed upon the King at Capetown, December 11th, 1882.

1. I will observe and respect the boundaries of the territories placed under the appointed chief Zibebu, as also those of the territory which Her Majesty's Government have decided shall be set apart as reserved territory with a British Resident Commissioner, and I will not attempt in any way to interfere with any of the people living in those territories.

2. I undertake to leave without interference all girls who, prior to the war in 1879, formed part of what was known as the Royal Zulu House, and who since that time have been married, as also their husbands, parents, guardians, and other relations, and I will make no claim on any of them in respect of such marriage. And I also undertake to hold no one criminally or otherwise responsible for any act of whatsoever nature or kind done or committed during my absence from Zululand, and I will not punish or proceed against any one for such in any way.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON January 28th, the day before the re-installment, the special correspondent of the *Natal Mercury* wrote as follows:—

“Speaking of Natal natives reminds me that some of those who have come in have not done so merely to satisfy their personal curiosity; there are others who are pointed out as *known emissaries of Bishopstowe.*”

And these words were repeated in the *Times of Natal* for February 20th, after various coarse and unworthy slanders insinuated against the Bishop of Natal, such as

“*the false report of the Bishopstowe Witness correspondent,*” and “*the trio [the Bishop, the editor of the Witness, and the S. C. of the Daily News] might have wriggled out of a charge of misrepresentation*” [*Times of Natal*, February 17th], “*three separate parties . . . to rank them in the order of prominence as determined by their violence*—(i) *the Colenso party, (ii) the Sutu party, (iii) the Zibebu party,*” and again, “*the white agitators in Natal, who wish for the dominion in South Africa of the black race, and the prevalence of a Kafir rather than an European civilisation,*” “*the exposure of*” their “*fraud,*” &c. &c.*

* This writer, though, unhappily for his own credit, not *speechless*, was, for some quite incomprehensible reason, almost incoherent with rage. In one sentence he accuses the Colensos of “enormous hatred” for Sir Henry Bulwer for Cetshwayo’s sake, and says that “the Zulu nation in the eyes of Bishopstowe begins, centres,

The Bishop sent a note to be published in the *Times of Natal*, contradicting what had appeared in that paper and the *Mercury* about “emissaries from Bishopstowe,” yet a few days later the assertion was repeated in the former paper, on which the Bishop wrote as follows:—

“*To the Editor of the TIMES OF NATAL.*

“BISHOPSTOWE, Feb. 20, 1883.

“SIR,—In your issue of to-day you repeat and italicise the statement that ‘*there were present at the Restoration, and prior to the act of Restoration, emissaries from Bishopstowe, one European and Natives*’—adding, by way of explanation, ‘emissaries, so much in the sense of the word as it implies secrecy of mission, as regards at least the ‘European,’ that he took the greatest care to keep his mission secret, and went so far as even to deny, point blank, that he was acting in a capacity which we knew he was acting in.’

“I had, of course, as much right, if I had pleased, to have sent ‘emissaries,’ white or black, to bring to me a true account of what passed on the occasion, as the *Advertiser* had to send Dr. Seaton [for the *London Standard*], or the *Mercury* to send yourself [for the *London Times*], or the *Witness* to send Mr. Mullins [for the *London Daily News*]. But I have to repeat that the whole statement above, italicised by yourself, is absolutely false. And I am at a loss to know how you can venture to assert that you ‘know’ that the ‘European’ in question was an ‘emissary from Bishopstowe,’ when he, it appears, as well as myself, has contradicted, ‘point blank,’ the assertion in question.

“As regards the ‘Natal natives,’ who (you stated as S.C. of the *Times*) were ‘well-known emissaries from Bishopstowe,’ no such

and ends in the person of the son of Mpande,” yet in the next breath he asks if “all this raving of the Cetshwayo party . . . is not rather directed and prompted solely by personal animosity towards the Governor of Natal.”

The—shall we say—*ravings* of Mr. Carter would be worth little notice had they stopped at publications by a colonial editor in his own local paper, but they were forwarded through the *Mercury*—perhaps with a little pruning for readers in England—to the *London Times*, and many of them are supported by official reports.

' emissaries ' were sent to be present at the late Restoration, whether prior or subsequently to the act of Restoration ; nor have any been sent, as you insinuate, at any time during my residence in the colony, as ' emissaries ' from Bishopstowe to Zululand, either by myself personally or by any one of my family, or by any one under my influence or authority.

" But, as you have repeated positively your original statement, I have a right to request, as I now do, that you will oblige me by mentioning the names of the natives in question, as also that of your (presumably) white informant, so that, if necessary, I may take steps accordingly.

" J. W. NATAL."

To this letter, the editor replied by a leader as follows :—

" We are sorry to have to refuse point blank to oblige the Bishop of Natal with the names of the emissaries who attended the Restoration, or with the names of either the Europeans or natives who pointed them out. The Bishop's statement—' nor have any been sent, as you insinuate, at any time during my residence in the colony, as emissaries from Bishopstowe to Zululand, either by myself personally, or by any one of my family, or by any one under my influence or authority,' is, in the face of the official proof furnished *to the contrary* in one of the last year's Blue Books, quite sufficient to prove that the Bishop has such an extraordinarily short memory that it is useless to give him specific information. It is not a question of our veracity as against that of Bishop Colenso, but a question of His Lordship's veracity as against that of the Kafirs he employs—but which he asserts he does not employ—to carry verbal messages for him to Zululand, and to receive reports from that country.

" Singularly enough, there appears in the *Natal Mercury* of yesterday a letter from a correspondent in Zululand, of whose trustworthiness our contemporary is satisfied, and that letter contains the following paragraph:—' Just as the Government party arrived at the Amahlabati, a *Kafir messenger passed, and he said he was sent by the Bishop of Natal to Mnyamana, to tell him not to be deceived by Sir T. Shepstone, who wished to give the Zulu King one arm and to cut off the other, whereas the Queen had given back to the King the whole country.*'

" It is also with reluctance that we are compelled to state that we decline to enter into any controversy upon the subject, for

reasons that will be obvious to nineteen out of every twenty men, who know how discussions with regard to Zulu affairs between His Lordship and any one else in the colony invariably terminate." —Ed. *Times of Natal*, February 22nd, 1883.

Answer by the Bishop. There is no "official proof to the contrary" in last year's Blue Books. There are insinuations, suggestions, accusations, "to the contrary," the latter based on statements of two unknown natives, who said that, when in Zululand, they had heard of such "emissaries," but (N.B.) *whose names are not given*, which is just the course followed by Mr. Carter on this, as on a former, occasion. Such charges were made without the knowledge of the Bishop, who was therefore unable to reply to them at the time, and only became aware, in this matter as in others, that he had been accused to the Secretary of State, when he saw the Blue Books some months afterwards. In point of fact, the accusations in question are absolutely untrue.

The "Kafir messenger" mentioned in the *Mercury*, was probably Mnyamana's son, who was sent down by his father to await the actual news of the King's having left Capetown, and who, after waiting some weeks, started at last with no other message than the telegrams just published in the local papers, viz. from Capetown, that "Cetshwayo had left Oude Molen," and from London, "Government repudiate annexation."

"Discussions with regard to Zulu affairs between the Bishop and any one else in the colony," have usually terminated by the Bishop producing facts which have overthrown the fallacies of his opponents, or requiring them, as here, to produce their proofs and substantiate their statements, which they have never been able to do.

Another member of the "trio," who, in Mr. Carter's opinion, might contrive to "wriggle out of a charge of misrepresentation," was Mr. F. Reginald Statham, editor of the *Natal Witness*.* This was the first, though not the last, occasion on which his name

* Author of 'Alice Rushton, and other Poems'; 'Glaphyra, and other Poems'; 'Eucharis, a Poem,' under the name of Francis Reynolds; of 'Free Thought and True Thought,' and other works of Sociology; of 'The Zulu Iniquity,' 'Blacks, Boers, and British.'

was honoured by being coupled with that of the foremost champion of truth, justice, and humanity in South Africa, the Bishop of Natal. Indeed, for some time after Mr. Statham's arrival in Natal in 1877, he had taken the popular colonial view of what was called the Bishop's "interference" in politics. As late as October 1881 this misapprehension was shown by an article from which a passage has already been quoted in this work, and in which the Bishop is alluded to as "an unofficial and irresponsible person, working in the dark," and interfering with colonial interests.*

But a further acquaintance with facts led the editor of the *Witness* to the discovery that the Bishop was right in Zulu matters, and, in the face of the colonial unpopularity which was certain to ensue, Mr. Statham took up the Zulu cause.

The result was one honourable to Mr. Statham, and especially so because there were reasons which made it not only peculiarly difficult for him to step forward boldly as the champion of the weak against the strong in South Africa, but an act of courage deserving full recognition,† However, up to this time he certainly had never been accused either of

* Mr. Statham first came to Natal in 1877, and was therefore not personally acquainted with the occurrences of 1873-4, when the Bishop first found himself obliged, as a man and a Christian, to "interfere" in so-called political matters, on behalf of the injured chief Langalibalele and his tribe. Mr. Statham was also absent from the colony between December 1879 and September 1881.

† See 'The Zulu Iniquity.' By F. R. Statham.

partisanship for the Bishop of Natal, or for Cetshwayo, nor yet of negrophilism. In a letter to the *Daily News*, dated May 1883, he says [‘Zulu Iniquity,’ p. 46]:—

“I was not . . . twelve months ago in favour of Cetshwayo’s restoration. Beyond all other risks, there seemed to be this—the risk of stirring up irritation and suspicion in the minds of European settlers against the native races generally. When, however, it was decided to restore Cetshwayo, there was only one thing to do—to restore him thoroughly, and make him your friend. This was what the [Home] Government intended, and this was what the country [England] approved.”

Mr. Statham had had some connection with the literary staff of the *Daily News* while in England in 1880, and upon his return to South Africa in the following year, he was asked by that journal to act as its correspondent in this part of the world. When the re-installation expedition under Sir T. Shepstone was about to start for Zululand, the principal colonial newspapers of course selected special correspondents to accompany the party for the benefit of their own papers, and of such English ones as they were in the habit of supplying with information, and the editor of the *Witness* amongst the rest.

“A few days before the end of the year,” he writes, “I had asked a gentleman then temporarily attached to the Commissariat and Transport Department, to act as correspondent with the escort into Zululand on behalf of a local paper. This gentleman . . . promised to do his best. I was, therefore, greatly surprised to receive a note from him a day or two later stating that he must decline to fulfil his promise, as he had been told that he would not be allowed to correspond for a newspaper, or that, if he did, his letters would have to be submitted to the staff officer before they were despatched. That, it will be admitted, was a fact of great significance; and I must confess that, knowing there was and could be

no pretence of a military necessity for such precaution, it was this communication that more than anything else led me to suspect that some underhand work was going on. My impression was further strengthened by the information I received from Colonel Curtis, in a note still in my possession, that "as regards any correspondent of a paper, he was altogether under the orders of superior authorities." It was this condition of things that convinced me my only chance of obtaining reliable information was to send into Zululand a gentleman so well acquainted with the country and the language and the people that he could be entirely independent of the military expedition.

Mr. J. Mullins was, therefore, chosen, and, as it turned out, a better choice could hardly have been made. In addition to the above-mentioned qualifications, he had no possible interest in the matter apart from the good of Cetshwayo and the Zulu people, and the accuracy of his accounts has since been proved beyond question.* Not so, however, did it appear in official eyes, for Mr. Mullins' reports gave an entirely different view of events from their own, and, it must be acknowledged, a very inconvenient one for them. For instance, he heard from the Zulus themselves how they had been frightened from the shore on Cetshwayo's arrival by threats of bullets, and this fact, with another statement concerning official inspection of letters and telegrams sent by the correspondents, was telegraphed home to the *Daily News* by Mr. Statham, and produced some sensation. The Earl of Derby at once telegraphed out to Sir Henry Bulwer for an explanation on these

* It is a notable fact that his accounts are supported by the S. C. of the *Advertiser*, Dr. Seaton, wherever that writer could escape from the difficulty of his own want of acquaintance with the Zulu language and the trammels of official influence.

two points, and on January 29th the latter replied [3466, p. 254]:—

“Officer escort reports that in establishing Tugela military telegraph newspaper correspondents allowed to send messages if signed by staff officer.* After 31st December signature no longer required, but, by mistake, one message refused because without signature. *No foundation for other statements.*” †

It has hardly yet been made quite clear that there was no sort of control exercised over the communications of the correspondents. The fact was denied, but not in such terms as to preclude the supposition that, without going so far as to suppress or refuse to forward obnoxious messages, the authorities with the expedition desired to *know* what was being said about their doings. It is made plain by the passages quoted from Colonel Curtis, and from the person first selected by Mr. Statham as correspondent, that perfect liberty there was not, but it remains uncertain what, exactly, was the state of the case.‡ The other, still

* It is explained that this restriction was imposed “in order to ensure precedence being given to military telegraphic messages of an official nature.” [Lieut.-Col. Curtis, 3616, p. 15.] To an ordinary un-official intelligence some simpler means of securing the desired result might seem preferable to one which certainly had the *appearance* of an official censorship of the Press.

† *Author's italics.* It has been abundantly shown that this assertion was a completely mistaken one.

‡ The memorandum from the telegraph clerk received by the editor of the *Natal Witness*, gave an entirely different excuse for the refusal of the one message which it is acknowledged was accidentally rejected, namely, that the message could not be sent because the Lower Tugela Office was a purely military “office,” which, Mr. Statham learned from the manager of telegraphs in Maritzburg, was not the fact, the office having been opened for general use under military control.

more serious accusation, that the Zulus had been driven from the shore by threats, elicited flat and indignant denials. Sir Henry Bulwer, in a despatch of March 21st [3616, pp. 13 and 88], forwards one on the part of the military officer in command, and, in a subsequent despatch, speaks in strong terms of the wrong done to himself by Mr. Statham in forwarding such reports. But the denials on the part of the military officers did not really affect the question at all, as no one ever supposed that the threats had emanated from them, or, indeed, that they knew anything about them. On the other hand, no denial has ever appeared from the civilian leaders of the expedition, and it remains a fact that the Zulus describe how they were frightened away from the shore by threats made, with or without authority, by subordinates of the said civilian leaders.*

* This statement was made at Bishopstowe, as already stated, by Mnyamana's messengers, as well as to Mr. Mullins by other Zulus. Mr. Samuelson also writes (letter republished in *Times of Natal*, September 28th, 1883): "All kinds of rumours were spread to frighten the Zulus, and deter them from meeting Cetshwayo on his landing, so that the Home Government might imagine that the Zulus did not care for Cetshwayo—such rumours as the following:—'Do not you Zulus be deceived, and so go to meet Cetshwayo; it is not Cetshwayo whom the English are bringing to you, but only his image; it is a trap for you Zulus. The English are coming with many vessels, and they mean to capture all who go to meet Cetshwayo, and who show that they are glad at his restoration; then they will carry them off to India as slaves; women, children, and cattle will be sold.'" Mr. Samuelson remarks: "That they should believe such rumours may seem absurd to an intelligent European; but the Zulus have been so used since the Zulu war, that they will believe anything which said that the English were going to punish them."

But this was not all. The whole series of *Witness-Daily News* telegrams had the same unpardonable fault of representing facts as they were, and not as it was officially desired that they should appear to be, and the circumstance was not allowed to remain unnoticed. The "Aborigines' Protection Society," to whose humane and disinterested efforts on behalf of the weak and helpless too much honour can never be rendered, addressed the following letter to the Colonial Office, on January 20th, 1883, through Mr. F. W. Chesson, Secretary [3466, p. 256] :—

"MY LORD,—I beg to inform your Lordship that, at a meeting of the Committee of the Aborigines' Protection Society held on Wednesday last, Mr. Dillwyn, M.P., in the chair, the following resolution, moved by Mr. Alderman Fowler, M.P., and seconded by Mr. H. Richard, M.P., was unanimously adopted :—

"That the attention of this meeting having been called to several telegrams relative to the partition of Zululand and the arrangements made for the return of Cetshwayo which have appeared in the *Daily News*, copies of these telegrams be sent to the Earl of Derby, with an earnest request that he will investigate the charges made, and take such steps as may be necessary to vindicate the good name of the country."

Mr. Chesson summarises the inclosed telegrams in the following paragraph :—

"I was desired to ask your Lordship's particular attention to the following statements :—(1) That although the Zulus as a nation desire Cetshwayo to be their King, yet the best part of Zululand has been withdrawn from his rule, and the new boundary leaves him only the most rugged and barren part of the country ; (2) that while the territory on the Natal border is called a "Native Reserve," and nominally remains independent, it is really annexed to the British possessions in South Africa, and is intended to provide an outlet for the native population of Natal ; (3) that the Zulus inhabiting this territory are anxious to live under Cetshwayo

and will refuse to be governed by any one else; (4) that no official intimation was given to the Zulus as to the date of the King's arrival, and that many of those who would have been present when he landed at Port Durnford were driven away by threats; and lastly, that a military censorship of the press has been established in Zululand, so that neither telegrams nor letters can be sent unless they are sanctioned by members of the staff."

Of the truth of these statements, with one exception, there can now be little question. The first is a simple matter of fact proved by the maps, and the accounts of all travellers in Zululand. No one has attempted to deny it.* That the (Natal) official *intentions* were such as they are described in Mr. Chesson's 2nd clause, is readily to be gathered from the Blue Books. Sir Henry Bulwer proposes to use the "reserved" portion of Zululand as an outlet for Natal natives of Zulu origin in his "Report" [3466, p. 148] on the "settlement of the Zulu country," and includes the idea in his "scheme of arrangements" for the government of the Reserve, sent home in October 1882 [*ibid.*, p. 206]. Sir Theo. Shepstone also writes [*ibid.*, p. 221]:—

"Then, again, when the Zulus, now straightened for land to occupy in Natal, find that in a portion of Zululand they can enjoy British protection as well as in Natal, they will migrate to the protected portion, and by so doing they will not only improve their own condition, but relieve the tension which their presence in Natal creates."

And that this intention, although checked for a while by prohibitions from the Home Government,

* Mr. Samuelson, who is well acquainted with both King and country, writes of the portion left to Cetshwayo as "his small, thorny, and uncomfortable cage," and of the "half of his country" which was taken from him as the "most valuable in every respect" [*Times of Natal*, September 28th, 1883].

is, nevertheless, in course of being carried out, may be gathered from a passage in the (English) *Times* of July 1884, "That territory [the Reserve] is now substantially part of Natal." *

The third statement quoted by Mr. Chesson has been proved by the Zulus in the Reserve themselves. The *haves* refused to be governed by any one but their rightful King, until it has even become a question whether England should not go to war with them upon the point. Nor is there any doubt about the remaining clauses, with the one possible exception of that concerning a military censorship of the press, which remains an uncertain point, except so far as it is allowed that the staff officer's signature was necessary before messages could be sent.

Nevertheless, Sir Henry Bulwer writes that [3616, p. 88], he had "felt obliged on two or three occasions to warn Her Majesty's Government of the unreliability of the information sent home by the Maritzburg correspondent of the *Daily News* to that paper," and on March 21st, 1883, he wrote a despatch upon the subject, in support of his previous warnings. This despatch deals with two separate subjects—the attitude of Sir Henry Bulwer towards the Transvaal Government, and his action upon the Zulu question.

On the former subject there can be no doubt that Sir Henry Bulwer had just cause of complaint against

* Nomgamulana states "he was a chief across the border. He was placed there about February by Mr. Jan [Mr. J. Shepstone]. Before that he was on the Natal side, about Rorke's Drift."—Report of Trial, *Natal Witness*, September 15th, 1883.

the editor of the *Witness*, who had somewhat hastily charged the Governor of Natal with two separate acts of a nature "distinctly unfriendly" to the Boer Government, neither of which acts Sir Henry Bulwer had committed. The first accusation was that "the deputation of Transvaal [native] chiefs demanding British assistance to resist the payment of taxes, has been invited by Sir Henry Bulwer to state its complaints in Maritzburg," and the other that "Sir Henry Bulwer refuses to allow the Transvaal Government to purchase artillery requisites in Natal without the permission of the Imperial Government."

The Transvaal chiefs in question were from the north of that country, belonging to tribes which had never been conquered by the Boers, and had never submitted to them. They had, however, become British subjects during the British occupation of the Transvaal, and upon its retrocession they were handed over to the Boers, in spite of their own protests and entreaties. The "artillery requisites" could only be required for the purpose of crushing and subduing these or other so-called "rebels" against Boer authority. England had decided to leave them to their fate, and to show that "confidence in" [Boer] intentions regarding the native population" which Mr. Statham elsewhere demands*—a "confidence" which is all the more touching, because however good their *intentions* may be, the Boers have as yet done nothing

* In a telegram to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, October 6th, 1881.

to merit it; and all the safer, because it is not ourselves, but the unfortunate natives whom we trust to the untried quality.* However, Sir Henry Bulwer would not, of course, have been justified in acting contrary to England's decisions, though many might sympathise with him, if, on this occasion, he found his duty a distasteful one, and the fact remains that he did *not* encourage the native deputation, and did *not* prevent the Boer purchase of artillery requisites. Mr. Statham [‘Zulu Iniquity,’ p. 51] fully acknowledged that in this respect he had been misinformed, pointing out that the fact of the Transvaal Governments having been equally misinformed with himself was some justification for the error in his case.

But while Sir Henry Bulwer was undoubtedly in the right in this portion of his despatch, it is impossible to say the same with regard to what follows. Having given the two instances mentioned above, he continues [3616, p. 90], “Such is the character of the information that the correspondent of the *Daily News* sends home to the paper which employs him,” and then asserts that the telegrams sent by Mr. Statham upon Zulu matters, so far as he had seen them, were “most of them misleading,” and that they contain “serious misstatements and unjustifiable assertions and imputations.” As a matter of fact,

* The present writer is, and has always been, entirely out of sympathy with Mr. Statham's views and publications upon the Dutch question of South Africa, and considers it an absolute duty never to lose an opportunity of opposing them.

the two Transvaal telegrams of October 16th and November 3rd appear to have been the *only* mistaken ones sent by Mr. Statham at all, while the whole of the Zulu ones are shown in these pages to have been substantially true. Sir Henry Bulwer writes [*ibid.*, p. 92], "There is not one word of truth in any of them. They are pure inventions, without even the shadow of a foundation." It can only be said that Sir Henry Bulwer was utterly mistaken and had been much deceived; yet this would hardly have been possible had not his own prejudices been so immovably fixed that he was simply incapable of believing anything that disagreed with them. His despatch was of course a direct attack upon Mr. Statham, in return for the latter's severe comments upon the actions of the officials, including himself, and was evidently intended to procure Mr. Statham's dismissal as correspondent of the *Daily News*, in which those comments had appeared, as he lays what he calls the "misrepresentations and imputations" before Lord Derby, in order that the latter may "bring them to the knowledge of the managers of the *Daily News*, and, if necessary, under the notice of Parliament."

On the 24th April, shortly after this despatch must have been received, Mr. Ashley, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, made the often-quoted reply in the House of Commons, that the Maritzburg correspondent of the *Daily News* was never well informed," and that he had, in fact, been in the habit of supplying that paper with false

information. Mr. Statham's own answer [‘Zulu Iniquity,’ p. 47] to this may be quoted:—

“It will be obvious to the common sense of every one that an atmosphere of unpopularity is not an atmosphere in which falsehoods are manufactured, and that it is never worth the while of any one to manufacture falsehoods at the imminent risk of ruin to himself, and all connected with him.”

Part of the last telegram inclosed by Mr. Chesson ran as follows [3466, p. 257]:—

“He [Cetshwayo] wishes his friends in England to understand that he was forced to sign the [Capetown] conditions under a threat of not returning to Zululand at all. He hopes the matter will be handled gently, as he feels sure the English people will see justice done.”

This was in reference to the message sent by Cetshwayo to the Bishop of Natal, through Mr. Mullins, to whom the King said, soon after he landed:—

“I was told that the country was to be cut off from the Umhlatuze, and that to the north also a large piece was to be cut off for Zibebu; and that, if I did not sign, I should never return, but remain always at the Cape. So I signed under protest, knowing that the land belongs to my people, and that I had no right to sign it away without their consent, and trusting that, as the English Government have listened to my prayer once, they will do so again, and set this thing right, and restore to us our country. And this is what I shall tell my people when they inquire of me how I came to do this thing, and I shall tell them that they must be patient and quiet meanwhile. And do you say to Sobantu that I commend this matter to him, and that I pray him to bring it before the English Government, and not to do anything hastily, but first to let all my friends in England know what is being done here.”*

* To Mr. W. Y. Campbell the King said:—“Kimberley told me, the Queen says you are to return, she gives you all your country; but at the same time Kimberley said there will be an *indawana* (literally a *small place*; it may mean 6 acres or 60 acres, possibly 600, but by no interpretation can it be made to mean one-

Two days after the reinstallation Umnyamana summoned to his presence his two trusty messengers, Mtokwane and Melakanya, who were engaged with

third of Zululand) taken off; it will not be much. I got anxious and remonstrated. I asked, is my return satisfactory when you speak of taking off a piece? Kimberley replied, it will be a piece of very little importance to you. Still I was anxious to know clearly where this *indawana* would be, and I asked if it would be on the Tugela bank, or somewhere, and Mr. Henrique Shepstone, who was near me, said yes, likely it will be about the Tugela. I then said to Kimberley, well, we shall see what the small piece will be that the servants you send will cut off; and he seeing my anxiety, assured me that my country was not going to be sliced, that I was to apprehend nothing serious, as the place would be small. The Umhlatuze was never once mentioned to me. The name of Zibebu was never mentioned to me, nor of any one who was to get the *indawana*. I feared the place was for Dunn, but they assured me that the Queen had no intention of giving any of Zululand to Dunn. This is what took place in Kimberley's house in England [the Colonial Office]. I was relieved by the assurance given; and I left for the Cape, and one day there Governor Robinson told me 'orders have come for you to go on your home journey.' I was glad at this. He then unfolded to me a lot of novel stipulations, which he told me came from London through Bulwer. I was sure they were not from London, because they were quite new to me, and I attributed them to Bulwer acted on by Misjan [Mr. J. Shepstone], who bears no love to either me or my people. . . . When Robinson told me that south of the Umhlatuze was taken from me and that Zibebu was confirmed in his command, I cried out and asked, Hulumende, whence these laws? They were never given in London. You say you will take all my south lands—all over the Umhlatuze. You say, also, you will give Usibebu lands in the north. Where, then, is the country I am being returned to? You elevate Usibebu; you give him, my once subject, lands. Why is he thus specially elevated? He alone singled out from the thirteen and all the others debased? Robinson replied, Usibebu positively declined to be with you or under you, and so we arranged the matter by separating you. I said, well if Usibebu is thus my enemy why should he be given a portion of

the other Zulus in cutting wood for building a kraal for the King. They found him in company with the Princes Dabulamanzi and Shingana, and two other

Zululand and made my neighbour? Why should he not be a stranger in body as well as in heart? And referring to the Umhlatuze I am dumbfounded over; there is the very portion of the lands where my father's headmen and my own mostly live; it is my chief cattle country; cut off that territory and you cut off my best possession; you leave me nothing; you remove the old Tugela landmarks and you put new ones in the heart of the very country the Queen gave me. You efface the Zulu country by your up-and-down slicing. What, then, has become of my recent new birth at the hands of our Queen? All this was taken silently and unrecorded. At last Robinson interposed, and said, 'Well, all this talk opens up a new discussion. I had made arrangements with General Smyth for an escort, but now your attitude will necessitate my countermanding them and you will have to stay here.' I retorted that that was an unfair way of dealing with me. Here was I alone and being saddled with *umtetwa* (laws) applying not only to myself, but to the Zulu nation at large. The nation's heads were not present; they were absent and ignorant of all this, and when I went to them with it they would be surprised indeed. Robinson replied: 'I have nothing to say to all this. As the matter stands you have an agreement with London, and it looks as if you were unwishful to fulfil it. This will look bad.' I replied: 'I have an agreement with London, but this is not it, and I must be allowed to protest against this new thing.' I protested because I knew it meant mischief. I knew things could not go naturally, and I must be allowed to speak my protest, and not be silenced or accept in silence. We had a long discussion about the land, and Robinson eventually said, 'Well, we must end this matter. You must accept the conditions laid before you.' I then said I wished him to clearly understand then that I protested against these conditions, and also that if mischief arose in the country it would not be my fault; also, that on my return I should still ask that the London agreement should be carried out, as I knew nothing of these Natal-made conditions. I only knew those given me by my Queen through Kimberley. I told Robinson that I had never heard till now that I was to be shorn of my lands

chiefs, one of them from the "Reserve," and Umyamana said to the men :

"I am sending you now to Sobantu. You two were present at the meeting with Somtseu, and heard all that was said, and you can report it all.

"The message which I send is this.

"I do not see where the King is to put the Zulu people. They all wish for the King; but the land has been taken away from us. Mbopa's tribe, Mfusi's tribe, and the tribe of amaNkengane, with the sub-tribes of Gqikazi and amaNhlwenga, part of the tribe of Masipula [Mpande's prime minister], and some of my people—all desiring the King—and even the kraals of the Princes Ndabuko and Ziwedu, and those of large portions of their tribes, are given to Zibebu. Seketwayo's land is reduced by what has been given to the Boers [the 'Disputed Territory']; and more land is to be cut off from him for Hlubi the Basuto, beside all the district south of the Umhlatuze. It is a mere strip that will be left to Cetshwayo, and we do not see how this can be done. We protest against it, the whole Zulu people, both those who have always prayed for the King, and those who, before his return, were weak-kneed and held back. We protest, all of us, against the cutting off of the land.

"You will ask Sobantu to send a telegram in our name—in the name of the headmen of the Zulu people—to protest to the Queen against all this which is being done in her name. And I see that the people of those districts will soon be following you, going themselves to protest.* What, indeed, is it intended should become of them?

"I do not, of course, send you without the King's sanction. Go now to him, and hear from himself.

and people. Robinson said, 'No, we take no people; we only take a portion of your land, and we will not interfere with your people.'

"Mr. Saul Solomon, at the Cape, was a friend of mine, and he advised me to accept under protest and get back to my country, and that constitutional means would be found to set things right. So, the day before leaving the Cape Robinson said to me 'Sign.' I said, 'Yes, sir, I will sign; but let us clearly understand that my signing does not imply acceptance of your boundary cutting, and we shall talk it over and discuss it from Zululand and try and understand each other.'"—['With Cetshwayo in the Inqandhla,' p. 7.]

* The people of the "Reserve."

“So Mgwazeni* took us to the King, with whom we found Somkele and Seketwayo. We reported Mnyamana’s words, and the King said, ‘I have no further word. I was in the hands of the English. My fathers do well to send you. I have already sent my own message to Sobantu.†

“‘Go, then, and say that the Zulu people protests, as I do. What they said at the meeting with Somtseu was exactly what I feel and wished to speak if I had been able. Ask Sobantu to send a telegram, so that you may bring me back an answer from England.’”‡

Cetshwayo was now left to make the best of the situation, such as it has already been depicted, and the *Times of Natal* was quite right in its conclusions that [*Times of Natal*, February 12th, 1883]

“By nothing short of the working of a miracle can the settlement itself become a permanent one, or even endure for a period of twelve months.” A “settlement which every man acquainted with the present circumstances of Zululand knows cannot endure for many months,” continues this writer [Feb. 17]. “What,” says the *Advertiser* [*Adv. S. C.*, Feb. 17] at the same time, “has the restoration in Zululand accomplished? It has replaced the hereditary potentate by conditions which it is impossible to fulfil.”

Speaking of Zibebu’s appointment, the same writer remarks that it

“can only breed discontent and jealousy throughout the Zulu nation. Not only the Sutu party, who had already experienced his tender mercies, but all the deposed chieftains, and most notably his own two brothers [who were not ‘appointed’ chiefs], declaimed against the retention of independent power by Zibebu; and, however anxious Cetshwayo may be to fulfil his obligations, I doubt if his utmost endeavours will prove sufficient to prevent the powerful Sutu party

* One of the chiefs who had attended the King at Capetown.

† The message sent through Mr. Mullins, and already forwarded to England.

‡ Part of this message from Umnyamana has previously been quoted in this volume.

from endeavouring to revenge their wrongs on this chief. . . . Had Cetshwayo been fully restored as King over all Zululand—had he been completely reinstated in the position he held before the Zulu war—there might now be no fear of civil war in Zululand. The Zulus would have received and welcomed him back as King, and settled down again under his sway. They might, under such circumstances, have admired the clemency of the British Government in restoring and reinstating a foe whom it had conquered, though they could not have completely understood it. As things are now, they can neither admire nor understand. Cetshwayo is restored to them, but he is not the same Cetshwayo as of old. He is shorn of a large area of his country, and of more than half his power. . . . John Dunn, and Hlubi, and Zibebu—and Zibebu most of all—are set up in opposition to him, or at any rate as authorities—in what was once his land and his only, and his people, equally with himself, fail to understand the usefulness, the justice, or the policy, of such an arrangement.”

Thus far the situation was apparent to any well-intentioned observer such as Dr. Seaton, but the recorder of these forebodings was yet unaware of that most fatal fact which destroyed any chance of peace in Zululand which the “conditions” themselves allowed, namely, that *three different boundaries between Zibebu and the Usutus had been officially announced to the Zulu people*. In preparation of the inevitable disturbances to ensue, the *Times of Natal*, and *Mercury*, soon flamed with exaggerated reports or false rumours, one report being headed “Cetshwayo breaks the conditions!” while another commenced “Breach of the Terms of Settlement.”

The earliest of these attempts to discredit Cetshwayo's actions was one in connection with the mealie-gardens which Umfanawendhlela had planted over and around the old King Umpande's burial-place. The King had waived his undoubted right to take

immediate possession of the site, and remove the desecration from his father's grave, until Umfanawendhlela's crops for that year should be reaped.* But, unfortunately, these gardens were in close proximity to the place selected for the reinstallation of the King. No provision whatever having been made for feeding the great numbers of people who were sure to flock together to witness the ceremony, they were soon short of food, and helped themselves from the mealie-gardens round about. They completely stripped the gardens of one of the King's mothers; they took large quantities from those of his aunt, and also from other gardens, including those of Umfanawendhlela. But the latter was the only one to complain, the others treating such an occurrence as inevitable unless the European officials had caused food to be provided for the people. Yet this simple and, as far as Cetshwayo was concerned, unavoidable circumstance was reported by the *Natal Mercury* of February 6th, thus:—"Cetshwayo has eaten up all the crops of Umfanawendhlela, the ex-chief who was adverse to his return," and by the *Times of Natal*:—

"The Sutu party has destroyed all Umfanawendhlela's gardens and others [N.B.] about there, and killed five men. I give this last bit of news for what it is worth [i. e. nothing, for the report of any *killing* was afterwards contradicted], though my source of information is exceptionally good." And again, "news from

* Sir T. Shepstone reports, "Cetshwayo intimated [to Umfanawendhlela] that he should require his old sites, but that the women and children might remain to watch the crops" [3616, p. 48].

Umfanawendhlela's territory confirms the reports respecting Cetshwayo's actions. The Sutu party ate up all the mealie and *amabele* gardens, raided cattle, and, in fact, resumed the same tactics which they so long exercised against Zibebu."*

The *Times of Natal* follows up this first report:—

"From a source which is perfectly reliable, we publish the information to-day that Cetshwayo is at his old tricks again, and has already commenced the eating-up process, which he so successfully practised to his own advantage and to the injury of his enemies in former days. He has, so the information goes, eaten up all the mealie gardens of Mfanawendhlela, an act in itself sufficient to provoke an immediate outbreak between the rival parties in Zululand.

"Mfanawendhlela, it must be borne in mind, was the chief appointed by Sir G. Wolseley to occupy that central district in Zululand, including the site of Cetshwayo's military kraals Ulundi, Emahlabatini, and Inhlazatshe (Mr. Osborn's late place of residence). Having no scruples as to the choice of ground on which to plant mealies, this chief selected the richest spots round about the site, and the site itself, of the Ulundi Kraal, and round about the scene of Mpande's burying-place hard by, as also the sites of several of the former outlying military kraals, with which the ground rising from the White Imfolozi was formerly studded. Whatever may be the superstitions or etiquette of the Zulus generally in regard to such localities—however much they may revere such ground or hold it sacred—this has nothing to do with the flagrant breach by Cetshwayo of his engagements given but a fortnight ago.

"What Cetshwayo's solemn word, pledged over and over again at the *Emtonjaneni* meeting, is worth is now apparent. The one condition, which was most frequently and forcibly impressed upon him, was that he was to molest no one for any act done during his absence, that he was to begin entirely afresh, and punish no one for anything that had been done during his exile. Again and again he agreed to observe these conditions, and yet *he does not wait a fortnight before deliberately breaking his word.*

* This accusation against the Usutus is entirely false, though it is truly made against Zibebu himself, of whom Mr. Campbell writes as "worrying and harrying the Usutu party and the King's brothers and relatives in the days of his chieftainship as one of the thirteen."—"With Cetshwayo in the Inkandhla," p. 38.

“It is not denied (!) that the King has wreaked his spite by ‘eating up,’ or destroying the ‘mealie gardens’ that had taken the place of his old abode. This in itself is just such an arbitrary and aggressive act as might have been looked for, and, should it lead up to more ‘killing,’ no one will be surprised. Every effort will be made by the party of disorder and agitation in this colony to hush up and make light of any despotic or destructive pranks on the part of their *protégé*. This was industriously done by Bishop Colenso and his confederates prior to the Zulu War, and subsequently. But facts are facts, and we shall, as heretofore, make it our business, as it is our duty, to chronicle, as fully and faithfully as possible, the doings of the restored King.”—Ed. *Merc.* [Mr. J. Robinson, Durban Correspondent of London *Times*], Feb. 17.

Meanwhile the Zulus from all parts of the country, including the Reserve, were flocking together to greet and serve the King. The very large numbers who thus voluntarily attended him are mentioned [3616, p. 69] by several independent witnesses, and it is impossible for any one acquainted with the Zulu language and feeling to doubt that the joy at Cetshwayo’s return was widespread and general. This was as true of the inhabitants of the proposed “Reserve” as of any other part. Mr. W. Grant reports at a somewhat later date:—

“The whole [? main] body of Zulus in the Reserve are entirely with the King. As I passed through, the expression on every lip was ‘Si yatanda Inkosi,’ i. e. ‘we love the King,’ [3864, p. 101], out of eleven of the most important chiefs belonging to the Reserve, eight were seen by me at Ulundi with the King, the remaining three had been to visit him, and returned to their homes, but were heartily loyal.”

These chiefs of the “Reserve” had already heard enough doubtful and even alarming intelligence of what the mistaken kindness of the British Govern-

ment, passed through the inimical medium of the Natal official mind, had prepared for them, to be very uneasy, and their uneasiness was increased by messages from Mr. J. Shepstone, British Resident Commissioner in the Reserve, summoning them to attend him at once, which summons was repeated until not only did Mr. Fynn, the new Resident with Cetshwayo, and Umnyamana, strongly advise them to obey, but the King himself laid his commands upon them to do so, enjoining them at the same time, to behave quietly, so as not to offend the power (England) in whose good intentions he still believed, although it was plain that she had thoroughly misunderstood the wishes and feelings of his people. The greater part of the chiefs in question departed, though most reluctantly.* They felt that their going would, in spite of themselves, be construed into submission to the policy of the Reserve, and repudiation of Cetshwayo, and that they could hardly behave "quietly" and avoid offending this peremptory representative of Her Majesty without giving him some grounds for asserting that they were, to use Mr. Shepstone's own phrase again, "*loyal to us.*" And so it actually happened. The majority sooner

* Four of the principal chiefs in the Reserve, Qetuka, Nobiya, Godide, and Ndwandwe, and two of rather less importance, did not, however, go themselves, but sent representatives. This proceeding was quite in accordance with Zulu etiquette, and could only be regarded as disrespect by Mr. Shepstone from some such overweening notion of his own importance, and fancied superiority to Cetshwayo, as that attributed to him in the report made to the King a little later (see p. 448).

or later waited on "Mr. Jan"; and whether, through their own weakness, or through his diplomacy, and their ignorance of precisely how advantage would be taken of any temporary submission to official hectoring, in the end they nearly all appeared upon Mr. Shepstone's lists of those who, he said, intended to remain in the Reserve, subject to quasi-British authority. On the part of the officials every effort was made to produce a respectable appearance (on paper) of Zulus claiming British protection against Cetshwayo, and every step which he took on the other side was fiercely denounced as a breach of his conditions, interfering in the Reserve, and so on. Sir Henry Bulwer says [3616, p. 65] on this point, that

"From the moment of his landing he began to break the conditions with regard to the people of the Reserved territory by sending messages to them with the object of persuading them that the territory would come under him, and of inducing them to recognise him."

What "messages" the King really sent has already been made plain, and it is curious to observe how the spirit of the English terms was gradually modified to suit the views of those who aimed at annexation. When the Home Government agreed that "on grounds of good faith locations must be assigned to such of the chiefs as might not be willing to return under Cetshwayo's rule, and it follows that a certain part of the territory must be reserved," but "no more than is necessary, &c.," and when it was explained to Cetshwayo that a small piece of land would thus be cut off, it certainly was not intended

that he should be debarred the right to communicate with nearly half the Zulus, or to stimulate their loyalty by such bloodless means as, alone, were in his power to use. The people of the Reserve had been told to make their choice, and no particular time was fixed by which that choice must be made, though generally (and repeatedly) it was laid down that all emigrants should be allowed to remain where they were until they had harvested their crops. This could not be for several months to come, and the majority of the people hoped that, by that time, the unnecessary character of the whole arrangement would be proved "to the satisfaction of the [Home] Government."

Meanwhile Cetshwayo certainly had a perfect right to communicate with all these subjects of his who had let him know that, in any case, their allegiance was his. And while the whole question still hung in the balance, it is difficult to understand under what pretence Sir Henry Bulwer could accuse the King of breaking his promises, unless he intended the words (from one of the conditions of his own framing) which he quotes as disregarded by Cetshwayo [3466, p. 240], "I will not attempt to interfere with any of the people living in those territories" [3616, p. 65], i. e. Zibebu's and the Reserve, in a far more tyrannical sense than they would generally be supposed to bear. The phrase would naturally be taken to mean that after the removals (if any) from either side were over, and the Reserved territory settled, Cetshwayo should not "attempt to interfere with any of the

people who had repudiated his rule," but it would hardly be interpreted to mean that from "the moment of his landing" Cetshwayo was forbidden to speak to his brother Dabulamanzi and the many other loyal chiefs from that district of their intentions, and might not while as yet they had taken no decided steps, use his personal influence to keep as many as possible loyal to himself.

There seems to have been much confusion of mind upon this point on the part of all personally concerned. The removal of A. to one side, and of B. to the other of a given boundary in the middle of Zululand, according to the respective preferences of A. and B. for the government existing on either side of the said boundary, might look very neat and simple on paper, but practically it was an impossible scheme. Tribes cannot well be thus removed from their old accustomed homes and lands except by an armed force, or in fear of their lives. Had Cetshwayo's name been a terror to the Zulus, as Sir Henry Bulwer imagined, no doubt the "Reserve" would quickly have been flooded by flying families, careless of every consideration but that of safety, and this, apparently, was what the Home Government had been led to expect by Natal advices. But no such eager flight took place. Many Zulus were reported by Mr. J. Shepstone as intending to remove into the Reserve, but very few actually did so. Large numbers determined to remain in it, not because they wished to disown Cetshwayo, but, partly because of the practical difficulties involved in the removal of con-

siderable tribes into a country already fully occupied, and partly because they were acting on Dabulamanzi's suggestion that they should stay quietly at their homes, but without renouncing the King, and so [3616, p. 12] "show to the satisfaction of the Government, that no necessity for a reserved territory exists." The Home Government certainly held that the Reserve was still unsettled. Lord Kimberley wrote in reply to Sir Henry Bulwer's scheme of arrangements for its governance [3466, p. 217]—

"So much must depend on the numbers and character of the chiefs and people who may elect not to remain under Cetshwayo's rule, that . . . it would be premature at once to settle the details of the administration of this reserve."

And on April 12, in reply to a despatch from Sir Henry Bulwer of the 15th February, Lord Derby refers him to the above answer, saying—

"Her Majesty's Government are not disposed to depart from the decision communicated to you in my predecessor's despatch of the 30th November last."

As we have seen, the assembled Zulus at Emtongani sent, or imagined they had sent, a protest to England against the division of the country, through Sir T. Shepstone. He promised to forward their representations [3616, p. 56], but, while the promise was merely formal, representing not the smallest wish on his part to support, or in any practical sense "forward" their prayers, they received the undertaking in earnest, and waited anxiously for a reply. The King had also sent his message to the

same effect, through Mr. Mullins, to the Bishop of Natal, requesting the latter to forward it to England, which, of course, was done at once, and, as we have seen, Umnyamana and the great chiefs soon after sent a similar one in the same manner. Cetshwayo himself had had practical proof of the rapidity of communication of the ocean cable, and, although his people neither knew the great distance between their country and England, nor yet understood anything of the means by which it is practically annihilated, they expected an answer pretty soon.

Meanwhile they thought it advisable to send a formal message of the same description to the Natal Government, and, after a small preliminary deputation had reported themselves to Sir T. Shepstone on March 14, a large and important one was announced to the Government five days later, consisting of Shingana (Cetshwayo's half-brother), the noted chief Sihayo, and thirteen others, all either men of note, or else representing some of the most powerful chiefs, both in the Reserve and beyond its limits. A few days after they had delivered their message to the Government, they repeated the substance of it at Bishopstowe, as follows:—

“ We are sent by (*uZulu*) the heads of the Zulu people to give thanks to the White House (the English) for this that they have done in restoring Cetshwayo. Our fathers say, ‘ We see that you do not forsake a covenant, for in restoring him you are carrying out the old covenant of friendship which Tshaka made with the English. Once before you fulfilled that covenant when the small-pox was raging and the people dying, and we were saved by English medicine. And now again you have raised us from the

dead by bringing back Cetshwayo. For this we shall always be thankful, that you have given him into our arms, saying, too, that he is now the son of the Queen, not of Mpande only. But where do you intend that we should set him up? There is no place left to us. And this is a complaint which we cannot conceal even while returning thanks, since it is to you that we make it—to his own people (friends) who have restored him. We complain that we are now told that the country is to be cut off at the Umhlatuze; whereas so many chiefs of the Zulu nation live with their tribes south of that river. We are told too that to the north, land is to be cut off for Zibebu, who is just one of Cetshwayo's dogs—which news astounds the whole of Zululand to-day. For the land belonging to many chiefs is now cut off for Zibebu.

“The Zulu people are bewildered by the order that whoever wishes for Cetshwayo is to cross the Umhlatuze. They say, ‘Hau! who is there, great or small, who does not wish for Cetshwayo? Have we not all petitioned for him?’

“We do not understand why the country is to be cut into three parts, for the Government, for Cetshwayo, and for Zibebu. We thought that the King belonged to the Queen with the whole country.

“All these words we have spoken at the S.N.A. Office. We have been in twice. The first day I (Shingana) only was called into the room, and Sihayo came with me. . . . We did not speak then the words about . . . [the] beating [of] Hozana, &c., because that was a disgraceful affair, not fit to be mixed with words of thanks and prayer, and because, also, Hubu's and Mjiba's turn had not yet come, who were the proper persons to speak them [being eye-witnesses].

“The next day four of us went into the office. Only Mr. Methley [clerk and interpreter] was present at first, we began to speak as alone, repeating what we had said to Mr. Symonds (acting S.N.A.) the day before. But as soon as we began, ‘We are sent by *uZulu*,’ he stopped us, saying, ‘Don't say that you are sent by the Zulu people. You are in fact sent by the Sutu. Has Zibebu, too, sent you then?’ But we denied altogether, saying, ‘The Sutu is only one tribe under the King; we are sent by the heads of the Zulu people.’ ‘Count them up then!’ said he. Said I, ‘Will not the sun have set before I've done, since, to begin with, there are all those whom you know,

who came down to pray for Cetshwayo [2000]. How can I count over the whole nation?' He kept continually objecting and stopping me, until I had to remonstrate, saying, 'Sir, this is stopping our mouth; you are not allowing us to speak our message.' When we spoke of the Umhlatuze line, he said, 'But don't you know that the line cutting off that country was drawn by Cetshwayo himself? Why! that was the means by which he got himself released. Where is Langalibalele [who has no land to give up]?' I replied, 'The King told us that he was forced to sign, and was told, "If you make any objections, you will delay your return indefinitely. The right thing for you to do is to sign now, and make your protest when you have reached home." Also, he said, "I was never told of all this in England; it was only proposed that I should give up a little bit of land, where Dunn is living—as it were, the piece which I formerly allowed him." And we replied, "Nkos, we have been misled in supposing that you were really restored. You are still a prisoner, if you are separated from your country and people. Can you carry us all on your head then?—us, who shall not give you up, since we have all been praying for you." And he replied, "Go, then, my friends, and report this, and ask where are you to set up your King?"' Mr. Methley had a paper and seemed to be writing down our words; but he behaved very oddly, writing a little and then dashing the pen across his writing, over and over again, and hiding away his paper under others when Mr. Symonds came into the room. We had told Mr. Methley saying, 'There are others with us from south of the Umhlatuze, who have also a message to give,' and Hubu and Mjiba had come in by his permission. It was soon after this that Mr. Symonds came in.

"He made us repeat our words, and asked us if these were all. We said, 'Those are all ours,' and Hubu, half-risen, came forward to speak, when Mr. Methley said, 'Yes, we have heard all that you have to say about the land south of the Umhlatuze.' And thereupon he, together with Mr. Symonds, got up and went away, leaving us gaping—for one cannot insist on a Chief's listening to one, if he does not choose to do so. So the story of the beating was not told."

What was meant by this allusion may be gathered from the words of the Zulus, as quoted from the

Natal Witness of March 20 and May 16, 1883, in the declaration made in Court on behalf of Mr. J. Shepstone in an action for libel, and published in the *Times of Natal* of September 15:—

“On March 14 four messengers came to Natal from Zululand with a message to Sir T. Shepstone, complaining that Cetshwayo was in danger of starving, all the Royal cattle being in the hands of the ex-appointed Chiefs. From these messengers we obtain details of Mr. John Shepstone’s treatment of certain chiefs of the Reserve territory, who had visited Cetshwayo. When the headmen, Madwaba, Siganda, and Hozana went to Equdeni, where Mr. John Shepstone was staying, they found that three other headmen had been brought before the S.N.A. by his policemen, and were then inside the house. Madwaba and the other two were ordered to remain outside. Mr. Shepstone came out and demanded to know why they had delayed so long. The headmen replied that they had been waiting to come with Mavumengwana, . . . but when they heard that the former had been taken prisoner, they followed. Mr. Shepstone said, ‘What have you come about, then? Where are the others whom I sent for—Qetuka, Melelesi, &c.?’ The deputation replied by pointing out the representatives of these chiefs. Mr. Shepstone then asked, ‘Where are they themselves?’ They replied, ‘They are building the King’s Kraal.’ Upon this Mr. Shepstone became very angry, and said, ‘Is Cetshwayo greater than I? Do you respect him more than me? Is he not under me—under my feet? Is he not just my dog, whom I have dragged here by a string round its throat?’

“‘Why do you stand looking at them?’ (addressing his own men). He then snatched Hozana’s stick from his hands, and struck him on the head within the heading, drawing blood. Mr. John’s men then set upon the chiefs with sticks and sjamboks, and beat them badly. They could not get away, because they were surrounded on all sides; and they are there in Mr. John’s hands now—as far as the messengers now in Natal know—except Madwaba, whom Mr. Shepstone made strip off his blankets, and show the mark where he had been struck—there was a great sjambok weal over his shoulders, from his back to his chest. Said Mr. John, ‘Yes, they’ve really hurt you,

Madwaba; it is because you despised my call. You may go home.' But he was the only one allowed to go. All the above was told to the messengers by Madwaba himself on the way down, and he added 'Does Mr. John really think that he can separate me from the King, now that I've seen him?' Madwaba is of the family of Masipula, Mpande's Prime Minister, but lives south of the Umhlatuze. Hozana is a maternal relative of the King. Sangcongeo, younger brother of Melelesi, was cut on the leg in trying to get over the fence. Ndunge, under Qetuka, brought up blood in consequence of the blows he received. Ndwandwe's people reported to Cetshwayo that Mr. Shepstone had eaten up their cattle; but Mr. Fynn, who was present, said that they were not being eaten up, but had been seized as a fine for the chief's delaying to obey the call of Mr. Shepstone. Ndwandwe, Qetuka, and Melelesi were ordered to pay each 10 head of cattle, Matshana Sitshakuza 5 head. In addition to that, whenever Mr. Shepstone sends a policeman, that man to whom he is sent has to pay the policeman one head. This, it seems, is going on all over the country south of the Umhlatuze; but the boundary which has been declared by Mr. John strikes off from the Umhlatuze *before reaching the source*, and proceeds to the north."—*Witness*, March 20.

This was a second-hand statement, i. e. made by men who had heard it from some of the beaten chiefs, but that of May 16th was taken down from the mouths of the complainants themselves, and a specimen of their accounts may be taken from the same paper [*Times of Natal*, Sept. 15th, 1883]:—

"He [Muntumpofu] said:— I was with the King when messengers came from Mr. John [Shepstone] to call the whole of the people who lived south of the Umhlatoozi. Mr. Fynn said to the King, 'Mr. John has been calling the people a long time now; let them go to him to hear the words which he brings from the Government.' The King said, 'Let all those men whom Mr. John has called go straight to him; do not go home. I do not know what he calls you for, but you will hear from him.' A number of us left together. On the way, three

chiefs went to their kraals; we delayed a little, and again collected together at Emtontaneni. As we were going towards Etshowe, messengers came from Mr. John to say he was going to Entumeni to Mr. Galloway's place.* We reached that place early the following morning; and found the horses being saddled. We were then told that Mr. John would speak to us at Equdeni, and that we were to follow him there.† When we got there—Mr. M. Oftebro's house‡—we were told to lay down our arms, and we put them under a tree some distance, about 100 yards from the house.§ When we arrived, the policemen were singing Mr. John's praises. They were saying, the white and the black bulls are facing one another; let us see whose horns will be broken before night. We all went in at the gate and saluted. Mr. John was sitting on the verandah. We were told to sit down. When we who were in front were about to sit down, it was said, 'Those who are behind must come in front.' When we were attempting to do so, Mr. John jumped upon us. He had a sjambok in his left hand, and with his right hand he took a knobkerry from Makatshana. This was the stick with which he 'killed' Hozana.|| Mr. John gave the word to attack, saying,

* Mr. Galloway, an adherent of Dunn's, and since a subordinate of the Resident in the Reserve.

† What a dance these unfortunate men—most of them men of rank and position, and some of them elderly—were led is hardly apparent without a map of Zululand showing the places mentioned.

‡ Mr. M. Oftebro, previously mentioned, one of Dunn's henchmen.

§ "We were told to leave our sticks, and we put them down under a tree, some little way off; they were only walking-sticks, no knobkerries, nor assegais, nor shortened assegais; so we went with our hands empty." (*Interpretation of Muntumpofu's speech by the Bishop of Natal.*)

|| Hozana himself, a month or two after his injury, said to the Bishop of Natal, "My head is still very painful, especially when the sun is hot. It throbs, and my eyes turn black [dizzy], and there is a singing in my ears, and I find that a man must tell me a thing three or four times over before I can thoroughly under-

‘Strike them; give them the stick hard.’ Thereupon the policemen drove us to the gate, and we crowded to get out; we then scattered in all directions. Mr. John was in amongst us striking in all directions. His men shouted, ‘Hurrah, Umgungunhlovu.’ I saw Mr. John strike Hozana.”*

The editor of the *Natal Witness* in publishing the first account of the above, i. e. the “hearsay” story, commented upon it thus:—

“We have always regarded Mr. Shepstone as a most unfit man to send into Zululand, if for no other reason than this—that the Zulus entertain towards him neither respect nor confidence.† To these disqualifications he has now, if our information is correct, added another, which is far more damnatory. Such an act as he has now been guilty of cannot be passed over if any kind of

stand it.” On the same occasion Muntumpofu said, “Magegeba’s hand they broke, it hangs at the wrist . . . but I did not see that [done]. What I saw with my own eyes was the knobkerry coming down on Hozana’s head—a light-coloured one, not very large, with the round head partly sliced off.” The defence on Mr. Shepstone’s part was that he neither struck nor ordered to be struck any blow, but that a fight arose between two parties in his presence. The blows would appear to have been all on one side, as while many names of injured “Sutus” (who had no weapons, not even sticks) have been given in, none have appeared on the other side. Sir Henry Bulwer in one of his palpably prejudiced despatches on the subject says, “Some of whom [i. e. the anti-Sutu party] Mr. Shepstone informs me were badly hurt,” but there is no mention of even this vague and general statement in Mr. Shepstone’s (published) report, and no single instance has ever been brought forward.

* Several others gave the like account, and mentioned severe injuries.

† The editor may here have alluded to Mr. Shepstone’s conduct in the Matshana affair, well known in Zululand, to which country Matshana escaped.

friendly relations are to be maintained between this Colony and Zululand,"

and more to the same effect.

A little later, the same story having reached Mr. Statham from an eye-witness, * it appeared again in the *Witness* in its fuller, and slightly corrected form. Before the publication of this second statement, all available means were taken to verify it. One of the employés of the paper was sent out to Bishopstowe, where, by that time (May 15th, 1883), were some of the beaten men themselves, and, careful inquiries having been made by the Bishop† as to the trustworthiness of the speakers, and the origin of their testimony, he took down their words with the assistance of Miss Colenso‡ and two native interpreters.

* *Times of Natal*, Report of Action, Sept. 17th, 1883.

† The death of the Bishop having meanwhile occurred, his daughter appeared as a witness on behalf of the defendants. Having occasion afterwards to supply a slight omission in her evidence which she thought might cause misunderstanding of her father's action, she published a few lines in the *Natal Witness*, and on Sept. 22nd, sent a copy to Sir H. Bulwer requesting him to annex one of them to such report of the trial as the Governor might send to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and on the 6th of December she received a reply from Sir H. Bulwer's private secretary to the effect that "His Excellency desires me now to say that he has received a despatch from the Secretary of State, in which His Lordship requests that you may be informed that he has received and read your letter." The despatch here alluded to does not, however, appear in the Blue Book, nor does Sir H. Bulwer's report, to which it was presumably the reply, and we have, therefore, no means of knowing how the matter was regarded in Downing Street.

‡ Miss Colenso, in her evidence, said that "she was pretty well acquainted with the native language; but in matters of impor-

A similar statement was sent home to the *Daily News*, as well as published in the *Natal Witness*, and the following official telegrams [3616, p. 111] were exchanged upon the subject.

First, from the Earl of Derby to Sir Henry Bulwer :—

“Daily News telegrams, Shepstone, 19th and 22nd March. Can you contradict statements?”

and second, from Sir Henry Bulwer to the Earl of Derby :—

“Wholly untrue, Shepstone striking or causing to be struck ; on contrary, interposed to stop fight between two factions ; fined altogether seven chiefs ; continued disregard of summons, not for reason stated ; no detention custody.” *

This assurance must have been given in dependence upon Mr. J. Shepstone's personal denial. It is proper to add that in this official's despatch of March 7th [3616, p. 86], reporting, at the time, the incidents of the journey, and meetings with chiefs when the assault or “fight” is said to have taken

tance, to the truth of which she particularly wished to get, she obtained the services of a native interpreter.” But it was only Miss Colenso's extreme care in learning, and as far as possible, speaking the exact truth which induced her thus to qualify her knowledge of the Zulu language. There are, probably, very few Europeans living who can speak it as correctly, and understand it as rapidly and thoroughly. (N.B. The Miss Colenso mentioned here is sister to the writer.)

* Sir Henry Bulwer says, “Cetshwayo, in preventing them from going, has interfered unduly with them,” although Mr. Fynn had reported that the King ordered them to go, and speaks of Cetshwayo “giving orders that Umnyamana is to send the headmen . . . at once,” as early as Feb. 8th.

place, makes no mention at all of any sort of disturbance having occurred, while in another of March 22nd [p. 125], he speaks of the six chiefs * who had not attended on him in person, but only by their representatives, as "the only chiefs who have given any trouble." It was not until the Zulu statement appeared in the *Witness* that anything was heard of the "faction fight," or serious disturbance, commenced in Mr. Shepstone's presence, and stopped by him, which was given later as the explanation of what had happened. The *Times of Natal* correspondent, writing from Etshowe on March 8th, said [*Times of Natal*, March 8th], that

"Very arduous work has devolved upon Mr. Shepstone in order to bring *recalcitrant chiefs*† to see the error of their ways."

And again,

"Natives tell me that at the meeting near Rorke's Drift called by Mr. Shepstone, some of those present insisted upon bringing into his presence, and retaining their assegais and shields, and Mr. Shepstone was obliged to order his own men to disarm them before the talk could commence."

As a matter of fact they did not attempt to take even sticks with them into Mr. Shepstone's presence ; but these and similar statements made before the publication of the matter in the form of a serious accusation against the official concerned, show plainly enough that a certain amount of *coercion* in the Reserve was generally taken as a matter of course.

* These chiefs, Qetuka, Nobiya, Godide, Melelesi, Umbandamana, and Undwandwe were amongst the most important in the Reserve.

† Author's italics.

It can certainly not have been intended by the Home Government, in the first instance, that any pressure, even to the extent admitted by Mr. Shepstone himself,* should be brought to bear upon the Zulus to make them disown Cetshwayo. The "Reserve" was to be for those who *could not, and would not*, come again under his sovereignty, those who were (supposed to be) horror-struck at the very idea of his return, and eager to flee into a country under British protection for safety. Had the matter been placed before them thus:—"There are, probably, a certain number of Zulus, who—after long and careful consideration of prospective personal advantages, from every point of view, and under the influence of the threats and promises of an arbitrarily disposed British official—will decide that, on the whole they may, if not permanently at least immediately, find themselves better off in our proposed 'Reserve' than under Cetshwayo, with the conditions and restrictions now imposed upon him," had this true view of the case been laid before the Home Government, there cannot be a doubt that the whole scheme of a Reserve would have been abandoned. With the additional fact that these people were called upon promptly to choose on the one hand between

* In September of the same year, Mr. Shepstone himself replied to questions as to why he had fined the chiefs, and how many he had fined. "I fined them for persistently neglecting to obey my summons to appear before me" [i. e. to leave Cetshwayo in the first hour of his return], and "I think there were seven, I am not sure."! (From Mr. J. Shepstone's evidence. Report of Trial, *Natal Witness*, Sept. 17th, 1883.)

quietly remaining at their homes, on their old-accustomed, and comparatively fruitful lands, without practical injury or danger to themselves, and on the other, being thrust forth homeless with their families, into a partially uninhabitable and poverty-stricken district, where there was no room for them, and therefore could be no welcome, the only wonder is that any of them should have preferred so forlorn a lot with the sole consolation of that loyalty which still exists amongst these untutored races, and perhaps hardly elsewhere beneath the sun. They were allowed no breathing space. Already, while the King was still arriving, "Mr. Jan" was calling the chiefs of the "Reserve" to come to him, although it was not many days since the Government intention of dividing the country had been announced to them at all. Mr. Shepstone appears to have been unreasonably irate at their delay in obeying his inconsiderate summons, and neither he nor his superiors seem to have thought of giving the Zulus time to see their restored King's face, to hear from his own lips his views for the future of the country, and to make up their minds on the serious question which awaited them. As early as February 8th, only ten days after the King's re-installation, we learn from a letter written by Mr. Fynn, in reply to one of the 6th (unpublished) from Mr. J. Shepstone, that messengers from the latter were harassing the people of the Reserve, and that Mr. Shepstone was peremptorily ordering them to leave the King [3616, p. 64], and threatening punishments if they did not

obey. Another remarkable little circumstance is that in this same despatch from Mr. Fynn to Mr. Shepstone, occurs the following phrase, "*I did not* * tell him [Cetshwayo] what you say you will do to them or their people, or his messengers, if they do not comply." This was in evident allusion to some vigorous threat, for Mr. Fynn continues "*I did* * tell him you would report [i. e. to Sir H. Bulwer] if the men did not appear before you." Yet, apparently, no explanation of the expression was ever asked or rendered, and no mention of these threats was made even when the question of Mr. Shepstone's conduct in the Reserve was before the public, a few months later. Mr. Fynn by Cetshwayo's directions formally reported the account that had reached Ulundi of the matter, and the documents were brought down to Maritzburg by Shingana and his party, the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr. Symons, reporting that he had sent the letter up to Government House the day the Zulus brought it, i. e. the 22nd of March.

Mr. Fynn wrote that a messenger sent by a chief of the Reserve

"reports that Mr. J. W. Shepstone fined Matshana Sitshakuza five large cattle, and seized by force cattle, ten from Sigananda, ten from Ndwandwe, and seven from Fokoti for not appearing when ordered, and that Mr. Shepstone sprang at the people, and set his police to beat the people, who fled, *but no one actually received any blow.*" *

This last phrase, Mr. Fynn asserted, showed un-

* Author's italics.

truthfulness on the part of the witness, who, he said,

“had first alleged people were injured, had been struck by Mr. Shepstone, that his Impi was eating up cattle; *but when I questioned him,* * he admitted that he was not present and *no one* was hurt, and fines were inflicted and messengers sent to fetch the cattle.”

Mr. Fynn said to the chiefs that

“the term ‘Impi’ . . . was untrue, and if messengers or police were sent to confiscate or recover fines, that was not an Impi, and this messenger deserved punishment for exaggerating.”

But the man does not appear ever to have said that he *was* present, and a modification of strong expressions would be but natural from a hearsay reporter when he found himself strictly questioned. The distinction between an “impi” eating up cattle, and an armed party of police sent to confiscate them, is hardly sufficiently apparent to justify a reflection upon the speaker’s honesty. On the following day, February 26th, however, further information had been received, and several eye-witnesses gave the following account, which Mr. Fynn took down in Cetshwayo’s presence, translated, and sent to the Governor :—

“. . . . five days ago inclusive (22nd), at Martin Oftebro’s, Equdeni, before Mr. J. W. Shepstone, were assembled a large number of residents of the Reserve. . . . The assembled people were removed, fresh men arriving seated themselves where the others had been previously removed from, and Mr. Shepstone sprang up, seized a stick near him, and struck Magegeba across the arm, calling upon his police and people to beat these people.”

* Author’s italics.

Then followed a detailed account of the injuries received, and the fines imposed upon members of the party, for non-appearance, and the detention of the representatives of those who were absent, * the same account as that published [3616, p. 116] by the *Witness* a little later.

An additional statement was also made that, after the men escaping from the blows had been called back, two of them remonstrated with Mr. Shepstone, saying :—

“ ‘ Did not your brother say we were to build [might build] huts for him (Cetshwayo), when at Emtonjaneni, and now we are being injured.’ . . . Mr. Shepstone said, ‘ You are doing this to yourselves, and so have become injured [it is your own fault; you have brought it on your own heads]. You are cheated by that insignificant mad one, Cetshwayo, then has he a country? (*sic*). When (or seeing) the country belongs to us! Whom did you overpower (conquer) and give the country to? Cetshwayo was

* It has been repeatedly denied [3616, p. 111] by, and for Mr. J. Shepstone, that any Zulus were imprisoned, or arrested, or detained “ in custody ” by him, in the Reserve. Of course there were no prisons there, nor was Mr. Shepstone accused of travelling about with a waggon-load of fetters, but he [3705, p. 27 and c.] said himself, “ I told these people they were not to go away; they were to sleep at the kraal near at hand, and I did not want them to leave for some days,” and this was a command, not a mere request. Mr. Martin Oftebro also, giving evidence on Mr. J. Shepstone’s behalf, says [Report of Action, *Natal Witness*, Sept. 15 and 17, 1883], “ That he knew they [the beaten men] were told they would be held responsible for what they had said. Mr. Shepstone said he would *bopa* them for what they had said.” Now *bopa* is the Zulu word universally employed for every form of imprisonment, arrest, official detention, &c., meaning, literally, tied or bound, whether by the word of a chief, who could punish for disobedience, or by actual bars and bonds.

told, and he admitted the boundaries of the Umhlatuzi, is he [then] still King? Is he not then a chief [only] like myself?'” and again,

“I will not crouch for Cetshwayo, it is he to crouch to (or for) me, I am greater than he to [in the eyes of] the Queen.’”

Cetshwayo, also, himself sent a written report through Mr. Fynn, which the latter translates in these words:—

“I report (or appeal) to the Government of Natal that Mr. J. W. Shepstone who is just insulting me, saying I am an insignificant mad one [*sic*]. I have not yet done wrong from the time I arrived. I am silent and seated. Those laws that were given to me I have not yet skipped; I continue to respect those laws; as I therefore respect [i.e. it is because I respect] those laws [that] these troubles, which are very great, [have come] upon me, by reason of there being no land sufficient for the people, I am this day entered with [by] terror, viz. that of my affliction [persecution], when I see my people that they are injured, bleeding blood, [when I see this state of things] superseding the [action of the] English [in] returning me with a kind heart, it is to-day I no longer perceive if it be plain that this my return is done with a kind heart? * When I see that I am being deprived of my people, it is said that they are not to come to me, I do not perceive, and also my being deprived of food, the cattle of mine, by the people Uzibebu, Dunn, Hamu, and the chiefs about me (referring more to the appointed chiefs), the word of the Government not coming to them to say they are to give me my cattle. How shall I do? Starvation is finishing me. How, have you returned me that I should have this great trouble? The country is becoming spoilt by what is being done across the Umhlatuzi (river) and Pongolo by the Boers and at Zibebu’s.

“I ask (plead) for kindness from the Government that they for me (put right) rectify this matter of the land, let it be that the

* A knowledge of the Zulu language enables one to infuse a certain amount of sense into Mr. Fynn’s confused phrases, by the addition of the portions between square brackets, the others being Mr. Fynn’s own. But the note of interrogation after “kind heart” is quite beyond the present writer’s interpretation.

land be rectified, that it be as at first. I look to the Queen that she rectify it for me, that the Queen's Minister of State help me. (The Queen) who overpowered the Zulus for ever, who (have not) will not repeat the spilling of blood of a person that is white or (with a) black person. Let the country return to the extent of boundaries of at first the Tugela, it (the country) be aided that the people rest nicely and be happy nicely.

“The house of Zulu let it not be rejected. It has become the Queen's for ever, and I also (the Queen's for ever). I have great faith (hope) that the Government will aid me kindly to this land, and the matter in regard thereto.”

In Mr. Fynn's covering despatch [3616, p. 114], he says that he encloses Cetshwayo's appeal to His Excellency “in his Zulu words,” as well as his (Mr. Fynn's) translation of the same, and it is to be regretted that, on receiving so palpably incorrect an English version, with a copy of the King's actual words in Zulu, Sir Henry Bulwer did not set some competent interpreter to make a better translation of the latter.*

* A translation by the Bishop of Natal of part of one of Cetshwayo's letters to him will show at once how much they suffered from *official* interpretation. On March 16th the King wrote, by the hand of an educated native who had accompanied him from the Cape, after speaking of the “beating” of his people at the meeting with Mr. Shepstone—

“But I ask now, ‘Such a law as this, is it an English law? Did it come from over the sea? Has ever a thing been done among yourselves such as this which is done to me?’ I say, I ask you of your grace to answer me whether it can be so done that a person should be stripped of his land and his cattle, and his people, while his cattle are left in the possession of people who are under him? Ask for me, I pray, the country in which I am to live—where is it? For my people are wandering about (homeless) with me. They are homeless, and why? Because, whereas it was said that they do not wish for me, they are now without a place to live in through wishing for me. What now, is the meaning of this? Speak for me! Come to

It is palpable from all his despatches that Mr. Fynn was totally incapable of writing his own tongue correctly, still less of expressing Cetshwayo's sentiments in suitable language, nevertheless these oddly translated phrases give a distinct account of the charges brought against Mr. J. Shepstone, and it is a singular fact that with so much evidence before him, Sir Henry Bulwer should have made no further inquiry than that of sending [3705, p. 27] "these papers to Mr. Shepstone for his information and

my help quickly! The country is being ruined! In what, then, have I offended so much? since both I and the Zulu people gave thanks for the Queen's exercise of power, and for your kindness, you who have befriended me."

And again, later on, when troubles were thickening about him, he wrote to the Bishop, more urgently still:—

"ULUNDI, ZULULAND, *May 4, 1883.*

"My Father,—I am writing to you, and to you, Nkosazana, [Miss Colenso], saying, O my friends! help me with my letters, make haste to send them over the sea. Say that I ask them to make peace for me, as I am being killed. I ask, What wrong, then, have I done before them (the English Government) that I should be so killed as I am now by so much of my country being taken away, in order that I might be killed? My country has been taken away and given to my dogs, in order that they might kill me. I was trusting, thinking that I was restored by the Queen, together with Mr. Gladstone and Lord Kimberley, and the Parliament, and all the headmen. They all said, 'We release you, we say Return to your country!' . . . But if I am only to be killed it amazes me.

"I ask you to pray for help for me from Lord Derby, who has entered on the office of Lord Kimberley, that he would help me so that my country may be restored to me, and my people, and this stabbing one another among the people may cease. . . . For my part I do not believe that he (Lord Derby) knows how I am being killed, and that is why I ask that he may be told, that he may know of it, he, and the whole Council [Parliament]."

report," and that, although aware of the importance attached by the Zulu King and people to the allegations that had been made against the Resident Commissioner, the Governor immediately and unreservedly accepted his denials.

Mr. Fynn's written reports having been brought down to Maritzburg by Shingana and his companions (see p. 178), Sir Henry Bulwer received the four principal men, viz. the Prince, and the chiefs Sihayo, Sicolo and Majumba, on April 4th, and they related to the Bishop of Natal the substance of what passed at the interview, as follows:—

"The Governor, through the interpreter, asked 'How was it that they had come down so many, when Mr. Fynn's paper, which they had brought, mentioned thirteen only?' They replied that those named by Mr. Fynn were the headmen sent, and the others were their baggage-carriers (*udibi*), making thirty-five in all. The Governor said that 'They must not come down again in this way. It is not convenient that a party should come down. Different members of the party go here and there * and talk, and we hear versions different from those that have been given to us. In old days, he (the Governor) was aware, verbal messages used to be sent; but they must be sent no longer, now that the Resident was there, who was the eye, and the hand, and the mouth of the Governor. The King should speak to Mr. Fynn, who would write down his words, and send them in a sealed envelope to the Governor. The letter should be brought by one man, or perhaps by two men, messengers only, who should not even know its contents. And the Governor would reply by a letter in the same way. Let there be an end of sending down parties with verbal messages to the Governor! †

* i. e. to Bishopstowe!

† This, and almost every other sentence (i. e. except those referring to the accusations definitely denied by the person accused), of the Zulu report, is corroborated by official despatches in Blue Book [3616, p. 100], and elsewhere.

“ ‘As for the present message, the Governor had heard it all. Mr. Symonds had reported carefully all their words. There was no answer for them to take back, as it had already been sent to the Resident, from whom they would hear it. They were to greet Cetshwayo kindly from him (the Governor).’

“ Sicoto spoke in reply, saying that ‘They (the Zulus) did not understand reading and writing. They would always require to come down together with any such letter, to bear witness with it, and to bring back witness to the reply. They did not see how this new plan would answer at all.’

“ The Governor asked the speaker’s name.

“ Majumba said, ‘The Zulus do not understand this division of the country, that one piece should be called the Governor’s, and another Cetshwayo’s, and a third Zibebu’s. They thought that the whole country belonged to the English, together with Cetshwayo, who is now, the Zulus say, the son of the Queen, not of Mpande only.’

“ This speaker’s name too the Governor asked.

“ Shingana said, ‘There are men with us now, Sir, of those who have been praying for Cetshwayo all along, before his return as well as now, men from south of the Umhlatuze, those who have been beaten. They have not yet been allowed to speak their message, because Mr. Symonds got up and left them in the act to speak.’

“ The Governor said, ‘These men do not belong to your party, they are separate’ [= ‘they live in the Reserve’].

“ Shingana replied, ‘Indeed, Sir, they are of our party, and the letter was written specially on account of them. I was there when Mr. Fynn was writing down their story, and all the witnesses to it were named, and those injured, and the nature of their hurts. They are just the head and front of the affair.’

“ The Governor said that ‘Mr. Fynn had not reported one word of all that—that it was not his office to do so, as he was appointed to attend to the land given to Cetshwayo only, and Mr. Osborn was appointed to attend to the Reserve.’*

* The Prince and his party had themselves brought Mr. Fynn’s report [3616, pp. 115 and 116], so that the Governor’s words must here have been very incorrectly interpreted to the Zulus, as it can hardly be supposed that what was intended was that as (in

“The Prince said ‘Cetshwayo would be much taken aback to hear that Mr. Fynn had reported nothing of this matter, since the men had been beaten, on being sent to Mr. J. Shepstone by the King in obedience to a message from himself (Mr. Fynn), and this was what the King had asked him to report, and what, it had been fully understood, he had reported.’ (Shingana here said to the Bishop that they had not mentioned to the Governor what was, however, a fact, namely, that Cetshwayo had proposed to Mr. Fynn to send first to Mr. Jan himself to ask an explanation, before reporting him to the Governor, but that Mr. Fynn, being very angry, had said, ‘Did Mr. Jan tell me that he was going to do this? Am I to send men to him to be beaten? I shall not communicate with him, but shall report it directly to the Governor, and let him tell me if I am wrong in doing so.’* ”

H.E.’s opinion) Mr. Fynn had *no business to write*, therefore his letter could not be spoken of as received. As there is no official report of this conversation, we have only what the interpreter said in Zulu, and not what Sir Henry Bulwer said in English, to go upon. The Zulu account is, however, incidentally confirmed on various points by official documents.

* And this is precisely what the Governor did. On the 24th March he wrote a despatch [3616, p. 100] to Mr. Fynn, every line of which evinces intense disapproval of the Resident’s action. “. . . I may remark, for your future guidance,” writes Sir Henry Bulwer, “that it would have been well had you consulted me before you allowed a deputation from Cetshwayo to come into Natal.” Such a tone of hostility towards the Zulu King as this, actually going so far as to impose restrictions on his free communication with the British Government, was altogether out of keeping with the kindly intentions of the Home Authorities. This letter to Mr. Fynn, alone, would have justified Cetshwayo’s observation to the Bishop, when asking the latter to speak for him, “to the great men of the Council over the sea (because, you know that I am not much in favour in Natal).” This is, however, in reply to the first message [see p. 432] sent by Umnyamana and Cetshwayo’s councillors (or as Sir H. Bulwer remarks “*as they themselves say*, from Cetshwayo and his councillors,” which, however, comes to precisely the same thing), and it makes no mention

“The Governor replied that all these matters should be reported to Mr. Osborn.* ‘Let Cetshwayo not interfere in any way with anything across the Umhlatuze, and attend only to the country given to him. Cetshwayo must not be hankering after this thing and that, which used to be his. †

“‘He had been conquered and his Kingship taken away. He came back now by the grace of the Authorities, and to the land of the Authorities, to the portion which they had appointed him to rule, and there was an end of it. Cetshwayo should bear in mind the words spoken by the great men over the sea, and take care that none of them were broken.’

“The Governor then took leave and left the room. They were asked also if, when they got home, they should report that they had been received and fed by the Government. They replied that they should. ‡

“Early next morning a messenger came to say that Mr. Jan had sent him to call the Prince back, as there remained a word to be spoken; but he was not to bring the others. So Shingana

of Shingana’s message, or of Mr. Fynn’s report [3616, p. 117] received two days before about the beating. These are answered in a later despatch of March 29th, written in the same tone, and commenting on the report thus: “I have received no information to show me that such occurrences took place as they are described” [*ibid.*, p. 118], and the Governor volunteers the opinion, “I am quite certain that Mr. Shepstone did not use the expressions regarding Cetshwayo which he was reported to have used.”

* Mr. Osborn was not there, in fact they found him still in Maritzburg (though he had started to replace Mr. Shepstone in the Reserve before these words of the Governor were spoken); so they had gone to Mr. Fynn, as they could hardly have reported Mr. Shepstone to himself.

† e. g. cattle which Lord Kimberley had said [3466, p. 129] ought to be collected for him, or a substitute provided for his maintenance according to his station.

‡ They had received about 3s. worth of meat daily, shinbone or similar pieces, i. e. not quite 3d. a day for each of the thirteen headmen, or 1d. a day for each of the whole party of thirty-five, and nothing else, e. g. no mealie-meal for their men.

took only Sicoto to be his witness, and the two eye-witnesses who would describe the beating, in case there might arise a chance for them to speak. For he asked the messenger, 'Is it not about the beating that we are called back?'—who replied that it might well be so, and that he had spoken about that affair with a young man of Mr. Jan's, who had just come down with him from Zululand, and that this young man had affirmed that Mr. Jan had not beaten the Zulus, he had merely 'startled them with a switch.' The messenger told Shingana to make all haste to come in. They did so, but were kept waiting till sun-down,—in the morning at the S.N.A. Office, in the afternoon outside Government House—the interpreter who brought them up having gone in, and Mr. Jan also entering in the course of the afternoon. They found these two with the Governor when, at last, Shingana and Sicoto were taken in.*

"They were told 'The Governor has sent for you to say "Go

* From Mr. Shepstone's own account it seems that, although present at this meeting, and well aware of the charges brought against him, he took so little interest in what passed that, six months later, he could not, under cross-examination, answer a single question on the subject with any degree of certainty. He said he believed His Excellency's reply was verbal; he did not know its nature, and did not think he could repeat a single sentence; he was in the same room, but did not interpret, and had nothing whatever to do with it. On being asked "Was any reference made at this interview at which you were present to the message which Cetshwayo sent down" [i. e. the accusation against the person questioned], Mr. Shepstone replied, "There may or may not. I do not remember. I told you I did not remember what was said. I had had quite enough to do with Zulu affairs without wanting to know what they had said."

Q. "Do I understand that you know nothing of what transpired at this meeting at which you were present?"

A. "I did not trouble my head about it. It may have been about me, but I do not remember. I did not pay any attention. I distinctly say, my Lord, I don't remember anything that did take place. I simply sat by." (Report of Action, *Natal Witness*, Sept. 17th, 1883.)

pleasantly," and that you should greet the King much from him. And tell him to bear in mind the words spoken by the great men over the sea and take care that none of them are broken. Let him not be deceived by other people, telling him falsely. The words (conditions) which were spoken over the sea, and which he knows, are the truth, and they are final, and will never be altered. If the King keeps firmly to all those words of the great men and of the Governor [i. e. the conditions told him in England and those told him at the Cape], the Governor too will support him. He is not speaking in anger but in kindness.' In fact, there were no new words at all, only the same that had been spoken the day before, reiterated and enforced.

"Shingana replied, 'It is just in pursuance of those conditions that we have come down. And we are sent by the Heads of the Zulu people [not by Cetshwayo alone]. For the King was told in England that only a little bit of land, where Dunn was, would be cut off, and at the Restoration it was said that this [cutting off] would be done on account of those who did not wish to be under Cetshwayo. And the Zulus then claimed that those who did not wish for Cetshwayo should be produced; but not a single one appeared or was named.* So the Zulus protested against this law, and prayed Sir T. Shepstone to forward all their words of protest. And he promised to do so, and said that, if the great men at home agreed to their prayer, he too should be glad, and, if they did not, he would forward the answer. For all the principal chiefs from south of the Umhlatuze protested before Sir T. Shepstone that day, saying, "Is it not we who have been praying for him?" Mavumengwana said that "He himself and others who had held down their heads [submitted to Dunn] had only behaved like women who marry again, because they believe that their own husband is dead. But, should their husband rise from the dead, will they not return at once to him, having been mistaken? The King, Sirs (*Makosi*)," said Mavumengwana, "is our husband, and, since you have brought him back to us, we shall cleave to him."

"'I meant,' said Shingana, 'to have gone on, and given the speeches of the other men south of the Umhlatuze, e. g. of Mayepu, when he said that "he would rather cut his throat than

* See remarks about Siunguza and Umgitshwa, pp. 388-91.

leave his daughters in the hands of dogs," and then to have spoken about the beating. But [one] now spoke to the Governor, and I had to break off. The Governor repeated that "Matters south of the Umhlatuze must be reported to Mr. Osborn, who alone was responsible there." And the Governor left the room.

"So we came away grievously disappointed. For we are as good as rejected, being sent back without a message, and without being allowed to report the men who were beaten, or even to hear our own words as Mr. Symonds had reported them, so as to be sure that the Governor had heard our message aright. We complain greatly of this arrangement. We see that a wall is to be built up round us, through which our cries cannot be heard.'

"The Bishop pointed out to them that those in the Reserve were allowed to report their troubles, including the beating, through Mr. Osborn. But they replied, 'We cannot do that; for it would immediately be taken to signify that we had recognized Mr. Osborn, and given up Cetshwayo.'

And, indeed, since they might not come down to state their grievances themselves, and Mr. Fynn was forbidden to report them on paper, a "wall" through which their cries could not be heard was truly built around them, as they said, and, a little later, when they had lost their best friend in the Bishop of Natal, after which official measures were taken to prevent their communicating with the family at Bishopstowe, they had no help left but in their own right arms. The persistence yet moderation with which they have used their strength as against Europeans generally, and British subjects in particular, forms a striking page in the history of a savage race. It shows plainly enough the influence which that remarkable man, whom we British have prevented from bringing about the salvation and

civilisation of his nation—Cetshwayo, had obtained over his people, who might under his reign have advanced far upon the road to civilisation and prosperity, had England assisted his naturally wise and humane inclination in the management of the Zulus with her strength and knowledge, instead of allowing the Natal Government to trample him under foot.

All these Zulu accounts, undoubtedly given in good faith, certainly represent a very different state of things from any anticipated or intended by the Home Government. Blue Book [3616] is, to a great extent, a record of the manner in which an appearance of considerable opposition to Cetshwayo was produced. Time and space fail us to unravel all the equivocations and misrepresentations by which this effect was achieved, but it might easily be done, could the reading public reasonably be expected to wade through the result. A few instances must therefore suffice, and any one who cares to study the subject thoroughly for themselves may easily learn that the cases given are but a fair sample of the whole. It may safely be inferred that, had the Home Government known—while the fate of Zululand still lay in England's hands—what Mr. J. Shepstone's despatches between January and March 1883 would unfold of the difficulty he found in procuring decisions against Cetshwayo, and the dilatory and uncertain nature of such decisions when made, they never would have consented to Sir Henry Bulwer's plan for a "Reserve" at all.

Mr. W. Y. Campbell, acting as special correspondent to the *Natal Advertiser* in September 1883, writes as follows:—

“ Whatever the professions of enmity to and fear of the King made by the Zulus in the Reserve prior to his return, the subsequent current of events has completely falsified those professions. The Reserve natives, though ordered not to go to the King, wilfully and persistently disregarded these orders on all hands, and the majority of the kraals in the Reserve sent a messenger with congratulatory messages of welcome to the King after his return. These men had to evade the police, and cross the Umhlatuze secretly. They went knowing that they would be fined for contempt of orders. But go they did. They risked all solely to see the King. At one time, shortly after his return, the King had something like 1500 men of the Reserve paying court to him at Ondini [Ulundi]. There was a constant stream passing backwards and forwards. A deal of night work had to be done to evade Malemate’s [Mr. Osborn’s] police, and the spies of the few chiefs inimical to the King. So the young men used to leave their kraals by night, and cross the boundary in the dark. The old men, the headmen, were wishful to go. But they being more conspicuous than their sons, could not be absent from their kraals without their absence being spotted and reported; and then followed the heavy fine or eating up. A few reckless old fellows chose to be eaten up rather than not have a look at the resurrected King. They had their look and were eaten up.*” — ‘With Cetshwayo in the Inkandhla,’ p. 46.

This account is given by an Englishman who travelled through the country in September 1883 with two objects, as he states himself, “1st, to find out the truth about the King; 2nd, to find out the feeling of the Reserve.”

Mr. Campbell gives the “Reserve” Zulus’ own

* Amongst these “reckless old fellows” were Qetuka, Godide, Nobiya, &c., some of the most powerful chiefs in the Reserve.

account of how they were treated, from which the following passage may be extracted:—

“We heard he [Cetshwayo] was come, and we wanted to go and see him. We were told, however, ‘No, lie down, stay where you are, do not upset the country by running about.’ We wondered at this command.* Some of us listened to it, and stayed. We lay down, holding our mouths. Others would not listen to it. They said, ‘No, the King is returned to us; why should we be kept from him? We will go to see him. There can be no wrong in this.’ And they went. They got through the police, and saw their King. On their return, however, they were fined. And so the thing began, and so the thing continued. To-day [the end of September] any Zulu in the Reserve who thinks of Cetshwayo with favour does so at his peril. He is watched by Government police that come from Natal.† He is watched by Dunn and his friends, and his spies that are everywhere.”

* The command, it will be remembered, reached them from Cetshwayo himself, as well as from Mr. Shepstone.

† On Feb. 13th, Mr. J. Shepstone reports [3616, p. 37] to Sir Henry Bulwer that “several chiefs and headmen living on and near the River Umhlatuze, which is the boundary of the Reserve, have begged me to place Government men at the different drifts and crossings of the border river; they say that it will afford them greater security against their own people on the opposite side, and will also for the present, while the existing feeling of distrust lasts, relieve them from turning informers against those who until lately were one with them, and who might resent any such action on their part, while if done by strangers no trouble would ensue.

“I consider that it is not only advisable to do this, but that it is indispensable. Some check should be placed upon the indiscriminate crossing and recrossing; it will prevent trouble and unpleasantness, and even should the pass system not be established, the Border guard should be the parties to whom each party crossing must report him or herself and their mission.” Sir H. Bulwer replied that he saw “No objection to this arrangement, provided it does not involve any expense, and that it will not interfere with the legitimate intercourse for peaceful purposes between the two Territories” [3616, p. 38], amongst which purposes visits to Cetshwayo were plainly not included.

This was the account, says Mr. Campbell, not “of one man, nor of twenty men, nor of a hundred, but of fully three-fourths of those natives, in the Reserve, for whose protection and preservation the Reserve was annexed.”

Those who had been frightened into denying their King, explained their conduct thus :—

“We could see our King was not liked by the Government [which had conquered them a few years before]. The face of the Government never turned to him pleasantly. The Government heart never seemed to care for him. And not only this. We noticed that Zibebu was allowed to do all manner of things unrebuked. We knew that Dunn was pulling against the King, and with great weight. We saw also that Zibebu was undoubtedly the Government favourite. . . . On top of all this we were told not to move; to lie quite still. We lay quite still. We kept our faces on the ground, and if we glanced upwards we saw a [Natal] native policeman or spy with an uplifted assegai over us. If we looked up on the other side we saw the muzzle of a policeman’s gun. What could we do in a case like that? Why, lie still of course.”

“And so, turn where one will,” writes Mr. Campbell, after recording special instances of oppression, “the repressing influence is everywhere apparent. The natives are thus compulsorily made good subjects in accordance with Blue Book wishes. They are not allowed to have any opinion of their own. To any one who sees below the surface, the evidence there is plain. The natives are coerced into an attitude foreign to their wish and their instincts.”

How Blue Book appearances were kept up the writer describes, from his own personal investigations, thus :—

“He [Dunn] is the centre of the anti-King opposition,—the valued adviser of all who are against the King. . . . He hears rumours in the Reserve. He sends them to Misjan [Mr. J. Shepstone], who in passing them on to Sir Henry Bulwer, forgets

to see if they have any foundation in fact. In turn they are passed on as enclosures, in long covering despatches, to Lord Derby, and as reprimands to the King."

"Misjan's" reign in the Reserve came to an end about the end of March, when Mr. Osborn was deputed to take his place, and the former returned to Pietermaritzburg and took up again his long held office of *acting* Secretary for Native Affairs. Meanwhile the accusations brought against him of ill-treating the Zulu chiefs were too serious, and the inquiries from home too urgent, to admit of the matter being allowed to drop. An action for libel was brought in Mr. Shepstone's name, nominally against the proprietors of the *Witness*, but practically against Mr. Statham, in respect of these accusations, and the *personal* nature of the attack is clearly shown by the fact that an offer was privately made by the plaintiff to the defendants to *withdraw the action if Mr. Statham were summarily dismissed* [*'The Zulu Iniquity,'* p. 30].

The offer was not accepted, but the fact of its having been made is a remarkable one. Mr. Statham was far too acute an observer, and too dangerous an opponent to be disregarded, now that he had seen through the tactics, and denounced the action of the officials [*ibid.*].

"Two things were essential for the safety of the 'official clique,'" writes Mr. Statham himself, "first that I should be discredited, and next, that the *Daily News* should be provided with a correspondent who would act in the official interest, and keep the public in England in the dark as to the real bearing of what was passing in Zululand. The only way in which this could be done was by a personal attack on me."

Towards the fulfilment of these objects Sir Henry Bulwer's despatch [3616, p. 88] impugning Mr. Statham's veracity, would naturally go a long way, and the latter was deprived of his position as correspondent to the *Daily News*, that paper being, he says [‘Zulu Iniquity,’ pp. 14 and 15] “supplied with a substitute of the ‘official clique’s’ own choosing.”

In addition to this, a cowardly attempt was made to injure Mr. Statham's personal character and prospects, and, so, possibly, drive him from the country, or at least from his influential position as editor of the *Witness*. In his youth he had been the victim of painful circumstances which had brought disastrous consequences in their train.* But, having retained the sympathy and respect of many worthy people, he had subsequently succeeded in shaking off the shadow of his early troubles, and making a career for himself. But *seventeen years later*, in 1882, an accident brought a breath of the old story to Natal.

“It seemed desirable,” writes Mr. Statham, “to take legal advice on the situation, and thus, under the seal of professional confidence, the facts relating to my earlier life passed into the possession of one member of the ‘official clique.’”† [*Ibid.*, p. 26.]

* Mr. E. W. Bird, described as “the leading partner in the oldest legal firm” in Liverpool, wrote that he regarded Mr. Statham “as the victim of circumstances over which he had no possible control.” [‘Zulu Iniquity,’ p. 22.]

† Mr. Statham explains his own use of the term “official clique” thus—“The head of the ‘official clique’ in Natal is Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and the clique consists, besides a few

Some time after, the political collision between Natal officialism and Mr. Statham having meanwhile taken place, he heard from a friend in London that

“The matter of which you speak in the letter received to-day has become common to everybody. When Merriman was here it seems to have been his policy to tell the story. . . . But nothing was heard of it till Merriman came.”—*Ibid.*, p. 15.

This was written in July 1883, and Mr. Statham traces the connection between this and his political and official opponents in Natal by the words [*ibid.*, p. 15], “When Sir Theophilus Shepstone went to England [in May 1883], he was accompanied from Cape Town by Mr. J. X. Merriman, a prominent member of the Cape Ministry,” who had “been for some years the Cape Town correspondent of the *Daily News*,” and “had been in intimate communication with Sir Theo. Shepstone during the voyage to England” [*ibid.*, p. 27].

Mr. Statham’s dismissal from his post of correspondent to the *Daily News* followed [*ibid.*, p. 14] without any reason whatever being assigned.

Immediately upon this secret undermining of his reputation came the action for libel, on the part of Mr. J. Shepstone, which was tried in Maritzburg in September 1883. The nominal defendants in the case were altogether out of sympathy with the Zulus,

outlying officials, mainly of members and connections of his family. By keeping close control over all native matters, this clique practically governs Natal, insomuch that no Governor has ever succeeded in getting behind its power.”—‘Zulu Iniquity,’ p. 9.

and with Mr. Statham's action. The political views of the colonial public, also, were wholly opposed to any point being made of Zulu loyalty to Cetshwayo, or of undue coercion on the part of Natal Government officials in the Reserve, in fact to any hypothesis likely to interfere with Sir Henry Bulwer's admirable scheme for neutralising the good effects of England's action. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising to find that the case was never defended upon its merits at all. The defendants took their stand on "privilege," and the matter tried was not whether Mr. J. Shepstone did, or did not act as the Zulus said that he did, but whether the *Witness* had a right or not to publish the story. This latter point was decided in favour of Mr. Shepstone, with damages 500*l.*, but it is not easy to see how the decision of the case *as it was tried*, had any result in his favour beyond the 500*l.*

It is not, indeed, easy for the "lay" mind to understand the precise bearings of this trial. The judge and the lawyers appear to have differed considerably in the mere legal technicalities of the matter. The counsel for the plaintiff having produced a native witness (one of Mr. J. Shepstone's party)—

"Mr. Morcom submitted that, in the pleadings, the question of the truth or falsity of the alleged libel did not arise. He contended that the question of the publication of occurrences in Zululand was one of privilege, and the truth or falsity of the statements did not arise."—*Times of Natal*, Sept. 15th, 1883.

This point was argued out in Court, the counsel for the plaintiff declining to admit it, and the ques-

tion finally turning upon whether Mr. Morcom had put in his objection at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end of the evidence of the first native witness on Mr. Shepstone's side. As it is quite plain that Mr. Morcom never intended to defend the case except upon the point of "privilege," the judge's remark that it was "a pity if counsel, in some technical point, put himself in a false position either with the Court or the jury" seems justified.

In summing up, his Lordship said that

"In this case the plaintiff claimed the sum of 5000*l.* damages in that the defendants had maliciously libelled him in the paper of which they were the publishers and proprietors. In the first place, the libel was stated to be in the report of certain messengers from Cetshwayo,* and secondly, in certain articles on those reports. . . . If the jury were satisfied as to the publication, the jury would then have to consider the second question, that of privilege. . . . If it were admitted in the pleadings that the matters appertaining to the reports were for the public good [? if the accused person admitted the facts stated against him], it might be his duty to tell them what their finding should be; but the plaintiff denied the accuracy of the report.† He stated that the report was not an accurate one, and that the King did not send the messengers.‡ The jury would have to consider whether

* Mr. Morcom said that "The matter complained of as libellous . . . was . . . privileged because practically a publication of the same charges against the plaintiff was to be found in the Imperial Blue Book published subsequently in England for the information of both Houses of Parliament, and accessible to the public, because offered for sale to the public."—*Times of Natal*, Sept. 18th, 1883.

† Otherwise it is hard to see how the plaintiff could justly raise a complaint.

‡ This is a curious defence, in face of the King's complaint, forwarded by Mr. Fynn, and printed in the Blue Book [3616, p. 115].

the statements were of vital importance to Natal,* and then whether the natives did come, and also whether the interpretation was a right one,† and, whether, taking into consideration all these things, the articles were *per se* justifiable, so as to make the publication a privileged one. As to the question of privilege in England, it had been held that a full and accurate report of parliamentary proceedings is privileged, and also the reports in a Court of Justice. He was, however, not aware that it went any further than that. Coming to this country, it appeared to him that it would be a very difficult thing for the jury to say that such publication was privileged apart from the truth of the report. If the jury found that the report was true, then the publication would be true,‡ and the jury would then have to consider whether the comments on the report were justifiable, otherwise the jury would still have to find for the plaintiff, but if they found that the comments were justified, then they would have to find for the defendants.§ In the third place the jury would have to consider whether the reports from Zululand were correct. § He did not intend to go into that question, as a great deal of evidence had been given on that point. || If they

* Was a jury of Natalians likely to think anything *purely Zulu* "of vital importance to Natal," and ought any such selfish considerations to have been introduced into this case?

† The Bishop of Natal had vouched for the fact that "the natives did come" (i. e. from Zululand, by Cetshwayo's orders), and the interpretation was made, under the Bishop's supervision, by Miss Colenso, with the assistance of two honest and intelligent natives.

‡ The following passages show that the words "that the report was true" meant only that the *Witness* newspaper correctly reported the statements of the Zulus, not that those statements were true.

§ Of this the jury had no possible means of judging. A number of Mr. Shepstone's witnesses had given evidence, but the counsel for defendants taking his stand on "privilege" only, declined to cross-examine them, and had not prepared his own case from that point of view at all.

|| Entirely on one side, with the sole exception of Shingana's evidence, introduced at the last moment (see p. 486).

considered that the facts were true, the plaintiff could not complain that they were published in the paper; but the jury would still have to deal with the comments. If the comments were justified by such accounts, the jury must find for the defendants,* but if the meeting at Mr. Oftebro's house was as stated by the plaintiff and his witnesses, then the jury must find for the plaintiff.† If they found that the plaintiff's character had been damaged by the publication of the libel, they must bring in a verdict for the plaintiff."—*Times of Natal*, Sept. 18th, 1883.

A unanimous verdict ‡ was given for the plaintiff, damages 500*l.* But the counsel for the defendants had previously stated some of the difficulties of his case as follows. Having said that "it was impossible to suppose that Bishop Colenso was not fulfilling a moral duty in anything that he did," he pointed out that

"No proper enquiry could be held in this matter without Sir Henry Bulwer attending and giving evidence. But he might have refused to attend if served with a subpœna, and there was no power in the Court to compel his attendance; the same applied to

* That is to say that, supposing the facts alleged against Mr. Shepstone, of assault upon certain native chiefs on account of their loyalty to their King, to be true, this jury of twelve Natalians were to consider whether *in their opinion*, such treatment of the Zulus deserved Mr. Statham's indignant comments. It is to be feared that British and Colonial opinion might differ upon this point. Shortly after the first publication of the story in the *Witness*, a Natalian was heard to declare, in a public vehicle with warm approval, that "It was just what John Shepstone would do. *He was the right man to manage the natives.*"

† This—to the lay mind—is a puzzling sentence. If "the meeting at Mr. Oftebro's house was as stated by plaintiff," the facts alleged against the latter were *not* true, but the confusing connection between this and the former part of the sentence may very possibly be due to a defective report.

‡ The unanimity of a jury in a civil case not being essential in Natal.

Mr. Osborn, and others in Zululand, a country to which the jurisdiction of the Court did not extend, and from whence, therefore, it was impossible for the defendants to obtain witnesses. Had the defendants been able to call these witnesses they would have been able to prove that the Government here not only refused to direct that passes should be granted to men coming to repeat that story,* but refused to give an answer to the messengers themselves; whilst the defendants would have been able to show that Mr. Fynn acted up to his instructions by refusing to give passes to natives to come in with complaints on the same head."

It is not apparent, on the whole—i. e. to the lay mind—whether the case was supposed to have been decided on its merits or not, but one thing is very plain, namely that it was not *defended* on its merits. The case as between Mr. Shepstone and the *Witness* was decided in favour of the former, but the case as between him and the Zulus was practically ignored, and has never been tried unto this day.

This double attack had seriously shaken Mr. Statham's position, but by a bold stroke he checkmated the more underhand manœuvres of his enemies, and exposed some of their political tricks. By the publication of a pamphlet entitled 'The Zulu Iniquity,' † he related, in a short and plain manner, the sad story, garbled editions of which were being used against him, and also the history of his telegrams to the *Daily News* on Zulu matters,

* " I cannot give permission to these people to come in for the purpose of repeating this distorted story."—Sir H. Bulwer to Mr. Fynn, May 9th, 1883 [3705, p. 60].

† "The Zulu Iniquity, by F. Reginald Statham, the Unjustly-discredited Natal Correspondent of the *Daily News*, with an Appendix. William Ridgway, Publisher, 169, Piccadilly."

and the manner in which he had been discredited as Natal correspondent to that paper. This latter subject has already been discussed in these pages, and for a full account of the former it is enough to refer our readers to Mr. Statham's own pamphlet, the perusal of which can hardly fail to inspire any intelligent reader with respect for the writer, and sympathy with his troubles, past and present.

It must be acknowledged that there were some undeniable excuses for the backwardness of the defendants in the matter of providing that the case should be tried upon its merits. Two events which had occurred since the publication of the accusations against Mr. Shepstone had greatly added to the difficulty which at any time would have existed in procuring native evidence in a case in which a Natal Government official, a Shepstone, and the head of the office for Native Affairs, was concerned. The first of these events was the death of the Bishop of Natal, whose very presence would have given the Zulus courage to speak the truth, whatever that might be, and whose influence both with them and with their King would have helped to ensure the appearance of the requisite witnesses. The second event was the sack of Ulundi by Zibebu, of whom Mr. Campbell speaks as "rushing unprovoked on the Ondini Kraal [Ulundi] and massacring all and sundry," [*Cetshwayo in the Inkandhla*, p. 38], but who, although certainly not provoked by the Zulu King and his people, was undoubtedly incited by his white advisers to commit the crime in question.

Amongst those slaughtered on this occasion was Hozana, one of the principal witnesses in the beating affair, while the others were scattered far and wide.

A faint effort was made to procure their attendance. A Zulu messenger named Kukula had come down to bring the news that the King himself had escaped from the murderous hands of Zibebu and his white men. He reported it to the Government at the S.N.A. Office, and he also told Miss Colenso, who telegraphed it to England. She had been asked, on behalf of the defendants in the approaching libel case, if she could not use the influence of her name to bring down the Zulu witnesses whom they should require. On Kukula's return to Zululand, therefore, Miss Colenso gave him a message to the King to say that

“Mr. J. Shepstone is bringing an action against the people who published the account of the beating, and says that the words are thoroughly false. He claims 5,000*l.* damages.”

And that she had been asked on behalf of these publishers

“to request the Zulu witnesses whom they require, to come down. These witnesses are Shingana and one who was with him at Government House: Mfunzi and one who was with him when he told Sir Theo. Shepstone about the beating: and several of those who were actually assaulted, especially Hozana and Muntompofu if still alive. They should start with the New Moon to be down in good time for Sept. 14.’”

But Miss Colenso at the same time advised the defendants to procure a “pass” from the S.N.A. Office, and to send it by a messenger of their own as well,

as a precaution against the delays and difficulties otherwise sure to be officially placed in the way of any Zulus seeking to enter Natal on such an errand. Her advice in this respect was disregarded, and the sequel showed how necessary it was. Hitherto no restrictions had been placed upon Zulus visiting Natal on private business, but first at this time, i. e. since Cetshwayo's return, a new departure was made in this matter.

On receiving Miss Colenso's message, the King sent down Shingana as requested, accompanied by his brother Dabulamanzi and several others, and followed immediately by five of the beaten men. The Princes bore a message to the Government from Cetshwayo about his own affairs as well, and their party got across the Tugela, though they found new regulations in force, the drifts being all closed, i. e. guarded, and no one allowed to cross without certain formalities. The Natal chief in charge, indeed, could not allow even the Princes to pass on their way, but took them to the nearest magistrate, at Greytown, where they were treated more like prisoners than visitors of rank. Finding themselves detained, and that they would probably be too late to give evidence, they contrived to send down a messenger to let Miss Colenso know the facts. In reply to the magistrate's inquiries they had only mentioned the one half of their errand, and, whether through lack of opportunity, or uncertainty as to what they ought to do, they said nothing about the action. But the names of the five beaten men, of

whom they spoke as just behind, and belonging to their party, were quite enough to let both the magistrate, and the Governor (to whom he reported the matter while he kept the Princes waiting), know upon what business they were coming. Miss Colenso sent back a message bidding them keep back nothing, but speak out and tell the magistrate that they were sent for as witnesses in the action, and also bidding them lose no time if they were allowed to start for Maritzburg. They followed her instructions, when, upon the following day, the magistrate sent for them, and, having now received his orders from Government, bade them return home at once. Their communication, however, made no difference. From their own account it appears that, after making it, they were still told to "be off at once," and that they would be seen across the Tugela (i. e. under police surveillance). Mtokwane* had passed on, into Zululand, the day before, to hurry up the beaten men, on hearing which, say the Zulus, the magistrate ordered his policeman to go and warn all those watching the drifts that if that fellow Mtokwane comes back, with the rest, they were to arrest (bopa) them, and bring them to him. "It was afternoon, and drizzling, but we were started and hurried on, although we objected, because we were so very cold."

Meanwhile Mr. W. B. Morcom, counsel for the proprietors of the *Witness*, having seen Shingana's

* The well-known and trusty Zulu messenger often mentioned in these volumes.

name in the *Times of Natal*, as one of a party who had been ordered back to Zululand, applied for him at the S.N.A. Office, as a witness in the impending case. By this means Shingana did actually reach Maritzburg on the last day of the trial, and by considerable exertions on the part of his friends, and in spite of various petty official obstacles, he reached the court in custody of a policeman, ten minutes before it opened. His story would have been very important, though not direct evidence (as he was not present at the beating) had the case been tried upon its merits at all.

The Zulus say that when, in consequence of Mr. Morcom's application, Shingana (and one of the others) were officially sent for, at last, the magistrate at Greytown told them

“It is your own fault [that you have been detained], because you concealed your business. We [Government officials] do not interfere with a witness in a case.”

And next morning he sent them down to Maritzburg in custody of the policeman who had brought the summons.

This was all very well, but it must be observed that, as mentioned before, the names of the beaten men made it plain what their errand must be; that on the previous day the Princes told the magistrate what it was, who, knowing it, still ordered them to return to Zululand at once; and that there was time enough after the Princes first reached Greytown, and gave the names of the rest of the

party (i. e. the beaten men, who were following them), for the Government to hear of their arrival, and to send for them to give their evidence in Maritzburg, had it really been desired that they should be allowed to do so. In fact, although it was easy enough, by strictly enforcing new-made rules, and by doing everything in a very leisurely fashion, to prevent these witnesses being in time, it would have been equally easy for the officials to bring them down had there been any wish amongst them to have the matter sifted. A touch of burlesque was added to the conduct of the officials in this matter, by a note sent from the Office of the Secretary for Native Affairs on October 1st, *a fortnight after the verdict*, to ask the defendants' legal adviser whether he required "any more witnesses in the libel case,"—the beaten men in fact, who, having been sent back to their homes in Zululand by the orders of the magistrate, and having been fetched back again by the indefatigable Mtokwane, were now waiting at Greytown for leave to come down. Mr. Morcom replied that

"The jury trial being now over, all the defendants' witnesses from Zululand having been stopped at the border, or prevented from coming on to Pietermaritzburg by the officers of the Government, these witnesses are no longer necessary for the purposes of the trial.

"But I ought to remark that the fact of these witnesses being sent forward seems a proof of the *bona fides* of the complaint of Cetshwayo [against Mr. Shepstone], and his desire that the matter should still be inquired into.

"It also shows how hard it was upon the proprietors of the

Natal Witness to attempt to throw upon them the onus of proving the truth of an alleged libel forming the subject of a communication or complaint from Cetshwayo to H.M. Special Commissioner for Zululand Affairs, but which His Excellency did not see fit to call upon Cetshwayo to support by proof, or to hear such evidence and witnesses as he (Cetshwayo) was desirous of forwarding, and actually did forward."

Sir Henry Bulwer's own despatches amply prove that he did not wish or intend to sift the matter, but was determined to take his stand simply and solely on the mere word of the accused person. Some time before the action (in May) was brought, Cetshwayo sent two messengers to Mr. Fynn to ask [3705, p. 59] "for a pass for witnesses to go into Natal in order to give evidence against Mr. Shepstone." One of these messengers, Makeu, had lately been at Bishopstowe, and had been sent from thence by Mtokwane to hasten the coming of the beaten men whom the King had previously expressed his intention of sending down to Mtokwane's care. Mtokwane sent Makeu on his own account, and without the knowledge of the Bishop, or of any one at Bishopstowe, but it is quite possible that Makeu took for granted that he had the Bishop's authority to do so. Makeu, however, was of a weak character, and not altogether to be relied upon, as is shown by the fact that, knowing how little attention a Natal official was likely to pay to a message from either the Bishop or the King, he "told Mr. Fynn that it was Hulumeni (i.e. "the Governor" or "the Government") who had told him to go and get these witnesses" [*ibid.*]. He meant to ensure their being

sent, but his untruth did no good to the Zulus, and only gave Sir H. Bulwer apparent grounds for a renewed attack upon the Bishop, Makeu having acknowledged under pressure what he apparently believed, although mistakenly, that it was "Sobantu," and not "Hulumeni" who had sent him. Mr. Fynn refused to give the pass, and wrote to Sir Henry Bulwer:—

"My reply to Cetshwayo [was], I will take down any statement or message, and forward to his Excellency, but I cannot send or give a pass, or give leave to go to Natal to give evidence, without his Excellency's authority; he objects

"Cetshwayo replies, Sobantu is my friend or relation, it was he who kept* me when in trouble, and I cannot abstain from telling my relation my troubles, but Makeu has done wrong in concealing Sobantu; I am not asking for the witnesses to go to Sobantu, but to his Excellency to give evidence by word of mouth, and [I] wished them to have a pass for that purpose; [but] that Hozana is, by reason of the injuries then received, rendered unable to proceed to Pietermaritzburg to give evidence [3705, p. 60].†

The above request was made on April 24th, and on May 9th, Sir Henry Bulwer replied to it. He says [*ibid.*]:—

". . . . I referred, as I promised to do, the representations forwarded in your previous despatch of the 3rd of March ‡ to

* Mr. Fynn may have meant "helped" here, or he may have coined the word from "Kipa," to deliver out of, to take out, &c.

† It is said that Cetshwayo wept over Hozana, when he was brought back to him severely injured, on this occasion. The King felt that he had sent his faithful subject out to be thus ill-treated.

‡ 3616, p. 114, &c. (see p. 460 *supra*).

Mr. Shepstone. As I had anticipated, there was no truth whatsoever in the allegation made that Mr. Shepstone had struck some person, and there was no foundation either for the statement that he had made use of certain injurious expressions regarding Cetshwayo. . . . I am perfectly satisfied that Mr. Shepstone did no such thing as strike any one, nor tell any one with him to do so, and that, on the contrary, he interposed to stop the fight that was just beginning.

“Under these circumstances I cannot give permission to these people to come in for the purpose of repeating this distorted story, I cannot consent to countenance, or encourage a wilful attempt to advance an unfounded charge. It is apparent, also, from your despatch . . . that the proposal of Cetshwayo to send these men is due to a suggestion received from Natal,* and that his object in sending them in would not be to send them to me (except ostensibly), but really that they may go and supply evidence to others in order that a case may be made out against Mr. Shepstone.† No doubt, whether I give the permission or not, some one will be sent in because of the suggestion received by Cetshwayo, but I cannot myself give any encouragement to such a proceeding.”

In fact the Governor was “perfectly satisfied,” simply on the word of the accused person that he “did no such thing.” He, therefore, refused to examine into the case, to hear any evidence, or to

* This is in allusion to Makeu’s mistaken statement [3705, p. 59], that he had been sent by the Bishop to fetch the witnesses. But that statement was made on the 24th April, and Cetshwayo’s first reports to the Natal Government upon the subject are dated by Mr. Fynn, 26th and 27th February [3616, pp. 115 and 116], before the Bishop could possibly have known anything about it.

† How is this “apparent”? Cetshwayo had done his best to bring these complaints to the Governor’s notice nearly two months previously, and had received nothing but cold rebuffs in return. What means would Sir Henry Bulwer have approved of his taking in order to obtain a full and just inquiry into the facts?

allow Cetshwayo to communicate with him upon the matter.

Can it possibly be believed that the Home Government ever intended that the Zulu King should be thus debarred from free communication with the Natal Government, or that he should be forbidden to send down to Maritzburg the people whom he desired should carry both his and their own complaints?

How absurd in Cetshwayo's eyes were these decisions of a case on the word of the accused may be gathered from Mr. Fynn's despatch to Sir H. Bulwer of May 31st. He writes [3864, p. 9] that:—

“In explaining to Cetshwayo the subject contained in your Excellency's despatch of May 9th,* Cetshwayo went into a fit of apparently uncontrollable laughter. I, however, did my best to impress upon him with seriousness, that your Excellency found no truth whatsoever in the allegations made against Mr. J. Shepstone that he had struck any one, or made use of certain injurious expressions regarding Cetshwayo, or that he had caused his police to beat any of the people alleged to have been beaten by them. I explained to Cetshwayo thoroughly the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of your Excellency's despatch of May 9th, but he ridiculed the matter, and persisted in his arguments that all that had been said against Mr. Shepstone was true.”

OWING to the causes explained in the Introduction, the detailed history of the ruin of Zululand must break off here, leaving the facts briefly summarised in these last pages, as well as the latest and worst result of British mistakes in that country—the

* 3705, p. 60.

irruption of the Boers—to be fully worked out in a supplementary volume.

It has yet to be told how effectual proved the official plan for creating disturbance between Zibebu and the Sutus by fixing three different boundaries between them, and how the Sutu women and children, quietly occupying the homes which they had been officially told were to be their own, found themselves ordered off, and their crops seized by Zibebu's men, Zibebu having also been officially told that the land was his. Now, either under the impression, or else to give the impression, that a great many Zulus would be anxious to quit Cetshwayo's territory, great stress had been officially laid upon the necessity of all those who wished to remove, being allowed to do so without undue hurry, and especially on their being permitted to remain where they were until they had harvested their season's crops. This arrangement must, of course, be taken to have referred equally to the Sutus, of whom Sir Henry Bulwer, having sanctioned their return to their old homesteads, writes to Lord Kimberley, in October 1882—"Their kraals are still standing, and all they have to do will be to remove there, and commence their planting."* Zibebu, however, was well

* It is plain that Sir H. Bulwer intended that these lands should henceforth belong to the Sutus, and form part of Cetshwayo's kingdom, but he was so ill-informed by his subordinates who knew the country, as to be unaware at the time, that they fell on Zibebu's side of the boundary announced to him. Yet even so, Zibebu should have been obliged, equally with Cetshwayo, to respect the growing crops. But, as the *Times* of

aware that laws were for Cetshwayo, and licence for him, so he paid no attention to the former, but speedily sent his men to take possession of the Sutu crops, planted under the Governor's sanction. The few owners on the spot * naturally resisted this outrage, and a collision ensued, which was predicted by the *Times of Natal* for March 13th in the following words:—

“ . . . Zibebu is represented as taking action which may be attended with disturbance. He wishes to have his slice of territory free of subjects of doubtful loyalty, and has warned the Masipula tribe who live at the foot of the Lebombo range, and who are located just within Zibebu's ground to move, an order which has led the intruders to arm.” †

Meanwhile there were ample grounds for suspicion that mischief was brewing against Cetshwayo, and the *Natal Mercury* of March 17th, gave a report that “Hamu and Zibebu were going to unite to attack the King,” while the *Times* correspondent, on March 27th, said that “The people wait anxiously to hear what Mr. J. Shepstone will have to say to the

Natal, though always opposed to Cetshwayo, reports, on the authority of a correspondent at Isandhlwana, writing on April 9th, 1883, of the fight referred to *infra*: “It seems that Zibebu had cut down all Ndabuko's crops, and driven the people away out of his territory. . . . Since then the fight took place. . . .”

* Most of the principal men were still at Ulundi, paying their respects to the King.

† “Zibebu's ground,” according to the latest of the officially shifted boundaries. Masipula's tribe had been there at least as long as that of Mapita (Zibebu's father) i.e. since Dingane's days, so they could only be *officially* termed “intruders.”

proposed offensive and defensive alliance with Zibebu and Hamu."

The full account has yet to be given of how the Sutu headmen, who were gathered around the King at Ulundi, hearing of the ill-treatment of their families by Zibebu, hurried off to protect them, without military organisation or practised leader, and consequently, meeting Zibebu's trained and mounted bands suddenly, were routed and put to flight.*

The King, indeed, had forbidden the Sutu princes and chiefs to go, wishing to avoid all chance of giving offence to the British Government, and seeing that no good could follow any collision with the Government protégé, Zibebu, although much misery must result from British encouragement of that chief-

* Sir Henry Bulwer reports [3616, p. 136] that the Usutus numbered "from 4000 to 6000 men," or "some 80 companies," and Zibebu's party "between 1500 and 2000 men," or "20 companies of foot, and one of mounted men." He attributes the result to the fact (?) that "Zibebu's men were fighting in their own country, and in the cause of their homes, and for the life of their chieftain against an invading force," and the Sutus "in a bad cause." Precisely the contrary, however, was the actual state of the case, except so far that the Sutus themselves say that they were disheartened because they "were not sent by Cetshwayo" [3616, p. 159]. The Sutus do not appear even to have been drawn up in battle array when they met Zibebu's force, and the simple fact mentioned by Sir Henry Bulwer that "The loss sustained by Zibebu, so far as is known, appears to have been but slight, but that of the attacking Usutu force must have been considerable, even the mat-carriers being killed in the retreat," proves that this disaster resulted from no fair trial of strength.

tain's ambition. He bade the Sutus wait, with what patience they might, while he applied to the Natal Government through his resident, Mr. Fynn, as he had been required to do in such matters by the conditions of his restoration, which gave ample time for his enemies to attack and destroy him and his people piecemeal, while he sent to ask leave to defend them and himself, with the reasonable expectation of eventually receiving in reply admonitions on no account to raise an armed force, and assurances that, in the opinion of Government, no danger was to be apprehended from Zibebu. Under these circumstances it is no wonder that even the most dutiful amongst them disobeyed, and slipped away, as they did, without Cetshwayo's permission, or even knowledge. Yet in Natal, and officially, it was declared that, while pretending to restrain the Usutus, the King had privately encouraged them to attack Zibebu, and that the latter's country had been wantonly invaded by them. It is easy to understand how, after this first collision, upon the disputed border line, reprisals followed on either side, but the King and his adherents were too heavily handicapped for any hopes of their success. The promises extorted from their King, and which he kept with scrupulous fidelity from first to last, hung heavily upon the loyal Zulus, and hampered Cetshwayo in his every effort to restore order. His men immensely outnumbered those whom Zibebu could command, but that chief was encouraged and assisted by a parcel of European

vagabonds,* who drilled his troops, helped him to mount them, buying horses for him in Natal, and led them in their most sanguinary actions, while Cetshwayo was bound by his conditions to organise no impi, and to repress and discourage every attempt on the part of his people to hold their own like men. No better means could have been devised for lessening Cetshwayo's influence over his people than that of obliging him, on pain of England's displeasure, to require them to endure wrong and insult without raising a hand in defence of themselves, their families, their cattle, and their lands. Nevertheless they flocked together from all quarters, after the first alarm, to protect the King. Many left their homes and families in questionable security, others—from the Reserve—knew that they were risking displeasure and punishment from the British Resident there, while all had equally to find food and shelter for themselves, since Cetshwayo had no means to provide for them. "The King," said some of his men, "will not send out an impi. He says 'When they come in sight of Ulundi, I will then give you

* On June 24th, 1882, the Editor, *Times of Natal*, wrote that Zibebu had his "men drilled, and an organisation more or less perfected." It would seem that Zibebu was allowed to arm and prepare his men, under Sir H. Bulwer as High Commissioner, for ten months before the Restoration, whereas Cetshwayo was forbidden "to establish any military kraal or military system. Zibebu had also command of firearms and ammunition, having, as his supporter of the *Times of Natal* reported, "means to obtain firearms; and many of his followers already not only possess firearms, but know how to use them." This was an advantage not permitted to Cetshwayo.

leave to fight, since they are coming here to kill me.’” He had, however, no easy task to prevent their avenging their own and their sovereign’s wrongs, and their forced inaction under the circumstances disheartened them as much as it inspirited their enemies.

Before long, Zibebu threw aside all pretence of keeping within bounds, and openly announced his intention to attack and kill the King.* His threats were carried to Cetshwayo, who reported them to the Natal Government, which did nothing to help him, but merely advised him to remain quiet, and told him that he was in no danger, or that, if he was, it was his own fault. All his representations were treated as pretences, his assurances of his own quiescence as falsehoods. Truly did he himself complain that Zibebu was “befriended by the Government, and he was rejected, and his views or words of the circumstances were not listened to,” † for Sir Henry Bulwer did not scruple to assert that “the attack upon Zibebu seems to have been utterly unprovoked. . . .,” and that “There can be no doubt that it was devised and carried out with the

* The pre-arranged scheme of Zibebu and Hamu for the invasion of Cetshwayo’s territory and attack on Ulundi, was spoken of by Hamu’s white man in a letter to the *Times of Natal*, dated March 31st, and April 1st, and published in the issue of that paper for April 28th.

† Mr. Fynn’s (always inadequate) translation of Cetshwayo’s words [3705, p. 52].

knowledge of Cetshwayo, and, I fear we must conclude, with his sanction" [3705, p. 2].*

Within a few days of the date of this despatch Cetshwayo sent down a messenger to the Bishop of Natal, and the Zulu, after recapitulating the miseries which had followed upon Sir Garnet Wolseley's "settlement," spoke for the people as follows:—

"Yes! there is no mistake, O English! as to how you are treating us. We fought with you, and you overcame us: we know that you fought with the French also, and overcame them, but you did not give their Kingship to their dogs. Our Kingship—Cetshwayo's Kingship—you are giving to our dogs. What you are doing to us, O English! is amazing to us Zulus. Is there then another sovereign besides the Queen? Do you work with two different hands [the one cursing, while the other blesses]? With the Queen, Cetshwayo ate food prepared for him! here, through you, he eats water only. Make it known in all the lands, O English! how you are treating Cetshwayo this year. Cetshwayo's dogs are given his Kingship, and are making sport of it in the public road!

"It is now five years that your hands have been sprinkling Zulu blood, O English! Have you, then, indeed been working with two different hands? Does Unkulunkulu [the Almighty] approve of what you are doing in Zululand? Does the Queen approve of what you are doing to Cetshwayo? Does she know that you are killing him? Report this to the Queen! Do not steal him from her by stealth! Would you eat up from him his country, which the Queen herself gave back to him? . . . Yes! we Zulus honour and reverence the Queen; she is an exalted and mighty chief. But we reverence also Cetshwayo. . . . Where, O English, shall we find another such a King, if you kill this our King who is so good? Where shall we Zulus pay allegiance, since we thought

* This assertion is made on the most inadequate grounds. "Mr. Fynn's reports [read 'vague opinions'], the information given by Zibebu (!), and the inherent probabilities of the case," i. e. Sir H. Bulwer's own fixed idea of Cetshwayo's worthlessness, "unquestionably lead," he says, "to this conclusion."

that this our King was being brought back by you? This is a theft, it is stealing his people and his country, which the Queen gave him! How is such an act regarded among yourselves, O English! Is it approved? Let the Parliament of England answer! Is Cetshwayo to be killed? Let the council at the Cape reply! Is the Queen's word to be broken? Let the men of London reply, and the whole of the Queen's Kingdom!

“So say we, all of us, and we pray Sobantu to send on these our words.”

Zibebu, or, rather, the white men with him, lost no time in taking advantage of the absence of any real check upon Cetshwayo's foes, and made a sudden dash at Ulundi. The truth of the King's assertion, that he did not keep the men who came up for his defence in fighting array, was proved upon the spot. Zibebu's small, but well-armed and trained band, led by savage whites, fell upon the great crowd who, employed in building the new royal kraal, were not prepared for the attack, and slaughtered them without mercy. But few of the headmen survived, and the death-roll is heavy with the names of chiefs of the highest rank, and most unswerving loyalty, and sad with those of women and children.* Cetshwayo's own escape was due partly to the cupidity of the white leaders, who were too much occupied in securing the lion's share of all the king's English

* “The sun was just up, and large parties of the men were away, some having gone to their wood-cutting, some to the river to wash, others to fetch water, some were escorting home the parties of girls who had come bringing food to the royal kraal, while those who remained were not kept in any particular order; while the kraal was full of women too who were preparing the thatch for the huts [besides the King's family].”—*Zulu account given at Bishopstowe.*

presents and valuables to follow the chase beyond the kraal,* and partly to the awe with which the Zulus universally regarded their hereditary sovereign, so that even when led against him, none of them would dare knowingly to strike the King. He received, however, two assegai wounds in the confusion, and remained in hiding for some time before he was able to travel.

The full account of this atrocity, with the pathetic story of Cetshwayo's noble demeanour on that melancholy day, must be reserved for another volume, and the present sketch passes on to the next period of Zulu misery, Cetshwayo's sojourn in the Inkandhla fastness,† where he abode until he was beguiled by

* "Before setting fire to the royal kraal, all the King's boxes, labelled 'King Cetshwayo, &c.,' were brought out and smashed open with large stones, then rifled, the white men sharing, a gentleman [?] who is said to be a special correspondent getting the lion's share, according to his own statement. Nothing of the smallest value was burnt, unless, indeed, it was the poor dogs."—*Corr.: Natal Witness*, Aug. 29, 1883.

Later on, when Zibebu met with reverses, a considerable fuss was made in Natal about these white men, and urgent appeals to Government to take measures for their protection. But England can hardly be expected to protect men who are, or who call themselves her sons in the commission of crimes (such as the sack of Ulundi) in a foreign country, and surely if these men were British subjects they should be called to account for this detestable action, and made to render up the Queen's, the Prince of Wales's, and other gifts to Cetshwayo, of which they robbed him at this time. Lord and Lady Churchill's cup was openly exhibited in a Durban shop soon after, and the other valuables fell for the most part into the hands of the same men.

† "The Inkandhla is a range of steep and mostly forest-clad hills, 50 or 60 miles long, extending from the Qudene mountain

his still unshattered faith in his friends the English to put himself under the "protection" of the Resident in the Reserve, Mr. Osborn, when he again became a prisoner.

The end was now close at hand, but those last few months of his life must have been the bitterest he had yet endured since he was hunted down in 1879. No justice, or even mercy, was shown the Zulu King—his deep sufferings, his noble fortitude and sincerity, his touching confidence that England, and England's Queen meant well by him and his people, in spite of all the injury inflicted on him and them in Her name—none of this had any power to move his oppressors' hearts. Cetshwayo stands out amidst all the chaos of South African blunders and wrongdoings, of cruelty, falsehood, and selfishness on the part of white and black, as grand a figure as any in modern history. His faith in our England wrought his downfall and his death, yet England's representatives here never seem to have entertained one just or gentle thought towards him in his misery; it did not chime in with their general policy that his merits should be admitted, and they continued to torture him to the last. The word is no exaggeration. He came to the Resident, or rather, as his intention was, to the British troops, for protection

to the Umhlatuze. We spent the night at a kraal, the owner of which keeps a spy on all advancing parties."—'With Cetshwayo in the Inkandhla,' by W. Y. Campbell.

N.B. The Inkandhla is within the "Reserve," i.e. in the country inhabited by some of Cetshwayo's most loyal subjects.

and sympathy, and he found himself at once deprived of the friends he wished to have beside him, his faithful followers dispersed,* the European secretary,† whom he had chosen, with the approval of the Bishop of Natal, driven away from him, and himself insulted, coerced, and restrained at every turn. But one last stroke finally broke his heart. He had good reason to feel unsafe where he was, kept under surveillance by Mr. Osborn, whom he could not look upon as favourable to him; rumours of fresh designs against his life on the part of Zibebu and Dunn had reached him, and he was altogether uncomfortable, friendless, and alone. At last a definite warning of an intended attack upon him was brought to him, and he determined that this should last no longer. He was not by rights a prisoner at all, but a King, who had trusted himself as a guest to the white authorities, and who wished to be with the British troops, encamped at no great distance from his quarters. He liked the English officers as a class. Many of them had treated him with courtesy and kindness during his long captivity at the Cape, and their whole tone had been different from that of the Natal officials. So Cetshwayo, with a party of attendants started off on foot and reached the British camp at about 10 P.M. on the 19th December.

* By Mr. Osborn, presumably under orders from head-quarters.

† Mr. Wm. Grant, who has of late, *but too late*, endeavoured to assist the Zulus, already, before his tardy arrival (delayed in the first instance through Sir H. Bulwer's refusal to recognise his mission) fallen into the jaws of their worst enemies, the Boers.

He left again next morning—it is said of his own free will, but the fact remains that he wished to stay with the military, and nothing but an intimation that, if he did not go of his own accord he would be made to go, can account for his speedy departure. Such a supposition is in keeping with the dignity of his character, and also, unhappily, with the evident determination on the part of the Natal officials to treat the Zulu King with whatever harshness lay within the bounds of possibility. For the honour of our soldiers' name we may be glad to know that the military authorities were guiltless of this affront, and that, so far as they had any conscious share in it at all, they were acting under strict commands from those who had never any pity for Cetshwayo. They might easily be ignorant of what was really said to and by the King, for they were necessarily at the mercy of interpreters, and most of them could only have taken their ideas of Cetshwayo's character and deserts from the Natal officials. However this may be, the disappointment on this occasion was the last stroke to Cetshwayo's overburdened spirit, and on the 8th February, 1884, he died, as nearly of a broken heart as is ever permitted to mortals here below. His best friend had gone before him to the better land where "the wicked cease from troubling, and the weary are at rest," and it is no small proof of the nobility of Cetshwayo's heart that soon after receiving notice of the death of the Bishop (on the 20th June, 1883)—although in debt and difficulty himself, hampered and beset on every side—he sent

a messenger to say that a memorial must be raised at his expense to his departed friend, "a stone to show their (the Zulu people's) love for him in return for his so great love for them." Since no one, he said, could owe more gratitude than he to the Bishop of Natal.

APPENDIX.

SIR BARTLE FRERE wrote of one of Cetshwayo's friends, who had been refused by his Excellency leave to visit the King in prison at Capetown, that he, Mr. John Mullins, was "a notorious gun-runner, who had been convicted in Natal, and suffered a term of imprisonment *with hard labour (sic)* for smuggling guns and selling them to Cetshwayo" (*vide supra*, p. 46). The following are facts concerning this case which do not admit of dispute. A consideration of them will show how far Mr. John Mullins' character was sacrificed to Sir Bartle Frere's anxiety to make a point against Cetshwayo and his well-wishers.

In 1878 a pamphlet ('The Zulu Agency') was published in Natal, descriptive of the circumstances attending Cetshwayo's attempt to avail himself of the services of two members of the (English) Bar as his agents in settling the dispute between the Boers and himself. In this pamphlet Mr. Mullins is described as one who "had lived as a trader at the King's kraal for five years, and was highly esteemed by the King." The author added "Mr. Mullins leads an honourable life, and supports his mother and her seven children by the profits of his trade, and has no Zulu wives. This, though a matter of surprise to the King, does not probably lessen his respect for the man."

These words were written with reference to the visit of Mr. F. Colenso to Ulundi in January 1878. He had then been hospitably entertained by Mr. Mullins who occupied a shanty near the Royal kraals, and who proved himself, through his local knowledge and experience, a useful assistant. Mr. Mullins having openly espoused Cetshwayo's cause, became the object of dislike and suspicion in many quarters,

and soon the means were found for interfering with his movements. Depositions were made in July 1878 by three natives, who had been in his employ, to the effect that in August 1873 he had bartered six guns to Cetshwayo, having brought them up in a wagon from Natal. As such an act constituted an infringement of a Colonial Statute, Mr. Mullins was brought up before a magistrate and committed for trial. He was treated with extraordinary severity, bail being refused in the first instance, but afterwards at the expiration of seventeen days' imprisonment, accepted in the amount of *two thousand pounds*. Mr. Mullins was convicted of having smuggled the six guns as alleged, and was sentenced to undergo six months' imprisonment but *without* hard labour, and to pay a fine of 100*l.* The Judge in passing sentence dwelt upon the heinousness of the prisoner's offence in supplying savages with firearms. But the penalty inflicted was regarded as a shamefully severe one in view of the facts:—

(1) That J. Dunn had had the Zulu gun trade entirely in his hands and had imported thousands of firearms into Zululand.

(2) That this, if proved, was a first offence, Mr. Mullins having pursued a legitimate calling ever since.

(3) That in September 1873, the month following the date of the alleged barter of the six guns, several breech-loaders were presented to the Zulu King *by leave of Sir T. Shepstone*.

There is no doubt that Mr. Mullins' incarceration during the six months which saw the inception of the invasion deprived the Zulu King of the services of a most useful emissary, who might have done much towards the exposure of the machinations which ultimately destroyed him. And whether Mr. Mullins was or was not, at the outset of his career as trader, guilty of the indiscretion laid to his charge, it is quite certain that the character which he bore in 1878 is correctly exhibited, not by Sir B. Frere's sweeping condemnation, but by the words quoted above from 'The Zulu Agency.'

I N D E X.



- ABORIGINES' Protection Society appeals to Colonial Office touching suppression of evidence of Zulu loyalty, 425.
- Amadhlozi (ancestral spirits), Zulu belief in, 344.
- Appointed chiefs, their respective ranks in the country, 141 *in notis*; their position on the eve of restoration, official reports as to their views, 220-4, 248-51.
- Bishop Colenso, his prayer for the Zulus, 47; offers to bury the dead on field of Isandhlwana, 48; accused of sending messages to Zululand, 101; his hospitality to Zulus: delicacy of Ndabuko respecting, 113 *in notis*; Sir H. Bulwer's attitude towards him, 163; the object of official animosity and Zulu affection, 172; letter from, as to Matshana inquiry, 175 *in notis*; further accusations against, 176; letter from, as to Cetshwayo's message to his people, 181; one of his supposed "emissaries" caught "red-handed," 188; accusations against, by Mr. J. Shepstone, 285-7, 298, 299 *in notis*; coarse abuse of, in Natal press, 416-18; his answer to, 419; references to, in action against *Natal Witness*, 480; Cetshwayo claims right of raising memorial to, 504.
- Blood River Meeting between Sir T. Shepstone and Zulus in 1877, regarded in Zululand as beginning of country's sorrows, 394 *in notis*.
- Boers, concessions to by England at expense of Zulus, 15-16; irruption of into Zululand, 491-2.
- Boundary between Cetshwayo and Zibebu readjusted to please latter, 381; but alteration not announced to Zulus at installation, 383, 396 *in notis*; hence collision between Zibebu and Sutus, 492.
- Bullets, Zulus coming to welcome Cetshwayo threatened with, 299.
- Bulwer, Sir H., his enmity towards Cetshwayo founded on an unauthentic message, 1; acquiesces in sacrifice of Zulu territory to Boers, 16; speech of, to Natal Legislative Council concerning Great Deputation, 100 *in notis*; remonstrates with loyal Zulus for taking up arms against Zibebu and Hamu, 122; runs counter to his instructions in ignoring petition of Great Deputation, 134; relations between him and the Bishop, 163 *et seq.*, 176; postpones Cetshwayo's visit to England, 184; visits Zulu border, 196; interview between him and Mnyamana, Zulu accounts of, 200; plans the partition of Zululand, 209; scheme of reservation of Zulu territory suggested by, 215;

- dilatory proceedings of, 240 ; frames supplementary conditions, 241, 414 ; attitude of, respecting *Daily News* telegrams, 427 ; accuses Cetshwayo of breach of conditions in opposing his moral influence to pressure exercised by officials upon Zulus of Reserve, 441 ; abstains from investigation into charges preferred by Cetshwayo against Mr. J. Shepstone, 462, 490.
- Campbell, Mr. W. Y., testifies to general devotion of Zulus in reserved territory to Cetshwayo, 471 ; personal investigation by, of public feeling there, 472.
- Carter, Mr. (editor of *Times of Natal*), animus of against Cetshwayo, 309-10, 361 *in notis* ; his intemperate language, 416-18.
- Chelmsford, Lord, his responsibility for disaster at Isandhlwana, 5 *in notis* ; cannot permit the Bishop of Natal to bury the dead on the battle-field, 48.
- Cetshwayo, opposition to his visiting England, 1 ; the object of undeserved ill-will on the part of Sir H. Bulwer, Sir T. Shepstone, and the colonists, 1 *et seq.* ; protests and appeals against his return, 7, 18, 22, 24, 25-7, 30-4 ; allegations of danger to Natal from his restoration not followed by even a suggestion of defensive preparations, 9 ; the Transvaal Government solicits his restoration, 16 ; his Natal foes, 18 ; their disloyal language, 21 ; evidence contributed by Cetshwayo's enemies of desire of Zululand for his rule, 25 *in notis* ; starts for England, 38 ; public feeling respecting him at Capetown, 39 ; disgraceful condition of his prison, 40 ; his friends refused access to him ; his foes admitted, 44 ; his surroundings from colonial point of view, 54 ; good effect of news of his visit to England upon agitation in Zululand, 55 ; his attitude towards the press, 56 ; anecdotes respecting his voyage home, 57 ; remarks respecting in the *World*, 59 ; fruitless inquiries by, respecting his family, 61 *in notis* ; his arrival in England, 63 ; anxieties of his mission, 65 ; visits Marlborough House and the Queen, 66-7 ; sits for his portrait ; is called upon by temperance deputation, 69 ; at the Colonial Office, 73 ; conditions of restoration, 76 ; he pleads for his people, 80 ; his sense of his innocence and anxiety for his people's good, 81-2 ; his final interview with Minister at Downing Street, 83 ; deprecates mutilation of Zululand, 84 ; denounces J. Dunn, 85-7 ; his promise, 89 ; Mr. Whiteley and the Zulu King, 91 ; royal presents to, 93 ; his cattle, 94 ; persevering loyalty of Zulus to, 102 *et seq.* ; hopes of his restoration had salutary effect upon strife in Zululand, 125 ; sends message to his people, 178 ; disposition towards him of Zulu chiefs and people, 220-5 ; at mercy of combination of enemies, 242 ; the people kept in ignorance of his return, 247 ; his return to Cape and exposure to grave risk of small-pox, 259 ; his anxious waiting, 262 ; unwarrantable detention, 263 ; his acquiescence in plans as explained in Downing Street, 264 ; is dismayed at discovery of arbitrary partition of Zululand, 266-7 ; binds himself but cannot bind the nation, 268-9 ; forced to borrow 50*l.*, 273 ; feels his poverty, 274 ; *Cape Times* on the Conditions, 275 ; his misgivings at Capetown, 265,

- 276 ; writes to the Queen, 277 ; his language misinterpreted, 288 ; his landing and subsequent events, 289, 306 ; argues with Sir T. Shepstone as to impropriety of Zulus being deterred from welcoming him, 308 *in notis* ; superintends landing of his baggage, 311 ; is insulted in landing, 310-3 ; his admirable self-command, 314 ; messages to his people, 314 ; legitimate object of the same admitted by Mr. J. Shepstone, 287 ; is treated virtually as a prisoner by Sir T. Shepstone, 320 ; his journey through Zululand, 323 ; and first formal interview with Sir T. Shepstone, 325 ; his meeting with his wives and children, 339 ; official support accorded to his opponents, 350 ; his magnanimity testified to by Colonial press, 358 ; methods of Natal officials designed to lessen his influence, 368 ; deprived by second condition of power of exacting civil service from Zulus, 372 ; disabilities and restrictions of his position plainly expounded to the Zulus by officials, 378 ; British bounty to, 402 ; his helpless position compared with that of Zibebu, 403 *in notis* ; libelled by *Times of Natal* and *Natal Mercury* immediately after installation, 438 ; use of his influence denied by officials to, 441-3 ; forwards report respecting alleged coercion in Reserve, 457 ; written appeal by, 460 ; debarred by Sir H. Bulwer from free communication with Government, 491 ; is struck with absurdity of the Governor's method of dealing with evidence, 491 ; prearranged scheme for attacking him confessed to in *Times of Natal*, 497 *in notis* ; mischief brews against him, 493-7 ; sudden and successful attack upon him by Zibebu and his "British subjects," 499 ; takes refuge in Inkandhla, 500 ; his English presents looted by Zibebu's whites, 500 *in notis* ; the last dregs, 501 ; friendless, 502 ; at rest, 503.
- Colenso, Mr. and Miss F. E., refused permission to visit Cetshwayo in captivity, 44 ; Mr. F. Colenso's visit to Cetshwayo at Ulundi, 51 *in notis*.
- Colenso, Dr. R. J., refused access to Cetshwayo at Capetown ; debate on this incident in Cape House of Assembly, 52-3.
- Colonial newspapers, unworthy sentiments in, 3 ; extracts from, as to restoration, 35 ; petty jealousy of, respecting King's treatment in England, 57 ; correspondents of, in Zululand, 289.
- Colonial Office, views of, as to reservation of territory, 444.
- Colonists of Natal, the spite shown by some of them against Cetshwayo, 2 ; sentiments of, towards natives, 58 ; the expression "mere colonist," 313 *in notis*.
- Conditions of restoration, 411.
- Dabulamanzi, a Zulu general, is civilly treated by Mr. Grant at Durban, 3 *in notis* ; interviewed by reporter of *Natal Witness*, 117 ; becomes official scapegoat, 194 *in notis* ; his efforts to promulgate in the Reserve the views of Her Majesty's Government, 297 *in notis* ; 298 *in notis* ; 396 ; silenced at installation ceremony, 397 ; remarks hereon, 401.
- Daily News*, telegrams in, 98, 101 ; discredited in Parliament, 429.
- Derby, Lord, appeal to by Aborigines Protection Society, 425.
- Durnford, Colonel A. W., his treatment of conquered natives : a contrast, 3 *in notis* ; orders executed by at Isandhlwana, 5 *in notis*.

- Dunn, J., protests against Cetshwayo's return, 7, 24; relations between him and the King, 8; his treachery to Zululand, *ib.*; deserted Cetshwayo under compulsion, *ib.*; threatens active resistance to Cetshwayo's restoration, 24-5; his finances, 28; his attitude towards loyal Zulus, 103; summons meeting of chiefs, 104; majority of these afterwards petition Government for Cetshwayo, 108 *et seq.*; efforts made by him to repress Zulu loyalty, 106-7; arrival of his chiefs at Pietermaritzburg, 110; the centre of anti-Cetshwayo activity, 473.
- Diplomatic agents, Cetshwayo's attempt to employ services of, 50.
- Expenses of Resident with Cetshwayo, 246.
- Flogging of native servants in Natal and Transvaal, 58 *in notis*.
- Frere, Sir Bartle, denies Cetshwayo a visit from some of his best friends, 44; excuses for his conduct, 46.
- Fynn, Mr., resident with Cetshwayo, his imperfect translations and knowledge of English, 460, 497.
- Grant, Mr. W., death of his brother at Isandhlwana; recommended to Cetshwayo as interpreter and amanuensis by the Bishop of Natal; friendly interview between him and Dabulamanzi, 3 *in notis*; his testimony to loyalty of Zulus in Reserve to Cetshwayo, 439.
- Great Deputation, peaceable return of, to Zululand, 97; inaccurate telegrams respecting, 98; is made light of by Government, 101; proceedings in Zululand consequent on its return, 105; its heads endeavour in vain to reach the ears of Colonial Office, 129.
- Hamu, defeat of, 124.
- Interpretation, illustrations of imperfect or mischievous, 390, 459-60.
- Isandhlwana, battle of, quarter offered to survivors of, by Zulus, 4; burial of the dead on field of, offered by Bishop Colenso, 48 *in notis*.
- Kambula, battle of, 4.
- Kimberley, Lord, rightly interprets action of Zulus, 186.
- Langalibalele, 167-8.
- Loyal chiefs, arrival of, at Sir T. Shepstone's camp, 360.
- Maduna (Ndabuko) Cetshwayo's brother, his influence in checking reprisals, 125; his representations as to cause of country's troubles, 149; the victim of official reports, 149; restrains loyal Zulus from retaliating upon Zibebu, 150; his character and purposes, 206; speech of, at installation, 398.
- Matshana inquiry, the, 169, 174 *in notis*.
- Mfanawendhlela (an appointed chief) visits Sir T. Shepstone, 352; his courteous treatment at hands of his nephew (Cetshwayo), 356.
- Mgitshwa (an appointed chief), attitude of, at installation, 390-1.
- Mlandela, ditto, ditto.
- Military system, Zulu, explanations of, 370.
- Mnyamana (the ex-Prime Minister) is invited by Natal Government to facilitate murderous attacks of Zibebu and Hamu, 122; vindicates his defensive attitude, 122; his representations to Resident respecting cause of country's troubles, 140; restrains loyal Zulus from retaliating upon Zibebu, 151; is grossly libelled, 204; testimony to his real character, 205 *in notis*; opens speeches at installation, 392; concluding speech of, 400.
- Morcom, Mr., Advocate, comments

- on difficulty attending legal proceedings where Government and natives are involved, 487.
- Mpande (Cetshwayo's father), desecration of his grave after war, 355.
- Mullins, Mr. J., 46; a useful Zululand correspondent for *Daily News*, 309, 422, and see Appendix.
- Natal farmers approve of Cetshwayo's being restored, 24.
- Natal Mercantile Advertiser* reports meeting at Durban to oppose Cetshwayo, 119.
- Natal Mercury*, Cetshwayo's constant and bitter foe, 18, 19, 22, *in notis*.
- Natal Witness*, espouses cause of Zulus, 114; abstract of information elicited by, 115; comments upon alleged coercion in Reserve, 451; official telegrams respecting, 453; action for libel against, 474 *et seq.*
- Natal officials, policy of, 411.
- Native Affairs Office in Natal, its method with Zulu emissaries, 109 *et seq.*, 113 *in notis*; its control over native witnesses, 486-7.
- Ndabuko (see Maduna).
- Newspapers, correspondents of, 289; mischievous pens of, at work against the "restored" King, 437.
- Official clique in Natal, 475 *in notis*.
- Osborn, Mr., Resident, proceedings of his police, 105-6, 118; his remarks concerning raids of Zibebu and Hamu, 120; assists Maduna in discouraging hostilities, 125; is interviewed by head of Great Deputation, 125; his report concerning them, 126; obtains dispersion of *impis*, 139; animus of, against the Princes, 161; report of, on condition of Zululand, 192; statement of, as to disposition of appointed chiefs towards Cetshwayo, 219 *in notis*;
- his fatal plan for partition of Zululand, 228; forwards groundless rumour as to designs upon reinstallation party, 335; authorises variation in boundary between Cetshwayo and Zibebu, 385; his responsibility for Zibebu's consequent aggression on Cetshwayo's people, 492.
- Petitions against the Restoration, analysis of, 30-4.
- Pietermaritzburg, protest from, 26.
- Population, interchange of, between Zululand and Natal, 212.
- Princes, the Zulu, are supported in their destitute condition by the Zulu people, 130 *in notis*; are unjustly discredited in Sir H. Bulwer's despatches, 135; bribes held out to, 197; their loyalty proved, 198; unreasonable project for location of, 202; means of self-protection denied them, 207; large portions of their territory given to Zibebu, 336-7.
- Qulusi, Aba, reprisals by, 159; the massacre of, 160.
- Refugees, Zulu, their numbers, 212; indenturing of, in Natal, 214.
- Reserved Territory, scheme of, emanating from Sir H. Bulwer, 215; basis of, adopted by Home Government a just one, 216, 234; delimitation of, not warranted by facts, 218; arbitrary severing of, 226; diagram showing Sir H. Bulwer's first suggestion for partition, 227; an extensive Reserve contrived by Natal officials instead of the *enduwana* (= little place) which was the subject of Downing Street assurances, 230; diagram showing Sir H. Bulwer's actual proposition respecting, 233; diagram showing boundaries finally fixed, 238; complexion

- put by Colonial officials on reservation, 278; inhabitants of, not amenable to their projects, 280-3; but give unmistakable proof of loyalty to Cetshwayo, 471; professions of Home Government with respect to, brought to knowledge of Zulus, 284-5; attempts to act on these resented by Natal officials, 286-7; Cetshwayo's language touching, 318; formal protests respecting, by Zulu chiefs, 432; vices of settlement patent, 435; chiefs of, summoned before Commissioner, 440; deputation from, 445; allegations of coercion employed in, by officials, 448, 465, 472 *in notis*; such coercion not contemplated by Colonial Office, 455; formal report of same, 459; chiefs of, at Government House, 463.
- Restoration of Cetshwayo, comment of Natal papers on proposed, 35; contrivances of local officials employed to defeat objects of, 236; plans of Home Government in respect of, at mercy of absolutely hostile agents, 244; prohibition of arms at ceremony of, 326, 345; arrangements for ceremony of, 362; situation of affairs at, from Zulu point of view, 363; unforeseen effect of condition No. 2 of, 370; conditions of, 411.
- Robinson, Mr. J. (editor of *Natal Mercury* and correspondent for *London Times*), 7; proposes protest against Cetshwayo's restoration, 19; his influence in Natal, 22 *in notis*; specimen of misleading telegram from, 302.
- Royal cattle, misappropriation of, 270.
- Royal women, their meeting with Cetshwayo, 339.
- Sanderson, John, his noble career as journalist, 114 *in notis*.
- Shepstone, Mr. A., his father's secretary, 401 *in notis*.
- Shepstone, Mr. George, one of the heroes of Isandhlwana, 3 *in notis*.
- Shepstone, Mr. W., and Dabulamanzi, *ib.*
- Shepstone, Mr. J. W., report by, 174; appointed Resident Commissioner in Reserve, 253; fraternises with J. Dunn, 299; his administration of Reserve commented upon in *Natal Witness*, 451; explains his grounds for fining chiefs of Reserve, 455 *in notis*; sues *Natal Witness* for libel, 474.
- Shepstone, Sir T., his enmity to Cetshwayo originating with the latter's refusal to give up Zulu territory to the Transvaal, 2; his plan for location of Natal natives in Zululand, 210; fatal appointment of, to re-establish Cetshwayo, 243, 252; evidence of his hostility to the King, 243 *in notis*; meets Cetshwayo on landing, 310; his treatment of King not in accordance with instructions, 320-1; first formal interview of, with Cetshwayo, 325; his reports, 329 *et seq.*; interview of, with Cetshwayo's wives, 340; misleading report by, 342; opening speech of, at reinstallation ceremony, 376; his summary of subjects treated of by chiefs, 385; publicly charged with being cause of country's evils, 395; his views upon the policy of restoration, 402.
- Siunguza (an appointed chief), his attitude at restoration ceremony, 390-1.
- Statham, Mr. F. R. (editor of *Natal Witness* and correspondent of *Daily News*), 115; his antecedents, 419, 475; reports censorship of telegrams, 423; defends himself from charge of sending false news, 431.

- Sprigg, Mr. (Colonial Secretary at Capetown), denies Cetshwayo visits from his friends, 53.
- Sutu, origin of term, 384.
- Times*, London, misleading telegrams in, 99, 302.
- Transvaal solicits Cetshwayo's restoration, 16-17; testimony by, to Cetshwayo's fitness for post of ruler in Zululand, *ib.*
- Tshingwayo (an appointed chief) visits Sir T. Shepstone, 351.
- Ulundi, battle of, 4; massacre of, 499.
- Witchcraft, Cetshwayo's views as to, 412 *in notis*.
- Wolseley, Sir G., supports J. Dunn's protest, 8; light regard paid by him to Boundary Award, while attaching importance to his own "guarantee," 10; evidence of his carelessness, 11-15; his conduct towards Cetshwayo at Capetown, 60 *in notis*; countenances attitude of discredited officials, 170.
- World, The*, sentiments in, respecting treatment of Cetshwayo in England, 59.
- Yates, Mr. Edmund, and Cetshwayo, 62.
- Zibebu, encouraged by attitude of Government towards Great Deputation, joins Hamu in attacking loyal kraals, 119; with help of whites does serious mischief, 125; persecutes his subjects, 144; the *protégé* of Natal officials, 151, 229, 350; his own account of his oppressive proceedings, 156; the same contradicted by palpable facts, 185; marries girls of Royal House by force, 180 *in notis*; punishes his people for joining in petition for Cetshwayo, 221 *in notis*; arrangement of his boundaries, 254; alteration to suit him, 258; disposed at first to acknowledge Cetshwayo, but influenced against him by Natal Government, 327; rumour as to his evil intentions, 328; visits Sir T. Shepstone, 327, 347; official support accorded to him, 350; a threefold boundary assigned him, 379, 436; his consequent aggression on Cetshwayo's people, 492-3; his well-trained forces, assisted by "British subjects," successful, 496.
- Zulus, quarter given by, at Isandhlwana, 4; ignorance and fears of, on eve of restoration, 293, 424 *in notis*; made acquainted with policy of Home Government, are anxious to show their loyalty to Cetshwayo, 294; but have to deal with Colonial officials, whose statements they distrust, 295; their ignorance of date of Cetshwayo's landing made use of by newspaper correspondents, 301; are driven from shore by threats of bullets, 299-303, 424; their warm welcome of Cetshwayo universally attested, 303, 439; return to allegiance by disaffected, 366; influence on, of official frowns, 367, 473; anxieties and misgivings of, 410; general loyalty of, 439, 471; without spokesman, 469; give strong proof of their loyalty in reserve, 471.

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